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COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS IN AFRICA

Is there a missing link?

Naison Ngoma
Senior Researcher in the Defence Sector Programme at the ISS

Published in African Security Review Vol 13 No 3, 2004

 

 

Coups and coup attempts are a phenomenon that has ravaged the African continent from the time of independence to the present. Despite the common belief that increased democratic practices should lead to fewer incidents of coups or coup attempts, this appears not to be the case. Despite the political determination not to reward military governments or those that have arisen from extra-constitutional arrangements, through welcoming them into the community of states, the scourge continues. This article seeks to identify other possible explanations for the prevalence of this phenomenon. The suggested models include greed and a crisis of expectations; naivety, ignorance and gullibility; and foreign intervention. The paper also provides a review of the prevalence of coups on the continent and a brief coverage of conceptual factors, which provides some understanding of civil-military relations as well as an indication of what the future holds.

Defining a coup d’état

 

Nowamagbe Omoigui has said this about the military and its relationship with state power structures:
The military has an unrivalled capacity to project force. This makes it an important tool for asserting state authority, enforcing the rule of law, and protecting the nation against external aggression. Unfortunately, such power, if not properly managed, can also pose a serious threat against civil authority as has been demonstrated numerous times in several African countries.1
Graham Evans has defined the concept of a coup d’état in two ways in a manner that is particularly fascinating. Firstly, by defining a coup d’état as “a sudden and decisive stroke of government policy”,2 a coup becomes definitive action that is legal and by its very character designed to achieve some elusive successes. In other words, a coup d’état projects in the most direct manner possible the letter of government’s intentions. Gregor Ferguson reinforces this view with his personal perception of a coup as perpetuating reform and creating a “new order” in which the “country was being saved from itself or from the decadence and frivolity of the politicians who may be accused of weakening or dissipating the national spirit or turning the country into what the fighting men perceive to be a laughing-stock”.3 Clearly, this is not the coup d’état that political leaders dread and that military men and women can hardly bring themselves to utter, even in the privacy of their rooms. From the perspective of ordinary people a coup d’état is the phenomenon that brings about uncertain expectations - the prelude to hope or disaster. This brings to the fore the second dimension of the concept as Evans sees it, which defines the phenomenon as a “sudden and unconstitutional change of government or regime”.4 Other contributors to the subject of coups d’état include Edward Luttwak with his succinctly titled work “Coup d’état: A practical handbook”, and Samuel P. Huntington. Edward Luttwak describes a coup as “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder” and in this manner excludes the use of the military as the major actor responsible for the illegal action, as alluded to earlier in Gregor Ferguson’s similarly entitled book “Coup d’état: A practical manual”. Samuel Huntington has contributed in this regard by placing coups in three categories: “breakthrough”, “guardian”, and “veto”5.

 

As intimated earlier, the mention of the word “coup d’état” tends to be met with stares of bewilderment, fear, anger, or even panic. In a region in which states have been grudgingly described as liberal democracies or at best as electoral democracies and with good reason regarded as either pseudo or virtual democracies6, an in-depth examination of the extra-legal activities is critical. However, although the consequences of unconstitutional removal of a government are severe, the phenomenon has not stopped. Perpetrators have often been subjected to charges of treason and, if the coup is successful, continental and even global sanctions against military governments are applied, as well as isolation designed to persuade them to revert to democratic governance.

 

Coups or attempted coups were a common phenomenon7 during the Cold War era and, to a lesser extent, during the later period, and have continued to be a feature of the African continent. However, in the post-Cold War era, the participation by the military in government is only an acceptable phenomenon if it is in support of civil authorities. The demands of democracy are that the military be are subordinate to political authority. With democracy becoming the norm and a condition for either bilateral or multilateral donor assistance - usually from the western hemisphere, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank - military coups or military coup attempts in Africa have become unacceptable to the point that the African Union has a policy position to that effect.8 The states in the region also have legal provisions making such acts high treason. Arising from such a firm stand, it would not be expected that a coup would be attempted, let alone accepted. In spite of the firmness towards unconstitutional changes of governments, military regimes have continued to exist, as have attempts to replace civilian-led governments by force, although these are not as frequent as in the past. Extra-judicial activities have continued to be a worrisome phenomenon.9

 

Four models of military coups d’état have been identified.10 One model postulates that coups are planned and coordinated by the military at the very top of the hierarchy. The second model is one in which there is a combined civilian-military plot. The participants are generally senior officers and some elements of the government or opposition political parties. In contrast to these two models, the third one – regarded by Ferguson as rather unusual - is externally mounted and involves either mercenaries or foreign troops who may be assisted by some disaffected opposition politicians in the country. Ferguson ’s fourth model is a putsch. This is a clique within the military whose membership may not necessarily be from the senior officers’ corps. It is nevertheless the prevalence of coups in Africa that is of major concern in this paper, rather than the type of coups they may illustrate.

