SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Gavin Cawthra
Director of the Centre for Defence Security Management at the University of Witwatersrand.

Published in African Security Review Vol 14 No 3, 2005

National security governance

Policy

A broad framework for improving national security and ending civil conflict was put in place during the transition to democracy as a result of a ‘pacted’ agreement between the major actors – chiefly the African National Congress (ANC) and the outgoing apartheid regime – in which normative principles relat ing to human rights, political conduct and the ‘rules of the game’ for the transition were agreed. These included a National Peace Accord, which set out norms for the conduct of political parties as well as the police; joint executive control in the lead-up to the election through the establishment of a transitional government; an early agreement that all combatants and soldiers answering to political parties who were involved in the negotiations would be integrated into a single national defence force; and agreement on the (limited but critical) role of external actors and the active involvement of civil society. Many of these principles were incorporated into an interim constitution that received wide support. At the same time the transitional government sought to demilitarise relations with neighbouring states.

During the Mandela presidency, security policy, including its foreign policy dimensions, was highly normative. Principles of democratic governance, human rights and constitutionalism dominated policy discourses in all areas, although this was strongly inflected with the overriding requirements for ‘transformation’.

Under the Mbeki presidency, realpolitik has become a more dominant trend in foreign as well as domestic security policy and the emphasis has been on implementation. Promotion of human rights and democratisation agendas internationally have given way to a concentration on conflict-resolution, peacekeeping, good governance and the promotion of national interests. Domestically, the focus has been on the ‘war against crime’. Transformation, however, has remained an overriding concern, democratic governance has been consolidated, and none of the normative intentions have been abandoned, even if they have sometimes been difficult to put into practice.

Since 11 September 2001 and the resultant ‘war against terror’, South Africa ’s security policies have had to be realigned to deal with these new global realities. Government is currently undertaking a review of national security policy, in part in response to these developments.

Control and oversight

Security decision-making has become increasingly centralised in the Office of the President, which has been provided with dedicated intelligence, policy and foreign affairs capacities. The somewhat ad hoc decision-making processes of the early post-apartheid period (which gave rise to some ill-prepared actions, such as the intervention in Lesotho in 1998) have been replaced by a much more coordinated system for national security management.

Mbeki’s government has introduced a more integrated process for executive decision-making through ‘clustering’ various ministries into cabinet committees. The two key clusters for security governance are International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) and Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS). The basic division of labour is that the IRPS is responsible for external security and the JCPS for internal security, although there is some overlap of membership and issues. Day-to-day management of security is also carried out by the Inter-Ministerial Security Committee (IMSC), involving the relevant ministers.

In addition, a National Security Council, consisting of senior ministers and officials, has been set up to make key decisions on high-impact security issues, be they internal or external. However, it meets irregularly to deal with specific crises: it is essentially a crisis management tool and is not involved in day-to-day management or policy.

None of these structures has threatened the normal processes of government or undermined the systems of accountability and (sometimes limited) transparency built into South Africa ’s democratic system. However, some concerns have been raised about the centralisation of decision-making in the presidency, and these appear to have led to tensions between the presidency and ministerial or departmental functions (for example on key foreign affairs issues, or commitments to deploy peacekeeping forces).

The ‘cluster’ system is replicated at the level of senior officials, promoting coordination on security issues, and some dedicated inter-departmental offices have been set up to further promote coordination and enhance effective decision-making, such as the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) and the Count er-Intelligence Forum, which deals with threat analysis.

All the security functions (including intelligence, although with some limitations) are subject to normal government auditing procedures and to scrutiny from the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). In addition, they are subject to oversight by the human rights monitoring agencies set up in terms of Chapter 9 of the South African constitution, such as the gender and human rights commissions.

Defence governance

Policy initiatives

During the negotiations that preceded the political transition, a broad set of principles relating to defence and security had been agreed by the various parties, relating in particular to democratic political control, human rights issues, peaceful relations with neighbours, professional non-partisan and properly equipped security forces, and the principles governing the integration of forces and the treatment of previous human rights abuses. Some of these principles were also entrenched in the interim constitution.

