Introduction

It is now widely recognised that the United Nations (UN) must increase its co-operation with regional organisations or groupings to maintain international peace and security. The UN faces acute resource constraints on an annual basis. The five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) are perceived as being reluctant to become directly involved in conflicts in far-flung areas whose strategic significance has diminished since the end of the Cold War. Both of these factors have compelled successive UN Secretaries-General to call upon regional arrangements to complement the world body’s efforts in peacekeeping and peacemaking.1 It is against this background that the paper seeks to assess the evolving co-operative relationship between the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).2

It is argued in this paper that, whilst the nature of collaboration between the UNSC and the OAU is satisfactory, certain points of friction are visible. Among them are Africa’s quest to achieve representation on an enlarged and reformed UNSC, and the lack of cohesiveness of OAU member states in enforcing UNSC-authorised sanctions. This “unco-operative” stance appears in part to be fuelled by the perception in the OAU that in the world of the 21st century, the UNSC has become an instrument to further the strategic foreign policy interests of the globe’s sole remaining superpower, the United States (US). Needless to say, the failure of some OAU member states to apply UN sanctions against certain state and non-state actors not only undermines the moral authority of the UNSC, but complicates the OAU’s relationships with the US and the United Kingdom (UK) – the two leading powers on the Council.

The UN Charter’s provisions for collaboration between the UN and regional organisations

Article 1 of the Charter of the UN clearly outlines the purposes of the world’s only universal organisation. These purposes are:3

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples and to take appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for the fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of those common ends.”

In its role of maintaining international peace and security as outlined above, the UN relies on the UNSC as its executive organ. Its duties are described in Article 24 of the Charter:4

“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”

Article 52 of the UN Charter allows states to form regional organisations for dealing with such matters of peace and security “as are appropriate for regional action”.5 Although not defined in the Charter, regional organisations are presumably bodies created by treaties of co-operation entered into by geographically proximate states. A body such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which is a multinational alliance for collective self-defence (as was the Warsaw Treaty Organisation), is not a regional organisation. This distinction is important, for it has fundamental implications for the legality of enforcement actions. A defensive alliance, according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, may use force in self defence (although only in response to an armed attack), without waiting for the UNSC to give permission. On the other hand, Article 53(1) allows a regional organisation to take enforcement action, even if there was no prior armed attack, conditional on UNSC authorisation.

Article 54 also requires that the UNSC “shall at all times be kept informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security”.6 In respect of the imposition of sanctions against states parties and non-state entities whose behaviour may be deemed by the Council as endangering international peace and security, Article 41 of the Charter states that:7

“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions and may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

It can thus be inferred that since members of regional organisations (such as the OAS and the OAU) are also member states of the UN, they are obliged to co-operate with the UNSC in enforcing measures against either state or non-state entities, as outlined in Article 41 of the UN Charter.

The Charter of the OAU and the Constitutive Act of the African Union: points of convergence with the UN Charter

The OAU was formed on 25 May 1963 in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, when the leaders of 32 independent African states signed its Charter. In its preamble, the OAU Charter refers to the UN in the following terms:

“Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-operation among African States….”8

and outlines the following purposes for the regional organisation:

to promote the unity and solidarity of African states



to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa



to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence



to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa



to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.9

From the above, it follows that the OAU Charter drew heavily on the Charter of the UN as African states sought to define a meaningful role for the regional organisation in international relations in the early 1960s.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) is the end product of the Declaration adopted by the 4th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya, in September 1999. The establishment of the AU can be seen as the product of a Libyan-driven initiative intended to enable the North African state to break out of the prolonged diplomatic isolation brought about by its poor relations with the US, UK and most of the Arab world. Since the Libyan state possesses vast petroleum reserves, it is able to use the huge financial resources at its disposal to bankroll the poorer OAU member states south of the Sahara, for example, by paying their dues to the organisation.10 By so doing, Libya has been able to ensure the diplomatic support of these states for its AU project.

