

DEFENCE SECTOR TRANSFORMATION

Challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa

LEN LE ROUX

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region facing many problems and challenges. Many of the countries in the region are experiencing internal conflicts and others are involved in processes of peace negotiations and post-conflict peace building. All these countries face the challenge of defence sector transformation in order to align their post-conflict defence departments and military forces with the demands of democratic societies. This is more than a demand for a reduction in defence spending and requires a fundamental change in defence policies, management and practises. There are, however, lessons to be learnt from other similar experiences in the region. This article examines some of those lessons and presents a generic model for defence sector transformation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Introduction

All too often when speaking of defence transformation the simplistic view is taken that it is synonymous with reducing the size and budget of defence forces. It is taken to be a simple matter of 'guns versus butter'. Furthermore, the demand for defence transformation normally goes hand in hand with the ending of a conflict. When conflict comes to an end, everybody wants the 'peace dividend' and that is seen as simply reducing the budget of the defence sector¹ so that spending on social and developmental objectives can increase.

In reality, defence transformation is much more complex and multi-faceted. It is also not necessarily tied to the ending of a specific

conflict. Defence transformation can also be triggered by major shifts in the international or external environment; internal political, economic or social change; changed normative and cultural realities; or the transformation of government management practices.

The simplistic line of reasoning that defence transformation is all about downsizing the military forces to release money for development is both dangerous and counter-productive. To quote Dr Rocky Williams,

This rather simplistic line of logic (best exemplified in the Structural Adjustment Programme interventions of the World Bank over the past two decades) maintains that a reduction in military expenditure is a 'good thing' in itself and, once effected,

releases valuable resources for the ongoing development of the country concerned. The reality is, of course, infinitely more nuance(d) than such mechanistic equations would have us believe. There is no necessary correlation between reductions in force levels, their budgets and their respective armouries and the ongoing development of a country.²

He cites some examples where ill-considered defence transformation and restructuring had actually bedevilled political stability and ultimately development.

This is not to say that there is no need for defence sector transformation. The contrary is true. Defence transformation must, however, be initiated for the right reasons and within a holistic approach to defence and security.

Strategic overview

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region coming out of an era of conflict and great instability into an era promising peace and stability. The extent of this change from conflict to peace differs in the various sub-regions and individual states but in all of them there is a great need for reconstruction of the state, and the social upliftment of their people.

The states of the region can be sub-divided into four categories of political stability and development which range from relatively stable to those still engaged in armed struggle.

First, there are the relatively stable new democracies such as Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. These countries have undergone various degrees of transformation in their defence sectors and can now focus on consolidation and periodic reviews and improvements of their defence establishments.

Other countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone fall into the second category of countries now in the process of establishing democracy and post-conflict peace building. They have largely completed the processes of demobilisation of the various armed groups and the building of their new militaries. They now face the challenges of developing appropriate defence policies, structures, processes and practise.

The third group are those countries busy with peace processes and the resolution of their conflicts through negotiations. These include Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire. They face the challenge of the fundamental and complete transformation of their defence establishments to adjust to the new realities.

Lastly there are those countries still in conflict and armed struggle such as the Somali Republic and Liberia. No meaningful discussion of defence transformation can be engaged in by these countries until such time as peace is established.

Amongst the Sub-Saharan countries in category one, South Africa is probably the one that has undergone the most fundamental defence transformation. This is due to the truly fundamental political change that occurred in South Africa during the period 1990 to 1994: the demise of Apartheid and the coming of democracy. For this reason, the transformation of defence in South Africa serves as an interesting case study for what lies ahead for many other states in the region.

Defence transformation in South Africa

Defence transformation in South Africa occurred against the background of the political transformation of the country during the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. This political transformation took place under a special set of circumstances, two of the most significant elements being the ending of the Cold War era and the demise of Apartheid due to the visionary leadership of Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk. These circumstances led to a process of negotiation for a political solution to one of the most complex socio-political realities in the modern world. This negotiation process occurred in an atmosphere of relative peace and stability which, in turn, allowed for the different armed forces—both statutory and non-statutory—to also find solutions to their problems around the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield. This climate of negotiation had a strong influence on the open and transparent way in which defence transformation took place in South Africa after 27 April 1994.