However, it was clear that these were insufficient as policy guidelines for the Department of Defence (DoD) and the new minister, Joe Modise, almost immediately implemented a process to produce a White Paper on Defence. Because of lack of capacity in the department, this was written largely by a civil society advisor and involved a protracted consultative process, in which parliament played a prominent role (see below).

The White Paper, pointedly entitled ‘Defence in a Democracy’, was adopted unanimously by parliament in 1996. Much of it was taken up with elaborating principles of democratic control and specifying the roles and functions of the various actors. It also established a set of principles governing the overall approach of the state to security, which could be summed up as a human security approach domestically and a collaborative security approach externally. It specified the roles and functions of the defence force – formulated in classic terms as defence against external aggression, although ‘secondary roles’ such as international peacekeeping, border protection and support to the police were provided for. The paper was consciously normative and principled and sought to ensure that the defence function was governed in a by-the-book democratic manner. At the same time, many of these principles were being debated in the Constitutional Assembly and were eventually incorporated into the constitution. The White Paper thus remains the guiding policy framework for the DoD.

With this policy framework in place, the DoD embarked on a defence review, the aim of which was to suggest more concrete policies regarding force design, budget frameworks, main armament requirements, human resource policies, defence structures, and land-use and environmental policies. By this stage, the department had the capacity to run the process itself, but nevertheless it made a conscious effort to involve parliament, other government departments, civil society and academics, and ran a process that is possibly globally unsurpassed in its transparency and consultative nature. One result of the broad consultations, particularly the involvement of issue-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs), was the adoption of progressive policies on human resource issues such as the rights of homosexuals and women in the armed forces. However, the ‘technical’ debates around issues such as structure, budget and armaments were dominated, as would be expected, by departmental experts. As a result some of the civil society organisations rejected the final product, arguing that it would lead to military rearmament inconsistent with the spirit of the White Paper.

The review left out two key issues: peacekeeping and defence industries. These were the subject of two further policy processes, but in both cases these were less consultative and much more focused in nature. The White Paper on South Africa ’s Participation in International Peace Missions was produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1998 and sought to align South African principles and practices with those of the United Nations. The White Paper on Defence-Related Industries, as it came to be called, adopted a largely non-interventionist approach to the defence industry, which had been allowed to wither, arguing that it should no longer be supported (or even identified) as a specific strategic sector, but that government should provide some policy guidance and seek to protect and support important technology development.

Institutional transformation

The new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) formally came into being at midnight on the day before the national elections. In reality, there was a high level of continuity between the SANDF and the old apartheid armed force, and many have argued that the process of amalgamating the seven armed formations amounted more to the absorption of guerrilla forces into the existing defence force than integration. Perhaps this was inevitable, given that the old defence force (including the ‘homeland’ armies and civilian administrators) outnumbered the guerrilla forces by approximately three to one, and it was largely incumbent on the guerrillas to accommodate themselves to a conventional army. As a result, the integration process was fraught with difficulty and a number of mutinies took place, although it was largely accomplished without violence.

The SANDF is still grappling with the problems of transformation and there are signs of ‘transformation fatigue’, even though transformation is far from complete. A key concern has naturally been to address the race and gender inequities. Substantial progress has been achieved at the most senior levels, through political appointments, and at the most junior levels, but it remains a major problem at the NCO and officer level, especially at the key level of colonel, where almost 80 per cent of officers are still from the old regime. Racial tensions have persisted and sometimes led to isolated acts of violence, despite a strong programme of equal opportunities and affirmative action.

To address political transformation, a civic education programme has been introduced to ensure that officers and soldiers understand democratic politics, constitutionalism, democratic civil-military relations, military professional obligations and international humanitarian law, but its implementation has been patchy.

Integration has been followed by demobilisation to reduce the SANDF to planned levels. In practice many former guerrillas were excluded because of health or age, and demobilisation has been poorly organised through cash hand-outs and a badly executed Service Corps. Further demobilisation is required, and this may have consequences for social and political stability.

