Introduction

‘Conflict’ or ‘blood’ diamonds that fuel African wars originate mostly in Central Africa. Rough diamonds valued at approximately US $370 million in 1999 and US $170 million in 2000 passed through rebel territory in this region. Angola’s rebel movement, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) controlled the export of approximately US $300 million in rough in 1999, which perhaps fell to US $100 million in 2000.¹ The main rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), though usually not actively mining diamonds themselves, tax and regulate artisan miners who sell to foreign dealers operating in Kisangani, Goma and Gbadolite.² The diamond trade in the eastern and northern Congo, of which much may completely bypass rebel taxation, is valued at approximately US $70 million per annum, or more.

Angola and the DRC established exporting monopolies in 2000 to reduce smuggling and increase official state revenue, although the DRC is renegotiating its contract with the exclusive license holders at present.³ The monopolies were promoted as a means to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate rough trade, especially in Angola. Some dispute this point, but both monopolies were meant to clarify and regulate the chaos reigning in local diamond markets in these countries. This essay will appraise the success of the monopolies by focusing on whether the regimes have increased state revenue, curbed smuggling, increased transparency and oversight, and reduced official outlets for conflict diamonds.

Moreover, the principal foreign power sources behind these two monopolies will be examined. Allegations of links between certain monopoly members and illicit activity will be assessed, with several cases highlighted to provide a more complete picture of the dynamics in the monopolies. Above all, this essay seeks to separate fact from fiction.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The monopoly’s success

An Israeli firm, International Diamond Industries (IDI), headed by Dan Gertler, was awarded an 18-month monopoly on diamond exports from the DRC in July 2000 through the company’s subsidiary IDI-Congo, to take effect 30 days after signature. The contract was repealed in April 2001, although the company continues its purchasing operations. At the time of signing, the DRC minister of Mines, Bishikwabo Chubaka, defended the diamond monopoly:

"This is the optimum way for the Congo diamond production to be marketed in a transparent manner that will inspire trust and confidence in the country’s certificate of origin, which will accompany each and every parcel to be exported by IDI."⁴

Nearly one year later, certificates of origin have yet to be instituted. Despite government officials defending the contract as a means to prevent the export of conflict diamonds and increase state revenue, the deal was in reality meant to provide cash for the war effort, as well as military assistance, presumably from the Israelis.⁵

IDI-Congo’s export contract coincided with the government’s suspension of all other export licenses, supposed to be valid until the end of 2000. Foreign dealers had to leave the DRC as their work permits were annulled. Artisan diggers and local traders were still allowed to operate but were required to sell to IDI-Congo.⁶ Increased fraud resulted as many of the local traders refused to sell to IDI-Congo. The monopoly was accused by its competitors of:

"cherrypicking the best Congolese diamonds and offering below-market prices for the rest, frustrating many producers who then smuggle their stones across the border for sale in the neighbouring Republic of Congo."⁷

According to figures produced by the Hoge Raad voor Diamant (HRD) in Antwerp, Belgium did not import any diamonds from the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) in August 2000, but once the IDI-Congo monopoly came into effect, imports from Congo-Brazzaville nearly doubled between September and November. When the monopoly began losing momentum, Antwerp imports from Congo-Brazzaville decreased in January 2001. The exact origin of these diamonds is unknown and they cannot all be attributed to the DRC — illicit Angolan diamonds have historically passed through Congo-Brazzaville, including those exported by UNITA rebels. The increased volume of rough passing through Congo-Brazzaville, however, partially suggests that IDI-Congo’s monopoly resulted in increased diamond-smuggling by DRC and foreign traders, with Antwerp importing US US $120 million rough from Congo-Brazzaville between September and January 2001. It may be assumed that IDI-Congo’s monopoly reduced state revenue as all other diamond exporters lost their operating licenses, with some possibly preferring the illicit trade and exporting DRC diamonds through Congo-Brazzaville instead. But was this IDI-Congo’s fault?

Congo-Brazzaville has long supplied rough diamonds to Belgium.⁸ Regulations for exporting diamonds are much more lax in Congo-Brazzaville, which has no domestic production. Export duties on rough diamonds are cheaper than in the DRC, allowing traders in Congo-Brazzaville to pay higher prices for rough. Congo-Brazzaville’s diamond exports to Antwerp increased dramatically after the monopoly took effect.⁹ Historically, attempts by DRC governments to control the national diamond trade have been counteracted by smuggling to Congo-Brazzaville. President Joseph Kabila’s aim to liberalise the DRC’s diamond sector should change this situation, but it remains to be seen if the state treasury will profit to the same degree after IDI-Congo’s departure.

The media reported on reduced prices offered for rough by IDI-Congo and the monopoly’s preference for gem over industrial quality diamonds.¹⁰ This accusation is debateable, since other sources noted that IDI-Congo paid a higher price per carat than the average exporters it replaced.¹¹ Average carat value alone, however, means little. The DRC’s Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA) produces large volumes of lower quality diamonds that reduce the average carat value. A spokesman for IDI contends that the company bought all the diamonds offered by MIBA — suggesting that IDI-Congo raised the average price per carat of all official diamond exports.¹² Conversely, one source close to MIBA notes that IDI-Congo did not purchase a MIBA tender in October 2000, which reportedly went to Super-Gem, and has only bought two out of four MIBA tenders since January 2001.¹³ If this is correct, the higher carat price paid by IDI-Congo would only display a higher proportion of gem quality stones. It also remains unclear whether IDI-Congo’s contract with the government encompassed all official diamonds, or excluded production from MIBA.