In this vastly changed environment it was clear that defence, as constituted and managed during the Apartheid era, had to change fundamentally to align itself with the new South African reality. This demand for change encompassed three major requirements related to transformation: integration, policy change and efficiency.

The first requirement was to integrate the military forces of all the previous combatant groupings into a new defence force. The new South African National Defence Force had to be representative of the demographics of the country especially with regard to race and gender.

Second, there was a requirement for a fundamental change in South African defence policy. South Africa, coming out of its Apartheid isolation, was due to play a much more significant role in the world and especially the African continent. It had a new view on security issues and defence posture and the new government had a new approach to civil-military relations.

Third, it was clear that governmental and societal priorities for reconstruction and development would require greater efficiency in defence spending through the adoption of a new force-design and structure, rightsizing of the South African National Defence Force and the establishment of improved management practices.

Integration

One of the fundamental changes that occurred in the South African defence establishment after 1994 was the integration of all forces into one National Defence Force. During Apartheid South Africa and the homeland policies, defence was fragmented. During this period the liberation movements also created their own armed forces. In the new united South Africa this obviously had to change. The new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was therefore comprised of the integrated forces of:

- the former South African Defence Force;
- the defence forces of the former independent homelands of Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei;
- the guerrilla armies of the ANC (Umkonto We Sizwe, MK) and that of the PAC (the

Azanian Peoples Liberation Army, APLA); and

- the KwaZulu Self-Protection Forces of the Inkatha Freedom Party.

This integration was successful in that it led to the rapid formation of a unified defence force enjoying national acceptance. On the negative side, integration swelled the size of the SANDF well beyond normal requirements. This necessitated innovative rationalisation and demobilisation initiatives, which were not always successful. These initiatives included:

- The Voluntary Severance Packages (VSP) offered to members had the positive effect of rapid downsizing but the negative effect of not rightsizing. In short, this meant that too many of the more highly qualified members left, creating certain expertise gaps. The VSP scheme was unattractive to younger and less qualified members.
- Demobilisation of lower qualified members through the Service Corps was largely a failure. The Service Corps was intended to train members wishing to demobilise in basic technical skills for civilian employment. It was unsuccessful mostly due to a lack of financial support from the government, and the fact that the training was not outsourced to civilian technical training establishments but done by the military, which created inefficient structures for this purpose.

The effect of this was firstly that the SANDF had to carry surplus personnel on its budget for some years and secondly, the loss of certain skills and expertise especially in middle management. This can only be rectified with time.

Defence policy

During the transformation of the SANDF great effort was put into the creation of new defence policy through the elaboration of a White Paper on Defence and a Defence Review. This included a redefinition of security in which human security was brought up to the level of the national security debate. Defence posture, redefined as a primary defensive posture, was brought in line with South Africa's new international and regional relations, and defence strategy and functions were aligned with this posture.

After 1994 real advances were made in ensuring democratic control over the military; greater accountability and transparency in defence management; and good civil–military relations. This manifested itself in the establishment of:

- constitutional provisions regarding the authority of the president as commander-in-chief of the SANDF and his/her authority in ordering the SANDF into service;
- a constitutional provision making a member of cabinet responsible for defence;
- a constitutional provision for parliamentary committees with oversight powers to ensure transparency and accountability;
- constitutionally determined functions of the SANDF;
- a consultative and transparent defence policy process which included the development of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review.
- a civilian Defence Secretariat led by the secretary for defence who was also appointed as head of department and accounting officer. The creation of the Secretariat allowed for civilian expertise, especially in the policy field to come into the Department of Defence (DoD) and also allowed for the military to focus on the core business of the SANDF: the provision, preparation and employment of military forces.

To ensure the institutionalisation and continued sustainability of the new policy paradigm of defence in the democratic environment, a very active and comprehensive civic education programme was instituted throughout the SANDF's education and training programmes.