The Constitutive Act of the AU envisages the establishment of a supranational type of executive body that can promote integration and sustainable human development in Africa more effectively than the OAU. The Act names the following bodies as the principal organs of the Union:

the Assembly of the Union


the Executive Council


the Pan-African Parliament


the Court of Justice


the Commission


the Permanent Representatives Committee


the specialised Technical Committees


the Economic, Social and Cultural Council


the Financial Institutions.11

Among the major objectives of the emergent AU, as enunciated in Article 3 of the Act, are to:

achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa;



accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; and



encourage international co-operation, taking due account of the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.12

Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act articulates the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of the Union in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. It is worth observing that the Act makes no reference to the UNSC, which is the primary instrument for dealing with the type of emergencies referred to in Article 4(h) of the Act. However, Article 4(g) effectively torpedoes 4(h) by affirming “non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another”.13 Hence, under the non-interference clause, a regime guilty of the type of gross human rights violations outlined in 4(h) can legally obstruct Union intervention.

This apparent contradiction in the Act provides an example of the ambivalent attitude of African countries towards the sensitive issue of national sovereignty. This may confirm the impression that the AU amounts to merely giving the OAU a “fresh coat of paint”, whilst the inner structures remain inert and ineffective. Another reason for cynicism about the probable future of the AU is the perennial resource and other constraints faced by the continental organisation.14 There is also a lack of consensus among OAU member states as to what shape the AU will take. Another caveat is that the establishment of a union such as envisaged in the Act presupposes a high degree of social and political integration among member states. It remains unclear whether a union modelled along the example of European integration can be successfully set up in Africa. Intra-African trade, notwithstanding the existence of sub-regional economic arrangements (such as the Economic Community of West African States – ECOWAS, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa – COMESA, and the Southern African Development Community – SADC) has persistently remained below the five per cent mark, calculated as a fraction of the continent’s total external trade.15

Notwithstanding the daunting legal, institutional, logistical and financial challenges inherent in the AU project, both the Charter of the OAU and Act of the AU agree with the UN Charter on the need to promote international co-operation. This point of convergence has, however, not always ensured that relations between the OAU and the UN are harmonious.

The schema below broadly indicates where there are areas of similarity in the Charters of the UN and the OAU. It also seeks to identify potential areas of conflict between the two bodies.

Evaluation of OAU and UNSC collaboration

UNSC indifference to peace and security challenges in Africa?

Co-operation between the OAU and the UNSC (and the UN system in general) has been most visible in the realm of peace support and peacekeeping operations. This co-operation has arisen on account of the rather rigid interpretation by OAU member states of Article 24 of the UN Charter, which confers “on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. However, there is a perception often aired at various OAU meetings that the UN upholds a double standard when it deals with peace and security challenges in Africa, as opposed to the way it deals with the same challenges in other parts of the world.

In her keynote address to an international symposium on conflict prevention, organised by the Government of Japan and held in Tokyo in March 2000, South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr Dlamini-Zuma, cautioned:16

“Responsibility that has been taken by regional organisations (in conflict resolution) should not mean that the UN, particularly the Security Council, should abdicate its responsibility as the primary organisation for maintaining international peace and stability. And we have observed over the years that sometimes when the UN is called upon to act in Africa, it approaches that responsibility with the speed of an elephant whereas when it is asked to act in other situations it approaches at the speed of a cheetah.”

This point regarding the relative indifference of the UNSC towards humanitarian and security catastrophes in Africa, when compared with the concern the Council has mobilised in extreme crises elsewhere, was also raised by the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. His account of the way in which the UNSC scaled down its observer mission (UNAMIR) in the Central African nation of Rwanda as it slid into anarchy and genocide in the spring of 1994 is sharply critical:17

“The behaviour of the Security Council was shocking; it meekly followed the US’ lead in denying the reality of the genocide. Although it was a clear case of genocide, US spokesmen were obviously under instructions to avoid the term in order to avoid having to fulfil their treaty obligations under the 1949 Genocide Convention.”

UNSC collaboration with the OAU in peacekeeping and peacebuilding

The need for the OAU to rethink its approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the continent has been made more urgent by the increasing number of interstate conflicts in Africa. Whereas during the Cold War period wars were mainly fought between states, the nature of war has changed significantly. Although the origins and political contexts in which wars have developed in the past 20 years vary, most of the conflicts that emerged during this period have common characteristics: fragmentation of the warring factions; massive violations of international humanitarian law (such as tactics that deliberately target the civilian population, causing countless atrocities committed against non-combatants); and exploitation of local resources to sustain war efforts. In some instances, these interstate wars have caused the collapse of the state as a functioning entity.

