AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS’
PEACE OPERATIONS
Developments and challenges1

Eric G Berman

Eric G Berman is a visiting scholar at the Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, United States.

Published in African Security Review Vol 11 No 4, 2002


This paper reviews recent developments among African regional organisations in undertaking peacekeeping operations, as well as in preparing for future missions. It focuses on those that have been the most active: the Organisation of African Unity/African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community. The paper goes on to briefly describe and analyse the activities of the French, UK, and US capacity-building programmes designed to develop African peacekeeping capacities. The author then identifies some specific concerns and recommends actions to help meet today’s challenges. The paper concludes with a short analysis of African organisations’ capacities and proclivities to provide a peacekeeping force for Sudan.

Introduction

Even though the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s approach toward Africa has changed dramatically in recent years, the number of Blue Helmets made available for peacekeeping duties on that continent will continue to be far below what is required. Since 1999, the UN Security Council has substantially re-engaged Africa, launching significant peace operations in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as well as along the border in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Today, of the some 44,000 UN peacekeepers serving around the world, roughly three in five are deployed in Africa. This responsibility is being undertaken by a sizeable number of countries. Seventy-five of the 90 UN member states contributing uniformed personnel are providing Blue Helmets in Africa—more than two thirds of which are from outside the continent. And yet, this much larger commitment is still far below the level of engagement from some ten years ago.2 Moreover, the number of UN peacekeepers in Africa is likely not politically sustainable. It is more likely that there will be a reduction of Blue Helmets rather than a further increase.

African countries’ willingness to participate in peace operations has dramatically increased in recent years. Prior to 1988, just 12 had contributed personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation, most only to a single mission. Since 1999, 29 have had contributed to a UN peacekeeping operation, most to more than one. This increased willingness is not limited to UN peacekeeping operations. Since 1990, at least one African country has participated in 8 of the 10 UN-authorised multinational forces (MNFs)3—all but the Italian-led MNF in Albania and the initially UK-led4 MNF in Afghanistan. All told, 41 African countries have contributed troops, observers or police to an internationally recognised peacekeeping operation.5

African regional organisations have also become more active. Of the 27 African-led peace operations that have been undertaken,6 21 have involved regional organisations. All but three of the missions involving African regional organisations have been undertaken since 1990. Five organisations have undertaken one or more such missions, but many more have created new conflict resolution mechanisms, strengthened their secretariats, undertaken training, and sought new funding streams to better prevent, manage or resolve conflict among their members.

Aware that African countries and regional organisations were experiencing growing pains as they assumed these new responsibilities, Western countries, led by France, the UK and the US—the self-proclaimed ‘P-3’—undertook various programmes to develop African peacekeeping capacities.7 The centrepiece of the French policy is the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities programme (RECAMP for Renforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix). The initial UK policy, the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, has been subsumed within a large programme known as the Conflict Prevention Pool, which combines resources from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development. The central US policy in this regard, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI),8 has been replaced by the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme.9 Washington also established Operation Focus Relief (OFR), which provided peacekeeping training and equipment to African countries during 2000 and 2001.10 OFR is viewed as a one-off initiative.

This article addresses two basic questions. First, what have African regional organisations done in the realm of peacekeeping, and what can they do better? Second, what have Western capacity-building programmes done and what can they do better? The first section provides an overview of African regional organisations, with a focus on those that have fielded peace operations. The second provides an overview of Western capacity-building programmes, with a focus on those of France, the UK and the US. The third section raises specific concerns and recommends actions to help meet today’s challenges. The paper concludes with a short analysis of African organisations’ capacities and proclivities to provide a peacekeeping force for Sudan in light of recent progress in ending that country’s civil war.

African regional organisations in peacekeeping

Six African organisations have fielded peace operations. The first to have done so was the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Since its initiatives in Chad in the early 1980s, the OAU deployed a total of 11 distinct operations.11 The Treaty on Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (ANAD) was the second organisation to have deployed a peacekeeping operation. The ANAD framework agreement was signed by Burkino Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo in 1977. In 1986, a small group of ANAD military observers were instrumental in resolving a border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali. The larger Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) became the third organisation to authorise a mission. In 1990, troops from the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were sent to Liberia. That organisation has subsequently authorised missions in four additional conflicts.12 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) became the fourth African intergovernmental organisation to participate in peacekeeping. In 1998, SADC member states sent troops to the DRC and later to Lesotho. The Community of Saharan and Sahelian States (CEN-SAD) became the fifth African organisation to undertake a peacekeeping operation, with a small force in Central African Republic (CAR).13 CAR was also the destination for the sixth regional organisation to send a mission: the first troops from the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) arrived in Bangui, the capital of CAR, in November 2002.