Average prices paid per carat and discrepancies over the commercialisation of MIBA’s production do not answer the question whether the monopoly maximised government revenue. Ironically, while smuggling through Congo-Brazzaville increased, so did government revenue. IDI-Congo has been favourably compared with the previous chaotic system of numerous exporters exporting rough diamonds from Kinshasa.¹⁴ IDI-Congo purchased US $72 million in rough diamonds from October 2000 to January 2001, compared with US $39 million by the 27 official exporters during the same period in 1999-2000. It would appear that IDI-Congo commercialised more diamonds than the exporters, while increased smuggling occurred through Congo-Brazzaville. This perhaps highlights the fact that many exporters did not declare all their purchases and smuggling syndicates, currently exporting from Congo-Brazzaville, previously operated illegally from Kinshasa. A source indicated that tax levied on IDI-Congo’s exports generated more revenue for the state than taxes paid under the old system.¹⁵

The recent United Nations report on the plundering of the DRC’s resources briefly mentions IDI-Congo:

"This deal turned out to be a nightmare for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a disaster for the local diamond trade as well as an embarrassment for the Republic of Congo, which is currently flirting with illicit diamonds. According to different sources, IDI paid only $3 million instead of $20 million and never supplied military equipment."¹⁶

This uncharacteristic attack seems curious. The report is vague about the diamond trade in the rebel-held portions of the DRC, raising suspicion about the panel’s research methodology. Furthermore, it is impossible to verify the UN’s unsupported allegations against IDI-Congo. Subjective wording such as ‘nightmare’ and ‘disaster’ could make detractors suspect that the monopoly’s competitors supplied the information cited by the UN.

Available documents provide for two conflicting conclusions about the amount paid by IDI-Congo to the DRC. The alleged exclusive contract of 7 September 2000 refers to an accord made on 31 July 2000 between the government and IDI-Congo in which IDI-Congo received exclusive rights in the diamond sector against the payment of US $20 million. No documentation could be obtained to establish whether IDI-Congo has fulfilled the financial obligations in the contract, although its spokesperson maintained that the money was paid to the DRC government.¹⁷ The contract appears to be a receipt from the DRC government, and the signatures of the minister of Finance and Kabila’s special representative for public and private investments suggest that it is more than an agreement of intent.

The document obtained from a DRC source referred to above, however, shows that the US $6.6 million in diamond receipts to the Congolese state for the first three months of the monopoly may have included payments for licenses. Since government receipts did not amount to more than US $20 million for the first three months, and if this US $6.6 million is inclusive of the license, then IDI-Congo did not pay the full US $20 million and, instead, paid a smaller sum of perhaps US $3 million as alleged by the UN. When questioned about this possible discrepancy, Chorev remarked that the US $6.6 million "is only the amount that was paid as tax and does not include the money paid for rights and for the exclusivity."¹⁸ The amount IDI-Congo was expected to pay, and whether those payments were made in full, remain unanswered since conflicting terms of payments for exclusivity are used, and no documentation of bank transfers has been furnished.

The question whether the DRC government has benefited, is answered by citing increased state revenue, regardless of whether IDI-Congo has paid its licence or not. The government seems to have benefited more from the IDI-Congo deal than from the previous system of competing exporters. The increased smuggling through Congo-Brazzaville may not represent a tangible loss to the Kinshasa government. Interpreting the Congo-Brazzaville statistics as a net loss to the Kinshasa government would have to be based on the assumption that these diamonds passed exclusively through official routes in the DRC under the previous system. Diamonds have historically been smuggled directly from Kinshasa to major trading or polishing centres. Estimates can be obtained by comparing the DRC’s export figures and Belgian import figures.¹⁹ Belgium is currently the only country to publish rough diamond import figures categorised by country. During the IDI-Congo monopoly, Belgium imported 3.4 million carats valued at US $117 million from the DRC between September and December 2000. This suggests that diamonds were smuggled from Kinshasa and legitimately imported in Antwerp, even if one MIBA tender went to an Antwerp-based company in October 2000, unless the IDI-Congo contract was legitimately circumvented by the DRC government. Though vice-minister Mbaka’s declaration that the DRC is "losing around 50 million dollars a month," is true, it cannot be linked conclusively to IDI-Congo’s activities.²⁰ It is likely that these smuggling routes existed under the old system. Indeed, Laurent Kabila’s restructuring of the diamond trade at the beginning of 1999, pushed the legitimate diamond trade into established illicit circuits with profits declining through mid-2000.

The issue of conflict diamonds has seemingly not been addressed. One rumour circulating in Kinshasa and Antwerp alleges that IDI-Congo bought UNITA diamonds.²¹ This could not be verified and was denied by IDI-Congo. Nor is there any evidence of IDI-Congo buying rough diamonds from territory controlled by rebels in eastern Congo. IDI-Congo maintained that conflict diamonds in the DRC "are easy to identify because of their unique origin (Kisangani) and colour. We put great efforts to prevent any marketing of such diamonds."²² The movement of conflict diamonds through diggers and middlemen is a likely occurrence. The volume of trade in conflict diamonds is not known, but the political and military complexities of the war in the DRC make the official market one of many expected outlets, especially as UNITA’s diamonds in northern Angola are similar to those found in the south-western DRC. The trade in conflict diamonds follows the same routes as that in illicit diamonds, many of which are commercialised and legitimised by middlemen in remote locations closer to the mines. Even if conflict diamonds were mistakenly commercialised, this would have been due to the impossibility of certifying the origin of rough sold by middlemen — a situation that existed before IDI-Congo which will not change in the near future. The DRC’s new certificate of origin deal, made with Antwerp’s HRD on 27 April 2001, is an entirely superficial system as conflict diamonds enter official routes at the same points as non-conflict artisan diamonds, long before tamper-proof certificates with water marks and sequential numbering are relevant.

Other concerns

Nkingi, one of the signatories of the contract, mentioned a possible venture with Israeli military specialists working in the DRC as part of the deal for the IDI-Congo contract. He alluded that the Israeli army would assist with training the police anti-smuggling unit and that this deal was one of the reasons why the company was chosen.²³ This was denied by IDI-Congo, the Israeli Defence Ministry and the DRC government, with Nkingi later jailed for unspecified reasons. Chorev, IDI-Congo’s spokesperson, noted that IDI-Congo was "not directly involved in any military operation."²⁴

Copies of alleged correspondence between Dan Gertler Diamonds (DGD) and the DRC government show that Gertler had attempted to enter the country since early 1998, before IDI-Congo had been formed.²⁵ One letter, dated 12 March 1998 in Kinshasa and addressed to the minister of Mines, Kibassa Maliba, noted that DGD is a capable diamond trading company. It refers to its activities in Russia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, and states that the company "owns and operates its own mining, transportation and security equipment, and trains its own personnel." It proposed a contract for the purchase US $2 billion in rough diamonds over a period of 24 months. A memorandum of intent, dated 12 March 1998, is allegedly part of the correspondence between Maliba and Gertler over the proposed contract.²⁶ The last paragraph of the memorandum mentions a company named the Russian Military Brotherhood (RMB), created by presidential decree on 23 June 1995 in Russia, and refers to contracts concluded between RMB and DGD on 25 February 1998.