The SANDF has had to transform itself from a largely conscript-based force to a mostly full-time one and from a strategic offensive posture to a defensive one. It has had to prepare itself for new roles such as international peacekeeping. It is not clear whether it has been able to devote sufficient attention to these challenges, given its preoccupation with integration and affirmative action, although it has developed an integrated ‘Human Resource 2010’ programme aimed at dealing with these issues in a visionary and holistic way.

Control, oversight and accountability

Executive control of defence is reasonably effective, although - as always in these cases - much depends on the power and character of the minister, especially since the ministerial staff itself is very small. As well as a minister, deputy ministers have been appointed. For the sake of stability an apartheid-era commander, General George Meiring, was left in command of the SANDF at first, and it took a political fall-out over his misuse of intelligence information for him to be dismissed in 1998. Since then the minister, deputy minister, secretary and chief of defence have all come from the same political party and liberation movement background. This might have led to too cosy a relationship; on the other hand it probably contributes to stability. The current minister, Mosiu Lekota, is also chair of the ANC. While this gives him considerable clout, it means that he has many other responsibilities.

The constitution provides for a powerful Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) (joint in the sense that it involves the National Assembly and the Council of Provinces), and parliament has also set up other committees for defence and security oversight. Because a great deal of replication took place, the Portfolio Committee on Defence in the National Assembly has now taken on much of the work of the JSCD. The committee system has proved very effective, thanks in part to strong leadership, and parliament has adopted a proactive and interventionist role in relation to crafting defence policy and legislation, and has held generals to account for performance and the implementation of policy.

Planning, budgeting and procurement

Given that the new government inherited a situation where there was in effect no ministry of defence, considerable progress has been made in establishing a functioning secretariat capable of policy development and interpretation, planning and budgeting. Procurement, previously the responsibility mostly of the state armaments manufacturer, Armscor, has also been transferred to the secretariat.

Initially thought of as a civilian body – and specified as such in the constitution – the secretariat involves many military officers and now forms part of an integrated military headquarters with the SANDF. The chief of the SANDF is basically responsible for force preparation and operations, while the policy-planning-budgeting-procurement cycle is the responsibility of the secretary, who is also the accounting officer. This arrangement, while it has served to consolidate civil control, has been fraught with difficulties, with inexperienced civilians struggling to win the confidence of hardened military officers and an increasing bureaucratisation sitting uncomfortably alongside traditional military concepts of command and control. Most of the secretariat staff are involved in financial administration and ‘turf wars’ have regularly erupted between the secretary and the chief.

The formal processes for planning, budgeting and procurement clearly set out and follow international best practice and require structured interactions between the executive, parliament, civil servants and military officers. A high degree of transparency and accountability is evident.

However, considerable public unease and allegations of sleaze have been attached to the major procurement initiative, the Strategic Arms Package, which emerged from the Defence Review, where it was ascertained that the SANDF needed to be almost totally re-equipped with major weapons systems for its primary role of conventional defence. The planning process for this was carried out in a systematic and transparent way and at the time received wide public support, largely because it was claimed that it would lead to job creation and massive offset benefits. It resulted in a decision, taken at cabinet level (although not without considerable initial dissent), to purchase, inter alia, 28 Gripen jet fighters, 24 Hawk lead-in jet trainers, four naval corvettes, three submarines and 30 light utility helicopters.

However, massive cost escalations, question s over the offsets and, above all, the unravelling of many prima facie incidents of corruption and kickbacks involving some of the most powerful political figures in the country have led to a media and political backlash. Question marks now hang over the integrity of the whole exercise, although only a few cases of corruption have been proven in court. This has reignited the public debate over whether the state is spending more than it should on defence rather than social or human security.

