



HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF

The DRC and the UN Security Council

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The response of the UN Security Council to the massive world war in the DRC is characterised by an abundance of rhetoric and a deficit of concrete action. When it has acted, its actions have often been clearly inappropriate, with the token deployment of lightly armed peacekeepers into a volatile area of ongoing conflict. In choosing such an option, it has shown how little political will there is for serious engagement, but also how little the Council has learnt from its own history. This paper seeks to analyse the Council's response to the conflict in the DRC, separating the rhetoric and the appearance of action from concrete measures designed at realising some form of conflict resolution.

Introduction

The history books are full of lessons that have not been learned, and history not learned is history waiting to be repeated. It is certainly repeating itself in more ways than one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). For the second time in recent years, rebels, together with their foreign backers, have swept across large parts of the country in a massive military offensive, sparking a humanitarian catastrophe unparalleled in recent history. Once again, the UN Security Council has covered its inaction with rhetoric, and by sending a token number of peacekeepers into a situation where there is no peace to keep—asking

them to do a peace enforcer's job. They are in serious trouble, and the unwilling but able developed world is baulking at the pleas of the UN Secretary-General to intervene.

Despite its unfortunate status as the deadliest recorded conflict since the Second World War, and the disastrous implications for human and regional security (with the direct military involvement of as many as eight countries), the DRC is an issue generally found on the periphery of Council's field of vision. The body entrusted with the task of restoring and maintaining international peace and security, is essentially a political body, and its actions generally reflect a convergence of

the national interests of its powerful members, rather than genuine humanitarian priorities. With next to no political will among its members to become seriously involved, it has taken but token steps to 'let off steam'—reducing any pressure there may be to intervene in a more meaningful way. In the almost total absence of media coverage, political interest and powerful lobby groups, however, there is very little pressure to bolster sincere involvement anyway.

This paper examines the performance of the Security Council in its handling (or lack thereof) of the conflict in the DRC, by analysing (1) the Council's involvement, from the outbreak of conflict, through the painfully slow and token deployment of peacekeepers (MONUC) to the arrival and departure of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia, and (2) the lack of genuine interest among Council members in bringing the conflict to a halt, which has led the Council to repeat its past mistakes—by taking action that is both irresponsible and dangerous. It concludes with a mixed assessment on what the future may hold for the Security Council and its dealings with the troubled DRC.

Evaluating Council response


The DRC conflict has arguably been marginalized by the UN Security Council. Yet, almost every month for the past five years, the DRC has been given a place for discussion on

the Council's monthly agenda. Council missions have visited the region four times, and Council-sanctioned peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces have been deployed on DRC soil. So how can the rhetoric be separated from the action, and the 'seriousness' of the Council in fulfilling its duty to restore international peace and security be measured?

This article uses a previously introduced 10-level scale of response system as the basis to evaluate the Council's performance.¹ The scale rates the levels of Council expression and response in the following manner:

- 0 No discussion
- 1 Procedural discussion
- 2 Discussion
- 3 Press statement
- 4 Presidential statement
- 5 Resolution: Measures under Chapter VI of the Charter
- 6 Resolution: Provisional measures (determination of threat/breach of the peace)²
- 7 Resolution: Sanctions (targeted at leadership)
- 8 Resolution: Sanctions (targeted at general population)
- 9 Resolution: Passive enforcement (primarily enforcing the status quo)³
- 10 Resolution: Active enforcement (enforcing a major change in the status quo)

Using this scale, it is possible to chronologically examine the Council's response to the conflict in the DRC by plotting the response levels on a graph as follows.⁴



Another world war in the DRC

The DRC conflict did not creep up on anyone, gradually escalating in a manner in which it might escape the notice of the international community.⁵ Its opening was sudden and dramatic. Fighting broke out simultaneously in the east and the west on 2 August 1998, and while Rwanda's attempt to deal a decisive blow to Kabila's government with an airborne assault in the west was foiled by Angolan intervention, anti-government forces and their foreign backers gained ground rapidly in the east. Within the month it had developed into a full-scale war, with anti-government forces penetrating hundreds of kilometres deep into DRC territory, and several countries joining the fray on both sides.