A regional survey

 

The general prevalence of coups d’état, successful and not successful, negatively affects the continent as a favoured destination of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). These occurrences, together with the ones not even reported because of the justified fear that the countries concerned would be deemed unstable, have contributed to the view of the continent as an unstable region. With 80 successful coups, 181 failed ones, and an unknown number of coup attempts between 1961 and 2004, 11 the African region has probably only been outdone by Latin America.12 Omoigui notes that by 1989 “very few sub-Saharan countries had been spared the trauma of extra-constitutional seizure of power.”13 Today it is probably only Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius that have not been subjected to this scourge against democracy.

 

These extra-constitutional activities are disturbing not necessarily because they are frequent or represent a setback to democratic and socio-economic development but because they have continued to occur. This is despite the increasing democratisation of the continent. The graph below (an extraction of data from McGowan) shows the rates of success of these coups.14

 

 

Although the period 1966 – 1970 had the highest rate of successful coups, what is particularly significant is that despite the demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the onset of sustained liberal democracy, there has not been the marked reduction in the incidences of coups one would have expected. The increase in instances of military coups between 1995 and 2001 challenges the general expectation that democratisation brings about a more stable socio-political environment. Indeed, military coups continued to be generally successful throughout the period 1956-2001, as the table above shows. Among the dimensions that may provide an improved understanding of the occurrence of military coups on the continent and possibly the best way the activities can be checked is a conceptual examination of civil-military relations.

A conceptual viewpoint

 

This paper identifies two theoretical approaches – organisational and praetorian models of civil-military relations - as those that best elucidate the broad issue of the manner in which the military and general society interact with each other. The discussion will first focus on the former model and, later on, on the latter one. The decision on which theoretical framework to begin with is not significant.

The organisational model

 

Organisational theory identifies the military institution as an entity separate from other non-military ones.15 Arising from this exclusive character of the institution is the perception of a ‘ military mystique’ - a development that has been worsened by society’s own intrigue with it to the point that the military embodies the very sanctity of the state. The coveted place the military occupies on national days, as it shows its ‘wares’ during military parades and fly-pasts, signifies society’s notion of the military’s elevated position.

 

Organisation theory postulates the officer corps as “an exclusive repository of modernising values and devotion to the ideal of the state as opposed to the regime in power”.16 In the event that the officer corps regards the regime as moving in a direction that it does not consider being in the best interests of the country, it does not hesitate in making the government irrelevant. This point is restated in Thomas Cox’s view of this self-acclamation of the officer corps as a type of notch ahead of the government in the art or science of statecraft - a phenomenon that explains the motivation for some officers to seek the reins of power in the belief that the ruling regime is not as effective as a military-led regime would be.

 

Generally, the military is seen by all and sundry as having the needed abilities to add value to the management of the affairs of state. It is nevertheless important to note that although the military has a certain contribution to make towards the development of a state, this contribution has not always been successful. Eric Nordlinger17 makes the point that the military is not the success organisational theory makes it out to be. Relatively poor economic management and restrained political activity have tended to manifest in virtually all the countries that have had military regimes.

 

Organisational theory further postulates that close cooperation exists between officers and the new middle class or emerging middle sectors of society. During the 1960s the United States policy makers considered such an alliance as the means of resolving the many challenges facing the developing world.18 Military coups of the time were therefore considered as positive! This helps explain the apparent acceptance of military regimes by the big powers during the early years of Africa’s political development until recently, when the continental body firmly resolved not to recognise any regime brought about through a coup d’état. In this respect it may be noteworthy to observe that of the 13 currently serving heads of state who came to power as a result of coups, 12 are from Africa!19 Is it possible that this may, in fact, be a reflection of society’s acceptance of some aspects of extra-judicial activity?

