



NEW TERRORISM

Toward an explanation of cases in Kenya

ERIC E OTENYO

New or contemporary international terrorism associated with Islamic fundamentalism and the struggle against Zionism and American interests is a recent phenomenon in Kenya, different to that experienced during the struggle against colonialism. Many explanations have been offered as to why Kenya is being targeted, but have not sufficiently explored its close relationship with the West – especially Britain and the United States, the perceived connection between Israel and the former Presidency of Daniel Arap Moi, domestic forces and government policy. Externally the most important explanations for the increase in regional terrorism are the three waves of global terrorism since 1967, the most recent and significant of which is associated with Osama bin Laden and the Palestinian Intifada. These events reverberated in the region, Sudan and Somalia in particular, but also internally. Both internal and external attribution factors explain the resurgence of new terrorism in Africa. In the case of Kenya, terrorist attacks are associated with the country's internal domestic processes and a naïve approach to broader international issues.

Introduction

On 12 December 1963 Kenya attained political independence from Great Britain. British authorities used the word 'terrorism' to describe the activities of Mau Mau land and freedom fighters.¹ In December 2003, in response to terrorist security threats, the United States (USA) imposed travel advisory restrictions on its citizens travelling to Kenya.²

The two terrorisms are different, however. Terrorism is a concept with a multitude of meanings and manifestations and includes state terrorism, a phenomenon widespread in Africa.³

At the time, the colonial administration in Kenya employed the term terrorism in describing the activities of the Mau Mau peas-

ant uprising (1952–1958). The Mau Mau operated in cells and took secrecy oaths to bind members to their cause. Paradoxically, a revisionist historian, Caroline Elkins, referred to colonial actions against the Mau Mau as terrorism.⁴ Still, Mau Mau terror killed more Africans than British settlers.⁵

The point is that there is no single satisfactory definition of terrorism. Jenkin's summation of Moussaoui's imagery is perhaps the most appropriate: 'Terrorism is like beauty, it is in the eye of the beholder.'⁶

Understanding the Mau Mau has some lessons for understanding contemporary terrorism. For example, the Mau Mau were organised along cells, forced members to abide by tribal oaths, and the applied psychological killings of non-conformists. Modern

terrorist groups of the Al Qaeda type employ similar oath strategies to cement brotherhood.⁷

Yet there are glaring differences, too. Most Mau Mau combatants were captured in forests around Mt Kenya: there is no conclusive evidence that the organisation had national appeal. The movement was disassociated from all global ideological currents.⁸ In fact, Kenyatta's government rewarded loyalists and dishonoured Mau Mau heroes. Being a localised protest movement, the Mau Mau posed a lesser threat than the contemporary diffused Al-Qaeda phantom cells that recently infiltrated Kenya.

In brief, the paper analyses the casual factors in forming new terrorism in Kenya.

New terrorism

Contemporary or new terrorism – especially when associated with Islamic fundamentalism and the struggle against Zionism and American interests – is a recent phenomenon in Kenya. Consensus is emerging on the main characteristics of new terrorism – particularly the increase in religious content and motivation. Increased use of martyrdom, co-ordinated attacks, and escalation of terror networks characterise new terrorism.⁹ Research suggests that, besides having comprehensible intentions, new terror is significantly more lethal in its methods. New terrorism is also more international in scope and takes advantage of available technological advances, including the extensive usage of cyberspace and cellphones. In addition, modern terrorism is capable of using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological, nuclear, and chemical agents. The terror attacks in the US in September 2001 and in Madrid, Spain, in March 2004 demonstrated the increased sophistication of the masterminds.

Evidently, new terrorist organisations no longer explicitly lay credible claim to their criminal actions.

The first sign that Kenya had entered the terrorist circuit was in December 1980 when terrorists sympathetic to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) bombed part

of the world-famous five-star Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi. At least 16 lives were lost and hundred of people were injured. A Jewish family owned the Norfolk Hotel. In August 1998 US Embassy buildings in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, resulting in at least 250 deaths.¹⁰ The attack was directly linked to Osama bin Laden.¹¹ In November 2002 suicide bomber terrorists calling themselves 'Army of Palestine' attacked, wounded, and killed patrons at another Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya. Almost simultaneously, the attackers shot at an Arkia Airline taking off from Mombasa International Airport for Israel. None of the 271 passengers in the plane was injured. Al Qaeda was blamed for the attacks.