Alleged correspondence exists between DGD, the RMB and the president of MIBA dated 22 March 1998.²⁷ Under the heading, the RMB expresses its satisfaction with negotiating the participation of its partner, DGD. The letter mentions that the RMB has considered the offer around the construction of a power plant in the area of MIBA’s activity, and that it is prepared to organise the necessary investments:

"We are interested in development of mutual cooperation in the field of creation of bank and joint venture on production of diamonds and gold … We represent interests of known firms according each of these questions and are ready to sign the Agreements on intentions with the indication of terms of execution of our propositions … Yours faithfully, Director of department ‘Development of cooperation With the countries of Africa’."

Another alleged letter from DGD, addressed to the president of MIBA, notes that the company wishes to conclude a contract for the purchase of US $3 billion dollars of rough diamonds over a period of five to ten years, and recognises the RMB as its partner in this contract.²⁸

The deal seems to have involved DGD in guaranteeing the purchase of diamonds from MIBA for ten years, with MIBA agreeing to pay for the construction of a power station and for the electric power provided from this station through diamond purchases. An intriguing aspect is the difference between the financial commitment to the government (US $2 billion) and to MIBA (US $3 billion). Furthermore, the East Power Corporation, in charge of the power station, is also mentioned in a chart of this association. These documents do not clarify the role of RMB: whether it was to work with the East Power Corporation, or replace it for a contract on the termination of the power plant’s construction, with the RMB acting as a broker of sorts. When asked about the alleged association between DGD and RMB, Chorev noted that the latter had offered to mediate a contract with MIBA in early 1998 and, after one meeting, there was no subsequent contact with RMB.²⁹ He also mentioned that, since IDI-Congo was not registered as a company at the time, it had nothing to do with RMB.³⁰

Little information is available on RMB. An internet address was obtained from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Washington DC. The site lists RMB’s activities as a military school and a programme for teenage abusers of alcohol and narcotics.³¹ RMB appears to be a non-governmental organisation, even though it was created by presidential decree. Another source notes that RMB comprises Russian generals who had initially opposed Yeltsin’s military reforms, but then pledged allegiance to the president in 1995, playing into the struggle between the Russian Defence Minister and the head of the State Duma Defence Committee.³²

Diamond industry sources in Belgium allege that there could be a business relationship between Gertler and Lev Leviev, one of the principals in Angola’s diamond monopoly, with further allegations that Leviev had helped Gertler to secure the DRC monopoly and that the Angolan government had lobbied Kinshasa to continue the IDI-Congo contract. These unsubstantiated rumours led to suggestions of a common link between Israeli and Russian interests, and were further fuelled by reports that a Russian named Bill Davidson works for IDI-Congo, reportedly as the company’s representative.³³ IDI-Congo indicated that he is a Russian, doing freelance work for many organisations.³⁴

Despite the tenuous associations outlined thus far, an Israeli journalist remarked that it is:

"difficult to believe that Gertler would become involved in an arms deal in the Congo after he lost a considerable amount of money in Sierra Leone, and his mother and grand-father would not have allowed it in any case."³⁵

In September 1999, it was noted in the media that Gertler was linked to Dov Katz and Yair Klein in a programme of diamond purchases in exchange for military training and arms deliveries in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1997.³⁶ Katz was the link between Gertler, providing financing, and Klein, providing the training. The operation failed due to convoluted military and political developments in Sierra Leone that led to the lengthy imprisonment of Klein in Freetown under suspicion of arming the rebels. Klein had reportedly been involved in training for the Medellin drug cartel in Colombia in the 1980s.³⁷ He was convicted in Israel of illegally exporting military equipment and has evaded a warrant for his arrest in the US for his activities in Colombia.³⁸ IDI-Congo currently has a buying operation in Sierra Leone.³⁹

Angola

The Angola Selling Corporation (Ascorp) monopoly was instituted in February 2000, replacing six official buying companies. Ascorp was also promoted as a means to bolster state revenue by reducing the chaos in the domestic market and to funnel rough through a legitimate and transparent outlet. Such oversight was also meant to prevent diamonds mined by Angola’s UNITA rebels from being exported through official channels in Luanda, as occurred under the previous system.⁴⁰ Ascorp comprises the Angolan state, represented by the Sociedade de Commercialização de Diamantes (Sodiam), Wellox of Israel and Tais of Belgium.⁴¹ Sodiam holds a 51% share while the foreign partners, Sylvain Goldberg of Omega Diamonds and Lev Leviev share the remaining 49%. Some sources indicate that this 49% is evenly split between Goldberg and Leviev, while others indicate that Leviev holds a larger percentage.⁴² There have been rumours that Angola tried unsuccessfully to push Leviev out of the monopoly. It would appear that Leviev is the main financier behind Ascorp, with Goldberg reportedly brought in because of his alleged association with Isabelle dos Santos (the president’s daughter) in the diamond buying company RDR.⁴³

Ascorp and Angola’s diamond industry

Angola’s diamond industry comprises formal, informal and illicit sectors. The formal market consists of all licensed mining companies. The informal, or ‘artisan’ market includes diamonds commercialised by licensed buyers, but mined by unlicensed diggers or garimpeiros. The illicit market comprises diamonds mined by garimpeiros and purchased by unlicensed buyers, as well as diamonds mined or sold by UNITA, and by garimpeiros under rebel control. The overlap between the informal and illicit sectors is considerable with the legitimacy of the buyer the only separation between the two.

Output by the different sectors in Angola’s diamond industry has been difficult to calculate due to the lack of available data. Statistics were obtained from the Angolan government (supplied by HRD) and Ascorp. The figures are often contradictory and, due to major flaws in the data previously provided by the government of Angola, statistics in the Ascorp financial report appear to be more reliable.

According to Ascorp, Angola’s formal production was 2.7 million carats, valued at US $367 million in 2000. This is a 17% increase in both value and volume over 1999. Government data, however, shows formal production increasing by 46% in volume, but declining 52% in value in 1999 — almost impossible.⁴⁴ This major discrepancy in the government’s figures and their clear divergence from Ascorp’s figures and other estimates of formal production, raise the suspicion that the data was deliberately falsified.⁴⁵ Ascorp is not involved in mining and the expansion of formal sector output is due mostly to increased production by Angola’s major mining companies. Ascorp’s monopoly actually created a certain degree of acrimony among several of the legitimate producers who wanted to pursue their own marketing arrangements. It is possible, though, that the Ascorp system introduced some transparency in output reports by mining companies.