All of these factors provide a compelling reason for the OAU to bring a fresh dynamism and innovation to the process of dealing with conflicts.18

The Declaration adopted by the 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on “The political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world” in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 1990, marked a turning point. It clearly expressed a renewed determination by the highest decision-making body of the OAU to address the scourge of conflict in Africa. The relevant paragraph of the Declaration reads as follows:19

“We realise that the possibilities of achieving the objectives we have set (socio-economic transformation and integration) will be constrained as long as an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability does not prevail in Africa. We therefore renew our determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the conflicts on our continent. The resolution of conflicts will be conducive to the creation of peace and stability in the continent and will also have the effect of reducing expenditures on defence and security, thus releasing additional resources for socio-economic development. We are equally determined to make renewed efforts to eradicate the root causes of the refugee problem. It is only through the creation of stable conditions that Africa can fully harness its human and material resources and direct them to development.”

It was in fulfilment of this commitment, and pursuant to the decision taken in Dakar, Senegal, in 1992 during the 28th Ordinary Session, that in June 1993 the Assembly adopted the Cairo Declaration on the establishment, within the OAU, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In the Declaration, the Heads of State and Government recognised that “no single internal factor has contributed more to the … socio-economic problems on the continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between … countries”. In particular, they noted that conflicts have brought about death and suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families; forced millions of people into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons; gobbled up scarce resources, and undermined the ability of African countries to address the many compelling needs of their peoples.20

At the 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Cairo, Egypt, African leaders declared that they “saw in the establishment of such a Mechanism, the opportunity to bring to the processes of dealing with conflicts on our continent a new institutional dynamism, enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and ultimately end conflicts when they occur”.21 The Mechanism is built around a central Organ, with the secretary-general and the secretariat as its operational arm. The Mechanism meets at ambassadorial and ministerial levels, and, when circumstances so dictate, at the level of Heads of State and Government.22 The Mechanism’s primary objective is the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it is the responsibility of the Mechanism to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions in order to facilitate the resolution of conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope may be mounted and deployed.23

The Declaration, however, stresses the importance of UN involvement in the work of the OAU Mechanism:24

“in the event that conflicts degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate the services of the UN will be sought under the general terms of the Charter. In this instance, our respective countries will examine ways and modalities through which they can make practical contribution to such UN undertakings and participate effectively in peacekeeping operations in Africa.”

Increasingly, it is the OAU Mechanism and sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC that have provided the lead in brokering peace agreements, with the UN playing a low-key supporting role.25 In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS negotiated the peace agreement between the government and the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 1999. The rebels had aroused the horror and indignation of the entire international community on account of their tactic of indiscriminately chopping off the limbs of civilians: to prevent further atrocities a central component of the Agreement called upon the UNSC to mount a peacekeeping operation, UNAMSIL. This would replace the regional peacekeeping force, the West African Economic Monitoring Group (ECOMOG – the military arm of ECOWAS), which had fought the RUF and brought about conditions that made a peace agreement between the warring parties possible.

Likewise, when the warring parties in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) gathered in the Zambian capital of Lusaka in July 1999 to sign a ceasefire pact, they endorsed an agreement initiated and mediated by SADC. The Lusaka Agreement provided for the establishment of an OAU Monitoring Mechanism, the Joint Military Commission (JMC). It was to be complemented by a UNSC-authorised peacekeeping deployment, MONUC.26

Another example of the OAU taking the lead in addressing conflicts in Africa is provided in the lengthy and complex negotiations that culminated in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Algiers, Algeria on 18 June 2000. This provided for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission, to be deployed under the auspices of the OAU. Accordingly, under Resolution 1312(2000) of 31 July 2000, the UNSC authorised a UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, to be known as UNMEE, “under the auspices of the OAU”.27 The central role of UNMEE is to monitor the cessation of hostilities and to co-ordinate the process of demarcating the frontier between the two adversaries anew.