The praetorian model

 

In contrast to the organisational model that posits two significant actors – the officer corps and the middle or emerging class - the praetorian model acknowledges that the military participates in an environment that has a number of other actors. However, the military remains the dominant group and in this sense is assured that most, if not all, of its demands are met. In this regard, South African civil-military relations of the apartheid era - during which period the military was able to get the resources it wanted - provides a firm example of this model on the continent.20 The military in conflict zones or conflict-prone areas such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) may be seen in this light. It may even be argued that the relative significance of the defence budgets on the continent continues to be an indication that the military remains an important (if not the dominant) consumer of fiscal resources.21 Quite often the other sectors of society have “completely (been) in the dark about the budgeting process or the actual amount apportioned to the military”.22

 

The praetorian model also posits the existence of an interaction between the military and society at large and in this regard acknowledges the role of other actors, even if in a diminished role relative to its own. The model emphasises the general expectation by “all groups” that the military intervenes in the running of the country. It also argues, however, that there is an absence of any tension among the actors.23 The model, however, posits a military that is neither autonomous nor neutral in political issues and consequently suggests a society that expects active military participation in the activities of governance. The intervention by the military in Chile and the dominance of the military in Algeria are a matter of record.24

 

Another important dimension that the praetorian model addresses is the matter of intra-military cohesion and in this regard it acknowledges “correlations between the absence of cohesion in the organisation and political fragmentation within the larger system”.25 This view entails that the homogeneity characteristic of the military is not a given, and tends to point to the existence of rivalry within the rank and file of the military. It is probably within this general perspective that counter coups may be understood.

 

It follows from the praetorian model that civil-military relations are considered to be very close, to the point that society ‘pushes’ the military into taking the reins of power, even if it does not consider itself particularly effective in this role.26 It seems, therefore, that the intervention by the military in government is driven more by the conclusion that the country needs it in order to meet the challenges at hand. The extent to which this could explain the continued existence of some coup leaders in government, a fact stated earlier, is a matter for debate. What remains, nevertheless, an important aim of this paper is the search for possible explanations for the prevalence of military coups despite the firm stand against extra-judicial actions.

Searching for a link

 

The search for explanations of illegal removal of governments in Africa, or attempts to remove them, begins with a critique of the traditional democracy-stability link, the notion that states that adherence to a democratic ethos will generally create and retain a peaceful environment. Another possible explanation for military coups d’état may simply be the sheer greed of some actors, who may either be citizens or foreigners, or even represent an alliance of the two. Yet another plausible explanation may be the mere failure by those involved to perceive correctly that the problem may be a combination of naivety, ignorance or simply gullibility-driven motivation. Foreign intervention as a factor is also a matter that cannot be ignored. The democracy-stability link is an appropriate place to begin the search for the missing link in the understanding of the military coups on the African continent.

Democratic governance- stability equation

 

Larry Diamond presents a rather robust argument about the role of democracy in ensuring a coup-free environment today and in the future.27 He postulates that “where civil society is weak and the politics are corrupt and divided, the military will prevail in that moment of opportunity”28 regardless of whether it is distrusted or despised. The converse belief is that with good democratic governance, characterised by an active civil society and corrupt-free politics, military coups will no longer occur. The assumption in this case is that there is a firm link between democratic governance and stability.

 

The belief in a direct relationship between democracy and the likelihood of military coups or coup attempts does not appear to be necessarily true for the African continent. When Nigeria recently had to put down a coup attempt, despite the improved democratic practices of the elected regime following decades of military rule, it was evident that other factors motivated this coup attempt.29 Indeed, despite the post-Cold War era being characterised by increasingly multi-party systems of governance (generally understood as symptomatic of democratic practice), continued coups and coup attempts suggest that the democratic-stability link is weak. Evidence indicates that the adherence to democratic norms alone is no guarantee that states will not slide into the undemocratic tendencies characteristic of an earlier era, as is clear in the table showing the incidence of successful coups.

 

The imperfections that characterise democracy make it rather tenuous to argue that adherence to democratic governance entails a stable environment. This is particularly the case in countries in which democracy is yet to take root. It is, therefore, necessary not to assume a simple linkage between democracy and stability but instead to acknowledge the complexity of a democratic society and seek to interrogate other dimensions that contribute to bringing about a stable environment, free of coups d’état. The character of expectations and capabilities is one such dimension.