At the same time, there is a growing perception among policymakers and leading military practitioners that the policy, planning and budgeting process emerging from the Defence Review, although technically proficient, was based on a fundamentally wrong assumption: that the SANDF should be designed, equipped and trained mainly for conventional defence. It is pointed out that the White Paper was carried out in the ‘post-apartheid honeymoon’ period and misjudged the gravity of the challenges facing the SANDF in Africa. Many argue that it might be time to ‘review the review’, in particular with regard to configuring the SANDF for what it actually does, and is likely to do: African peacekeeping, border protection and support to the police. However, since the Strategic Arms Package flows from the review and the White Paper, a fundamental revision of policy is likely to be resisted as it would probably add further weight to those opp osing the arms deal.

Role of civil society

During the transition and immediate post-election period a wide range of civil society organisations, the media and the public at large were energetically engaged in policy argument over defence. This waned as broad consensus was reached through the Defence Review. It has been reinvigorated by the arms package controversies. At the same time, a few NGOs specialising in defence and security issues – notably the Institute for Security Studies and the Centre for Violence and Reconciliation – have grown substantially in terms of their policy-research capacity. It is unclear, however, to what extent they influence government policy.

The executive, parliament and the DoD itself all went out of their way to consult with civil society organisations and the general public during the major policy development processes around defence. In part, this was occasioned by an acknowledged lack of expertise, and civil society was seen as being able to plug some of the gaps. But the principal reason was the perceived need to legitimise the defence function, which had been associated with repression and apartheid. Since then, it is notable that the level of consultation with civil society has declined – although this may be a reflection of wider governance trends and increased institutional capacity within government.

Safety and security governance

Policy initiatives

The principal policy concerns in relation to policing during the transition period and immediately afterwards can be summed up as establishing political control and overseeing a move from a militarised/repressive ‘force’ to a community policing ‘service’. This entailed demilitarising the police; introducing less-confrontational public order policing; establishing mechanisms for accountability to communities and for civil control and oversight; integration and restructuring; and ending human rights violations and torture. As with the defence force, transformation – understood largely as addressing racial and gender inequities – has been a principal concern.

A policy paper dealing with many of the ab ove issues was introduced for discussion in 1994; at the same time new legislation was introduced to effect the move from a ‘force’ to a ‘service’ and to institutionalise principles of community policing. At this point policy capacity within government was limited, and considerable reliance was placed on private consultants with anti-apartheid activist backgrounds.

In 1996, in response to growing public concern about crime, six government departments (Correctional Services, Defence, Intelligence, Justice, Safety and Security, and Welfare) set up a joint policy task force, which resulted in agreement on a National Crime Prevention Strategy. This seems has faded away in favour of a more hard-line police-driven response aimed at combating rather than preventing crime (see below).

It was only in 1998 that a White Paper on Safety and Security was finalised, drafted mainly by the Safety and Security Secretariat (see below) and based on extensive public and political consultations, which included (as with the Defence Review) provincial and parliamentary public hearings. The White Paper focused on four issues: law enforcement, social crime prevention, institutional reform, and the enhancement of policing at provincial and local levels. The White Paper sought to move beyond the issues of control and community policing that had been the focus hitherto to concentrate on crime prevention and improving police effectiveness.

This policy shift has become even more evident in recent years. Issues of accountability, democratic governance and human rights, although still upheld, seem have become less important than the exigencies of the ‘war against crime’ and political engagements with opposition parties around this issue. Policy now revolves around the National Crime Combating Strategy, leading to actions such as ‘Operation Crackdown’ involving cordon-and-search operations and roadblocks, usually with assistance from the defence force. Levels of police repression and human rights abuses appear to have levelled out at approximately those of major US cities: while far from perfect, this is a far cry from the situation ten years ago and better than in most developing countries.

Control, oversight and accountability

The new government was naturally concerned to establish firm control over the police, which had been at the front line of apartheid repression. For this reason, it resisted decentralisation proposals, instead amalgamating the eleven nominally separate police forces (the South African Police (SAP), the forces of the ‘independent homelands’ and the forces of six ‘self-governing homelands’, which had police forces but not armies) into a single national South African Police Service (SAPS), which was made accountable to the Minister of Safety and Security. The nature of ministerial oversight has varied according to the character of the ministers, as discussed below. However, in general all the ministers have had other political priorities that may have distracted them from their departmental leadership responsibilities.