These six institutions, and several other African organisations, have developed or are developing new structures to address shortcomings or to prepare for future missions. This paper focuses on the OAU/African Union (AU),14 ECOWAS, and SADC as those three have been the most active. Indeed, ANAD no longer exists,15 and it is difficult to evaluate the peacekeeping activities and potential of CEN-SAD and CEMAC given that their cumulative peace support operations experience is less than a year. It is appropriate to at least mention here that the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Manu River Union (MRU) have all created structures designed to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts.16

Decision making

In the 1990s, the then OAU, SADC and ECOWAS all created new conflict resolution mechanisms. In 1993, the OAU adopted its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In 1996, SADC established its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security although the protocol was only finalised several years later. And in 1999, ECOWAS passed its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace and Security.

Not all of these mechanisms have been used as intended or strictly adhered to by their member states. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, as Chairman of the SADC Organ, quickly convened a meeting in response to the war in the DRC and essentially transformed a ‘coalition of the willing’ (i.e. his country and two other SADC members: Angola and Namibia) into a ‘SADC’ force. The Botswana and South African ‘SADC’ intervention in Lesotho apparently received the backing of many SADC members during a series of late-night phone calls.17

An important trend is emerging that regional organisations will no longer require consensus to create a peacekeeping force. The ECOWAS Mechanism requires that a two-thirds majority of the nine-member Mediation and Security Council authorise any deployment.18 Whereas the Central Organ of the OAU required consensus, the Peace and Security Council of the AU is to require only a two-thirds majority for substantive decisions and a simple majority for procedural matters.19 The SADC Organ, however, is still to operate on a basis of consensus, although a quorum requires only two-thirds of the membership.20

Staffing and mission planning

Substantial progress has been made in the area of staffing and mission planning. For example, during the height of ECOMOG operations in Liberia, the ECOWAS Legal Advisor and his Deputy used to be responsible for all legal and many political and security matters at headquarters. There is now a deputy executive secretary for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and where his staff used to be limited to a military adviser, it now has several people and continues to grow.

Despite notable improvements, staffing remains wholly inadequate to undertake the responsibilities these organisations have assumed for themselves. The OAU Early Warning Unit within the Conflict Management Centre was supposed to be operational 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Six years after its establishment in 1993, insufficient staffing permitted the office to be up and running only 12 hours a day, Monday through Friday, and four hours a day on weekends.21 SADC, which is in the midst of restructuring its secretariat, has agreed that as a temporary measure the country chairing the Organ would support its operations. Mozambique, which assumed the Chair, has tasked its foreign ministry to take on these responsibilities. Rarely are additional personnel recruited to handle the new tasks. Rather, it is customary for existing staff to become ‘dual-hatted’: continuing in their original job while working on their new portfolios. As for ECOWAS, despite the progress noted above, the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Peace and Security remains understaffed.

Peacekeeping training

African countries have taken part in numerous peacekeeping training exercises, but the regional organisations’ secretariats have not been particularly involved. A command post exercise was held at the OAU Conflict Management Centre in 1996 with the support of the US. A map exercise, known as Blue Pelican, was held at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat in November 2000 with the support of France and the UK. Staff members of African regional organisations have also attended planning sessions for and participated in some Western-led command post exercises, computer-assisted exercises and field training. For the most part, however, African countries undertake training on a bilateral basis with the donor country.