Greed and a crisis of expectations

 

Although the African continent has undertaken great strides in peace and development so much that is negative remains that the prevalence of the sort of instability discussed above should really not come as a total surprise. Nowamagbe Omoigui outlines a range of features that have tended to characterise the African continent, including frequent and bitter ethnic feuds30 and the lowest growth rate in terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP).31 The region also has the highest percentage of very poor people in the world, with the majority of poor people living below the international poverty line and having a general low life expectancy. It is needless to mention that the economies in Africa have tended to be the worst performing on the entire globe.

 

As a consequence of all these intractable problems, the continent’s leadership and society strive to achieve a peaceful and stable region through the revitalisation of the region’s economies in order to enhance its capacity to deliver on the numerous public expectations. However, although working towards fulfilling expectations contributes towards keeping peace in deprived societies, it does not guarantee that these expectations will be sufficiently addressed to make the incidence of coups unlikely. Nigeria is a case in point. In fact, the seemingly unremitting rate of coups, as displayed earlier, shows that despite the improvements of sub-Saharan Africa’s economic performance (which is generally considered synonymous with the democratisation of the states) the danger of coups d’état remains high. Society’s expectations have tended to supersede governments’ economic capacity. The solution in this regard would seem to be economies performing beyond the demands made by the general society. Since this is hardly likely, given the general lack of capacity of the states in the region, military coups remain a realistic threat.

 

A more serious situation seen in some parts of the continent is that of low expectations. This is a particularly dangerous scenario in that the general society might have lost confidence in an economy that may either be performing poorly or be improving, but only at a very slow rate. States in conflict - like the DRC, Burundi, parts of the Sudan and Somalia - are often states experiencing declining capacity and expectations.32 Countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia and Sierra Leone conform to the scenario of countries that are improving their economic capacity but with high expectations 33. Both these scenarios provide for a coup-prone environment. It is such environments that are particularly fertile for greed in society and that provide for a coup–prone situation. This greed is made worse by an insatiable taste for economic and political power on the part of some members of the military and civilian sectors.

 

Further contributing to the struggle for scarce resources is what Nowamagbe Omoigui identifies as the “limited opportunities for extra-governmental acquisition of sustainable wealth”.34 He makes the point that this is a common economic characteristic of a continent on which accumulation of private wealth is generally due to “access to state power”, often taking on the dimensions of a “race of gargantuan proportions for control of government power”,35 Such a race, entered into by numbers of political parties participating in national elections, tend towards unconstitutional changes of governments due to their attractive possibilities. Two issues may be identified. Firstly, there are the pursuers of private wealth who will do anything to achieve their goal.36 Once having achieved it, they proceed to ensure that they keep it, under any circumstances - including through unconstitutional means. Since it is essentially the military that holds the ultimate ‘weapon of persuasion’, it is logical to assume that the seekers of wealth would want to obtain the help of the military to access the state power necessary to maintain their wealth. This is in line with Thomas Cox’s view of cooperation between some elements of the military and the middle class in terms of the organisational theory of civil-military relations. While this approach suggests greed as the major driving force, the middle class and its allies may also be seeking solutions to the unfavourable socio-economic and political situation generally characteristic of a major part of the continent. Therefore, both greed and a positive desire to alter things for the better can be and have been the motivation for the use of unconstitutional means to bring about change.

 

Unlike some coups d’état that are elite led, others have been ground based. Sometimes, after a long period of poor economic conditions, people abruptly ‘awaken’ and decide that ‘enough is enough’ and that an immediate change of regime is required and, in the process, invite the possibility of a veto military coup. Almost typical of such abrupt ‘eruption’ by the ‘masses’ are the two political movements in Zambia and Zimbabwe that have ‘change’ as the major part of their names. It is in such an environment that the seemingly popular ‘Luchembe’ coup attempt in Zambia, following food riots, may be placed.

 

However, if inadequate government capacity, society’s unmet expectations, and greed on the part of some members of society have tended to put in motion some unconstitutional changes of government, credulity or, put differently, naivety, ignorance and even sheer gullibility, have at times brought about coups and coup attempts.