However, policing is constitutionally a provincial responsibility, and although there is one national service, policy, oversight and (with some exceptions) operational deployment are carried out at provincial level. Members of the Executive Committee (MECs) for Safety and Security thus play an important executive role, and provincial parliaments are actively involved in oversight.

A civilian Secretariat for Safety and Security was provided for in the constitution and established in 1994 at national headquarters to deal with policy, budgeting and political accountability issues. Its functions were defined as promoting democratic accountability and transparency in the service, monitoring policy implementation, conducting policy-oriented research and offering legal services, communication, and providing advice to the minister. This system was replicated at provincial level.

The Safety and Security Secretariat has been much less successful than the Defence Secretariat, however. Reasons for this include institutional resistance within the police service, a failure to bridge the divide between policy and operations and between civilians and uniformed members, lack of knowledge and experience of civilian members, and personality factors. Initially a sharp distinction was made between policy (the secretariat’s responsibility) and implementation, but this may have served to have weakened the policy function rather than strengthen it. After the 1999 general elections, when crime became a political football, the secretariat was increasingly seen as an impediment to ‘getting the job done’. The power and influence of the secretariat has subsequently declined sharply, and with it some important aspects of civil oversight and monitoring. The police commissioner – now essentially a political appointment – and not the secretary is now seen as the main mechanism for government control.

At provincial level, the picture is less clear, with some provincial secretariats still playing an important role in monitoring policy implementation and dealing with police accountability issues, if not in the actual formulation of policy. Their powers are limited, however, as they have to operate within the framework of national policies and initiatives.

A further level of accountability is provided through the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), a separately budgeted state institution independent of the police, which was specifically set up to investigate and deter human rights abuses on the basis of complaints submitted by the public. Most of the complaints are now about service delivery, however. The ICD has proven to be fairly effective, although it is not clear whether the reduction in the number of complaints relating to human rights abuses is a result of its work.

While there is no ‘joint standing committee’ in parliament for safety and security, multi-party committees exist in both houses and have played an active role in drawing up legislation, and also in formulating policy, monitoring compliance and discussing issues of public concern. The extent to which they have actively exercised their powers has depended to a large extent on the strength of the leading personalities involved and their relationships with the minister.

The Safety and Security Department carries out its planning, budgeting and procurement cycles much like any other government department. At the higher level, this requires active interactions between parliament, the executive and the department, although, as noted above, the role of the secretariat has not been as effective as it might have been.

There seem to be signs of growing frustration by the political leaders at the failure of the police to make a significant impact on crime. As the issue has become politicised (it is one of the main issues that opposition parties use to bash the ruling party) a certain defensiveness seems to have crept in, perhaps indicated most clearly by an unwillingness to publish crime statistics.

Professionalism and institutional transformation

Institutional transformation initially involved the integration of eleven forces and the subsequent rearticulation of the service into eight new provincial services. Key functions such as public order policing remained under national command.

Unlike the SANDF, SAPS did not integrate any significant number of former guerrillas (except into the VIP Protection Unit), but it did have to incorporate the ten former ‘homeland’ forces. This had the effect, however, of radically changing the racial demographics of the force at all levels, although whites continue to predominate at senior management levels.

Police training has been systematically demilitarised and the police are now also trained in human rights issues and the use of non-lethal force. The extent to which this has been successful is debateable, as SAPS is still under scrutiny for human rights abuses.

Role of civil society

Civil society organisations and academics played an important role in the early period of post-apartheid policy formation, in part because of lack of governmental capacity. Their influence seems to have waned over the last few years, even as their research capabilities have grown (witnessed by the substantial research output from the ISS and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). Government now appears less willing to engage the public on policy issues relating to safety and security, possibly because it is on the political defensive over crime.