Ascorp reported that production by Angola’s informal market reached 1.2 million carats, valued at US $371 million in 2000. Since Ascorp reformed purchasing methods in the informal market in early 2000, exports are shown to have risen by 41% in value and 13% in volume over 1999. Again, there are discrepancies between the Ascorp’s statistics and those supplied by the government in 2000. It appears that there are considerable discrepancies in estimates of the informal economy in both 1998 and 1999. Government figures attribute 217 000 carats and US $76 million more to the informal economy than the Ascorp data for 1998, and 240 000 carats and US $35 million more for 1999. Higher values of rough exports from the informal market, as cited by the government, raise doubt about Ascorp’s effectiveness in capturing this sector in 2000. If the figure for 2000, cited in the Ascorp financial report as 1.2 million carats valued at US $371 million, is compared with figures provided by the government for the informal market in 1999, cited as 1.3 million carats valued at US $298 million, Ascorp actually commercialised 93 000 fewer carats than the previous buying operations in 1999. This is a major discrepancy despite the fact that Ascorp was only instituted in February 2000.

Ascorp must be evaluated primarily on the performance of the informal sector, since it does not control formal production. The monopoly reportedly does not profit much from its rough purchasing operations due to high security costs.⁴⁶ It is difficult to understand why garimpeiros would sell to Ascorp, since the monopoly reportedly reduced prices for rough diamonds.⁴⁷ Comparisons of data showed that Ascorp did not increase the volume, but did increase the value of diamonds commercialised by the informal market since the start of the monopoly in February 2000. This makes it difficult to support the claim, reportedly made by vice-minister for Geology and Mines, Antonio Carlos Sumbula, that "Angola lost $2 million per day due to diamond smuggling before the creation of Ascorp, which was halved after the imposition of the Ascorp regime."⁴⁸ Massive formal sector output and marginal informal sector fluctuations do not lead to the conclusion that Ascorp reduced the volume of diamonds circumventing official Angolan government channels, unless fraud is suggested by licensed mining companies prior to Ascorp.

Ascorp cited its greatest achievement as the increase in state revenue from the formal and informal diamond sectors, from US $10 million in 1998 to US $66 million by 2000. However, it cannot be determined whether a well-regulated but liberalised system would have performed worse. This accomplishment makes Ascorp a resounding success in terms of its primary aim to increase "the income of diamond trade in Angola."⁴⁹ The state’s 51% share in Ascorp means that a portion of the monopoly’s profits will be funnelled through the government. Ascorp therefore appears to have improved the domestic diamond trade, by curbing the underreporting of export figures. Under this new system of accountability, the government can perhaps also disclose how this money was reinvested to the benefit of the country’s population or for national development.

Conflict diamonds

Conflicting data and the irregular disclosure of official statistics remain difficult to resolve. The difficulty in accounting for Angola’s legitimate diamond production is parallel to themes of resource extraction in war economies. Ascorp has increased state revenue, but has it reduced official outlets for conflict diamonds? Ascorp was initially heralded as a means to prevent rough diamonds mined by UNITA from entering the legitimate informal diamond market. The company’s financial report notes that, besides the primary goal of increasing state revenue, "Ascorp was also established in order to control the identity and authenticity of diamonds in Angola and to make sure that this industry will not sponsor illegal activity."⁵⁰

The introduction of a single marketing entity and reduced competition between buying houses were supposed to be followed by the licensing of several hundred thousand garimpeiros and middlemen in the diamond fields. This was to prevent UNITA diamonds from entering the informal trade at any point, thus guaranteeing that Angola’s certificate of origin included no conflict diamonds. While middlemen were licensed in many cases, the garimpeiros have reportedly remained mostly unlicensed. The unruly diamond economy has so far resisted moves by Ascorp to impose order and regularity on informal and illicit financial networks. If allegations of Ascorp paying lower prices for diamonds were true then this would ironically be the most effective means of preventing the domestic commercialisation of UNITA’s production.

The volume of diamonds mined by UNITA has declined drastically since government military offensives in 1998. UNITA’s diamond production was approximately US $600 million in 1997, falling to US $250 million in 1998, but then rising to US $300 million in 1999.⁵¹ The rebels have since suffered major military defeats, and have produced perhaps US $100 million in 2000, a figure that has probably not changed much. The Angolan minister of Mines, however, reported in December 2000 that:

"UNITA does not control any diamond zone today … We are now concerned with [halting] the illegal trafficking of diamonds and not with UNITA’s blood diamonds."⁵²

However, possible UNITA mining activity in Cuando-Cubango, Moxico, Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte, Malange and Uíge provinces may have been overlooked. UNITA has obviously been pushed out of many diamond areas that were under its control in 1999, and has been replaced by unaligned garimpeiros. Ascorp has thus been forced to deal with the increased smuggling of non-conflict diamonds. Unfortunately, UNITA mines and exports diamonds in sufficient numbers to taint Angola’s informal diamond sector, even if it only sells a limited volume domestically. The oft-repeated notion that no system is infallible raises the question of what an acceptable percentage of contamination by UNITA diamonds would be. While the Angolan government professes the legitimacy of its diamonds, it has not divulged known UNITA positions in the diamond fields. By dismissing the fact that UNITA controls producing territory, the statement above may suggest that Ascorp seeks to legitimise the substantial informal diamond sector and bring the profits through official circuits in Luanda, no matter what the exact origin of the rough. It has been noted that Ascorp "has reduced the black market for diamonds by channelling all sales through the new company."⁵³ If Ascorp refuses certain stones or deters intermediaries dealing with UNITA, these diamonds would be sold across Angola’s borders. The result is that Angola’s certificate of origin is a public relations tool that may not correspond to realities in Angola’s diamond fields.