Naivety, ignorance and gullibility

 

Yet another explanation for the prevalence of military coups in Africa may actually not have anything to do with the high political or economic ideals one would have associated with those seeking the reins of state power but simply be a result of naivety, ignorance or plain gullibility, principally on the part of the organisers of coups and, to a lesser extent, on the part of their supporters. While these factors can indeed be found amongst the most learned of people, it is nevertheless not unreasonable to argue that the poorly educated are especially susceptible to being deceived or misled. Therefore, since it is an undeniable fact that the African continent has relatively higher levels of illiteracy than other continents, it is more likely to experience an ‘uninformed’ reaction to what are often complex governance issues.

 

The 1990 and 1997 military coup attempts in Zambia represent inadequate attempts to analyse the socio-political and economic challenges that faced the country. The 1990 attempt at illegally removing the Zambian government, undertaken by Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe, was preceded by a chaotic environment that included unprecedented food riots in a country that had generally been regarded as relatively stable.37 The riots were themselves triggered by government’s attempts to adhere to economic reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund.38 The economic austerity programmes continued to prevail during 1997, when the infamous Captain Lungu who identified himself as Captain ‘Solo’ during the military coup attempt dubbed “Operation Born Again” undertook to replace President Chiluba’s government. Although this event has been attributed to Captain Lungu’s compatriots’ excessive intake of alcohol,39 it is nevertheless pertinent to note that the action taken by dissenting soldiers was itself (as was the case in the earlier coup) embedded in a renewed multi-party environment characterised by continued economic challenges and a failure to absorb the demands of the tenets of democracy. Although the failure may be attributed to more than one or two factors, the inability of the military coup perpetrators to perceive that the country was in any event undergoing political and economic reforms of intense magnitude may be explained away as indicative of naivety, ignorance or gullibility.

A case of foreign intervention

 

The prevalence of military coups in Africa may also be attributed to exogenous factors. Foreign intervention as a significant cause of coups or coup attempts is a contentious matter that is often hastily dismissed as nothing but one of those ‘conspiracy’ theorists, ‘bashers’ of Western states and business who are said to always see the hand of ‘colonialists’ and the ‘imperialists’ whenever political upheavals due largely to the poor governance that occurs in their countries. Yet the history of foreign governments and foreign businesses in bringing down governments in Africa has been well documented.40 Tacit support for unconstitutional changes of governments in the region during the Cold War era cannot be disputed. Angola, Congo and even Nigeria are some of the clearer examples where foreign governments and multinational corporations have played roles in subverting some of the governments in the states. The role of foreign intervention has resurged with that of mercenaries and both these open and subtle involvement of foreign actors. The standard motivation factors include new business openings and geo-political interests. The Equatorial Guinea saga and the role that mercenaries were going to play in the removal of the government in that country, with foreign assistance (most likely only foreign businesses) in partnership with some power-hungry local politicians, is a more recent indication of the nature of foreign intervention.

 

It is also a notable factor that foreign intervention may initially take the form of positive moves to contribute to raising the technical or administrative capacity of some military in the region. However the extent to which this remains at the level of altruism is subject to debate. With the constant shifts in geo-politics and, consequently, in alliances that are designed to meet concerns of national interest, it would not be unexpected for foreign donors to maximise their influence in some elements of the military in order to reflect their shifted concerns. The United States’ position on coups in the developing world, outlined in the conceptual discourse articulated earlier, is indicative of this point. Therefore “instill[ing] U.S.-style military discipline”41 designed to mitigate the emergence of military officers who may attempt to pursue an active political life, may turn out to be counter-productive. The training, which will have been given with the intention of uplifting the officers’ professionalism, may in fact turn out to serve their entry into the political field rather than enhance their military knowledge.

 

Foreign intervention as a ‘push factor’ for coups d’état is therefore a matter that cannot be disputed, as mercenary activity is a known element on the continent, and past events - such as those in Angola during the late Ronald Reagan’s presidency and in South Africa during apartheid - testify to governmental participation. However, for how long exogenous actors will continue to be significant in this matter in the face of rigorous continental and international consensus that governments – however detestable – are not to be removed by force but by democratic means is a matter for conjuncture.