The most important elements of civil society oversight are community police forums, which are meant to be established at every police station, in which community representatives are involved daily, and in a structured way provided by law, in oversight of policing in their area. In practice, they tend to work best in wealthy white areas, where in cases they have also been actively involved in supporting the police and garnering additional resources. Implementation across the country has been patchy at best, and they have failed to get off the ground in many of the areas where they are most needed.

Intelligence governance

Policy initiatives and institutional transformation

Government moved swiftly to establish a policy framework for intelligence, through the White Paper on Intelligence of 1994, which sought to place the intelligence function firmly under constitutional and democratic control. This was followed by the enactment of new legislation reorganising the intelligence agencies, defining their functions, and providing for the amalgamation of the various ‘homeland’ agencies and the integration of around 1,000 former ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) intelligence operatives.

Military intelligence, the dominant agency in the dying years of apartheid, was downgraded and prevented from carrying out non-military covert operations, while the SAPS’s intelligence function was restricted to criminal investigations. Two principal civilian intelligence agencies were set up, the South African Secret Service (SASS) for foreign intelligence, and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) for domestic intelligence. Information gathered by all the agencies should be passed on to the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC), which analyses and interprets intelligence on behalf of the ministry, which is responsible for distributing it to the appropriate government structures. In addition, in November 2001 a Presidential Support Unit (PSU) was set up to support the president on issues related to conflict and conflict resolution, especially in Africa (it has been very involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Burundi peace processes).

Four new acts were introduced in 2002 and were aimed at further aligning the intelligence agencies with democratic governance norms and other national legislation, and dealing with new threats such as cyber-intelligence. Government is currently undertaking a review of intelligence in the context of the National Security Review, which will lead to a new White Paper on Intelligence. It is expected that this will involve a considerable degree of civil society participation. As with other policy reviews, it is likely that it will take a less idealistic view of things, concentrating on effectiveness and national interest.

Control and oversight

Formerly under a deputy minister, intelligence was upgraded to full ministerial and departmental status in President Mbeki’s government in 2001. The minister has proved to be proactive and has actively sought to increase interactions between the intelligence community and civil society.

A multi-party Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence has been active in carrying out legislative, oversight and monitoring activities. Although it meets in secret, it is required to send an annual report to parliament.

Additional controls are provided by the Auditor General, and an Inspector General for Intelligence has been established with wide powers of oversight, although the inability of government to find an appropriate individual to take on this role must be a cause of concern. An audit committee, including outsiders, has been appointed as well as a presidential budgetary advisory committee.

Remarkably, there was very little public demand for intelligence functions to be opened to public scrutiny, as happened for example when the German Democratic Republic collapsed. Instead, there seems to have been a high level of continuity, with files remaining closed or (mostly) being destroyed – no less than 44 tons of government security-related documentation was shredded during the transition. It is thus unclear to what extent a break with past covert and intrusive practices has been made, even though a legislative and administrative framework consistent with best democratic practice has been put in place.

However, a Review Committee on Classification and Declassification, consisting entirely of academics was set up in 2002 and was due to report before the end of 2003. [S3] Public input was invited into the process and it was likely to recommend that pre-1994 records (those that remain) should be audited with a view to being made public and that the restrictive Protection of Information Act of 1982 should be replaced with a new law.

Role of civil society

Intelligence is not an area in which civil society can be expected to be extensively involved. However, the intelligence ministry has recently shown greater signs of openness towards civil society and academia, especially with regards to the declassification issue and the upcoming White Paper.

In addition, the new National Intelligence Academy has actively sought to recruit academics to its staff and is establishing (which is required by law) an advisory board from civil society, chaired by an individual who has to go through a process of public nomination.

Challenges

South Africa is often held up as an exemplar of ‘security sector reform’. Measured against the past, remarkable progress has been made, and it has generally been achieved since 1994 with minimal violence. The security agencies have remained functional throughout, despite the enormous pressures of transformation and the challenges of dealing with apartheid legacies.

