Feature

ASSESSING SMALL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES
The Nairobi Declaration

---

Thokozani Thusi
Researcher with the Arms Management Programme at the ISS

Published in African Security Review Vol 12 No 2, 2003

In recognition of the devastating impact of small arms and light weapons on a swath of Africa ranging across the Great Lakes, East Africa and the Horn, 10 countries agreed to the Nairobi Declaration in March 2000. the Declaration dealt with the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. In the past three years, countries in the region have made some progress in implementing the Declaration. However, the focus on implementing the Declaration in unison across the region—incorporating countries as diverse as Djibouti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—has slowed progress. This article presents an overview of the challenges experienced by those countries implementing the Declaration. It is recommended that regional and national efforts to control small arms should happen in parallel, but not at the expense of progress in an individual state or on a specific level. A lack of progress at one level (or in one state) should not prevent progress at another.

Introduction

The presence of excessive and easily accessible quantities of small arms and light weapons (SALW) have resulted in devastating violence, displacement, human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law around the world.¹ These arms fuel wars and sustain conflicts between and within states. In addition to increased insecurity and instability, the use of SALW poses a threat to human security and hinders socio-economic development. Recently analysts have started to quantify the economic cost of arms proliferation and found these to be disturbingly high.

The end of the Cold War accelerated the global proliferation of SALW. Arms left in from Cold War-era stockpiles moved into unstable regions. The decade 1989–1999 saw an increase in intra-state conflicts with serious and devastating spill over effects, especially in Africa. Civilians and non-combatants comprised the most number of causalities in these conflicts.² Today many regions of Africa are routinely defined as ‘conflict prone’, especially the Great Lakes region and many parts of Central Africa.

The Great Lakes, Central Africa and the Horn are amongst the most affected regions by the easily availability and proliferation of SALW. A study carried by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey (SAS) on the availability of small arms in the Republic of Congo revealed an estimated figure of 41,000 weapons in the hands of various militias scattered throughout the country.³

In recognition of the disastrous impact and effect of these arms on African communities, African governments have initiated various mechanisms aimed at addressing the problem of proliferation and abuse of these weapons. Amongst these initiatives is the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, the latter forming focus of this article. The two instruments address the problems posed by SALW at both continental and sub-regional level.

The Nairobi Declaration is a political declaration that is sub-regional in scope and envisages a broad partnership between governments, multi-lateral agencies and representatives of civil society groups.⁴ The Declaration aims to provide a comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy that involves, for example, improvement of national laws and regulations governing the manufacture, trade, acquisition, possession and use of arms; weapons collection and destruction programmes; capacity building for law enforcement officers, such as the police, border control officers and customs officials. It also makes provision for monitoring of arms transfers through the establishment of national databases and communication systems. Information exchange between regional law enforcement officers and public awareness programmes are also some of the envisaged strategies aimed at halting the proliferation of SALW in the sub-region.

The Declaration has a practical Agenda for Action and an Implementation Plan, both aimed at giving ‘clear’ guidelines to the member states regarding the realisation of its objectives. The implementation plan has a three-year timeline beginning in 2001 through 2003. However, due to difficulties experienced with the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration, the First Ministerial Review Conference that took place in Nairobi in August 2002 adopted a revised implementation plan. This means that there is a clear and feasible framework that can be used by signatories to take the implementation process forward.

This article aims to locate the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration within a conceptual framework that argues for a synergy between regional and national arms control mechanisms. Such an approach does not negate the significance of initiatives such as the Declaration but argues that putting more emphasis on regional mechanisms is misplaced if it does not also strengthen national structures and programmes dealing with arms proliferation. These should include implementation and training assistance for law enforcement agencies, as well promotion of civil society initiatives.