Peering into the future

 

What the future holds for Africa in regard to unconstitutional changes of government is a matter one can afford to be cautiously optimistic about, and one that has been well expressed by Larry Diamond in his declaration that:
While the circumstances in Africa today are dire, they are not hopeless. In fact, they offer more grounds for hope than at any time in the past three decades.42
Diamond provides several justifications for this optimism by identifying the counter-trends against the “greed, suspicion, fragmentation, exploitation, violence” that have been associated with politics on the continent. He also argues that the growing acceptance of market and democratic principles among many African elites, the general weariness of violent conflict, the apparent willingness to sacrifice for a more peaceful continent, and the growing intolerance of corruption are all indicative of a continent that demands a peaceful and prosperous future. Diamond also refers to a mass media that “seeks better, more liberal, responsible, and humane governance for the society rather than immediate, material rewards for themselves”.43

 

With the inauguration of the Peace and Security Council (PSC)44 at the continental level, which has further reinforced the African Union’s undertaking not to recognise governments from extra-constitutional action, it may be reasonably assumed that the frequency of such undemocratic practices will reduce considerably, if not disappear altogether. However, the observation that “an army may be ninety percent professional but still coup prone”,45 signifies that classic causes of coups as those discussed above, require careful study if the problem of coups d’état is to be successfully resolved.

 

It is therefore in this light that the essay argues that the democratic governance-stability connection should not be accepted uncritically. The continuation of what Keith Somerville describes as “Africa’s virulent military virus” in an environment that seeks both political and economic pluralism clearly shows that the mere transition to democratic governance is no guarantee that military coups will not occur. A further point that the paper makes is that sheer greed and the crises of expectations play a significant role as ‘push factors’ for these activities. Military coups are prevalent in Africa because of the generally low levels of literacy. Such uninformedness leads the majority of the citizens to respond - or indeed react - to political and economic reforms in a manner that is premised on naivety, ignorance or gullibility. The role of some foreign governments and foreign business is another issue that has been articulated in this article. Therefore, in seeking a sustained solution to this “ military virus” the African Union and its sub-structures ought to supplement the current policy of non-recognition of governments that come about through military intervention and sub-regional military standby arrangements with a vigorous interrogation of the problem. This essay is an effort to contribute to the search for the link that is still missing for a complete understanding of the causes of military coups and coup attempts in Africa.

Notes

  1. N Omoigui, Military Defence Pacts in Africa, <www.dawadu.com/omoigui1.htm>.

  2. G Evans and J Newnham (1998). The Penguin dictionary of international relations, London, Penguin Books, 1998, p 100.

  3. G Ferguson, Coup d’etat: A practical manual, Arms & Armour Press, New York, 1987, pp 17-18.

  4. Ibid.

  5. Breakthrough coups are those undertaken by relatively junior members of the military with the intention of creating a new bureaucratic elite while the guardian coups are those designed to stop chaos and disorder and do not necessarily imply a change in the structural make up of power. Veto coups are those in which the military violently suppresses a general civilian uprising. For details see “Dictionary and Encyclopedia”, <www.wordiq.com/definition/coup>, p 2.

  6. For a lengthier discussion of the character of the African state see L Diamond, Developing democracy in Africa: African and international imperatives, <www.democracy.stanford.edu/seminar/diamondafrica.htm>.

  7. Ferguson regards the phenomenon as a mere fact of political life much the same way as taxes and the lesser aspects of human beings like hypocrisy and personal greed, See Gregor Ferguson, ibid, p 7.

  8. African leaders pledge to oppose coups, support democracy, June 4 1997, <www.edition.cnn.com/world/9706/04/zimbabwe.new.africa/>.

  9. The most recent military coup attempt was planned for 14 August 2004 in Mauritania. The country also had a failed putsch in June 2003. IRIN, Mauritania: Defence Minister confirms coup plot, arrests, August 11 2004. <www.allafrica.com/stories/200408110040.html>. The elaboration of what the concept of a putsch is in contrast to a military coup below.

  10. Ferguson, op cit, p 113-125.

  11. The latest coup attempt in Nigeria has been merely explained away as “a breach of national security”. See also A Borzello, Nigeria probes military on ‘coup’, BBC News World Edition, 2 April 2004, <www.news.bbc.co.uk>.