In a parallel development, at the 68th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ, held on 28 July 2000 at ambassadorial level, the OAU Secretary-General was authorised to “deploy the necessary military and civilian personnel to enable the OAU to effectively discharge its role in the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities”.28

Following that decision, the OAU Secretary-General set up an OAU Liaison Office known as OLMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Its mandate “consists in assisting the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and co-operating closely with it in the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities”.29

In seeking to prove that the UN is not indifferent to Africa’s security and humanitarian challenges, the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has undertaken specific actions to follow up the recommendations contained in his 1998 report to the UNSC, The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Specific actions include:

the adoption of Security Council resolutions to strengthen the enforcement and monitoring of regional arms embargoes; to improve security for African refugees and increase aid to countries hosting refugees and to expand security co-operation with the OAU and sub-regional bodies30



the appointment of special representatives and envoys to assist African mediation efforts in Sierra Leone, the DRC, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region



an increase in the number of African countries participating in the UN peacekeeping Stand-by Arrangement, in terms of which member states maintain personnel or material in readiness for rapid deployment, from 12 to 23.31

UNSC collaboration with the OAU in enforcement of sanctions

The relationship between the UNSC and the OAU in the sphere of enforcing international sanctions against parties whose conduct is deemed prejudicial to the maintenance of international peace and security has been sorely tested over the past few years. It should be noted that sanctions have been used by the UNSC 12 times since 1990, compared with only 12 before 1990. “They allowed the Council to demonstrate the enforcement of its decisions without having to resort to the use of force”.32

Two specific instances of the application of sanctions that have generated tensions between the UNSC and the OAU are in respect of the sanctions regimes against Libya and Angola’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The delegate of the People’s Republic of China observed during the Security Council’s Debate on General Issues Relating to Sanctions, held in New York April 2000, that:33

“it was regrettable that more often than not the Council was quick in imposing sanctions but slow in lifting them when the conditions that had prompted the sanctions were no longer existent. Sanctions on Libya [on account of the long drawn out saga over the 1988 Lockerbie bombing of a Pan-Am Jet liner], which were only suspended and not lifted are a case in point.”

The position of the OAU with regard to the application of the UNSC sanctions regime against Libya has been that both the US and the UK have been using the UN to extract financial compensation from Libya, because the majority of those who perished in the Lockerbie tragedy were of Anglo-Saxon stock. A wider strategic consideration of the OAU is that both great powers appear to have pursued the political and economic emasculation of the Libyan regime under the cloak of UN sanctions, because of its steadfast opposition to the Middle East peace process. (The reason is that the Libyan leadership perceives the peace negotiations as favouring Israel at the expense of the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world.) This explains why the OAU, in the teeth of the anger of both the US and the UK, decided in 1998 to cease complying with UN sanctions directed against Libya.34

The US and the UK appear not to have displayed similar zeal in applying the sanctions regime intended to choke the capacity of the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA, in its prolonged civil war against the government and people of Angola. Notwithstanding the passing of UNSC Resolutions 864(1993) of 15 September 1993, and several subsequent resolutions, in particular Resolutions 1127(1997) of 28 August, 1997, 1173(1998) of 12 June 1998 and 1237 of 7 May 1999, UNITA’s capacity to continue the war has not been significantly affected by the sanctions. Indeed, a number of OAU member states have taken advantage of the relatively lax approach of the Security Council to breach the sanctions, despite the OAU’s exhortations that its member states should comply with the UN regime against UNITA.

However, the publication of the Fowler Report in 2000 on the widespread and systematic violations of the anti-UNITA sanctions regime specifically named the heads of state of Burkina Faso and Togo, among others, as being complicit in ignoring the sanctions. It was only then that the OAU, with some embarrassment, decided to play a more visible role in attempts to curb the activities of UNITA.35 The 36th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly, meeting in Lomé, Togo, from 10–12 July 2000, not only expressed its concern “at the fact that the UN sanctions against UNITA are not implemented effectively”, but authorised the establishment of a five-nation Ad-hoc Committee to augment the actions against UNITA of the UN’s Committee on Sanctions.36