The article starts with a brief background of the security situation within the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa and of the Nairobi Declaration’s provisions and targets. The second section discusses some of the challenges being faced in the implementation of the Declaration and proposes alternative approaches to resolve some of these. It also outlines a possible framework for enhancing the initiatives aimed at combating arms proliferation in East Africa. This framework argues for a shift towards a focus on national processes underway that deal with small arms proliferation issues. At a regional level, this approach also calls for a shift from an emphasis on a political document (as significant as the Declaration is) towards a focus on enhancing and improving the capacity of law enforcement agencies such as the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) to work in support of the implementation of the Declaration⁵ and individual national departments, such as law enforcement, customs and security forces.

The experience that EAPCCO possesses in dealing with cross-border illicit activities, such as drugs, car theft, cattle-rustling, terrorism, as well as firearms, should be utilised in a manner that ensures that national law enforcement agencies dealing with arms issues are able to do their job effectively and efficiently.

At one level, law enforcement agencies are a natural focus for the implementation of the Declaration since national police services most often respond to small arms issues (e.g. the use of firearms in crime and tracing lost and stolen weapons). However, caution should be exercised when arguing for a shift towards national and regional law enforcement agencies. Such a strategy should not result in the marginalisation of other important role players such as other government departments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or broader civil society. This challenge requires a conscious and deliberately comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy that links regional, national and local perspectives and experiences in dealing with arms proliferation.

It is also important to note that shifting focus to the national level or rather arguing for a synergy with the regional process (with an obvious national bias) will require huge investment in time, resources (and resources transfers), training, implementation assistance and political support from governments of the sub-region.

The regional context

The Great Lakes region has been at the centre of conflict and the proliferation of SALW in Africa. The sub-region has received and recycled arsenals of arms and weapons from the decolonisation struggles throughout the Cold War and its aftermath.

Today both the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa are characterised by major inter and intra-state conflicts, cross-border wars and cattle rustling, and other types of cross-border illegal activities. Conflicts and incidents of cattle-rustling involving Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), northern Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and north-western border area between Kenya and Somalia, continue to threaten peace and stability and consequently hinder prospects for socio-economic development in the entire sub-region.

In Sudan, the government has been battling the main rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) group in one of the continent’s longest and most brutal wars. In Uganda the government has been fighting with the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) since 1989. The linkages between the two conflicts have been reflected in each government accusing the other of providing bases, logistical support and arms to the other’s adversary. The tensions between Uganda and Sudan resulted in the former severing diplomatic links in 1995. Despite these accusations, the conflicts in each country feed the other and result in instability and a continued cycle of violence and rearmament with serious regional implications.

In the DRC more than six countries have, at some stage, been involved in the war fought between the Kinshasa government and two main rebel groups, the Movement for Liberation of Congo–MLC and Rally for Congolese Democracy–National, (RCD-N). Both sides have received explicit backing from foreign forces in what has been described as ‘Africa’s First World War’. At the core of this and other conflicts is the availability and proliferation of SALW as tools of violence. The effects and impact of these arms have been manifest in high levels of death, injury, social dislocation and economic destruction.

Small arms and light weapons also play a role in facilitating and fuelling other illegal cross-border activities such as cattle rustling, drug trafficking and trade in endangered species. In the pastoral communities bordering Kenya and Sudan, as well as those at the border between Kenya and Somalia, there are often deadly skirmishes between communities from either side of the border. Conflict and incidents of cattle-rustling date back about a century but were not characterised by today’s high mortality rates. The availability of small arms amongst pastoralist countries has turned these conflicts into brutal ‘low intensity’ wars.

It is estimated that there are five million small arms circulating among 189 million inhabitants of the pastoral areas of eastern Africa and the Horn.⁶ These arms have increased cross-border raids between the Karamajong and Pokot, the Karamajong and Jie, Dodoso, Turkana, Samburu, Marakwet, Sapiny or Sabawoot, and Bakusu. These conflicts occur in the border areas of North-eastern Uganda and Western parts of the Kenyan border.