The huge escalation of hostilities was not matched by an escalation in Council response. The DRC government lodged a number of complaints with the UN Security Council, which proceeded to discuss (in informal consultations) the issue on a number of occasions, with the president addressing the press following the discussion (level 3). It took a full month for the Council to formally express itself on the issue, calling for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces in a presidential statement—one rank lower than a resolution (level 4).⁶ This was to become the Council's characteristic way of 'dealing' with the conflict in the DRC in the years to come. It would discuss the issue, after which it would express its concern, call for an end to the violence, the withdrawal of the foreign forces and respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC, without proceeding to take any further action when its calls were ignored by the parties concerned.

Little progress was made in the Council regarding the DRC for several months to come. Africa's world war was being upstaged by a comparatively minor low-intensity conflict in Kosovo, Yugoslavia, and by the breakdown of weapons inspections in Iraq. The next six months would see powerful Council members and their allies waging large-scale bombing campaigns against both countries, which would dominate the world's attention. It was not until 9 April 1999, more than 8 months

after the war in the DRC had begun, that the Council adopted its first resolution on the matter, and recognised the existence of a threat to the peace (level 6).⁷ While the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the Council expressed its readiness to assist in the implementation of a ceasefire, the operational paragraphs of the resolution contained no concrete measures for any particular action. In any case, any political significance its adoption may have had was drowned out by NATO's bombardment of Kosovo and Serbia, and the Council made it clear that it was going to wait for a ceasefire in the DRC before getting involved in conflict resolution.

'Doing something': Peacekeeping on the cheap

The Lusaka Peace Accords and following developments provided an opportunity for the Council (and its powerful members) to move to attempt to ward off accusations of double standards in responding to humanitarian emergencies in the aftermath of NATO's war. In August 1999, the Council adopted its second resolution on the DRC and cautiously authorised the deployment of up to 90 military liaison personnel for a period of up to three months.⁸ Half a year later, small teams (of up to four members) were deployed in only nine locations in the DRC. Notwithstanding the mission's obvious inability to carry out its mandate (largely due to uncertain battle lines and lack of security guarantees), in a resolution extending the deployment, the UN Secretary General was asked to prepare for the deployment of up to 500 military observers with a view to future 'rapid' deployments.⁹

The Security Council's next move came in February 2000. By this time, one and a half years (and at the cost of one and a half million lives)¹⁰ after the outbreak of the war, the Lusaka Peace Accords were increasingly looking like a dead letter, and the Council had little (if anything) to show for its deliberations. Like the liaison officers before them, the observers were unable to function under such precarious security conditions, and the Council, acting on the

recommendations of the UN Secretary-General, decided to send peacekeepers into the DRC.¹¹

With Kosovo still fresh in the international community's memory, and the Security Council's record-breaking response time in approving a peace enforcement operation in East Timor, there was a certain amount of pressure on Council members to present the image that African conflicts had not been completely forgotten by the Council. What followed was a classic example of the adoption of one of the most inadvisable courses of action that the Council can take in such a volatile situation—grey area peacekeeping (level 8 and a half).¹²

In resolution 1291 of 2000, the Council authorised MONUC to “take the necessary action...to protect United Nations...personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”. In theory, such a mandate is not very far from the right of self-defence of regular peacekeepers. In practice, however, the actual use of “necessary action” to ensure freedom of movement and to protect civilians is more often than not seen as a provocation (to be met with a military response) by the parties to the conflict, particularly when the mandate is adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In authorising the deployment of up to 5,537 lightly armed peacekeepers, the resolution provided neither the numbers nor the force structure necessary to even attempt to implement the mandate it provided.¹³

The decision showed how little the Council had chosen to learn from the lessons of its own experiences, and was a clear example of the ‘do something syndrome’.¹⁴ Similar unrealistic mandates had been given to blue-helmet peacekeepers in conflict situations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone, and each case had convincingly shown the dangers of deploying lightly-armed peacekeepers where there is clearly no peace to keep. As Timothy Wallace Crawford points out, such a response may be chosen precisely because it is one of the least costly alternatives, and “to argue that a peacekeeping mission is an implicit threat of

more forceful action ignores the motives of the participating states and, perhaps worse, assumes the belligerents will ignore these motives too”.¹⁵ Although written of peacekeeping in Bosnia, the same can be said of grey area peacekeeping attempts in Somalia, Sierra Leone and the DRC. Grey area (or robust) peacekeeping only works where a relatively stable peace has been achieved, in which the threat is primarily from small remnants of beaten armies or spoilers.¹⁶