Financing

Financing for peacekeeping-related activities of African regional organisations is similarly better than it was, but it still falls well below what is needed. The OAU Peace Fund created as part of the 1993 Mechanism provided for five per cent of the OAU’s annual regular budget to be earmarked for peace and security initiatives, which netted about $2 million a year as the money was to be taken regardless of the state of arrears.22 The Peace Fund, which also comprised a pool of money generated from voluntary contributions, totalled around $47 million by the end of 2001.23 This is enough to field only a small force for a limited time. (To give some sense of peacekeeping’s costs, operations such as the current UN missions in the DRC and Sierra Leone are each budgeted at more than $600 million a year. Even a much smaller operation such as the UN mission in Western Sahara, with a uniformed force numbering fewer than 250, costs more than $40 million per annum.) It has also made the OAU very reliant on voluntary contributions, the majority of which came from Western countries. ECOWAS is trying something novel, by requiring member states to earmark 0.5% of expenditures on imports from outside the regional bloc. This mechanism is just beginning to be instituted after many years of discussion, but has yet to be adopted by all 15 ECOWAS member states.24 As for SADC, it is still evaluating how to address this issue.

Western capacity-building programmes

Nature of assistance

Broadly speaking, Western capacity programmes offer three types of assistance: classroom education; field training; and equipment. Initially, such efforts were largely designed to support classical, or consensual, peacekeeping. For example, only France’s programme provided lethal equipment—and then on a very modest scale. A notable trend is developing whereby donors are increasingly providing training and equipment for a more hostile environment. This was most pronounced in Operation Focus Relief, which included significant matériel. In comparison, the only lethal equipment provided under ACRI was ammunition to be solely used for marksmanship training. The new programme ACOTA is still being developed, but is expected to include a more robust equipment package for some recipients along the lines of Operation Focus Relief.

Recipients

Nine countries have concluded agreements to receive ACRI training. Of these, five had completed the entire three-year programme at the battalion-level when ACRI concluded in November 2002: Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Mali and Senegal. Three others had received part of the envisaged training modules: Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda.25 The ninth country, Ethiopia, was suspended from the programme before the initial training module was offered.26 Kenya and Senegal also received brigade-level training under ACRI. During ACRI’s six-year run, some 9,000 African troops had participated in the programme.27

Under Operation Focus Relief, the US trained seven battalions from three West African countries. Nigeria provided five battalions, while Ghana and Senegal each contributed a single battalion. The training was offered in three phases from October 2000 through December 2001.

At least 32 African countries have received training under RECAMP. Eight West African countries contributed military personnel to the first RECAMP multinational exercise, which was held in Senegal and Mauritania in February 1998.28 Another eight countries participated in the second exercise held in Gabon in January 2000.29 The most recent exercise of this kind was held in Tanzania in February this year. Sixteen African countries took part.30

About 20 African countries have benefited directly from UK capacity-building training. British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs) operated with regional remits in Ghana and Zimbabwe. The BMATT in Ghana principally offered classroom training, with recipients going to its base in Accra. The instructors from the BMATT in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, would travel to the recipient country.31 A BMATT-type operation in Kenya, known as the British Peace Support Team (BPST),32 was established in 2000. It offers training in Kenya as well as abroad.

Use of donated equipment

It is difficult to document how many recipients have used the skills imparted and equipment provided for peacekeeping purposes. Partly in response to criticism that many individual recipients were not making full use of their training, and partly in response to financial pressures, there has been a greater emphasis on ‘training the trainer’. This has the added benefit of creating a sustainable platform for the training to continue after the Western-sponsored programme has ended. Checks and balances have been established to help ensure that the equipment provided is used as intended. France retains control of the three RECAMP depots it has established,33 and its equipment is well accounted for. The US-provided matériel remains with the recipients. Although agreements have been concluded that prohibit the recipients to use the equipment in ways other than as intended, or to transfer any of it without authorisation from Washington, it is believed that not every recipient has adhered to these precepts.34

In the case of Operation Focus Relief (OFR), however, it is quite clear how the training and matériel were used. Six of the seven battalions trained under this programme did deploy as part of UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone. The only OFR-trained battalion that did not deploy to Sierra Leone was the one from Senegal.35 The Senegalese contingent earmarked for the ECOMOG force in Côte d’Ivoire is believed to have received ACRI and ACOTA training and is to deploy with equipment provided under the two programmes.

Relevance

A question that cuts to the core of the capacity-building programmes of France, the UK and the US is does the training or equipment offered make African recipients any more willing or able to undertake peacekeeping on their continent? The links between participation in these programmes and either an increased willingness to participate in peacekeeping, or an enhanced effectiveness, are not clear.