Why is Kenya being targeted?

The central question is why Kenya has witnessed the full wrath of global terrorism. So far, the media have been replete with commentaries linking the elite in Kenya to Western interests. While researchers are not agreed on a unified theoretical framework for understanding the causes of terrorism, there are some indicators. Jenkins points out that:

... even if we agree that the suicide bombings are terrorism, experts and journalists take very different approaches to questions like the accusation of the act, or who might be responsible. Some experts would emphasize individual or social factors, seeing the attacks as the product of frustration and anger.

He adds that others point accusing fingers to brainwashing by religious fanatics.¹²

In this article, the popular explanation that Kenya is closely allied to US and Israeli interests is re-examined. Similarly, the proximity of easy-to-reach targets, especially American and Israeli nationals living in Kenya, is a possible variable. There are also commentaries that suggest that African hospitality and – perhaps more accurately – administrative ineptitude, statelessness, and porous borders allow terrorism to flourish in Kenya.

Leading theorist Martha Crenshaw offered similar frameworks for understanding why ter-

rorism occurs in some localities and not in others. According to her, a comprehensive explanation must account for the environment in which terrorism occurs and address the question of whether political social and economic conditions make terrorism more likely to occur in some contexts than in others.¹³ She contended that there are preconditions for terrorism to take place.

Nevertheless, she observed accurately that there is an absence of significant empirical studies of relevant transnational factors to inform policy on terrorism.¹⁴

While these are credible explanations, they do not go far enough in accounting for contemporary terrorism in Kenya. Specifically, they fail to explain why terrorists attacked Kenya twice between 1998 and 2002, and not other African countries.

Two-fold explanatory causal approaches

The literature provides some answers, even though insufficient studies have been done on Kenya's foreign policy – especially its relationship with Israel and the United States.

Some of the terrorists are non-state actors, but they may be clandestinely supported by state operatives. Given that many of the states that supported terrorism were undemocratic and lacked legal structures, idiosyncratic variables are hard to verify. Stated differently, to understand terrorism scholars need to dig deeper into non-official policy declarations. Research must therefore go beyond the interpretation of policy statements and documents. Complementary ethnographic and cultural data would enrich subsequent discussions about terrorism.

From an analytical point of view, at least two perspectives are essential for unearthing the independent variables in question. First, there is merit in understanding terrorism as perceived from the standpoint of the perpetrators of violent action. The focus then would be on internal aspects such as the traits, abilities, and intentions of the perpetrators of terrorism. Second, attribution may seek explanations in external forces, including incentives for terrorist actions.¹⁵ Hence the

reinforcement of discourses that present terrorism as a global challenge. Such models do two things. First, they emphasise the legitimisation of terrorist acts in messianic or Jihadist terms that provide scholars with opportunities to examine the flow of cultural battles within a given polity. In addition, there is the thrust of economic determinism, which, although anachronistic, retains its explanatory power. The connection is apparent: new terrorists have seized this opportunity to attack targets that symbolise economic domination.

Ellis and Killingray, among others, recognise the importance of external factors in the broader presentation of the cause of terrorism in Africa.¹⁶

Islam, foundations, terrorist waves, and internal issues

Several internal conditions and assumptions account for Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism.

Terrorist activities occurred when the economy was at its lowest level, creating the fallacy that poverty triggers destitution and crime – including terrorism. A group of human rights activists have also supported the theory that poverty creates conditions conducive to terrorism.¹⁷ That assertion is not plausible, however, because most African countries find themselves in a similar social-economic predicament. On the other hand, it is cannot be denied that religious and cultural sensibilities are at the root of how terrorism is framed and conducted.

In all probability, the increase in regional terrorism had more to do with the emergence of new terrorist waves globally. At least three waves are known to have been associated with the growth of terrorism, which is directly linked to fundamentalism.

- The first modern wave occurred after the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab world.
- The second, in 1979, was epitomised by the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran and the fall of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Khomeini's support for hostage-taking terrorism gave the world a frightening lesson in state-supported terrorism. The Ayatollah's support is important in the

sense that it encouraged martyrdom.