The OAU and UNSC reform

The official position of the OAU on the reform of the UNSC is that the present Council is not numerically proportionate to the distribution of General Assembly membership. The UN runs the risk of losing the trust of the members unless it adopts a more balanced representation. Additionally, the emergence of Japan and Germany as economic superpowers and the relative decline of the UK and France from global to middle-ranking powers, have prompted loud calls for the inclusion of Japan and Germany as permanent members of the UNSC, entitled to exercise the much-coveted veto prerogative.37

Secretary-General Kofi Annan appears to back the position of those who advocate enlarging the Council to make it more representative. He explains his stance in the following manner:38

“I have always maintained that the Security Council is in need of reform and that we should bring it in line with today’s realities. So what I have said in the report is consistent with my long held view, and I hope Member States will move forward and reform the Security Council. The argument that the Council should remain small in order to be effective is one group’s position but the position of the others that the Council should be expanded to be made more democratic and, therefore, gain greater legitimacy is also important. I believe it ought to be possible to reform the Council and give it greater representation while keeping its effectiveness.”

The OAU has articulated the position that Africa should be accorded two permanent and five non-permanent seats on a reformed UNSC.39 Though the OAU has not publicly endorsed the candidature of any particular member state, it is widely believed that the governments of Nigeria and South Africa are mounting intense diplomatic campaigns to secure the endorsement of the OAU.40 It should nonetheless be stressed that official positions adopted at OAU meetings have no power to prevent member states from taking differing stances within the wider global fora offered by the UN system.41 There is therefore no guarantee that diplomatic support declared for Abuja and Pretoria by African countries within the continental framework of the OAU would automatically translate into votes for their campaigns within the larger forum of the General Assembly of the UN.

Some of the smaller OAU member states, fearful and resentful of the nascent ‘Abuja-Pretoria Axis’ and its implications for UNSC reform, have unofficially expressed a preference that the two permanent African seats envisaged should be filled on a rotational basis, to be determined by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government.42 How such a formula could be translated in practice, in view of the parallel demand for five non-permanent seats for Africa, is difficult to imagine at this point.

One complicating factor in the drive to achieve consensus on OAU candidates is the fear of successive French governments that inclusion of Anglophone powers such as Nigeria and South Africa will further diminish the usage of French in the UN system. It is therefore not improbable that Paris will use fora such as the annual Franco-African Summits and the wider La Francophonie to build a bloc of French-speaking OAU member states that will thwart Abuja’s and Pretoria’s UNSC ambitions. France appears to have played a decisive although ‘behind the scenes’ role in the election of the former Foreign Affairs Minister of the Ivory Coast, Amara Essy, as the OAU’s new Secretary-General. He replaced the long-serving Tanzanian diplomat Salim Ahmed Salim at the 37th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly held in July 2001 in the Zambian capital of Lusaka.43 The Ivorian diplomat defeated Namibia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Theo Ben Gurirab, largely on account of the unified support for Essy’s candidature provided by the French-speaking countries of Central and West Africa. The Namibian candidate was mainly backed by the countries belonging to the largely English-speaking SADC.44

Most OAU member states agree that, while both Germany and Japan are deserving of the status of permanent members of the UNSC, it is important that Bonn/Berlin and Tokyo make a public demonstration of support for the bids of Africa’s leading candidates to acquire similar positions.45
Both Nigeria and South Africa fear that the P5 may quietly agree to enlargement of the Council on condition that it will offer a two-tier type of membership, with some new permanent members granted the veto prerogative whilst other new entrants are not. Such a situation would create the possibility of conflict between Germany and Japan on the one hand, and the OAU on the other, especially if African countries determine that Bonn/Berlin and Tokyo are willing to make a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with the current P5 members that would entail their acquiring permanent membership at the expense of Africa’s doing so.46

Conclusion

It cannot be denied that the OAU appreciates the contributions of the UN in the interconnected areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa. In the structures and mechanisms of the OAU, however, there is the persistent suspicion that the UN, currently in the grip of the two dominant Anglophone powers – the US and UK – pays only lip service to addressing peace and security challenges in Africa (as compared with crisis points elsewhere). This has from time to time given rise to frictions between the UNSC and the OAU. Another view emanating from Addis Ababa that reinforces this suspicion relates to the manner in which UN-authorised sanctions appear to be selectively applied by the Council.