As a result of the above situation, some analysts are of the view that, “the Karamoja region is awash with guns that originate from the war in Sudan, northern Uganda and even far field in Somalia and Ethiopia”.⁷ This shows that not only are small arms involved at the centre of pastoral ‘wars’ over scarce water and pasture but also that solving the problem of proliferation and its impact also requires a multi-faceted regional strategy that incorporates legal, political, social and economic solutions.

In the Horn of Africa, Somalia, for years without government authority, is today regarded as the major transit point for weapons to East Africa.⁸ The country has also received attention in the USA’s ‘war against terror’. There have been allegations that terrorist groups such as the Somali-based Al Itihaad are using the country for training and use charitable organizations to transfer money and smuggle arms. Many Somali militia are said to be involved in the trafficking of arms that can reach as far as Ethiopia and downtown Nairobi.⁹ As the ‘war on terror’ expands to East Africa, small arms proliferation and trafficking will receive more attention. It is instructive to note that the terrorists who attempted to shoot down an Israeli plane, as it took off from Mombassa in Kenya in late 2002, used man-portable surface-to-air missiles, categorised as light weapons.¹⁰

The Nairobi Declaration

The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn Of Africa was signed in Nairobi in March 2000. Signatories to the Declaration are tasked with ensuring that they take appropriate national measures aimed at addressing the problem of small arms and light weapons.

Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Djibouti have signed the Declaration. The interesting combination of these countries reveals the nature of historical, political and socio-cultural linkages that define their relations in times of both peace and war. The Nairobi Declaration emphasises and reflects the cross-border dynamic of conflict, instability and small arms proliferation as it affects countries of the two sub-regions of the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa.

The Declaration makes provision for an Agenda for Action and Implementation Plan. These were put in place in November 2000. These were revised at the Ministerial meeting in August 2002. The Implementation Plan provides for a ‘tripartite’ partnership between governments, civil society groups and inter-regional organisations, such as EAPCCO, to work together to realise the implementation of the Declaration. The benefits and challenges of this approach form the next section of this article.

The Implementation Plan is the operational framework of the Agenda for Action based on seven pillars. These pillars set out operational guidelines for the implementation of the Declaration. The Implementation Plan emphasises a regional approach in solving the problem of arms proliferation. This is significant since it recognises that the problem of small arms proliferation in the Great Lakes and the Horn has regional dynamics that involve region-wide networks of gun-running, smuggling, drug trafficking and political conflict.

The Implementation Plan locates national initiatives within a regional context. Although this approach correctly diagnoses the problem and provides appealing solutions, there are still conceptual and operational challenges associated with an overemphasis on regional (political) action as opposed to a balanced shift towards strengthening national instruments, such as legislation, and improving the capacity of law enforcement agencies to deal with the problem of small arms proliferation.

One major challenge resulting from the above approach is how best to coordinate various national initiatives between countries with diverse levels of resources, institutional capacity, legal traditions and expertise. In addition, most countries in the sub-region are involved in conflict. Though these conflicts do not necessarily mean small arms control measures must be put on hold, they do impact on the authority’s ability to regulate small arms (and, where necessary, disarm people) and the latter’s will to do so in conditions of severe insecurity. These challenges affect the work of the Nairobi Secretariat as the institutional body charged with overseeing implementation.



The seven pillars of the Implementation Plan are:

An institutional framework

The Declaration calls for the establishment of National Focal Points (NFPs) and the Nairobi Secretariat. The former is to be established by member states within three months of the signing of the Agenda for Action.¹¹ The NFPs are tasked with co-ordinating with the Secretariat in matters regarding implementation, interacting with other NFPs and civil society groups, facilitating research activities and exchanging and disseminating information on SALW issues.

The signatories to the Declaration designated the Kenyan government to establish the Secretariat in order to co-ordinate the Agenda for Action. The Secretariat is located in Nairobi within the Department of Foreign Affairs. The role of the Secretariat is to ensure effective and productive liaison with and between member states, co-ordinating programs such as the annual consultative meetings, the annual ministerial meeting, annual seminars for NFP, identification of minimum legal standards regarding firearms, and the publication of a compendium of policies, regulations and laws related to SALW in the sub-region.