Efficiency

To maximise the post-Apartheid peace dividend, it was essential that the defence function in South Africa should be executed as efficiently as possible. This led to a project that had, as its aim, to 'ensure adequate, appropriate, affordable and accountable defence for South Africa in the new millennium'. The major objectives of this project were:

- optimising the force design of the SANDF in line with the requirements of the new strategic environment;

- re-engineering the DoD according to a systems approach and establishing appropriate departmental structures;
- achieving greater economies and efficiencies by creating joint agencies such as general support bases and joint divisions (for example, joint support and joint training);
- focusing on core business and the resulting outsourcing of non-core business;
- establishing a viable reserve component;
- establishing information systems aligned with the core business of the DoD;
- institutionalising performance management in the DoD; and
- institutionalising modern command, leadership and management principles and practises in the DoD.

Most of these objectives have been met to a greater or lesser degree. Areas that still require attention are those of the reserve forces, aligned information systems, performance management and institutionalisation of improved command, and leadership and management practises.

The transformation process

All aspects of defence transformation in South Africa were a product of close co-operation and collaboration between various role players. The Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), the Ministry and the DoD played the major roles while civil society organisations (CSO) were involved in all these processes to a lesser degree. This collaboration was not by any measure spontaneous and without initial friction and suspicion, but did develop over time into a mutual understanding and acceptance of responsibility within the respective domains.

The integration process was largely managed by the SANDF itself under the political guidance of the Ministry and was closely monitored and scrutinised by the JSCD. To assist in conflict resolution during this process, use was made of the British Military Assistance and Training Team. The services of this independent team which acted as an arbiter were invaluable to the relatively smooth running of the integration process.

The policy process, which was principally conducted through the development of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review, was a highly collaborative process. Firstly, a draft white paper was drawn up by June 1995. The draft was then distributed for public comment. Over 90 written submissions were received and scrutinised during a three-day session by the drafter, members of the DoD and members of the Institute for Security Studies. Finally, the updated draft was gone through page by page by the JSCD with the drafter and members of the DoD in attendance to answer questions and argue their specific positions.

The Defence Review was drafted by a committee appointed by the minister of defence. This Defence Review Work Group (DRWG) was constituted of members of the DoD, ministerial advisors, representatives of the JSCD, representatives of the academic community and defence-related non-government organisations (NGOs), a representative of the defence industry and a representative of the National Part Time Force Council, as well as the drafter of the White Paper on Defence. The DRWG set up various sub-committees that each included representatives from the JSCD, the DoD, other government departments and civil society organisations. These sub-committees were responsible for specific chapters of the Defence Review such as defence posture; tasks and force design; efficiency; management and structure; human resources; the part-time or reserve component; land and the environment; the defence acquisition process and the defence legal environment. During the process, nine regional consultative conferences and three national consultative conferences were held. After the final national consultative conference, public hearings were held by the JSCD after which the Defence Review was presented to the cabinet and Parliament for final approval in April 1998.

The project, which aimed to improve the efficiency of the SANDF, was managed within the DoD but was supported by civilian management consultants. The force design model was used in close consultation with the JSCD. Many force design options were gener-

ated and in the end the cabinet and Parliament approved the recommended force design. The restructuring of the DoD was done using modern business process re-engineering techniques. Improvements in management were in line with modern management practices and guidelines regarding efficiency and accountability in government were received from the Departments of Public Service and Administration and of Finance.

The outcome of the South African transformation process

Today the SANDF stands as a totally legitimate and generally accepted defence force of the South African nation. This is largely due to the highly consultative and transparent way in which the process of defence transformation was conducted. The Defence Review process, in particular, is often hailed as the most consultative and transparent in modern history. This internal legitimacy of the SANDF is also largely attributable to the importance placed on the normative aspects of the transformation of the DoD. These normative aspects include the crucial aspects of making the DoD representative of the population of South Africa with regard to both race and gender; the implementation of dynamic affirmative action and equal opportunities programmes; and the alignment of defence policy and legislation with the Constitution.

To place this new standing of South African defence in perspective, it is instructive to look at some of the successes and failures of the transformed DoD and SANDF.