It also demonstrated how entrenched the division of labour in the use of ground forces in conflict resolution has become. The powerful members, fully aware of how inappropriate (not to mention downright dangerous) the proposed operation was, approved mandates and force structures for the troops of developing countries that they would not dare approve for their own troops.¹⁷ Furthermore, by using a UN Secretariat-led blue-helmet operation (rather than a multinational operation led by a powerful developed country), they set up the UN Secretariat as a convenient scapegoat for when things started to go wrong—an escape technique used (to great effect) by Western politicians during and after operations in Somalia and Bosnia.¹⁸

Other Measures: The rhetoric and the reality

Naturally, the mission did not get off the ground. It would be another full year before the conditions allowed peacekeepers to be fielded in the DRC, and even then it was a token and largely impotent force. But the Security Council should not necessarily be judged by whether or not it was able to field a peacekeeping force or by how big the force is. Besides the fact that peacekeepers should never have been deployed in the first place,¹⁹ the Council has several other tools at its disposal, not least of all the application of sanctions (level 7 or 8). Some form of targeted sanctions, or other action short of the deployment of ground troops, may have been effective in curbing the illegal occupation, illicit flows of arms, illegal exploitation of natural resources, massacres and other factors that have served to exacerbate and perpetuate the

conflict.²⁰ Unfortunately, however, such measures were notably absent from the Council's response over the past five years, despite its repeated (and unanswered) demands to stop the aforementioned actions.

The Council quickly recognised the difference between invited (acting under legitimate collective self-defence) and uninvited forces in the DRC, deplored the presence of the latter and called on states that had deployed such forces to bring an "immediate end" to their presence, to little effect.²¹ In all 20 of the Council's resolutions on the DRC it expressed its firm commitment to preserving the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the DRC. Moreover, no less than 11 resolutions repeatedly demanded that uninvited foreign forces be withdrawn.²² The Council also demanded that states cease their support for armed groups in the DRC in a total of nine resolutions. Unfortunately, there were no consequences for non-compliance in either instance.

The Council stated in April 1999 that it was "Deeply concerned at the illicit flow of arms and military material in the Great Lakes region".²³ In February 2000 it called upon "all concerned to halt such flows, and expresses its intention to consider this issue further".²⁴ This 'concern' did not translate into action. Despite the continuous and abundant flow of illicit arms into the DRC that have made the continuation of conflict possible, a ban on arms sales to the parties to the conflict would not be applied until a full five years after the start of the conflict.²⁵

The illegal exploitation of natural resources—one of the greatest driving forces behind the entire conflict—was another topic of concern in Council rhetoric that did not translate into action. The Council expressed its concern about such exploitation at an early stage in the conflict, recognised the link between exploitation and the continuation of conflict,²⁶ and set up a panel to investigate. In response to a damning report by the panel,²⁷ the Council, in June 2001, reaffirmed "that it attaches the highest importance to the cessation of the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and reaffirms that it is ready to consider the necessary

actions to put an end to this exploitation".²⁸ Two years later, the Council had very little to show for its demands and deliberations, with the exception of the final report of its panel of experts and some recommendations.²⁹

Deplored and demanding a stop to massacres, and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights also featured frequently in Council resolutions. As early as April 1999, the Council, condemning the massacres, called for an investigation "with a view to bringing to justice those responsible".³⁰ It explicitly condemned the massacres in the DRC in 7 resolutions over the years, at times calling for investigations, at other times stressing that there would be no impunity for the perpetrators. The Council did not set up any *ad hoc* tribunals, however, and it was only after five years of massacres and massive human rights violations that the international community began to consider concrete action (through the International Criminal Court—which can only deal with crimes committed after July 2002) aimed at bringing some of those responsible to justice.