Regarding ACRI, Senegal, for example, sent a company to the UN mission in the CAR, but had already joined the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements. Similarly, Kenya served in the UN mission in East Timor, but had already been in the Australian-led MNF there. Both initial commitments were made prior to these countries’ joining ACRI. Moreover, not all recipients have performed ably in peacekeeping. Mali, for example, experienced great problems in Sierra Leone. These may not have been ACRI-trained troops. Many troops from ACRI recipient countries who were sent abroad to participate in peacekeeping operations did not receive any ACRI training. This is not meant to impugn the entire ACRI programme or somehow tarnish other countries’ programmes. Rather, it is meant to suggest that a cause and effect relationship is difficult to establish.

Concerns

ECOMOG’s future: With or wither Nigeria?

ECOMOG presents a conundrum: previous Nigerian military regimes undermined its effectiveness, yet ECOMOG cannot be effective without Nigeria. When Nigeria does not participate in an operation—as was the case in Guinea-Bissau—ECOMOG cannot field a meaningful force.36 Financial and political considerations suggest that Abuja will be much less likely to offer a large number of troops for future ECOMOG operations.37 Indeed, for the proposed ECOMOG mission along the border of Guinea and Liberia, Nigeria pledged a single battalion. While it is true that this offer represented half the envisaged force, the planners restricted their assessment of what was needed based on their understanding of what could be provided.38 For the most recent ECOMOG operation in Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria formally pledged only 250 troops,39 but ultimately was not among the troop contributors.

An emboldened or embittered South Africa?

Prior to 1997, South Africa’s participation in peace operations was largely limited to sending troops to Korea in the 1950s and assisting UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Rwanda and Mozambique.40 The international community’s growing condemnation and isolation of South Africa under apartheid, and post-apartheid South Africa’s need to focus on internal matters such as the transformation of its armed forces, largely explain why this is so. Since 1998, however, South Africa has led the SADC force in Lesotho, provided key logistic and air units to the UN mission in the DRC, and spearheaded the ambitious and sensitive mission in Burundi.41 It will be interesting to see what happens in Burundi, where South Africa has received significant financial and logistical support from Belgium and the European Union. As of July, those commitments were sufficient only to sustain the South African force until the end of this October.42 Pretoria, which continues to be the only African country with troops deployed in Burundi despite pledges from three other countries,43 will be put in a difficult position should the international community and African countries not be generous with its assistance. This is especially so given that the most challenging part of Burundi’s peace process still lies ahead.44 It will be similarly interesting to follow the activities of South Africa in the DRC where Pretoria has committed itself to taking a leading role in disarmament in the Kivus through the commitment of a reinforced battalion group. Will South Africa emerge from these ambitious forays more committed to peacekeeping, or feel dejected and under-appreciated?

African Union: Old wine in a new bottle?

Will the AU represent a bold new initiative that markedly changes the way African countries work toward the promotion of peace and security on their continent, or is this initiative unlikely to much change the status quo? Sufficient evidence exists to call the grandiose plans of the AU into question. Since the Extraordinary OAU Summit convened in Sirte, Libya, back in March 2001 to declare the establishment of the AU,45 protocols for only four of the 17 Organs have been adopted. The more ambitious AU is likely to face severe financial challenges. Its predecessor is reported to have been more than $50 million in arrears.46 Libya may have supported a peacekeeping operation in the CAR, but it also actively destabilised numerous other countries on the continent in the past. It is not at all clear that Libya’s agenda would include robust conflict resolution and management policies, especially where they involve intervening in intra-state conflicts. This is a significant concern given Libya’s potential influence on the agendas of other African states. Libya has bankrolled many African countries to enable them to pay some of their dues to restore their voting privileges within the OAU/AU.47 Africa’s peacekeeping operations will still be forced to operate on a shoestring budget.

Lessons learned in Sierra Leone: Lost cause or cause for optimism?