- The third is associated with Osama bin Laden and the Palestinian Intifada, mainly at the end of the Gulf War of 1991.¹⁸

For Kenya, the third wave is particularly significant. Multipartism emerged in Kenya after 1991. Fearing regime and state disintegration, then President Daniel Arap Moi banned the registration of parties based on ethnic and religious affinities. One of the parties denied registration was the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), which received support from neighbouring Sudan, then home to Osama bin Laden. Sudan had a strong anti-Christian establishment, which was engaged in a military war with the Christian and Animist South. Moi was sympathetic to the South, in part because his Kalenjin are ethnically related to Sudanese Nilotes.¹⁹

Furthermore, in 1993 Sudan gave explicit support to the activities of Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) guerrilla organisation in the North in order to undermine Uganda's support for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), whose leader, Colonel John Garang, was ideologically associated with Uganda's secular leadership. On his part, Garang framed the Sudanese civil war as 'Arabism' versus Christianity.²⁰

Sudan's role in the war against terrorism must not be seen outside the framework of the intention to Islamise the Nile and Greater East African region. It is not surprising that Osama bin Laden found a home in Sudan before moving to Afghanistan. The Islamist government came to power in Sudan in June 1989 and immediately supported the spread of fundamentalism.²¹ Among the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) leadership were extremists Hassan Tourabi, Khalid Osman Moudawi, and Abdel Rahim Hamdi at Feisal Bank. The top hierarchy also included hardliners – foreign ministers Ali Osman Mohammed Taha and Ghazi Salahaddin Attabani. These radicals formulated Trotskyian revolutionary policies bent on spreading Islam, first to neighbouring countries and to South Africa by the year 2050.²² Africa has quietly become the battleground for religious fissures. With several West

African countries already members of the Islamic world, the religious battles are shifting south of the Sahara.

The Islamist radicals found some support in stateless Somalia, a country with an uneasy coexistence with the Nairobi power elite. In the 1960s Kenya's foreign policy was partly designed to check Somali irredentism. Then, there had been talk of creating greater Somalia, which would include parts of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.²³ Strategically, links between Somali-based Islamic fundamentalists and the docile nationalists would always spell doom for Kenya. Now that Sudanese-based fundamentalists were seeking a 'holy alliance' with factions in Somalia, the danger of instability was real. Further concern stemmed from Sudan's support to drought-stricken Somalis rather than to Southern Sudanese Christians facing similar conditions.

Sudan's attitude towards terrorism in Kenya was complicated by the fact that its government provided support to the Islamist group Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union). Al-Islami was founded around 1991, at the end of Siyyad Barre's regime, with the objective of finding a minimal element of 'national' cohesion premised on Islamist ideology. Unfortunately, Al-Ittihad became an instrument of Sudanese foreign policy, declaring a jihad against 'infidels' in the region. The organisation conducted activities in Ethiopia through the intermediary of its large resident Somali population. The Ethiopian government reacted angrily to Al-Ittihad's activities and arrested Somalis living in Addis Ababa and Gedo. The FBI still regards Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) as a terrorist group with links to Al Qaeda.²⁴ As for Kenya, police reports about the November 2002 bombing of the Israeli Hotel in the north of Mombasa attributed the crime to the group's support.

Still, Sudan supported ethnic Somali groups, including the Islamic Oromo Organisation and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromiya (IFLO), based in Ethiopia. Ethiopia has a standing military treaty with Kenya to deter Somali secessionist movements commonly known as the *Shifta*. Former president Siyyad Barre's government

had seriously considered the possibility of unification as a right of the Somali people.²⁵

Traditionally, Kenya had reacted viciously to this possibility, suppressing dissidence. In the 1990s, Somalis were ordered to carry special identity cards. Human Rights Watch groups reported that Kenyan authorities treated thousands of Somalis in refugee camps inhumanely.²⁶ A number of Somalis in the camps were suspected of being agents of Islamic fundamentalism. Reports suggest that the Dadaab refugee camp with close to 120,000 Somalis was a haven for terrorists and bandits.²⁷ Kenya government security briefings were concerned that illegal firearms, other weapons, and a variety of telecommunication equipment were being sold in refugee camps. The situation was exacerbated by the UN's inability to provide sufficient funds for the needs of refugees. In addition, the World Food Programme (WFP) cut supplies to the camp.