Numerous other demands were made by the Council that were not heeded, including the abstention from offensive action, cooperation with MONUC and humanitarian operations, the demilitarisation of Kisangani, and an end to the use of child soldiers. The Council explicitly expressed in its resolutions on numerous occasions "its readiness to consider possible measures which could be imposed in accordance with its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations in case of failure by parties to comply fully with this resolution".³¹ Yet, concrete measures simply did not eventuate, despite an almost complete failure to comply with the Council's demands by the parties to the conflict.

A number of other measures were considered by the Council that were not followed through. One example was the proposed deployment of a "curtain of troops" along the DRC's eastern borders (particularly during the withdrawal of foreign forces) to prevent cross-border incursions, to build confidence, and to enhance the stability of the region. Although a peace enforcement mission capable of restoring and maintaining peace throughout

the DRC is a practical impossibility (given the numbers of troops, costs and logistics required), the idea for a less demanding “curtain of troops” was raised during a Council mission to the DRC and considered in a subsequent resolution in June 2002.³² It remained, however, simply an idea. The violence in the wake of the Ugandan withdrawal in 2003 showed the potential necessity of such a force.

It can be argued that the failure of the Council to take concrete measures to become seriously involved in conflict resolution in the DRC is largely a reflection of the apathy of the Council’s powerful members towards a conflict that does not have a significant affect on their economic or political interests. With a media industry utterly blind to its existence, and given the complexity and scale of the conflict, there remains very little incentive to become involved at all.

Still, there may well be more than pure apathy at work here. Reluctance to intervene may also be a reflection of the economic benefits (for powerful Council members) of the continuation of conflict, as seen in the damning report on the involvement of numerous Western multinationals in the exploitation of natural resources.³³ Politically, there are other issues involved, such as the mutual back-scratching by the US and Uganda on the issue of terrorism (with US training for Uganda’s armed forces and Ugandan support for US military operations). Allegations of covert involvement in the hostilities,³⁷ and the blocking of peacekeeping reinforcements also serve to support such theories.³⁵

Bunia 2003: A glimmer of hope?

At the beginning of 2003, after four and a half years of conflict, the death toll was standing at over 3.3 million people (making it the world’s deadliest recorded conflict since World War II). Yet, the Council had neither attempted, nor achieved much of any substance, and the world at large still had very little idea that there was even a war going on at all. With little political will for anything else, the Council and the UN Secretary-General, taking advantage of some very limited progress on the

ground, had begun pushing the limits of peacekeeping. MONUC was expanded to 8,700 military personnel (despite the fact that 3 years after MONUC had been authorised, it had not been fully deployed),³⁶ and peacekeepers began to expand their operations.

It was a recipe for disaster especially evident in the small town of Bunia, where MONUC soon ran into trouble. The limits of peacekeeping were again pushed too far as 700 Uruguayan peacekeepers found themselves barely able to protect themselves (let alone the thousands of civilians who had sought their protection). Caught in the middle of fierce battles, with as many as 20,000 militia vying for control of the town, two peacekeepers were killed, and the situation was increasingly beginning to look like a repeat of bitter past experiences of peacekeeping in Bosnia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone.

For a brief moment the Western media industry, seeing white peacekeepers in trouble and parallels with the Rwandan genocide, picked up the story and ran with it. The Secretary-General lobbied frantically for stronger assistance, and, after considerable delay, France agreed to lead a small stopgap peace enforcement force in Bunia until UN reinforcements could arrive. Although it is the first time in seven years that the Council has authorised a peace enforcement mission in Africa (ironically the most recent was a force for Eastern Zaire that never deployed),³⁷ there would appear to be little hope for a solution that can be derived from such a move.

The tiny force, with a mandate that did not go beyond contributing to the security of the town and its airport, was incapable of controlling the whole town, let alone the broader conflict zone of Ituri or the Kivus. Furthermore, it was to be replaced by an expanded blue-helmet peacekeeping force in just three months. Such a small and momentary deployment could well be interpreted as being another display of the ‘do something’ syndrome. As expected, media attention was fleeting at best. The authority for ground troops in Bunia was to be quietly handed back to the peacekeepers, and while this bolstered force may now be somewhat closer to being able to stabilise that particular town, the peace

and stability of the wider region has yet to be adequately addressed.