What will happen in Sierra Leone and the region in the coming months and years? The UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone quickly grew from a modest observer mission to its largest operation at the time—by far.48 In line with the Brahimi Report, the mission has remained near its maximum authorised strength for several months after the election held in May 2002. This has significantly added to the mission’s cost. Assuming that Sierra Leone remains stable and sets forth on recovery, the Security Council and broader international community may see this as having been a worthwhile investment. What happens, however, if Sierra Leone should descend anew into civil war, or be thrown into a regional conflict given the instability and tensions in Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia? How will that affect the Security Council’s predisposition toward supporting robust peacekeeping elsewhere in Africa? Moreover, what effect would such a scenario have on UK policy? London, which has provided a separate mission to assist the government of Sierra Leone and the UN peacekeeping operation, also trained and equipped the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces. Should things turn sour, will the UK’s enthusiasm wane toward security sector reform in Sierra Leone, in Africa and elsewhere in the world?

Effects of September 11

The US, in response to events of 11 September 2001, is likely to become increasingly involved in Africa—a continent that has traditionally generated relatively little interest in Washington. US interest in exploring and exploiting Africa’s natural resources (particularly oil) will intensify as it seeks to lessen its dependence on Middle Eastern suppliers. Attempts to deny terrorist cells sanctuary and support will also make Washington pay closer attention to activities in several African countries, and seek support from governments throughout the region with which it historically has not enjoyed particularly close ties. Will this renewed interest be a net positive? Will it result in greater resources for African efforts to counter terrorism and resolve conflicts? Or will it support corrupt regimes at the expense of much needed democratic reforms and development initiatives that promise to benefit the average citizen and not the country’s elite?

Recommendations

Greater self-sufficiency

Africans must create a healthy financial basis for their mechanisms and undertakings. They continue to rely too heavily on outside sources for financial and material support. The problems inherent in such a modus operandi were clear back in the early 1980s when the OAU undertook its peacekeeping missions in Chad. When France and the US withdrew its support, the mission came to an abrupt end. Moreover, their limited support paved the way for Hissène Habré’s forces to overthrow the government of Goukouni Weddeye. The situation has not appreciably changed over the past 20 years. For example, the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau was dependent on France to deploy. This force similarly suffered operational deficiencies and succeeded in monitoring another coup.49 This is not to say that Africans should not seek foreign support for their peacekeeping initiatives, or that their undertakings are not worthy of support. Rather, when Africans rely excessively on foreign aid, their chances for success become more complicated. This is true not just for missions, but also regarding training. The activities of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre have been suspended and its future is now very much in doubt after its major backer, Denmark, withdrew its support in March 2002.

Focus on realistic goals

Given the limited resources of African countries and their regional organisations, it is incumbent on them to utilise their assets intelligently. This is not to suggest that resources have been wasted on procurements. Though this may indeed be the case, it would not be so unusual, and is not likely to have been undertaken on a scale to cause unnecessary worry. Rather, the greater concern rests on the questionable allocation of human resources. As already noted, secretariat staffs are much too small to handle the demands placed on them. Their productivity is further diminished when they are tasked with projects that are unrealistic or will likely yield few benefits. There is, perhaps, no better example of this than attempts to field stand-by forces for peacekeeping duties, let alone a standing army. While there is nothing inherently wrong with ‘thinking big’, and while the maxim that ‘Rome wasn’t built in a day’, may sometimes hold, neither of these constructs is applicable here. Money and effort devoted to such projects can be better used on shorter-term goals that promise to yield immediate results. Examples would include hiring additional capable and motivated staff to form a nucleus of in-house expertise to plan and run missions.

Harmonisation of donor agendas and African needs

For some time it has been clear what African countries lack when undertaking peacekeeping operations, but donors have been slow to accommodate them—although there are indications that this is changing. At the risk of minimising some important shortcomings, there are three principal areas that need to be addressed as a matter of priority.
  • First, Africans need help to field a peacekeeping mission. While some neighbouring countries may be able to deploy economically and in short order, their participation may not foster peace. To democratise the force and introduce much-needed checks and balances, it is important to introduce contingents from countries believed to be neutral—or at least less obviously biased—in the conflict, which often means those from states that are not neighbours.

  • Second, more must be done to help sustain the force. When troops (eventually) arrive to undertake their sensitive tasks without sufficient stores, and when resupply proves slow and sporadic, the troops are left to fend for themselves and often live off the land. The peacekeepers too often compete for scarce resources with, or, worse, prey on those whom they are supposed to be helping.