This provided an opportunity for the Saudi-based Islamic aid organisation Al Haramain Islamic Foundation to fill the void. Although the FBI claimed that Al Haramain was a conduit for terror cells, Kenya and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) disagreed.²⁸ Later, a connection was established between the foundation and the terrorist embassy bombing in Kenya.²⁹

Millions of Al Qaeda dollars were siphoned to sympathisers through Al Haramain. While a court in Kenya ruled that the organisation's registration be reconsidered, the UN blacklisted Al Haramain.³⁰ In March 2002 the United States blocked funds of the Somalia and Bosnia branches of Al Haramain, claiming that those offices were diverting charity donations to terrorist groups. The idea that the camp was vulnerable to the possibility of radical ideas and training seeping in was never rejected. Not surprisingly, after the suicide bombing incident in Mombasa in November 2002, both the FBI and Mossad moved into the refugee camps hoping to trace leads as to how two-surface-to-air missiles fired at the Israeli passenger jet were acquired.

On the social front, Kenya is characterised as a majority Christian nation (over 65%). In

the eighties and nineties, the spread of Islam in Kenya was undeniable. Part of the problem was that the leadership was insensitive to Muslim citizens. In comparative terms, Muslims regions were perceived as most underdeveloped. Curiously, at the lower primary and secondary levels, schools associated with Christian churches always performed better than most.

For several years, the government allowed and supported evangelical preaching in stadiums and other open-air venues. Invited evangelists from the West preached against the encroachment of Islam. A Pentecostal Church frequented by government officials held seminars and prayer meetings urging salvation and halting the spread of Islam.³¹ Another Pentecostal Church protested government provision of land for the building of an Islamic mosque in their neighbourhood.³² Quiet religious warfare was also evident in song and praise. Several Christian churches conducted open-air crusades in which the implicit message was that the spread of Islam was discomfiting.³³ Importantly, Islam made inroads into the interior of Kenya. Radical Islamic preacher Sheikh Khalid Balala actively opposed government policies in the country and threatened to unleash a holy war. He was stripped of his citizenship in 1994 and exiled to Germany.

The growth of Islam in Kenya directly challenged the Christian oligarchy. Most of the money for expansion of Islam came from the Middle East and the West. As mentioned above, funds were channelled through a host of foundations, including the Islamic African Relief Agency of Columbia, Missouri, and the Horn of Africa Relief Agency (HARA). Others were the Islamic Foundation Kenya, Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), ICNA's affiliate, the Relief-Helping Hand, Mercy Relief International, the Al-Haramain Foundation, Help African People, the Islamic Relief Organisation, and the Ibrahim Bin Abdul Aziz Al Ibrahim Foundation.

The West and external attribution

The second explanatory variable is a reflection

of Kenya's external relations with regimes and non-state actors. An examination of Kenya's relationship with the USA and Israel provides causal linkages about perceptions of the nature of the discontent. The simple conclusion is that suicide bombers targeted Kenya because the country provoked the wrath of Islamic fundamentalists. It is assumed, then, that the role of powerful individuals in the government contributed to creating conditions for terrorist reprisals by embracing policies inimical to the ideological cause of the perpetrators of terrorist acts.

While several plausible explanations, other than conspiracy, account for terror, at least four situational foreign policy factors require further examination:

- the perceived close association between Kenya and the West – especially Britain and the USA;
- the perceived connection between Israel and elements in the former president's government;
- subjective forces associated with the country's self-definition as a bastion for regional peace and prosperity;
- the naïve nature of the elite dealings with various dissident groups across the board.

These factors are not mutually exclusive but reinforce one another. The variables are discussed below.

Situational foreign policy factors

Most accounts assert that Kenya was from the outset integrated into the Western economic structures as member of the bloc's ideological axis.³⁴ At the height of the cold war, the country allied with the US while, initially, Somalia affiliated with the Soviet Union. Regionally, Ethiopia and Somalia switched camps with the former seeking Soviet patronage, but Kenya never faltered in its embrace of Western capitalism. In fact, President James E Carter procured a military agreement with the administration in Nairobi for the exclusive use of Mombasa in its Indian Ocean–Gulf region strategic endeavours. Mombasa was also used for US military operations during the first Gulf War and in Operation Restore

Hope in Somalia. Later, Mombasa became an important base for marines seeking out Al Qaeda terrorists in the Horn of Africa region. The increased presence of US marines provided clear targets for anti-American terrorists in the region.