Regional co-operation and co-ordination

The Declaration has a regional bias, focus and intention. This means the design of programme and other initiatives have a regional scope and utilise regional institutions. The Implementation Plan explicitly stipulates that organisations such as EAPCCO and civil society groups across the region be involved in the activities designed to fulfil the objectives of the Declaration.

The Secretariat is tasked with organising the Annual Ministerial Review Meeting, annual capacity building seminars for NFPs and convening an annual consultative meeting on the status of implementation. The First Ministerial Review Meeting was held in Nairobi, Kenya in August 2002. In this meeting issues regarding progress made by member states in implementing the provisions were discussed.

Legislative measures

The Implementation Plan provides for the promotion of legal uniformity and establishment of minimum standards governing the manufacture, possession, import, export, transfer, transit, transport and control of small arms. Legal instruments will also regulate effective control over manufacturers, traders, brokers, financers and transporters of small arms and light weapons. There has been little progress made with regard to legislative reform and harmonisation of national laws governing small arms.

Operational capacity-building

The desperate resource situation in East Africa means that there is an urgent need to ensure that adequate support is given to institutions such as the Nairobi Secretariat and NFPs in order to enable them to execute their responsibilities under the Declaration. One of the major problems to regional co-operation efforts in many parts of Africa has been the lack of advanced tools of communication. These and other resource needs have a direct impact on the execution of duties and fulfilment of regional mandates.

Control, seizures, forfeiture, distribution, collection and destruction

Most countries in East Africa possess unknown and varying quantities of arms and ammunition. This means there is a need to increase the capacity of states to control and account for SALW in their possession. The Implementation Plan encourages states to put effective mechanisms in place to monitor, account for and trace weapons they purchase and distribute to legal owners (including police and the military), as well as those weapons which are obsolete and those retrieved from illegal owners.

Kenya has set a leading example in the destruction of its small arms in the region. On the 15 March 2003, Kenya celebrated the third anniversary of the Nairobi Declaration by destroying thousands of illegal firearms. This is a good example of commitment to the obligations the country has under the Implementation Plan of the Nairobi Declaration. This exercise is important in the sense that it reduces chances that these arms fall into wrong hands through corruption by officers charged with their safe storage.

Furthermore, law enforcement agencies are encouraged to work in partnership with local communities in identifying and destroying arms caches. They must also initiate voluntary weapons collection programmes through using such incentives as amnesty and immunity from prosecution for those submitting weapons.

Information exchange and record keeping

The problem of arms proliferation and smuggling involves complex and intractable networks of supply and transit; there is a need for countries, especially law enforcement agencies, to improve information exchange and record keeping. Information exchange among law enforcement agencies on syndicate groups and their modus operandi, types of activities they engage in, types of weapons flows, sources if supply, supply routes, destinations, method of transportation for groups engaged illicit cross-border activities can improve their ability to disrupt the cycle of small arms proliferation.¹²

Public awareness

The implementation Plan states the need to design programmes and projects aimed at sensitising the general public on the extent, danger and consequences of small arms proliferation. These should include programmes on responsible firearm possession, storage and proper use of firearms. However, there should also be more focus on reducing ‘gun culture’ as preferable means of ensuring security amongst citizens of states in the sub-region.

The Nairobi Secretariat has already started with the publication of a newsletter called Progress aimed at sensitising the public about small arms issues and informing them about the work of the Secretariat.

The first ministerial review conference

Although it is still early and inappropriate to ‘evaluate progress’ made with the implementation of the Declaration there are instructive challenges that have faced various actors, which can help in mapping a possible feasible approach towards achieving the objectives set out in the Implementation Plan.