- The SANDF is an example of the successful integration of former adversaries into a unified national defence force.
- The SANDF is a defence force under civil control, serving the elected political authority of the country.
- The DoD has adopted modern management practices on which to model the processes and procedures of the department. This has set the basis for efficiency in the management of the defence function.

Of course, all this is not a bed of roses. The South African DoD and the SANDF still face many difficulties. These include:

- further rationalisation and demobilisation of personnel in a very difficult socio-economic climate;
- management of the defence function in a manner that remains affordable and sustainable within the difficult economic conditions facing a developing country such as South Africa;
- establishment of effective defence co-operation and security management in the sub-region; and
- maintenance of military professionalism in an environment placing great demands on the restricted defence budget.

Lessons learnt

A brief look at some of the lessons learnt during the South African defence transformation experience may help other states during their experiences.

The role of parliamentary committees

The provision of, and empowerment through, the Constitution and Law of the Parliamentary Defence Committees was an essential ingredient of the success of the South African transformation of the defence function. The JSCD played a most crucial role in establishing democratic control over the armed forces as well as in establishing good civil–military relations and transparency in defence management. This was achieved through the robust insistence by the Committee on its involvement in all major aspects of defence policy and planning, and its refusal to ‘rubber-stamp’ key policy documents emerging from the Department of Defence. Such a role by Parliamentary Committees is essential when establishing democratic control over the military and healthy civil–military relations.

Involvement of other departments

One of the errors in the transformation of defence in South Africa was the inadequate involvement of other government departments in the defence debate. In particular, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence Department were not sufficiently consulted on foreign and broader national

security policy throughout the debate. The Departments of Finance and State Expenditure were also not fully consulted on aspects of longer-term defence budget planning. This led to the early need for some revision in defence policy. All government departments should be involved, to some extent, in the establishment of practical and sustainable defence policy.

Role of top management

The DoD at first did not acknowledge the role of the JSCD and sent officials at the rank level of Director/Brigadier-General to debate with the Committee and attend the consultative conferences. This caused ill-feeling between the JSCD and the DoD top structure and resulted in lost time and opportunities. Later the minister of defence rectified this matter. Top officials must personally drive transformation and be involved in the debate with the Parliamentary Defence Committees.

Knowledgeable civil society organisations

Civil society organisations can only play a role in the defence debate if they are experts within their own fields. In the South African case this was the reality and it greatly enhanced the debate. Civil society must be involved in the defence debate but must ensure that it has the expertise to do so.

Consultation

The broad consultative nature of the South African defence debate made it a slow and time-consuming process. However, it greatly enhanced the quality thereof and led to a high degree of national consensus on defence. Consultation is imperative for reaching national consensus.

Other lessons from Africa

One of the most important, but also most complex, processes within defence transformation is the demobilisation and reintegration into civil society of ex-combatants that do not wish to integrate or are superfluous to the need. This takes place within the broader process of the integration into a new national defence force of forces previously in opposi-

tion to one another. Such processes were undertaken (or are underway) in Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia and Uganda. These processes have met with varying degrees of success but in general all encountered the same problems. An ISS monograph³ enumerated these problems as follows:

- Former combatants have enormous difficulties in finding employment, or establishing small enterprises.
- Demobilised soldiers usually have very poor prospects for successful integration because of a lack of skills, education, or as a result of serious health problems.
- Psychological adjustment for former soldiers is usually a critical challenge, forcing major changes in attitudes and expectations.
- The resulting availability of 'uncontrolled' light weapons, which are often linked to smuggling and banditry, pose serious risks.
- The propensity of demobilised soldiers to join private armies is an issue of concern.

Certain key lessons for successful integration, demobilisation and reintegration into civil society can be deduced from studies of the processes in the countries mentioned above.

- Integration must be done in a manner that does not simply entail absorption of opposing forces into statutory structures. This requires an impartial facilitator in the process. In South Africa the role played by the British Military Advisory and Training Team in the process of integration was crucial.
- Demobilisation and reintegration into civil society are national concerns and must be conducted as national programmes. They cannot simply be delegated to defence to resolve on its own. Departments of manpower, trade and industry, education, welfare and safety and security must all be involved, as must business representatives wherever possible. Integrated strategies are required for successful demobilisation and reintegration.
- Demobilisation and reintegration are long-term programmes. To be successful, they need monitoring and follow-up over many years.