  • And third, command and control needs to be substantially strengthened—both between headquarters and the operation’s headquarters, as well as throughout the mission area itself.
Each of the P-3 countries has made progress in providing services and equipment to develop African peacekeeping capacities, but much more can be done. Too often, the assistance has been of an ad hoc nature and too little too late. Although France, the UK, and the US tried to initiate an exchange of information with other donors and with African recipients in May 1997, the resultant meeting convened at the UN in New York in December 1997 was fraught with reservations and recriminations. A new dialogue is urgently needed among donors, among recipients as well as within regional organisations, and between both donors and recipients.

Support and develop regional organisations

Despite much rhetoric from both African recipients and Western donor countries about the crucial role regional organisations are to assume, for the most part aid continues to be channelled bilaterally. Both sides share responsibility for this state of affairs, and both sides need to change the status quo. Regional organisations provide the best possible check and balance against abuse. It is necessary to stop paying lip service to these organisations’ importance and to support them energetically: that means giving them appropriate staff in qualifications and numbers, as well as a secure financial base.

A peacekeeping force for Sudan

It is unlikely that any African regional organisation can assume the responsibility to field a peacekeeping force in Sudan. Sudan is a member of the AU, CEN-SAD, COMESA and IGAD. Of these four, only two—the AU and CEN-SAD—have fielded peacekeeping operations in the past.

For the reasons noted above, the AU is unlikely to be able to assume robust or large peace operations for financial reasons even if the political will should exist. Because of the wealth of Libya, the driving force behind CEN-SAD, and that country’s willingness to stake other countries’ military interventions elsewhere in the continent (and it is assumed in the CEN-SAD mission in the CAR), that organisation could conceivably be unconstrained by financial concerns. However, the long-standing tensions between Libya and Chad make such a venture improbable. As for COMESA and IGAD, while both organisations seek to promote peace and security as a central component of their charters, neither has in place mechanisms that make explicit reference to peace operations. Moreover, most of IGAD’s members have not been neutral in the Sudanese civil war and would likely have their potential presence challenged by one of the protagonists.

While an ad hoc coalition of the willing cannot be ruled out, the UN Security Council might decide to authorise a UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan should sufficient progress be made on a cease-fire and a political settlement. Although Africa does not normally rank high on the US political agenda, Sudan is in somewhat of a unique position. For those policymakers in the administration and Congress motivated by strategic concerns, the prospect of exploiting Sudan’s oil deposits is attractive and worth pursuing—perhaps more so in light of the events of September 11. There is also a vocal and energised minority in the Congress among Republican conservatives who might be willing to support a UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan. While these legislators are not predisposed to supporting either the UN or increasing US dues to the World Body, they have exhibited great concern over the plight of Sudanese slaves in the south of that country, and the perceived religious intolerance by the government of the minority Christians.

These two factors suggest that the US might be willing to fund a lengthy and sizable UN peacekeeping force for Sudan, or perhaps generously assist an African organisation or ad hoc coalition to field such a mission. This second option is not as attractive as the first. The US is unlikely to support CEN-SAD given that organisation’s pro-Libyan bias. And Washington remains sceptical of the AU and is still smarting from the millions of dollars it feels it wasted on previous support of OAU peace and security initiatives. As the US is forbidden by law to pay foreign troops, financial constraints will make all troop contributors wary of making any meaningful commitment to any ad hoc force. The result is that the UN emerges by default and merit as the frontrunner for a future peacekeeping mission in Sudan.

Notes

  1. This article is based on a paper presented by Eric G. Berman at the International Resource Group’s Conference on Governance and the rule of law in the Horn of Africa, Mombassa, Kenya, 13 September 2002. It is published in the ASR under the auspices of the Training for Peace in Southern Africa programme, funded by the Royal Norwegian Government.

  2. There were fewer than 1,600 UN peacekeepers in Africa as of June 1999. In December 1993 their numbers were greater than 34,300. In September 2002, there were roughly 26,100 Blue Helmets serving in Africa.

  3. The eight UN-authorised MNFs include the US-led missions in the Persian Gulf (1990-91), Somalia (1992-93) and Haiti (1994-95), the French-led mission in Rwanda (1994), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-96, and 1996 to date) and Kosovo (1999 to date), and the Australian-led mission in East Timor (1999-2000). African countries also participated in two UN military observer/liaison missions in Zaire (1995-96) and East Timor (1999) that were neither official ‘UN peacekeeping operations’ nor authorised by the Council, but nevertheless deserve mention.