The UN report of 11 April 2001, noted that:

"[Ascorp] buyers are able to identify the origin of the diamonds they buy … parcels of diamonds worth more than $100,000 are unusual; smaller parcels are more typical, with about five clients bringing in diamonds worth $400,000 a week (typical UNITA diamond trades involve larger parcels, worth $1 million and upwards)."⁵⁴

It is unlikely that Ascorp buyers could positively identify UNITA diamonds mined in close proximity to those of government-friendly garimpeiros. It would also seem strange to base the presence of UNITA diamonds on parcel sizes, since the rebels could easily export smaller packages of diamonds through more intermediaries. Perhaps the most practical solution would be for UN employees to be stationed at all Ascorp buying offices to examine purchasing methods and observe measures used by Ascorp agents to verify that diamonds are not of UNITA origin.

However, it appears that the Ministry of Mines and several Ascorp managers intend to reduce the laundering of UNITA diamonds through official circuits, if only to prevent criticism from potential competitors. It is also easier to criticise and condemn Ascorp rather than to solve the problem of conflict diamonds entering Angola’s legitimate ‘artisan’ production. Angola’s informal diamond economy represents one of the country’s only forms of revenue for impoverished garimpeiros, civilian patrons and military strongmen. The perceived chaos in the diamond fields actually revolves around competing and interconnected parties ruled by self-interest that thrive outside of state control and which are anathema to Ascorp’s planned licensing regime. There may also be some formidable powers in Luanda who profit from favourable commercial incongruities in the diamond fields. Comprehensive plans for licensing garimpeiros may never be practical in Angola’s diamond fields due to the inherent difficulty of extending state control over ungovernable terrain. Ascorp’s proposal to license miners using photographic barcoded identification linked to a computerised database would be difficult even in a wealthy peaceful European country with well-defined borders. The campaign against conflict diamonds, however, has necessitated impoverished producing countries such as Angola to counteract with formidable public relations efforts, promoting concepts that may not be practical.

Such cynicism may be unwarranted after a recent investigation of Ascorp by Global Witness. Global Witness noted that Ascorp genuinely plans to reduce the autonomy of middlemen and buy directly from garimpeiros, enabling regional profiling of production and purchasing.⁵⁵ Though this overhaul of the informal diamond economy is in Ascorp’s financial interest, it could also improve transparency about conflict diamonds. Garimpeiros and middlemen will not participate in the new system without sufficient incentives, however, which may compel Ascorp to rely on the efficiency of its own security force.

Ascorp may be the best possible system for Angola despite its flaws, given the greater degree of transparency and firmer measures to counter smuggling through major transportation hubs. Higher government revenue has been recorded and the monopoly certainly seems to be more concerned with isolating UNITA diamonds. Ascorp’s release of statistics is an improvement over the previous system of competing buying houses that refused to divulge information. A further examination of Ascorp reveals more subjective undercurrents in Angola’s political economy that suggest the monopoly was not created solely to boost official revenue. Ascorp has been used by central political patrons to reduce the financial autonomy of military officers in the diamond fields. This would be a positive transformation of Angola’s diamond economy except that it remains questionable whether the political élite will seek to eliminate diamond-smuggling circuits or will themselves harness the profits from this illicit activity:

"Rather than revamping buying practices by licensed dealers, the monopoly seems to be aimed more at co-opting and incorporating financially rebellious generals, forcing them to obtain the necessary paperwork through partners in the Futungo" [presidential palace where the power resides].⁵⁶

It is therefore possible to see Ascorp in a different context, determined by competition between centripetal and centrifugal commercial forces between central authority and military strongmen in the diamond fields. It is within this framework of the patrimonial state that the laundering of conflict diamonds overlaps with attempts to control the informal market.

Other concerns

Ascorp’s ability to monopolise the export of Angolan diamonds is remarkable, considering the diamond industry giants which it replaced. Rumours of Ascorp’s imminent annulment in mid-2000 proved unfounded. Some of the foreign companies previously involved in the informal market have maintained representation in Luanda, but it seems unlikely that Ascorp will divulge any power to competitors. The monopoly has succeeded in commercialising Angola’s legitimate diamond production due to an efficient marketing strategy and the financial acumen of its foreign shareholders.

Ascorp’s financial credentials have never been questioned, but it has significant aptitude in areas unrelated to diamonds. Negotiations leading to Ascorp’s genesis remain confidential. Proof of a tender process is not available and the government has not revealed why partnerships was awarded to Leviev and Goldberg to the exclusion of other reputable foreign companies. Leviev’s status as one of the world’s largest diamond dealers, as well as Goldberg’s strong position in Antwerp and knowledge of Angola’s informal market, makes the duo appear to be highly capable, though perhaps no better equipped to market diamonds than other companies operating in Angola before. Rumours in the diamond industry suggest that Ascorp may owe its creation to previously established military services and hardware trade networks. There are no direct connections between Ascorp, or its principal investors, and the military industry, but circumstantial associations exist between some Ascorp personalities and African conflicts where natural resources influence politics and warfare.

Leviev, seemingly Ascorp’s principal external investor, runs a global commercial empire that includes the Leviev Group, Lev Leviev Diamonds and Africa-Israel. His influence appears to be centred in Israel, Russia and states of the former Soviet Union. The Leviev Group is one of the largest diamond companies in the world with a reported turnover of US $1.5 billion, and polishing factories in countries such as Russia and Armenia.⁵⁷ Leviev is the chairperson of Africa-Israel, an Israeli company purchased from the Bank of Leumi in 1996.⁵⁸ It provides numerous financial platforms including real estate, hotels, shopping malls and construction companies. Leviev also holds considerable power in Russia, partially through his influence in the Federation of Jewish Communities. He is reportedly protected by the highest Israeli authorities and has cultivated close relations with Russian oligarchs through his position as president of the Russian-Israeli chamber of commerce.⁵⁹

Leviev’s participation in Angola’s diamond sector started with investment in the Catoca kimberlite project, the largest producer of Angolan diamonds. Catoca was conceived in 1992 as a Russo-Angolan joint venture reportedly involving Angola’s debt to Russia for arms deliveries during the Cold War. Production from the mine only commenced after Leviev invested over US $25 million in 1997. The mine is managed by Almazzi Rossi Sahka (Alrosa), Russia’s largest diamond producer, but Leviev’s investment in the final stages of construction secured him the right to market Catoca’s output. He reportedly lost this right in 1999, but regained control through the imposition of the Ascorp monopoly, much to the consternation of the Alrosa management. Leviev’s initial involvement in Catoca appears to have paved the way for his participation in Ascorp, as well as in the Camafuca kimberlite pipe in Angola. It would appear, therefore, that the creation of Ascorp could have stemmed from Leviev’s prominent position in Angola’s formal diamond sector.