Importantly, Mombasa is the largest majority Islamic city in Kenya. Since the attacks of August 1998 and September 11, high-level US forces increased their local presence. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents and German and British intelligence officials assigned to the area assisted local authorities in the pursuit of terrorists. The allies patrolled the Kenyan coast and monitored shipping activities into the Gulf area, especially movements toward Pakistan, Somalia and the Arab Peninsular. Besides, while the USA has exclusive use of Mombasa airport for military operations in the region, Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) has a base in Nanyuki.

Kenya also found itself on the wrong side of self-described religious fundamentalists when it supported US initiatives to eliminate Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, then a strong opponent of Zionism. Kenya hosted some 354 Libyan troops trained by the US and bent on overthrowing Gaddafi. Ambassador Smith Hempstone documented this incident in his memoirs.³⁵ The so-called 'Haftar Force' was a covert effort by the Republican administration to use Libyans captured in the wars in central Africa, including Chad, to overthrow Gaddafi. Other African countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, rejected the US offer to temporarily host the clandestine force. Moi and Gaddafi were never friends. Moi blamed Libya for supporting dissident activities against him. There were also claims that Libyan nationals were active supporters of radical Islamic foundations with operations in Kenya. The USA short-listed Libya as a country that sponsored terrorism, but began to soften its stand in 2004 after Libya abandoned a clandestine plan to build nuclear bombs.

The second attribute is an extension of the first. Regionally, Kenya is perceived to be a close ally of Israel. Some powerful members of Moi's administration had business connections with Israeli nationals. A commission of

inquiry into the activities of former powerful Attorney General Charles Njonjo revealed his close links with the Israelis and apartheid South Africa. Nicholas Biwott, arguably the most powerful minister in Moi's government, was a business associate of several Israeli nationals, including wealthy businessman Gad Ze'evi.³⁶ Ze'evi had substantial interests in leading communication and electricity companies. Leading government bureaucrats often considered his numerous well-paying companies as 'retirement avenues' after they left the public service. Furthermore, Israel trained former President Moi's security detail. Security ties with Kenya predate Moi's administration. In 1964, Israel supported the formation of the crack paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) in Kenya. This specialised unit not only provided security for Israel's El Al flights in Nairobi, but was central to Moi's personal security.³⁷

President Moi visited Israel on several occasions, including on private affairs. Even when African countries shut the door to Israel over its occupation of Arab lands – the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and West Bank – in the late 1960s and 1970s, Kenya continued to maintain an open door policy to Israel. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union (AU)) had placed embargoes and asked its member states not to have diplomatic ties with Israel. After the 1973 war twenty-nine African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Only three states did not, namely Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The African boycotts were suspended after the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978, which improved relations between Israel and Egypt. A number of countries established diplomatic relations with Israel, including Congo (then Zaire) in 1982, Liberia (1983), Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon in 1986, and Togo in 1987. At that time, Kenya, Gabon, and Senegal were maintaining strong links with Israel. During President Moi's rule, Kenya established a full-fledged embassy in Tel Aviv. Likewise, Israel has full diplomatic representation in Nairobi.

Israel supported Kenya's agricultural development initiatives, especially in the field of

arid land plant husbandry. This included support to horticulture in the semi-arid Kibwezi, Makueni District area. The Kibwezi irrigation project is a joint effort between the Israeli Center for International Cooperation, Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the University of Nairobi. Additionally, Gurion University collaborated with the University of Nairobi in the area of agriculture.

In brief, Kenya-Israel relations under the the Kenyatta and Moi administrations were warm, causing considerable discomfort to local Muslim groups. For example, the influential Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) in September of 2001 issued a statement calling for an end to diplomatic links between Kenya and Israel, citing Israeli abuse of Palestinian rights. Although Kenya voted for the admission of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as a permanent observer to the UN's General Assembly, it gave little support to Palestinian aspirations to statehood.³⁸ Prominent scholar Ali Mazrui noted that Kenya paid a price for its policy towards Zionism. According to Mazrui, the root problem of terrorism in Kenya is the discontent with those associating with Zionism. He wrote:

Yet the problem of Israel and Zionist power against the Palestinians has to be solved if we are serious about ending terrorism ... Zionism is a political ideology; Judaism is a religion. Can we have a world without terrorism for as long as Zionists power is protected by the United States? The American veto in the Security Council of the United Nations makes it difficult even to reprimand Israel for wrong-headed policies.³⁹

Mazrui's point resonates with Kenyans, especially those of Arab descent. It will be noted that the first major modern terrorist attack on Kenyan soil in 1980 was an Arab response to the nation's support for commandos that rescued hijacked Israeli planes in Uganda, then under Idi Amin, a sworn enemy of Zionism.