  4. In June 2002, a Turkish general was given command of the 18-nation International Security Assistance Force. Germany and the Netherlands are to assume command for the force in early 2003.

  5. In addition to the 36 African countries that have contributed military or police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, five others have contributed in such a manner to Western- or African-led MNFs. The 12 African countries that are members of the UN and have yet to participate in a peacekeeping operation are Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia and Swaziland. Equatorial Guinea has pledged to contribute troops to the new Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR).

  6. The proposed Senegalese-led ad hoc mission for Congo (Brazzaville) that never deployed is not considered in these numbers. The six ad hoc missions that are included, and which did deploy, include the two African MNFs in Zaire (1977 and 1978-79), the Nigerian peacekeeping force in Chad (1979), the presence of foreign military troops in Mozambique (1986-92), the MNF in the CAR (1997-98), and the South African-led mission in Burundi (2001 to date). All but one of the 21 missions undertaken by or with the support of African regional organisations was fielded. The one that has not is included in this number as it has received authorisation and could, in theory, still become operational.

  7. For information on the various non-P-3 capacity-building programmes, see E G Berman and K E Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and culpabilities, Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000, pp 333-58.

  8. ACRI’s long-term objective was to build a peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance capacity in Africa of about 12,000 trained military personnel. Decisions on actual deployment of ACRI-trained troops were to be made by the ACRI partner nations, in response to requests from international organisations, such as the UN or the OAU, or a sub-regional organisation, such as ECOWAS. It was envisaged that ACRI-trained troops could also participate in a multinational peacekeeping coalition, in Africa or elsewhere. For more information on ACRI, see E G Berman, French, UK, and US policies to support peacekeeping in Africa: Current status and future prospects, NUPI Working Paper 622, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, pp 25-27. Available at <www.nupi.no,> (3 September 2002).

  9. The follow-on programme to ACRI was announced by the State Department in July 2002. It has been dubbed ACOTA, or Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance. The new programme will include training, technical and maintenance assistance and the provision of some field equipment. Pentagon officials say it is designed to be flexible and sustainable, but always based on the partner country’s interests and capacities.

  10. Three years after the launch of ACRI training, the near collapse of the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone prompted US policymakers to develop an additional training initiative in parallel to ACRI – Operation Focus Relief. The US committed some $90 million to train and equip seven battalions from ECOWAS member states, on the understanding that these battalions would join UNAMSIL upon completion of the programme.

  11. The OAU has authorised missions in Chad (2), Rwanda (3), Burundi (1), Comoros (3), DRC (1) and Eritrea/Ethiopia (1).

  12. After Liberia, ECOMOG troops served in Sierra Leone (1997-2000) and Guinea-Bissau (1998-99). A fourth mission was authorised in December 2000 for the border between Guinea and Liberia, but it has yet to materialise. The initial troops of a fifth operation for Côte d'Ivoire arrived in the mission area in November 2002.

  13. The mission, authorised in December 2001, became operational in January 2002. Three CEN-SAD member states—Djibouti, Libya and Sudan—contributed troops to the force. With CEMAC deciding in early October 2002 to send a mission to the CAR, CEN-SAD agreed to withdraw its troops from that country once the CEMAC force had deployed. The planned-for arrival of a Burkinabe company to join the CEN-SAD operation later in October was therefore called off. Interview with UN official, 25 November 2002, by telephone.

  14. The AU replaced the OAU in July 2002, although some structures of the OAU continue to be operational.

  15. The organisation closed its doors in September 2001.

  16. This is a representative and not a comprehensive list. Some of their structures are undeveloped or dormant. For additional information on AMU, EAC, ECCAS, and IGAD, see Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and culpabilities, pp 193-209.

  17. Interviews with diplomatic officials from SADC countries, September and October 1998, Southern Africa.

  18. ECOWAS permitted Liberia to join the Council as the tenth member in response to that country’s sensitivities about the appointment of Guinea and Sierra Leone to the Council. Interview with Col. Dixon Dikio, Military Adviser, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, 17 April 2002, Abuja.