Another possible scenario for Leviev’s success in Angola involves personal networks rather than diamonds:

"One version has it that Leviev was helped by his friend and eventual partner in Africa-Israel, Arcady Gaydamak, who opened doors for him in Angola. Gaydamak, with his French partner Pierre Falcone, sold millions of dollars worth of eastern European arms to Angola and became cronies of President Eduardo dos Santos."⁶⁰

Gaydamak purchased 15% of Africa-Israel in January 2000, a deal explained by a company spokesperson:

"Levayev believes that the company can reach international achievements in energy, real estate, and investment assets following the partnership with Gaydamak."⁶¹

Gaydamak, a businessman with Russian and Israeli citizenship, worked as an economic advisor to President dos Santos and was reportedly involved with Pierre Falcone in the renegotiation of Angola’s debt to Russia in 1996 through the French bank Paribas and the Russian bank Menatap.⁶² Gaydamak "initiated a deal in which Angola would sell oil drilling franchises and, with the money earned, buy weapons from the Russian Defense Ministry."⁶³ Some alleged arms deals, however, were scrutinised by the French authorities and an international arrest warrant was reportedly issued in 2000. He "is wanted for questioning by Paris magistrates about a £450m allegedly illegal arms deal with Angola in the early 1990s."⁶⁴ The French intelligence service had apparently been investigating Falcone and Gaydamak for possible money-laundering through petrol and arms sales, as well as for Gaydamak’s possible association with Russian organised crime.⁶⁵

Gaydamak also reportedly has close ties with Danny Yatom, a former head of Mossad and security advisor to Ehud Barak.⁶⁶ Apparently, Yatom introduced Gaydamak to Leviev around the beginning of 1999.⁶⁷ Yatom established the Strategic Consulting Group (SCG) in July 1998 with Avi Dagan, the former head of Mossad’s collection department, and the company sought contracts in Kazakhstan and Algeria.⁶⁸ Yatom and Dagan visited Angola in 1999 with Gaydamak "to examine an option in engaging in a large security project." After Gaydamak introduced the two men to an Angolan government minister, "the terms of the deal were agreed upon."⁶⁹ Yatom reportedly left SCG when Barak’s government took office in July 1999 and the status of the Angolan project is unknown.⁷⁰

Retired Israeli General Ze’ev Zahrine was also reported to have been part of the Ascorp establishment until late 2000.⁷¹ It is not clear exactly why he departed from Angola. Zahrine was the manager of Levdan, an Israeli military service provider that reportedly had a contract for presidential security in Angola.⁷² Levdan completed a three-year contract to train the armed forces and presidential guard for Pascal Lissouba in Congo-Brazzaville in the mid-1990s, and the government "agreed to buy more than $10 million worth of Israeli weapons and military equipment."⁷³ Naptha, an oil company with a 5% equity partnership in Angola’s Block 33 concession, seems to have "benefited from Levdan’s services in Angola, as they did in Congo-Brazzaville" with Levdan playing a "vital role in Naptha’s acquisition of its Congo-Brazzaville oil contract."⁷⁴

Paul Motmans is a Belgian member of Ascorp’s security, working through a company named SAO.⁷⁵ It was reported that "Motmans is an ex-member of the Belgian national guard who started a number of security companies in the early nineties, together with Sylvain Goldberg." His associate in Angola is Willy van Mechelen, a former member of the Bijzondere Opsporingsbrigade (special investigations brigade) who was indicted in a narcotics smuggling case that was related to the famous Dutch IRT-affaire (a scandal resulting in a parliamentary inquiry into controversial techniques used by drug squads). Van Mechelen officially had to resign.

Rupert Bowen, a British national, also worked for Ascorp for an undetermined period in late 2000/2001 and has now left the company. Bowen was previously the first secretary for the British High Commission in Namibia, after which he represented Branch Energy in Sierra Leone from the middle to late 1990s. Branch Energy played a close, yet undetermined, role together with Sandline International, the British private military company, and Executive Outcomes, a South African ‘mercenary’ company involved in Angola and Sierra Leone. Bowen’s name appears in association with the rearming of the Kabbah regime by Sandline International to oust the military junta of Johnny Paul Koroma in 1999 despite a UN arms embargo on Sierra Leone.⁷⁶ Bowen was not implicated in the transaction, although he reportedly liased with the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, to inform him that arms had been delivered.⁷⁷ Rakesh Saxena was reportedly supposed to bankroll the Sandline operation in return for diamond and other concessions by the Kabbah government.⁷⁸ Saxena could not fulfil his role, however, because he was arrested in Canada on charges of possessing a forged Yugoslavian passport.⁷⁹ Saxena also faced a warrant for his arrest in Thailand over charges of fraud, having been instrumental in defrauding the Bangkok Bank of Commerce in 1996.⁸⁰ He later invested heavily in Global Explorations, a Toronto-based company seeking diamond concessions in Sierra Leone and Angola.

Another Ascorp peculiarity was the reported involvement of André Roque da Silva in a buying office in Malange late in 2000. He has since been removed from his post due to the activities of his brother, with which he does not appear to be associated. His brother, Manuel Roque da Silva, otherwise known as Manu, was mentioned in the UN Fowler report on sanctions-busting in connection with UNITA diamonds, although the UN was unable to determine his surname. Manu is now allegedly purchasing rough diamonds in Namibia with his contacts extending from Windhoek to Katima Mulilo.⁸¹

Conclusion

IDI-Congo and Ascorp have increased government revenue from the domestic diamond industries in the DRC and Angola. Ascorp generated over US $60 million for the Angolan government in 2000 compared to a total of only US $30 in 1998 and 1999. Although IDI-Congo’s financial benefit for Kinshasa is not as easy to discern, it appears to have generated more revenue for the DRC government than the previous exporters, despite various examples of increased diamond-smuggling through Congo-Brazzaville that can also be attributed to diamonds illegally exported from Angola.