- Integration, demobilisation and reintegration processes are expensive. In most Sub-Saharan countries international financial support will be required for successful completion of these processes.
- Demobilisation and reintegration must have a regional and local component and must consider the impact on local communities and families. These programmes are best conducted where local communities can get directly involved in solving their local problems of job creation and training.
- Demobilisation and reintegration programmes are about enabling demobilised soldiers and not simply a matter of cash handouts to get rid of unwanted people. In the South African case this was badly handled and many demobilised soldiers are today poor, jobless and living on the streets.
- Integration, demobilisation and reintegration processes have an important psychological component. It is not only about training people for new jobs but also about readjusting people psychologically for successful reintegration into civil society after years of fighting and war. Society must also be prepared for dealing with ex-combatants.

A generic model for security sector transformation

As demonstrated by defence transformation in South Africa, transformation encompasses much more than a simple 'guns versus butter' debate. If defence sector transformation was only about downsizing the security sector, the question arises: 'why not simply close it down and redirect defence spending to other government priorities?' David Chuter, in discussing the question 'what are militaries for?' says

If civil-military relations were only about the reduction of military power, then the sensible thing would be to abolish the military altogether. The fact that this is hardly ever suggested points to two issues; that the military must have some useful role to play; and that civil-military questions cannot therefore be limited to the means to minimise military power. All states pursue a variety of domestic and foreign policies. Sometimes, these policies

need to be underwritten by the use, threat, or the appearance of violence, and the military exist to supply this.⁴

Defence transformation is therefore more than a simple cutback exercise but is more concerned with bringing defence into line with the principles of democracy and responsible and accountable governance.

In attempting to suggest a generic model for defence transformation, one becomes acutely aware of the shortcomings inherent in any generalisation. The intension is not to offer pre-packaged answers but rather to present a theoretical framework for defence transformation. It is in this context that it is suggested that defence transformation programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa could gain from the concepts presented here.

Governance

Defence transformation is in the first instance a question of good governance. This involves the establishment of dynamic democratic control over the defence. To quote Laurie Nathan, 'The common concern is captured by the much-quoted aphorism of the Latin poet Juvenal, *quis custodiet ipsos custodios?* (who shall guard the guardians themselves?)'⁵ Democracy is after all about who decides. In a democracy, the representatives of the electorate must take decisions about the object, roles, posture and policies of the security sector.

It is therefore submitted that the first step in any defence sector transformation programme must be directed at the establishment of democratic control of the military. This will entail:

- establishing constitutional and/or legislative provisions for the relationship between the head of state and the defence force, (including the powers of the head of state in employing military forces);
- establishing political accountability for the defence force in a member of the cabinet;
- establishing appropriate parliamentary oversight over the defence force, (via parliamentary committees for the sector and public accounts committees);
- empowering the minister responsible by strengthening the capacity of the relevant ministry, (measures should include the

appointment of suitably qualified civilians to act as advisors to the minister on matters of policy, strategy and management in the defence department); and

- ensuring transparency and accountability through the establishment of national institutions for supporting constitutional democracy such as a Public Protector, an Ombudsman and an Auditor-General.

According to Nathan,

The methods by which states address this question differ from case to case depending on ideological, constitutional and historical factors. In democratic societies the governing principle is civil supremacy over the armed forces. In other words, the armed forces are subordinate and accountable to the elected and duly appointed civilian authority.⁶

Institutionalising democratic control is not very easy and leads to conflict of interests and frustration. There are, however, certain measures that can be taken to smooth the way. These include the institution of civic education programmes in the defence force to promote professionalism and the understanding of democratic processes, educating members of parliamentary committees and defence ministries in defence related strategy, planning, management and operational processes and by building good relationships between officials and politicians through regular interaction and dedicated team-building exercises. Rocky Williams advises, 'Initially this should focus more on the process of facilitating dialogue between the political and military elites than simply instituting a battery of formal control mechanisms over the security forces.'⁷

If good governance and democratic control structures and procedures exist, this will greatly enhance the capacity of political and defence sector leaders jointly to develop meaningful defence policies, strategies and plans.