Still, it would appear that the involvement in this tiny town in the DRC has served at least to jump-start, or give some momentum to a number of other developments. For example, the interest of the International Criminal Court in war crimes in the DRC was largely inspired by the attention given to Bunia. Moreover, the Council agreed for the first time to ban the supply, sale or transfer of arms to parties to the conflict. In the same resolution, it authorised the increase in military strength of MONUC to 10,800, and authorised MONUC “to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided”.³⁸ How effective these measures will be in nurturing sustained political interest among Council members, facilitating an end to the conflict and contributing to a political solution, however, remains to be seen.

Conclusion

In terms of armed conflict, the DRC can be considered as one of the greatest tragedies since World War II. This is not only because of the death toll, but also because its victims have suffered and died in an almost complete silence, made possible by apathetic policy makers, media corporations, and academics outside the region. This has provided the cover behind which the UN Security Council has hidden for the past five years. The Council has not necessarily been silent: it has made numerous demands, adopted numerous resolutions, and taken a number of steps, including the authorisation of a peace-keeping and peace enforcement force. But the deployment of forces has been largely ineffective and inappropriate, and its demands have been almost invariably ignored, to which it has generally responded by repeating the same demands, without attaching consequences to the failure to comply.

In choosing the use of peacekeeping in response to ongoing conflict (the cheap option that would not directly involve Western troops) and through dangerous mission creep, the Council was repeating some of

the most obvious mistakes of its recent history. Any deployment would have been much more appropriate in the form of peace enforcement with a strong force structure, probably following the curtain of troops idea, and/or in a number of strategic cities and towns. If we maintain a healthy dose of realism and acknowledge the almost non-existent political will among powerful Council members to send in an effective number of troops, however, there still remains the equally important issue of measures short of troop deployment. Measures such as targeted sanctions, legal proceedings against war criminals (or measures that would at least give war criminals some cause to be concerned and refrain from future crimes), and sustained pressure on the parties to the conflict (and their backers) by the Council, were never properly explored.

Bunia appears to have provided a window of opportunity for the Council to acknowledge its mistakes, attempt to correct them, and finally become seriously involved in the resolution of the conflict. Unlike similar situations in Somalia and Bosnia, however, the conflict in the DRC is still hopelessly far from the spotlight of international concern, and hence, the willingness to act by the Council and its powerful members may well rapidly lose its momentum. Thus the question remains, how much did the Council learn from its close call in Bunia? Are its latest measures merely slightly more elaborate examples of the ‘do something’ syndrome? Peace enforcement mandates have been given once again to lightly armed (albeit larger numbers of) peacekeepers. Compliance with, and the effectiveness of, the prohibition of the supply of arms to the parties to the conflict can be considered questionable. Steps to control the exploitation of natural resources have yet to be taken.

The UN Security Council is a political body, and political will is not something that will develop and grow in a vacuum. Bunia has provided some momentum to the peace process, but Council interest can only be maintained with the attention, support and pressure of policy makers, the media, civil society and academia. The DRC appears to be edging towards something that resembles a

political settlement. The time for the Council and the international community as a whole to collectively make amends and begin serious and sustained engagement is ripe. With a death toll that may well be approaching four million, it is an opportunity that must not be missed.