The issue of conflict diamonds remains unresolved. Ascorp and IDI-Congo are at least concerned, but whether they have instituted effective measures to counter the problem cannot be determined. The difficulty with any certificate-of-origin regime starts with the trading circuits from artisanal mines to the first point of sale. Ascorp and IDI-Congo reportedly do not purchase directly from the alluvial diggings in remote locations. The responsibility to reject conflict diamonds therefore falls on middlemen who provide this link between foreign buying houses and artisan diggers. Foreign companies send representatives to central locations to purchase from middlemen, who buy from sources that cannot always be determined by the exporting company. Diamonds follow a pyramidal route from mines to trading centres in Belgium and Israel, for example, making it more cost-effective (in terms of licenses, salaries and security) for foreign representatives to buy alluvial goods in local catchments that are fed by peripheral mines. Conflict diamonds move quite easily within this system, especially in Angola where UNITA mines in close proximity to government garrisons with little control over the buying activities of middlemen. Similarly, the legitimate diamond market in the DRC merges with diamond-smuggling routes where middlemen deal with the government in Kinshasa, as well as Goma (headquarters of one rebel army) and Tshikapa where diamonds arrive from Angola.

There are no simple solutions to the problem of conflict diamonds. Embargoes on Angola and the DRC would be disastrous for these governments, as well as the informal diamond economy of the region that provides subsistence to hundreds of thousands of people. It would only redirect conflict diamonds to other outlets. Perhaps an interim measure would be for the governments of Angola and the DRC to produce regular verifiable statistics on the value and volume of carats purchased by licensed buyers, categorised by location of purchase, as well as data concerning artisan production categorised by region or zone where the diamonds are believed to have been produced. More reliable figures on formal production must also be released. Ascorp seems to have initiated this type of transparency in its annual report, a commendable move that should reduce incongruities that facilitate the laundering of conflict diamonds. Neither IDI-Congo nor the DRC government, however, have instituted similar measures.

An analysis of Ascorp and IDI-Congo in terms of increased revenue and nuances of the trade in conflict diamonds in Central Africa does not provide answers to alleged associations between monopoly members and activities unrelated to diamonds. Possible scenarios have been explored without finding conclusive evidence of misconduct. Circumstantial links, however, suggest that these monopolies may have brought together a diverse group of individuals who have prior experience in areas where natural resource extraction and conflict influence the national economy. Some Antwerp diamond dealers note that the strength of Ascorp and IDI-Congo is derived from the association of some of their members with activities related to the military industry, as well as a network of formidable personal connections in Israel and Russia. The monopolies contend, however, that they are legitimate businesses that have been slandered by their competitors. It would seem that IDI-Congo and Ascorp are indeed represented by reputable diamantaires, some of whom have or have had tenuous, yet inconclusive, links to individuals or companies involved in military services.

Gertler’s reported links to Klein do not prove that Gertler was involved in wrongdoing, nor does an alleged association with the RMB suggest that IDI-Congo’s monopoly had anything to do with the provision of foreign military advisors to the DRC government. Similarly, the fact that Gaydamak reportedly owns 15% of Africa-Israel does not necessarily associate Leviev or Ascorp with his past activities in Angola. On the other hand, these monopolies have been capable of outmanoeuvring substantial competitors for unknown reasons. Full transparency by the principals of foreign companies involved in the monopolies, as well as the DRC and Angolan governments, will be the only method to verify the truth of allegations and rumours.

The larger issue at stake in allegations and counterclaims is the destination of rough diamonds from Angola and the DRC. De Beers cancelled its buying operations in these two countries, citing its concern over conflict diamonds — a move that many diamantaires see as adroit competitive positioning. This has left diamond industry representatives from Belgium and Israel to compete for Central Africa’s diamonds.

William Reno notes that the symbiosis between external policy and commerce in smaller states such as Israel is particularly acute:

"smaller powers such as Israel are more constrained to use commercial agents to exercise influence … Tighter connections between commercial and security services make Israeli firms relatively attractive to Angolan officials in pursuit of their fighting strategy. Seen from Tel Aviv, military and commercial strategies toward places like Angola are especially hard to separate."⁸²

Belgian diamond dealers and industry representatives, on the other hand, tried to influence the annulment of the IDI-Congo monopoly in the DRC so that the Congo’s substantial exports are funnelled through Antwerp instead. Certain sources in the Belgian diamond industry, keen on the DRC’s production, have sought to discredit IDI-Congo’s contract on the grounds of increased fraud and smuggling activity, with others leaking information to discredit members of Ascorp.

Notes

This is an edited and shortened version of an article that appeared in the Minerals and Arms Research Bulletin 2, <www.users.skynet.be/ipis/etstudy.htm>.

See J Cilliers & C Dietrich (eds), Angola’s war economy: The role of oil and diamonds, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2000. These figures are disputed, but there is no clear estimate of informal diggers working under UNITA rule, nor is there any manpower to carat production ratio that can be applied to ensure validity. See also the report by the UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000.



Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Goma (RCD-Goma) and Front de libération du Congo (FLC).



See Congo liberalizes diamond exports, Jewelers Circular Keystone, 25 April 2001.



S Berger, Congo signs $700m agreement with IDI Diamonds, Jerusalem Post, 2 August 2000.



B Stanley, Diamond monopoly hands obscure Israeli firm the key to Congo’s economy, Associated Press, 18 March 2001, <ap.tbo.com>.



See Congo awards exclusive diamond marketing rights to Israeli trading group, Mazal U’Bracha Magazine, September 2000, <www.diamondsview.com/news_ 113_sep.htm>.



Stanley, op cit.



Antwerp HRD Statistics, 1997 Annual Report, Antwerp, 1998, p 32.



HRD statistics for February 2001, and HRD annual statistics for 2000.



Matières précieuses: Seulement six colis de diamant exportes en deux mois, Le Potentiel, 23 November 2000, <www.digitalcongo.net/actualite/00-11-24-diamant.shtml>.



N Abor, IDI Congo réalise 72 millions USD en 4 mois, The Newspaper, 24 January 2001, <www.digitalcongo. net/actualite/01-01-24-diamant.shtml>.



Lior Chorev, special strategic and communication consultant to IDI, email message, 24 May 2001.



Telephone interview, 26 May 2001. See also MIBA: IDI diamonds misses again on October auction, Africa Mining Intelligence, 15 November 2000, <www. africaintelligence.com>.



Abor, op cit.



Bilan I.D.I. Congo, document received from an unnamed Congolese source (15 May 2001).



Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12 April 2001, paragraph 151, <www.un.org/News/dh/ latest/drcongo.html>.



Chorev, email, 16 May 2001, op cit.



Chorev, email, 24 May 2001, op cit.