For example, although Libya has complied with all UNSC demands regarding the 1988 bombing of the Pan-Am airliner over Lockerbie, the Council has declined to lift the sanctions regime. Hence in mid-September 2000, the representatives of a five-member OAU committee (Cameroon, Ghana, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe) noted that it was 18 months since the two Libyan suspects first appeared before a Scottish Court in the Netherlands and five months since the trial had begun, but sanctions had not been eased. “Despite the Security Council’s own provision for lifting sanctions once the suspects had appeared in court and despite a report by Secretary-General Kofi Annan indicating that Libya had complied with all its commitments, the sanctions remain in place”, reported the Committee.47

The UNSC stands in urgent need of reform if it is to assert its moral authority in situations concerning good governance, global peace, sustainable human development and security. Unless it strives to redress an imbalance that has historically favoured the industrialised countries, it will continue to suffer a gradual erosion of that authority. Indeed, the Security Council is seen by most OAU member states as a pliable instrument of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. America is believed to use the Council to pursue its strategy of neutralising countries such as Iraq and Libya, which strive to pursue a policy of non-alignment sharply at variance with the paradigm of global governance envisaged by the US. This explains, in the view of most OAU member states, why the US has consistently opposed the lifting of sanctions against Iraq and Libya.

The aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the US carried out on 11 September 2001 could trigger new frictions between the UNSC and the OAU, as the US asserts its pre-eminent position on the Council to build and consolidate its global coalition against international terrorism.48 As has been pointed out, whereas the major Western powers have tended to avoid committing their military forces to peacekeeping operations in Africa, they have responded with overwhelming enthusiasm to participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This is the coalition force deployed to provide security for the Post Taliban Interim Government in Afghanistan. Already hawkish members of the American administration have suggested that the US-led coalition should extend its anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan to include Iraq. This follows from the presumption that the regime of Saddam Hussein is not only developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but abets international terrorists. The majority of OAU member states, especially those with predominantly Muslim populations, entertain the suspicion that under US pressure, the UNSC may authorise military strikes against Iraq, ostensibly to coerce Iraq into allowing UN arms inspectors back into the country. The real motivation, according to this view, would be to ensure that America’s strategic ally Israel maintains its military supremacy in the Middle-East/ North Africa balance of power equation.

The major challenge faced by the collective membership of the UN in the first decade of the new millennium is likely to be devising a formula for the reform of the Council, to give it a more representative composition. This would acknowledge the importance of ensuring that member states, particularly those from the Third World, perceive it to be impartial and even-handed in addressing humanitarian and security challenges all over the world. Equitable representation of all the world’s regions and impartiality in addressing global emergencies are also crucial to the Council’s operational effectiveness. Balancing these seemingly contradictory priorities will no doubt be a formidably difficult undertaking for all UN member states on both sides of the North–South dichotomy in international relations.

Notes

See Kofi A. Annan, Preventing war and disaster: A growing global challenge, 1999 Annual Report on the Work of the Organisation, New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1999, pp 36–37.



The OAU is in the process of being transformed into the new African Union (AU), as provided for in the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lomé, Togo, 10–12 July 2000 provided the occasion for the signing of the Act. See NM Mulikita, Enhancing African integration: The African Union Treaty, ECA News, III(3), August–October 2000, p 17.



See United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 1997, p 36.



Ibid, p 20.



See Jakkie Cilliers, Strengthening sub-regional organisations in Africa, Report of the international symposium on the Roles of sub-regional and non-governmental organisations in conflict prevention and peace initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ Institute of International Policy Studies, 28–29 March, 2000, p 126.



See United Nations op cit, p 36.



Ibid, p 28.



See Organisation of African Unity, Compendium of OAU instruments & texts on refugees, returnees & displaced persons in Africa, OAU/UNHCR, Addis Ababa, March 2000, p 3.



Organisation of African Unity, OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure, Press and Information Service of the OAU General Secretariat, Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, August 1992, p 4.