Integration, demobilisation and reintegration

To ensure the long-term sustainability of peace, it is imperative that integration, demobilisation and reintegration programmes be instituted and professionally executed. If this is not done, combatants will disrupt the peace process by


turning to crime or using private armies to make a living. All these processes should be seen as national concerns and must be conducted as national programmes. Integrated strategies are required for successful demobilisation and reintegration and they need to be monitored and controlled over a long period of time. These processes are complex and expensive and the international community would do well to provide meaningful support to them; there is probably no better investment in peace.

Nationally, the process of integration must ensure equitable ethnic and gender representation in defence departments. This is important to ensure national acceptance of, and pride in, the defence establishment. Demobilisation and reintegration programmes must aim to involve the broadest range of stakeholders and interest groups to ensure ownership of the process.

Functions and structure

It is imperative that the political decision-makers and the leaders of the defence sector engage in a thorough debate on ends, ways and means. Ends are those outputs that Government requires from the defence force in support of Government's national goals and objectives. These will probably include peace, security, stability and public safety. The primary responsibility for determining the ends of the defence sector rests with government. Ways are those methods (strategic and operational concepts) that are available to the DoD to pursue the desired ends, and are influenced by the government's national policies and posture. The responsibility for determining ways is a dual Government–DoD responsibility with the officials primarily responsible for expert advice to government. Means are essentially the capabilities required by military to execute its tasks. This is expressed in the structure of the defence force. The determination of the means (structure) is primarily the responsibility of the officials of the defence sector in alignment with the ends and ways as prescribed by policy. Figure 1 represents the ends, ways and means variables schematically.

This scale indicates that what government requires from the defence force (ends) must take into consideration that the approved



methods (ways) must be balanced by capabilities (means) and that this requires a determined amount of resources. The scale can be brought into balance by either reducing ends, adapting the ways (moving the pivot left or right) or by increasing means and thus resources. If there is an imbalance or inconsistency between ends, ways and means this will result in a strategic gap between what needs to be done and what can be done. Government must manage this strategic gap. David Chuter, writing on defence transformation says, 'The usual reason for the continual crises in a defence programme is an imbalance between commitments and resources. This occurs for one of two main reasons:

- a political desire for a defence posture which cannot be afforded with the money available; or
- a political desire to hang onto defence roles and tasks which are now not affordable."⁸

In defence transformation, these factors—the ends, ways and means—are the principal factors for negotiation between government and officials. The selections made by government will ultimately determine the cost of the defence force and therefore the long-term resource allocation to be provided through the national medium-term expenditure framework. No meaningful lower-order planning, programing and budgeting can be done without this strategic guidance. These choices and decisions constitute the basis of the performance agreements between government and the senior officials of the defence department.

Efficiency

In the ever-present economic reality where needs will always exceed resources, it is imper-

ative that everything possible is done to achieve the maximum efficiency with the available inputs. In the next paragraphs, some generic measures for efficiency improvement as a fundamental ingredient of defence sector transformation are discussed.

- Many organisations have bloated structures. In the military the term 'tooth vs. tail' is often used when describing bloated administrative and support structures (tail) as opposed to limited operational capabilities (tooth). The solution to this problem should be addressed by using business process re-engineering techniques to ensure that all structures add value to the total process of achieving the desired outputs.
- All civil service organisations must focus on core business and seriously investigate the outsourcing of non-core business. This must, however, be done in a scientific way and careful consideration must be given to the sustainability of outsourced services.
- Management Information is the key to good decision-making and effective control; both are essential ingredients of efficiency. During defence transformation great emphasis should be placed on the development of modern information management systems aligned with the core business of the organisation.
- Performance management should be institutionalised in all modern organisations. The focus of performance measurement should be on output according to set goals, targets and costs. This requires a management approach based on negotiated performance agreements, empowering delegations, trust and reward according to achievement.
- Part-time forces or reserves should be established and used as extensively as possible in peacetime defence forces. In general, there is no need for large standing regular military forces in sub-Saharan Africa. Defence forces can be much more efficiently designed around the concept of a relatively small regular core force and a significantly larger active reserve or part-time component. This can lead to significant cost reduction in defence.