  19. J Cilliers, "Peace, security and democracy in Africa?: A summary of outcomes from the 2002 OAU/AU summits in Durban, Occasional Paper No. 60, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, August 2002. Available at <www.issafrica.org,> (9 September 2002).

  20. Written correspondence with J Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies, 9 May 2001.

  21. Written correspondence with S Ibok, Director, Political Affairs Department, OAU Secretariat, 14 June 2001. The situation has not demonstrably improved since then.

  22. This figure was subsequently changed to six per cent. The annual OAU budget in recent years was roughly $30 million. See Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and culpabilities, pp 65-66, and E G Berman and K E Sams, The peacekeeping capacities of African regional organisations, Journal of Conflict, Security & Development 2(1), 2002, p 36.

  23. Interview with Col. Festus Aboagye, Senior Military Expert, OAU Secretariat, 21 February 2002, Dar es Salaam.

  24. Interview with Adrienne Diop, Director, Department of Communications, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, 16 April 2002, Abuja.

  25. Ghana essentially chose not to pursue the programme, but remained eligible. For Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda, the decision was made for them because of political considerations.

  26. Ethiopia may receive training under the new ACOTA programme, now that the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has concluded.

  27. Based on written correspondence with S Fisher, Political-Military Adviser, African Crisis Response Initiative Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, 10 July 2002.

  28. Known as Exercise Guidimakha, African countries that contributed troops included Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.

  29. Burundi, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, as well as São Tomé and Principe took part in Gabon 2000.

  30. The 16 were all 14 SADC countries, plus Kenya and Madagascar. The operation’s name was Exercise Tanzanite.

  31. The BMATT in Zimbabwe ceased operations in March 2001. London has expressed its intent to establish a similar BMATT elsewhere in Southern Africa.

  32. BPST received its current designation in July 2001. It had previously been called the British Advisory and Training Team Kenya (or BATT (Ken)), and was originally planned to be the BMATT for East Africa based in Uganda.

  33. The depots have been established in Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti.

  34. Uganda, for example, is believed to have used some of its ACRI equipment in the DRC.

  35. Dakar was willing to contribute the contingent as intended, but the UN did not require additional troops as the mission’s maximum authorised strength had been met. Unlike Senegal, both Ghana and Nigeria were already troop contributors to the mission and therefore were able to rotate their OFR-trained battalions into the operation in the normal course of events.

  36. Out of the 5,000 troops ECOWAS believed were needed for that operation, fewer than 800 were deployed. Moreover, this small force was dependent on France. See Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and culpabilities, pp 128-38.

  37. See Col. K Faith and E G Berman, " Synopsis of a study on strengthening the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, An independent report prepared for the UK Department for International Development, 21 May 2002, paras. 11-12.

  38. Interview with West African military official, June 2001.

  39. Written correspondence with Western military official, 13 November 2002.

  40. For example, see E Groenewald, National interests, regional and international obligations, in M Shaw and J Cilliers (eds), South Africa and peacekeeping in Africa I, Halfway House, Institute for Defence Policy, 1995, pp 47-48.

  41. South Africa has also provided a small number of staff officers and military observers to both the UN and OAU/AU missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

  42. Interview with South African military official, June 2002.

  43. The three others mentioned were Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal.

  44. Under the terms of the peace accords, President Pierre Buyoya is to step down next year, a move that many in the Tutsi-led armed forces do not support.

  45. The Constitutive Act of the AU entered into force on 26 May 2001 with the ratification by the 36th state, representing two-thirds of the OAU membership.

  46. D Davies, Preparing for the Union, West Africa Magazine, 3-9 June 2002, p 9.

  47. Cilliers, Peace, security and democracy in Africa?: A summary of outcomes from the 2002 OAU/AU summits in Durban.

  48. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) had a maximum authorised strength of 210 observers. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which replaced UNOMSIL in October 1999, had an initial authorised strength of 6,000 military personnel. This number grew to 11,100, 13,000, and ultimately 17,500 within a year. The second largest UN mission at UNAMSIL’s height was in East Timor, with roughly half the number of Blue Helmets.

  49. The ECOMOG troops deployed between Decem-ber 1998 and February 1999. Their small numbers and few resources largely limited their area of operation to Bangui, the capital of the CAR. Former army chief Ansumane Mane overthrew President João Bernardo Vieira that May.