The subjective forces associated with Kenya's self-definition as a bastion for regional peace and prosperity is a fundamental reason for the nation's vulnerability to terrorism.

Pundits argue that Kenya is a 'soft target' because it is the third largest economy in the impoverished Sub-Saharan Africa. Besides, the country registered more Western investments than its neighbours and is home to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

Kenya's elite projected itself as 'an island' in a region characterised by war and chaos. The need to defend its image as a Western-style democracy placed it at odds with several Islamic fundamentalist organisations. Meanwhile, President Moi, a devout Christian and member of the African Inland Church (AIC), was not apologetic for his support for radical protestant evangelical churches opposed to Islam. He continued to attend church services and used his vast financial resources to construct church buildings across the nation.⁴⁰ Perhaps Moi regarded Kenya's relative peace in comparison to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan as a blessing. Moi rejected the registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya for security reasons and was criticised for his less than enthusiastic support for Islamic organisations.

The final variable that should be considered is the naïve nature of the elite's dealings with various dissident groups. Under Moi Kenya was considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world and therefore vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. It is possible that terrorists find it easy to infiltrate a corrupt bureaucracy through bribery for services such as passports and banking. Furthermore, a corrupt bureaucracy is likely to be extremely inept and incompetent. Both factors have some merit. A corrupt bureaucracy will not generate enough revenue for social security needs. Buttressed by an insecure border, a poor economy and a decayed infrastructure, the country's vulnerability is obvious. Needless to say, underpaid police are unlikely to be thorough in their jobs. Indeed, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) regarded corruption and poverty as the primary causes of terrorism in Kenya.

It is important to note that individuals associated with 'terror activities' gained admission to the country with connivance of the administration. For example, officials permit-

ted Abdalla Ocalan – the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) – to enter the country even though he was wanted in Turkey for activities described as 'terrorism'. Ocalan, expelled from Syria, had been a most wanted man in Turkey. Turkey accused Ocalan's PKK of the murder of 30,000 people between 1985 and 1999. Ocalan, who was sympathetic to Islamic factions in the Gulf, was eventually captured in Nairobi in February 1999.⁴¹ His capture sparked off protests in Europe, including at the Kenyan Embassy in Vienna. Several Kenyan embassies closed for a few days in fear of terrorist attacks. However, the Clinton administration regarded Ocalan as a terrorist and expressed satisfaction with his apprehension in Nairobi.⁴²

Similarly, Moi's administration – in undisclosed circumstances – provided full protection to deposed Somali dictator Siad Barre, amidst protests from some Islamic organisations. Barre was hosted in a Kenyan hotel before moving to North Africa. He is considered by many to be responsible for the fragmentation of Somalia and the subsequent rise of terrorist groups in the region.

Kenya's history of supporting high-risk individuals is not confined to those from Islamic nations. Kenya supported Afonso d'Lakama whose Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) was operating against the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) government of Marxist Samora Machel. While d'Lakama was engaged in a civil war with Frelimo, he enjoyed Kenyan diplomatic support. Members of the Moi administration also supported factions of the Southern Sudanese secessionist movements. In 1998 two factions were engaged in a shootout in Nairobi.

The list of Kenya's support for groups that were pursuing violent means for addressing their causes included providing refuge to people involved in the Rwanda genocide in 1993/94. The former US ambassador to Kenya, Johnie Carson, reported that one of the masterminds of the genocide, Felicien Kabuga, was protected by members of the Moi administration. The US placed a \$5 million bounty on his head.⁴³ Previously, a gov-

ernment commission of inquiry reported that former Attorney General Charles Njonjo, assisted by South African mercenaries, plotted an invasion of Seychelles to forestall expansion of Marxism on the island.⁴⁴ Besides, Kenya was partisan in regional civil wars in Uganda (1986) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998). Still, a former US ambassador acknowledged that he negotiated the Haftar Force deal because Kenyan leaders were venal.⁴⁵ In short, elements of the ruling power elite made Kenya a haven for groups sympathetic to the terrorist cause.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion has shed some light on the expansion of terrorist activities in Africa. While such an approach is essential in discerning the global state of new terrorism, the African situation has not been well explored. Still, accounting for the causes of a complex issue such as terrorism is a difficult endeavour. The fact that Kenya has been a frequent victim of terrorist attacks and security alerts is eliciting considerable debate and demands intellectual analysis. From an empirical standpoint, few systematic studies account for the specifics of terrorist attacks in Kenya. There are shortcomings in simple explanations that modern terrorists attack American and Israeli interests wherever they are situated. Potentially soft targets exist throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.