  12. Rise of democracy in South America, <www.cyberfessays.com/history/88.htm>.

  13. N Omoigui, op cit. See also Samuels Decalo, Modalities of civil-military stability in Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, 27(4), 1989, p 547-578. See also Africa at a glance: Facts and figures 2001/02, Africa Institute of South Africa, 2002, Figure 36 on unconstitutional changes of government, 1952-1999.

  14. P McGowan, African military coups d’etat, 1956-2001: frequency, trends and distribution, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41(3), 2003, p 351.

  15. T Cox, Civil-military relations in Sierra Leone: A case study of African soldiers in politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 1976.

  16. Ibid, 9.

  17. See E Nordlinger, Soldiers in politics military coups and governments, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977.

  18. Ibid, p. 8.

  19. “Dictionary and Encyclopedia”, op cit, pp 3-4.

  20. P Frankel, Pretori’s Praetorians: Civil-military relations in South Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York and Melbourne, 1984.

  21. IDRC, Budgeting for Defence in Africa, <www.idrc.ca/en/env-26229-1-DO_TOPIC.html>.

  22. Ibid, p 1.

  23. Frankel, op cit, p 9.

  24. See <www.hrw.org/backgrounder/america/chile/ chile0903-6.htm> and E. Hermassi, 1972. Leaderships and national development in North Africa, Macmillan Press, London, p. 141.

  25. Cox, op cit, p 9.

  26. Ibid, p 10.

  27. Diamond, op cit.

  28. Ibid.

  29. Nigeria probes ‘security breach’, BBC News, 2 April 2004, pp 1 - 2. See also A Borzello, op cit.

  30. The recent massacre of refugees in a camp in Burundi is a case in point. For further details see C Tomlinson, Massacre of Refugees in Burundi threatens to re-ignite conflict, August 18 2004. <wcco.com>.

  31. M McPherson and T Rakovski, Trade and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Further empirical evidence, African Economic Policy Discussion Paper Number 6, 4 May 2001, <www.eagerproject.com/discussion64.shtml>.

  32. The concept of “failed states” may actually be applied to the majority of these states. For debates on the concept of “failed states” see A Hamilton, Idea of state fatally flawed, August 22 2004. <www.Seattle.nwsource.com/opinion/ 187223_nationalstate22.html> and R Wilde, The skewed responsibility narrative of the Failed States concept. <www.nsulaw.nova.edu/sturgs/ ILSAJournal/9-2/Wilde2,pdf>.

  33. There has been a surge of investments in-flow in these countries and improved economic performance. See Sierra Leone country commercial guide FY2004. <www.Strategis.ic.gc.ca>, O Hesselmark, A country ICT survey for Zambia, SIDA Nov 2002, and J Ngoma and A Toure, Zambia: World Bank supports economic expansion and diversification in Zambia. <www..worldbank.org>; Zimbabwe: Investments, credibility and the dynamics following trade liberalisation. <www.Folk.uio.no/hmehlum/publications/zimcred. pdf> and G Gono, Monetary policy statement: The second quarterly to 30 June 2004, July 2004, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.

  34. Omoigui, op cit.

  35. Ibid.

  36. It needs to be noted that while the general commercial actors may have no desire to acquire or indeed control political power, they would nevertheless not be oblivious to the value of state power and therefore the desire by some of them to facilitate extra-legal activities.

  37. G Machona, A harvest of treason trials, in A Onadipe and D Lord, African media and conflict. <wwwc-r.org/pubs/occ_papers/af_media/ machona.shtml>.

  38. Ibid. See also M Mulenga, A glance at Zambia’s political history. <www.geocities.com/maiddie/ azmhist.html>.

  39. Ibid.

  40. Coups arranged or backed by the USA. <www.krysstal.com/democracy_whyusal01.html>. See also P Goodenough, Zimbabwe says US, Others Behind Alleged Mercenary Coup Plot. www.cnsnews.com and A Talbot, British Guardian backs CIA dirty tricks on Zimbabwe, 28 August 2002. <www.wasws.org/articles/2002/ aug2002/muga-a28.shtml>.

  41. R Newman and K Whitelaw, The military is the key, U.S.News & World Report, November 1 1999, <www.keepmedia.com>.

  42. Diamond, op cit.

  43. Ibid.

  44. The Peace and Security Council was officially inaugurated on 26 May 2004. See also L Goering, Africa nations from council on security, <www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/text/ 2001938792_Africa26.html>.

  45. Omoigui, op cit.