The governments of Togo and Zambia reportedly received generous subsidies from President Muhammar Gaddafi of Libya to enable them to meet the huge costs of hosting the OAU Summits of 2000 and 2001 respectively. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has turned to Colonel Gaddafi for moral and material support as he faces growing criticism from Western countries over his controversial land reform programme. See, Mugabe, Gaddafi discuss oil deal, Times of Zambia, December 20, 2001, p 7.



See NM Mulikita, op cit, p17.



Organisation of African Unity, Constitutive Act of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 2000, p 5.



Ibid, p 7.



The Act entered into force on 26 May 2001, following its signing by two-thirds of OAU member states. The OAU has now entered a transition period of one year in which it will evolve into the new African Union. See Cherif Ouazani, Quel Succesesseur Pour Salim?, Jeune Afrique, No. 2110, 19–25 June 2001, pp 28–29.



See NM Mulikita, TICAD: A new framework for African development? Sub-Regional Development Centre for Southern Africa Bulletin, UN Economic Commission for Africa, No.5, June 1999, (SA-SRDC), Lusaka, Zambia, pp 8–11.



N Dlamini-Zuma (Dr) Speech by Her Excellency the Minister for External Affairs of the Republic of South Africa at the international symposium on the Roles of sub-regional and non-governmental organisations in conflict prevention and peace initiatives in sub-saharan Africa, 28 March 2000, Tokyo, Japan.



See Buotros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga, I.B.Tauris Publishers, London-New York, 1999, pp 135–136. An independent UN enquiry into the Rwanda genocide concluded that “the failure of the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently, to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole. There was a persistent lack of political will by member states to act, or to act with enough assertiveness”. See IPEP, Rwanda: The preventable genocide, OAU, Addis Ababa, 2000, p 103.



See Organisation of African Unity, The OAU and conflict management – an overview, Position paper prepared for the fourth high-level meeting between the United Nations and regional organisations: co-operation for peace-building, New York, February 6–7 2001, p 1.



Ibid, p 2.



Organisation of African Unity, Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment, within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Cairo, Egypt, June 1993, p 6.



Ibid, p 7.



Meetings of the Mechanism at ambassadorial level are held at least once a month at OAU Headquarters. The UN Secretary-General is represented at these meetings by the Director of the UN Liaison Office with the OAU, whose office is housed in the premises of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Addis Ababa.



The OAU maintains Observer Missions in the Comoros (OMIC), Burundi (OMIB) and in Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE).



Ibid, p 9.



See Michael Fleshman, Sharing Africa’s peacekeeping burden: UN Secretary-General report stirs debate on double standards, Africa Recovery, UN Department of Public Information, December 1999, p 4.



Ibid.



Organisation of African Unity, Seventy-First Session of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Report of the Secretary-General on developments in the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Addis Ababa, 23 November 2000, p 3.



Ibid, p 1.



Ibid.



For a more detailed breakdown of the framework governing OAU/UN System co-operation, see Joint OAU/UN Report on Co-operation between the United Nations system and the Organisation of African Unity, UN/OAU/MTG/011/2000/Rev.2, 11 April 2000.



See Michael Fleshman, op cit, p 4.



OAU Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations, Report of the Security Council debate on general issues relating to sanctions, New York, 17 April 2000, p 4.



Ibid, p 6.



Organisation of African Unity, Declaration and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, AHG/Dec.127 (XXXIV), The crisis between the Great Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States and the United Kingdom, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 8–10 June 1998.



United Nations, Notes for an address by Ambassador Robert Fowler, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 864(1993) concerning Angola to the UN Security Council on the Report of the Panel of Experts established by Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999).



Organisation of African Unity, Declaration and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, AHG/Dec.148 (XXXIVI), Decision on Angola, Lomé, Togo, 10–12 July, See also Organisation of African Unity, Progress report of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee to evaluate the implementation of the UN Security Council sanctions against UNITA, Addis Ababa, 2000, pp 1–2.



NM Mulikita, Reforming the UN Security Council: What role for the OAU?’ Southern African Political and Economic Monthly, 11(11), September–October 1998, p 14.



United Nations, Secretary-General’s press release: Transcript of press conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, at Headquarters, 3 April 2000, p 2.