Notes

1. Virgil Hawkins, 'Measuring UN Security Council action and inaction in the 1990s: Lessons for Africa?', *African Security Review*, 12 (2), 2003, pp 61–71.
2. All measures at level 6 to 10 are those adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
3. Not to be confused with peacekeeping, this refers to the authorisation to use force to ensure compliance with a peace agreement, Council resolutions or other measures above and beyond self-defence.
4. The spike at the beginning of 2000 (level 8.5) represents the authorisation of MONUC. As the level of force authorised essentially did not change until July 2003, other extensions, expansions and adjustments are treated here simply as resolutions, rather than the authorisation of a new force. The first and second spikes in mid-2003 (level 9) represent the authorisation of the French-led multinational force, and the adjustment of MONUC's mandate, respectively. See endnote 38.
5. Nor was the conflict unprecedented. Were it not for Angola choosing to join the government the second time around (as opposed to the rebels), one could almost be forgiven for confusing the two world wars that occurred within a span of just two years in Zaire/DRC.
6. See S/PRST/1998/26.
7. UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999).
8. UN Security Council Resolution 1258 (1999).
9. UN Security Council Resolution 1279 (1999).
10. The International Rescue Committee estimated that there had been 1.7 million conflict-related deaths in the DRC between August 1998 and May 2000. See International Rescue Committee, *Mortality in Eastern DRC: Results from Five Mortality Surveys*, May 2000, <www.theirc.org>.
11. The Secretary General did not envision a role beyond that of the observers already authorised. It was simply a matter of fact that the security conditions on the ground necessitated an armed force even for the purposes of observation. See UN Security Council, *Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, S/1999/790, paragraph 67.
12. Grey area peacekeeping refers to an operation occupying the area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement – lightly armed 'peacekeepers' are deployed in an area of ongoing conflict with a mandate similar to that of traditional peacekeeping forces (primarily allowing the use of force for self protection), but the mandate is adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The level of eight and a half is used to reflect the odd and somewhat half-hearted nature of this response.
13. For more detailed discussion on the difficulties and delays of peacekeeping in the DRC, see Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Peacekeeping in the DRC, MONUC and the Road to Peace*, ISS Monograph No. 66, October 2001.
14. Donald M. Snow uses this term to refer to inappropriate or ineffective responses to conflict situations used to project the image (usually in response to pressure to act) of being seriously involved in conflict resolution, when little intent exists. See Donald M. Snow *Distant Thunder: Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World* (second edition), Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 193.
15. Timothy Crawford Wallace, 'Why Minimum Force Won't Work: Doctrine and Deterrence in Bosnia and Beyond', *Global Governance*, Vol. 4, No. 2, April–June 1998, p. 239.
16. E-mail interview with member of the UN Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, November 2001.
17. Developing countries (with higher casualty tolerances) go along with this division of labour because of the level of reimbursement for participation and the opportunity for experience and training for their troops.
18. 'UN-bashing' was an effective component of the then US President Clinton's successful re-election campaign.
19. See, for example, Mark Malan, 'The UN 'Month of Africa': A Push for Actual Peace Efforts or a Fig Leaf on the DRC?', Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, No. 44, 2000.
20. Angola is one example where targeted sanctions appear to have had some effect in curbing the actions of the rebel armed forces (although the evidence is inconclusive).
21. UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999).
22. This does not include calls for withdrawal in presidential statements or statements to the press.
23. UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999).
24. UN Security Council Resolution 1291 (2000).
25. UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003). It is unclear how serious the Council is about enforcing this embargo – it did not set up a sanctions committee as it usually does when applying sanctions, stating instead that it will consider the possible establishment of a monitoring mechanism.
26. UN Security Council Resolution 1332 (2000).
27. UN Security Council document S/2001/357.
28. UN Security Council Resolution 1355 (2001).
29. See UN Security Council document S/2002/1146, and Resolution 1457 (2003).
30. UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999).
31. See, for example, UN Security Council Resolutions 1304 (2000), 1332 (2000), 1341 (2001) and 1355 (2001).
32. UN Security Council Resolution 1417 (2002).
33. See UN Security Council document S/2002/1146.

34. See Wayne Madsen, 'America's Covert Operations in the Great Lakes', Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights and Human Rights and Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, Washington D.C., 17 May 2001, <www2.minorisa.es/inshuti/madsen2>, and John Kamau, 'Is the Congo facing a second betrayal?', *The Nation*, 6 June 2003.
35. See Francois Grignon, 'There will be no excuses for not knowing', *Observer*, 25 May 2003.
36. UN Security Council Resolution 1445 (2002).
37. The Council did deploy grey area peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic and Sierra Leone during this time.
38. UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003). Under this resolution, the addition of this element indicates the crossing of the fine line from grey area peacekeeping into peace enforcement. Until that time, MONUC had been authorised only to protect itself and civilians under imminent threat of danger.