Organisational culture

Defence transformation must also take cognisance of cultural issues and in fact be rooted in the culture of society. Many defence forces in the world today are structured and organised on the value systems of the colonial past. Transformation programmes must ensure that new structures, organisation and procedures are brought in line with the traditions and values of the institutional and national environment. This is probably the most difficult task in the whole process but is of the utmost importance to ensure national consensus and the long-term health of the organisation. Programmes to this effect can only be devised by each individual country and are impossible to standardise.

Sustainability

No transformation process can be considered successful if it is not sustainable. The ultimate aim should be to institutionalise processes that will ensure continued alignment with the ever-changing external environment. This can be achieved in three ways:

- Institutionalising modern management principles and practices. This implies that top management must focus on strategic direction and control and leave operational management in the hands of middle management.
- Cultivating a learning environment in the organisation. No investment in any organisation is of more value than an investment in the talent of its personnel. If transformation is to be sustainable and if change is to be part of the management culture of an organisation, then great emphasis must be placed on education and training.
- Institutionalising organisational culture in alignment with national values and traditions.

Conclusion

Sub-Saharan Africa faces many challenges as the region moves from an era of conflict into a new era of democratisation and peace building. Amongst these challenges is the challenge of transforming the defence sectors of the region to ensure appropriate, adequate, accountable

and affordable defence for the people and nations of the region.

Defence transformation is, however, not just about budget cuts and control. It starts with the recognition of the vital role the defence sector plays in support of government's protective functions. Once this role is recognised, defence transformation should ensure that the sector is aligned with the principles of democratic control. This makes the military subservient to the *civis*, the state, as the elected representative of the people and ensures that the national interest and objectives are served and supported. Defence transformation must furthermore ensure that a balance is reached between the ends, ways and means of the sector. If this is not done the defence force will continually be in conflict with government about its budget. In the final instance defence transformation must investigate all possibilities to enhance the efficiency of the military. Where the demand for resources exceeds their availability, all efforts must be made to ensure maximal service delivery for the lowest input.

The challenges of defence transformation will obviously differ from country to country due to their particular circumstances. The reason for transformation and the specific goals will depend on local political, economic, social, security and institutional circumstances. Every country's experience and every country's starting point will be different. Nevertheless, there are common factors in all transformational processes. The change imperatives normally include changed strategic situations; the requirement for improved democratic control measures; the need for economising and ensuring greater efficiency;

and the need for improved service delivery to the people.

Endnotes

1. In this paper the 'Defence Sector' is taken as consisting of the armed or military forces, related defence departments and ministries, par-military forces, governmental legislative and oversight bodies, other national departments in as far as they interact with defence, civil society organisations involved in the defence debate and sub-regional, regional and international defence and security organisations. The 'Security Sector' includes the defence sector and that involving the intelligence services, the police, correctional services and the judiciary.
2. R Williams, *Bringing the Security Sector into the Democratisation Process – Africa and the Challenge of Security Sector Transformation*, Working Paper Number 2, Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe, December 2000, p 1.
3. ISS Monograph No 59, *Demobilisation and its aftermath I*.
4. D Chuter, *Defence Transformation, A Short Guide to the Issues*, ISS Monograph No 49, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, August 2000, p 11.
5. L Nathan, *The Changing of the Guard, Armed Forces and Defence Policy in a Democratic South Africa*, Pretoria, South Africa, 1994, p 60.
6. L Nathan, *The Changing of the Guard, Armed Forces and Defence Policy in a Democratic South Africa*, Pretoria, South Africa, 1994, p 60-61.
7. R Williams, *Bringing the Security Sector into the Democratisation Process – Africa and the Challenge of Security Sector Transformation*, Working Paper Number 2, Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe, December 2000, p 5.
8. D Chuter, *Defence Transformation, A Short Guide to the Issues*, ISS Monograph No 49, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, August 2000, p 98.