Both internal and external attribution factors should be relied upon in identifying the causes of the resurgence of new terrorism in Africa. Briefly, terrorist attacks in Kenya are associated with the country's internal domestic processes as well as with a naïve approach to broader international issues.

In a more general sense, Kenya's entry into the terrorist circuit can be attributed to the distinctive and conspicuous actions of the power elite in Kenya. Seemingly frequent attacks by terrorist cells on Americans and Israeli citizens in Kenya must be seen in the light of the terrorists' psychological disposition that some countries are better 'formatted' for attack than others.

Terrorism cannot be reduced to a few variables. Further discussion on the penetration of terrorist cells in African countries is required.

Notes

- 1 R. Conley, Joyful Kenya gets independence from Britain, *New York Times*, 12 December 1963; see also R A Frost, Sir Mitchell, Governor of Kenya, *African Affairs* 78(313), 1979, pp 535–553.
- 2 M. Gaiho, US–Kenya ties 'better than before', *Daily Nation*, 5 December 2003.
- 3 J Cilliers, Terrorism and Africa, *African Security Review*, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 12(4) 2004, p 2.
- 4 C Elkins, Kenya: white terror, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) documentary, 2002, <www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/2416049.stm>, accessed 12 January 2003; D Throup, *Economic and social origins of Mau Mau 1945–1953*, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1988.
- 5 In fact the connection between the Mau Mau and African freedom is doubted. See J Lonsdale, Mau Maus of the mind: making Mau Mau and remaking Kenya, *Journal of African History* 31, 1990, pp 393–421, and A Cleary, The myth of Mau Mau in its international context, *African Affairs*, 89 (355), 1990, pp 227–245.
- 6 P Jenkins, *Images of terror: what we can and can't know about terrorism*, Aldine de Gruyter, New York, 2003; see also A Schmid and J de Graaf, *Violence as communication: insurgent terrorism and the Western news media*, Sage, Beverly Hills, Calif, 1982, p 60.
- 7 P Williams, *Al Qaeda: the brotherhood of terror*, Alpha Pearsons, New York, 2002, pp 9–12. All members of Al Qaeda were asked to sign agreements that they would devote their lives to the submission of all creation to the will of Allah. They took the oath of allegiance, the *bayat*, to Osama, involving fasting and self-castigation.
- 8 Cleary, op cit, p 228.
- 9 D Brooks, The culture of martyrdom: how suicide bombing became not just a means but an end, in G Hanus, *The compendium: a critical analysis of the Arab–Israeli conflict July 2000 – July 2002*, Gravitas Media, Chicago, 2002, pp 180–183; B Nacos, The terrorist calculus behind 9–11: a model for future terrorism? *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26, 2003, pp 1–16; M Crenshaw, The psychology of political terrorism, in M Hermann (ed), *Political psychology: contemporary problems and issues*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1986, pp 379–413.
- 10 This figure varies according to source. The Kenya government did not verify the actual number of deaths.