At the Millennium Summit of the UN, 6–8 September 2000, “Angolan Foreign Affairs Minister Joao Bernardo de Miranda spoke for numerous African leaders when he underscored Angola’s strong support for Africa’s demand for two permanent and five non-permanent seats on an expanded Security Council”. (Africa currently has three non-permanent seats.) See Michael Fleshman, Reform plans dominate Security Council debate on peacekeeping in Africa’, Africa Recovery, UN Department of Public Information, October 2000, p 10.



Early in 2000, the presidents of Nigeria and South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki respectively, announced their initiative, known as the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme, essentially intended to galvanise international support for Africa’s development efforts. In a rival initiative intended to indicate that French-speaking Africa would not agree to subscribe to an Abuja–Pretoria leadership axis, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal announced his OMEGA Plan for Africa, which the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has described as having the same vision for Africa as the Nigeria/South Africa initiative. The two competing blueprints have since been merged to form the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). See UN Economic Commission for Africa, Compact for African Recovery, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 2001.



A classic example of how easily OAU member states break their diplomatic solidarity occurred in 2000. Whereas the 71st Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers endorsed Sudan’s candidature for a two-year period of membership on the UNSC, Mauritius broke ranks and forwarded its own candidature during the UN General Assembly in September 2000. In the electoral contest, Mauritius soundly defeated the officially endorsed candidate of the OAU, Sudan, and secured one of the three non-permanent seats reserved for Africa on the Council.



Some Addis Ababa–based diplomats representing SADC member states privately complain of what they see as South Africa’s tendency to make unilateral foreign policy decisions which impact adversely on the other SADC member countries. A case in point relates to the free trade agreement Pretoria concluded with the European Union in 2000, without consulting its SADC partners. They are therefore unwilling to support South Africa’s gaining a permanent seat on the UNSC.



The Ivorian candidate ran a high-profile campaign, inclusive of a glossy home page on the Internet. The influential French news weekly magazine, Jeune Afrique, gave his profile considerably high visibility; See Cherif Ouazani, Quel Successeur pour Salim?, Jeune Afrique, 2110, 19–25 June 2001, pp 28–29. In a sub-article entitled, Amara Essy: Un CV Impressionant, the author made a strong case for the highly experienced Ivorian envoy to become Africa’s top diplomat. In another sub-article on the candidature of the SADC-backed Namibian foreign minister Theo Ben Gurirab, entitled, Theo Ben Gurirab: A la Demande de Mbeki, the same author described the Namibian diplomat as having a “distant and somewhat arrogant” manner.



Prior to the Lusaka Summit, speculation ran high that the Southern African region would supply the next OAU secretary-general, in view of the fact that previous secretaries-general had come from other regions of the continent. However, the Francophone states felt that English speakers had gained disproportionate influence in the General Secretariat on account of the 12-year incumbency of the monolingual Salim A. Salim of Tanzania. Senegal presented the candidature of UN Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahim Fall; Guinea proposed Lansana Kouyate, the outgoing Executive Secretary of ECOWAS; whilst Ivory Coast nominated Amara Essy (previously the candidate strongly favoured by France to succeed Boutros Boutros-Ghali as UN Secretary-General in 1996). In the end Kouyate and Fall withdrew in favour of Essy.



Japan has used the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) forum as a vehicle to mobilise African support for Tokyo’s bid to secure permanent UN Security Council membership. For a detailed discussion of Japan’s diplomatic strategy, see NM Mulikita, Japan’s ‘TICAD Diplomacy’ and African development: An appraisal, AEC Newsletter, IV(2)14 February–April 2000; General Secretariat of OAU/AEC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, pp 3–6.



I elicited this perspective during my discussions with Addis Ababa–based diplomats of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa.



See, Lockerbie: OAU calls for end to sanctions on Libya, Africa Recovery, October 2000, p 32.



In 1999, the OAU adopted its own Anti-Terrorism Convention. It will be interesting to investigate the extent to which the US-led coalition views the Convention as a viable regional instrument with which to combat terrorism. See, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Compendium of OAU instruments & texts on refugees, returnees & displaced persons in Africa: 1963–1999, Algiers, Algeria, op. cit., 10 July 1999, pp 102–112.