C Dietrich, Porous borders and diamonds, in Cilliers & Dietrich, op cit, p 324.



Belgium and Congo sign agreement to end conflict diamond trade, AP World News, 30 April 2001, <www. un.int/drcongo/disc14/00000025.htm>.



L Kalala, Le diamant empoisonne les relations entre Kinshasa et Luanda, Le Potentiel, 12 February 2001, <www.digitalcongo.net/actualite/01-02-12-diamant. shtml>.



Chorev, email, 25 May 2001.



DRC: Israeli company awarded diamond contract, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 5 September 2000, <www.reliefweb.int>; IDI and Congo: Partners in (anti-)crime, Mazal U’Bracha Magazine, September 2000, <www.diamondsview. com/news_143_sep.htm>.



DRC: Israeli company awarded diamond contract, ibid.



Documents provided by an unnamed banking source, March 2001.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Chorev, email, 24 May 2001, op cit.



Ibid.



See <windoms.sitek.net/~rmb/rmb/RMB.htm>.



Two enemies meet: Talks between Grachev and Yushenkov, Rossiiskiye Vesti, 6 April 1995, <www.lib. unc.edu/ejournal/anm/anm-pw/V2N13.PW>. The date of this publication is earlier than the date on which RMB was created by presidential decree.



Kinshasa, DR Congo: Kabila’s government works to boost Congo economy, Sapa-AP, 2 February 2001, <www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/2001/news0202.txt>.



Chorev, email, 24 May 2001, op cit.



R Ben-Yishai, Yediot Aharonot, Israel, telephone interview, May 2001.



R Ben-Yishai & M Camprier-Kritz, The murder request went to the wrong address, Yediot Aharonot, 19 September 1999.



A Bechar, Kidnapped, Ha’aretz, 14 May 1999.



Ben-Yishai & Camprier-Kritz, op cit.



Israel diamantaires obtain export licenses from Sierra Leone, TACY, 10 November 2000, <www. diamondconsult.com/TACY-Articles/nov110029html>.



C Dietrich, Power struggles in the diamond fields, in Cilliers & Dietrich, op cit.



Angolan Embassy to the US, Diamond production increases by fifty percent, O Pensador Newsletter, 24 January 2001, <www.angola.org>.



Angola: Focus on diamond industry shakeup, IRIN, 22 September 2000, <www.reliefweb.int>.



Dietrich, Power struggles in the diamond fields, op cit.



C Dietrich, Inventory of formal diamond mining in Angola, in Cilliers & Dietrich, op cit, p 154.



Ibid, pp 153-154.



According to sources close to Ascorp, confidential interviews.



Angola: Focus on diamond industry shakeup, IRIN, 22 September 2000, <www.reliefweb.int>.



Angolan Embassy to the US, op cit.



Summary, Ascorp Financial Report, p 4.



Ibid.



C Dietrich, Unita’s diamond mining and exporting capacity, in Cilliers & Dietrich, op cit, p 284.



Angola denies ‘blood diamond’ sales, Mail & Guardian, 28 December 2000, <www.mg.co.za/mg/za/ archive/2000dec/28dec-busness.html>.



Angolan Embassy to the US, op cit..



Addendum to the Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA, S/2001/363, 18 April 2001, paragraph 71.



A Yearsley, Global Witness, 19 June 2001.



C Dietrich, Power struggles in the diamond fields, in Cilliers & Dietrich, op cit, p 189.



See V Hugeux & V Nouzille, Diamants couleur sang, L’Express, 7 December 2000, <www.lexpress.presse.fr>; Namco raises US$9.4 million of financing and secures a strategic investment of US$15 million, PR Newswire, 26 March 2001.



Y Melman, Angola has a new emperor, Ha’aretz Daily Newspaper, 30 March 2001, <www3.haaretz.co.il>; and Hugeux & Nouzille, ibid.



Hugeux & Nouzille, ibid.



Melman, op cit.



G Leshem, ‘I only wanted to work with powerful Jews’ (like Dani Yatom), Yediot Aharonot, 21 January 2000, pp. 4-6.



Melman, op cit; Blanchiment d’argent et mafia russe, Le Parisien, 23 March 2001, <archives.leparisean. com>. See also La renégociation de la dette de l’Angola envers la Russie ouvre une autre piste, Le Monde, 9 April 2001, <www.lemonde.fr>; Leshem, op cit, pp 4-6.



Leshem, ibid.



D Pallister & J Henley, British warrant issued in French arms row, The Guardian, 26 March 2001, <www.global policy.org/security/sanction/angola/2001/0326corr.html>.



Le Parisien, 23 March 2001, op cit.



Fugitive Mitterrand ally takes refuge in Israel, The Times of India, 30 December 2000, <www.timesof india.com>.



Leshem, op cit.



Israel: Former Mossad head Yatom sets up defence exports, security consultancy firm, Reuters Business Briefing, 25 August 1998, <www.business.reuters>; Algeria denies seeking Israeli security assistance, Yediot Aharonot, <www.metimes.com/2K/issue2000-12/reg/algeria_denies_seeking.htm>.



Leshem, op cit.



Algeria denies seeking Israeli security assistance, op cit.



According to two unnamed Ascorp employees, communication ongoing.



A crude awakening: The role of the oil and banking industries in Angola’s civil war and the plunder of state assets, Global Witness, December 1999, <www. oneworld.org/globalwitness/>.



A Zagorin, Soldiers for sale, Time Magazine 149(21), 26 May 1997, <www.time.com>.



A crude awakening, op cit; Y Walter, Shahaq in the Congo, Tel Aviv Ma’ariv, 7 October 1994.



See <www.maomagazine.be>.



Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation, House of Commons, 27 July 1999.



Ibid.



R Cornwell, Africa Watch: Sierra Leone: RUF Diamonds?, African Security Review 7(4), 1998, <www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/7.4/Africa%20Watch.html>; and Sierra Leone: IRIN chronology of significant events, 30 December 2000, <allafrica.com/stories/ 200012310043.htm>l, 5 May 2001.



IRIN chronology, ibid.



Canada: Inside story — Crime — Thailand’s most wanted man, Reuters, 28 July 1998.



According to an unnamed Belgian diamond dealer, Antwerp, April 2001.



W Reno, The real (war) economy of Angola, in Cilliers & Dietrich, op cit, p 230.