- 11 J Scherer, *Terrorism*, 1998, XIII(4), October 1998.
- 12 Jenkins, op cit, p 3.
- 13 M Crenshaw, The causes of terrorism past and present, in C Kegley Jr (ed), *The new global terrorism: characteristics, causes, controls*, Prentice Hall, NJ, 2003, pp 92–106.
- 14 Ibid, p 93.
- 15 H Fritz, *The psychology of interpersonal relations*, Wiley, New York, 1958; K Harold, The process of casual attribution, *American Psychologist*, 28, 1973, pp 107–128.
- 16 S Ellis and D Killingray, Africa after 11 September 2001, *African Affairs* 101, 2002, pp 5–8.
- 17 W Mutunga, Development, terrorism and human rights, Mellefolklight Samvirkr, *Partner NEWS* 7(1), <www.Kenya.ms.dk/partnews/visartikel.asp?id=298>, accessed 19 June 2004.
- 18 For more details on Intifada see J Nassar and R Heacock (eds), *Intifada: Palestine at the crossroads*, Praeger, New York, 1990. Arguably, the fourth wave coincides with hostilities in the Gulf area after the 2003 US occupation of Iraq.
- 19 The Kalenjin ethnic group is classified as Nilotic, along with most Southern Sudanese people.
- 20 G Prunier, Armed conflict in the heart of Africa, Sudan's regional war, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, <www.mondediplo.com/1997/02/02sudan>, accessed 2 February 1997.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 W Laquer, *The new terrorism: fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p 180.
- 23 K Adar, Kenyan foreign policy behavior towards Somalia, 1963–1983, University Press of America, Lanham, 1994.
- 24 P Watson and S Barua, Somalian link seen to al Qaeda, *Los Angeles Times*, 25 February 2002, <www.why-war.com/news/2002/02/25/somalian.html>
- 25 K Adar, Kenya–US relations: a recapitulation of the patterns of paradigmatic conceptualization, 1960s–1990s, in M Munene, J Olewe-Nyunya and K Adar (eds), *The United States and Africa: from independence to the end of the Cold War*, East African Educational Publishers, Nairobi, 1995, p 97.
- 26 A Parker, Kenya: crackdown on Nairobi's refugees after Mombasa attacks, Human Rights Watch, <www.hrw.org/press/2002/12/kenya1205.htm>
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Statements attributed to various UNHCR persons available at <www.hrw.org/africa/kenya.php>, accessed 25 January 2004.
- 29 US State Department, Patterns of global terrorism report, Washington, DC, April 2004.
- 30 M Rosenberg, Al Haramain Foundation, <www.seattlepi.nwsourc.com/national/apafri-story?>, accessed 6 June 2004.
- 31 A Canadian, Dennis White, then pastor of Valley Road Pentecostal Church, and other evangelical pastors and clergy preached a strong salvation gospel. The clergy conducted prayer meetings, conferences, and crusades against the 'southward' spread of Islam into Kenya. Similar messages were carried in several evangelical music cassettes.
- 32 Deliverance Church, leaders, opposed construction of an Islamic Mosque in Umoja, Nairobi, 1996.
- 33 For example, one audiocassette contained offensive lyrics that claimed Prophet Muhammad would worship Jesus: The Mwaura's Praise and Worship Gospel Singers, undated (c 1995/96), especially the release 'Jesus a Mighty God'.
- 34 S Makinda, From quiet diplomacy to Cold War politics: Kenya's foreign policy, *Third World Quarterly* 52 (April), 1983, pp 300–319; Philip Nyinguro, Phd Dissertation United States policy and the transition to democracy in Kenya, 1990–1992, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 1999.
- 35 S Hempstone, *Rogue ambassador: an Africa memoir*, University of the South Press, Sewanee, Tenn, 1997.
- 36 Africa intelligence, a bad debtor, *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 543, 26 September 1992, <www.africaintelligence.com/ps/AN/Arch/ION/ION_543.asp>
- 37 Editorial, Getting ready for terror, *Daily Nation*, 2 December 2002. The GSU was hailed for suppressing an attempted Kenya Air Force *coup d'état* that would have seen Moi out of office in August 1982. See J Karimi, Kenya's day of terror: 20 years after, *Daily Nation*, 29 July 2002.
- 38 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 42/229 A: 143-1-0 of 2 March 1988.
- 39 A Mazrui, Kenya: US should address causes of terrorism, *Daily Nation*, 7 October 2001, <www.allafrica.com/stories/200110070031.html>
- 40 A Morton, *The making of an African statesman*, Trafalgar Square Books, London, 1998.
- 41 Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, The truth About PKK, <www.ataturk.com/pkk/Capture.shtml>, accessed 17 June 2004.
- 42 White House spokesman J Lockhart, quoted by correspondent P Goodenough in the *Conservative News Service*, 16 February 1999, <www.conservativenews.org/>
- 43 Republic of Kenya, *Commission of Inquiry on Attorney General, Charles Njonjo*, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1984.
- 44 E Chisika, Kabuga still holed up in Kenya, says US. *East African Standard*, 5 February 2003, <www.eastandard.net/headlines/news05022003013.htm>
- 45 Hempstone, op cit.