Using the time lines set out in the original Implementation Plan as benchmarks for evaluating progress with implementation is inappropriate because the timing was ambitious in the first place. The best way of taking the disarmament debate forward in East Africa is to focus on strengthening complementary action, institutions and activities currently underway at both national and regional levels.

The First Ministerial Review Conference highlighted some of the challenges and problems facing all actors charged with the task of fulfilling the provisions of the Nairobi Declaration. However, as will be demonstrated below, this article argues that some of the more fundamental problems (at a conceptual level) are associated with the manner in which the issue of small arms and light weapons proliferation has been approached in the sub-region.

Thus, although the Declaration provides the necessary political impetus to combat proliferation, there are intrinsic unintended consequences resulting from attention being given to a non-binding political declaration as opposed to working with law enforcement agencies (and increasing their capacity) and/or utilising a legally binding structure to respond to small arms control challenges.

Some of the issues highlighted by the Ministerial Conference include the following:

National focal points

Little progress has been made in establishing National Focal Points and there is a lack of clear monitoring on the part of the Secretariat to ensure that member states follow proper guidelines. Although Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Sudan, DRC and Ethiopia (comprising more than half the signatories to the Declaration), have established focal points, there is little that suggests following the established guidelines and in some cases nothing suggesting an operational institution.

Some of the problems faced by member states when establishing focal points include a lack of capacity to establish a permanent secretariat responsible for the work of the focal point and resources to sustain the functioning of the focal point.

The Nairobi Secretariat has voiced concern about the failure of member states to indicate their assistance needs in establishing focal points and in accessing some of the assistance (including funding) that the Secretariat has earmarked for their activities.

However, others suggest that responsibility for the lack of progress lies with the Secretariat, which has failed to address ambiguities contained in the Implementation Plan. The Implementation Plan requires member states to establish focal points but does not stipulate any criteria for qualification as a recognised focal point.

Thus some member states have established what they consider to be NFPs to have the Nairobi Secretariat refuse to release funds to them because they have not been launched ‘formally’. However, there is nothing that states that countries should first formally launch their focal points before they are recognised. This problem was clearly visible during the launch of the Rwanda focal point. Although the focal point has been in existence for three years it was only formally launched in March 2003 and thus recognised by the Nairobi Secretariat.

This problem needs urgent attention as it obscures work that is currently underway in other countries and deprives them of possible funding. The Nairobi Secretariat should strike a balance between the need for establishing uniformity in operationalising NFPs and in providing support to those member states that are currently engaging in activities aimed at reducing proliferation as mandated by the Nairobi Declaration.

Relations with civil society

Ambiguous and ambivalent relations between civil society, national governments and the Nairobi Secretariat have dogged the Declaration. Civil society organisations have played an impressive role in the formulation of the Declaration. However tensions seem to exist between these groups and the Secretariat. The problems regarding the role of civil society groups in the entire Declaration framework is problematic at two levels.

Firstly, civil society is not homogeneous and possesses different levels of expertise and resources. There are also multiple organisations working on the issue of SALW in the sub-regions. The latter issue becomes more complex when member states are required to select particular groups as implementation partners (i.e. in NFPs). Any resentment or accusations that this creates can be counterproductive to progress. The challenge is thus to be as inclusive as possible without compromising efficiency and the ability to deliver.

Secondly, there is a history of ambiguity towards civil society on the part of most African governments. This was evident at the Ministerial Conference last year. Although some civil society organisations assisted in co-hosting the event, many civil society groups felt they were marginalized and not given adequate room (as partners) to deliberate on the issues discussed. The role and obligations of civil society groups as partners in the fight against weapons proliferation is clearly spelled out in the Implementation Plan. However, during the meeting civil society delegates voiced their disappointment at their exclusion. As one participant pointed out, “Civil society has been locked out of this ministerial meeting. They have not been allowed to give their input to the process. Civil society is attending the meeting as observers, even though the Nairobi Declaration states clearly that they should be full participants in the process”.¹³

The major problem with the inclusion of civil society groups is at the national level. As mentioned above, the ambiguity towards civil society on the part of African governments will impact upon progress achieved by signatory states. In countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda and the DRC, the state remains sceptical of civil society. This can mean that including civil society groups in the NFPs will be a difficult process.

Lack of sufficient resources

There is also the problem of resource mobilization and utilization. Although the United Kingdom Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme provides core funding to the Secretariat, with £500,000 between 2001– 2004, there has been controversy and dissatisfaction about the utilisation of these funds.¹⁴ The money is specifically allocated for the operationalisation of the Secretariat, co-ordination, information sharing and awareness raising as well as capacity building for member states.

However, as illustrated in the case of the establishment of NFPs, there have been accusations and counteraccusations between the Secretariat and some member states regarding the distribution of funds. Notwithstanding this, it is important point to note that the available funds will not be sufficient to support the needs of all the Nairobi Declaration countries, nor should external funds always be necessary. For example existing expertise in institutions such as law enforcement agencies that can be used for training, or the strengthening of national legislation can be undertaken in some instances through national resources.

Over-emphasis on a regional political declaration

Another challenge in the implementation of the Declaration is that it is a non-binding political document. The problem of small arms proliferation is essential a law enforcement issue that requires the strengthening of the capacity of these institutions. Thus where expertise and experience are lacking at national level this should be rectified so that regional action can progress. One of the apparent shortcomings

in the implementation process for the Declaration is that it does not fully utilise the expertise of regional law enforcement agencies, such as EAPPCO, or political organisations, such as the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) that could provide useful support.

Complementary initiatives and processes

As argued elsewhere in this article, there has been an apparent overemphasis on a pan-regional approach to SALW proliferation that does not give attention to complementary and parallel activities currently underway in countries such as Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. This bottom-up approach reveals a variety of activity at the local level.

During the First Ministerial Review Conference, Uganda was amongst countries that reported some form of progress in fulfilling their obligations under the Declaration. Uganda reported having established a permanent secretariat to carry out functions of the NFP on a regular basis. The secretariat is comprised of five officials from the police, Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), Office of the President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. At the moment the focal point is currently finalising a draft policy paper on co-operation between civil society organisations and government in fighting the scourge of small arms. The example of Uganda should be encouraged and could be used as a point of reference for other countries.

The recent destruction of small arms by the Kenyan government is further proof that member states can and are making some progress in activities related to small arms proliferation and should continue to do so without waiting for the entire region to move forward. Such national action has the potential to encourage other member states to take specific actions.

Conclusion

Given the complexity and magnitude of small arms proliferation and the multi-faceted nature of possible solutions, the level of progress within the Great Lakes and Horn regions is encouraging. However, as is being learned, some, but not all, of the possible solutions to the proliferation of small arms are contained in the implementation plan of the Nairobi Declaration.

This article has argued that the Nairobi Declaration is an important process that has given much needed political momentum to the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in East Africa, the Great Lakes and the Horn. However, as with any political instrument, there are still a number of problems and challenges hindering the implementation of the Declaration and therefore calling for new thinking.

Amongst these problems is the focus. Although the Declaration correctly points out the regional magnitude and impact of arms proliferation in the sub-region and locates emphasis and action at that level, there are a number of problems emanating from too much reliance on this approach.

The first and most serious problem is that this emphasis has resulted in the neglect of and lack of support for various national processes required in order to effectively implement the Declaration. While the establishment of NFPs is an important first step, building the necessary laws, procedures and skills within countries must also take place.

Secondly, in relation to relevant actors the implementation plan fails to put give support and put emphasis on the existing work of law enforcement agencies, the organisations that deal with small arms (and other related crimes) on a daily basis. This is a reflection of a lack of institutional synergy between existing law enforcement agencies and regional institutions such as the Nairobi Secretariat and missing opportunities to utilise the former to maximum capacity. These and other issues will need to be evaluated and addressed if the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration is to make real progress in combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Notes