This is not to say that transformation has been without its stresses, or that it has been complete and effective. After all, measurement of success should not be made against a pathological past, but in terms of a future vision. There is not, of course, a perfect solution to the multifaceted challenges of governing security in a democracy. There will always be a tension, even a contradiction, because democratic states ultimately rely on undemocratic institutions (which at times must carry out undemocratic practices) in order to protect democracy. If the security institutions of a state cannot be democratic, however, they can at least be governed in a democratic way. Even here, though, there are necessary limits to the principles of transparency and accountability required for democratic governance that need to be carefully managed.

Governance, like democracy, is always as much a process as an ideal, and in any country evolution of structures and practices will reflect political cultures and take idiosyncratic and context-specific turns.

In general terms it is evident that – at least on the formal level – South Africa has consciously and fairly successfully sought to apply best democratic practices to the governance of security. In some ways it has found more transparent and accountable ways of doing this than exist even in established democracies. It has also sought to take into account the specific requirements of the transition, specifically in relation to the need to redress past inequities. However, the process of transformation itself has engendered some organisational and perhaps political fault-lines, and the focus on redressing inequities has perhaps resulted in other pressing institutional challenges being left unaddressed.

Some key issues for discussion include the following:

• Policy overload and transformation fatigue: It is evident that an enormous number of policy changes have taken place in a short period of time, coupled with fairly radical institutional transformations, even though these are far from complete. Can the security institutions be expected to continue to respond effectively to ongoing policy and transformation pressures and requirements? Are appropriate prioritisation and integration of policy initiatives taking place or are institutions expected to do too much at the same time? Is there sufficient continuity of policy and institutional transformation or are short-term political interventions holding sway?
  
  

• Policy reviews: While a national security management system is in place, it is not clear whether a coherent and integrated national security policy exists. Government has indicated that it intends to review national security and intelligence policy, particularly in the context of security environment changes since 9/11. Is it possible to operationalise the normative framework of democratic governance and human security and at the same time ensure effective day-to-day security management?
  
  

• Defence policy: With regard to defence policy it becoming evident that in order to pay for the Strategic Arms Package other areas are being made to suffer. Is it necessary to carry out a policy review to ensure that an appropriate balance between various capabilities (conventional, peacekeeping, etc) is achieved? Does the Strategic Arms Package need reviewing?
  
  

• Safety and security policy: Within safety and security policy it is evident that there has been a move away from normative concerns towards effective crime combating. But is there policy coherence to this?
  
  Implementation: Policies are not always effectively implemented and do not necessarily achieve their envisaged goals. Are the resources available (human, capital, technological, organisational) or, put another way, are the policies appropriately tailored to the resource constraints current in South Africa (are we importing ‘first world policies’ for ‘third world conditions’)? Are appropriate strategies and priorities being developed for policy implementation through the policy-planning-budgeting frameworks?
  
  

• Centralisation and coordination: Considerable progress has been made in coordination of security policy and governance, and the Office of the Presidency has been strengthened. Is this improving effectiveness? And if so, is it doing so at the possible expense of the pluralism and system of checks and balances essential to democratic governance?
  
  

• Control and oversight: This study has indicated that neither the defence nor safety and security secretariats are achieving in full their objectives as provided for in the constitution. How can this be addressed? While the parliamentary committees function reasonably well, could their role be enhanced? Are they appropriately resourced? With regard to safety and security, it is also clear that urgent attention needs to be given to community policing and the CPFs in particular as a form of civil oversight.
  
  

• One-party dominance: This carries with it both positive and negative features for a developing country like South Africa emerging from a conflictual past. A dominant party provides the gel that holds together state, political society, civil society and to some extent the private sector, and establishes a national vision. However, could the intention of the ANC to gain control over state and society in the interests of transformation, achieved in the first instance through appointments to key posts of ANC supporters, have negative implications for governance? Could the separation of powers so key to democracy be threatened, and the system of checks and balances so carefully instituted through legislation and policy, as seen in this article, be weakened? And down to what level should political appointments be made in the civil service and, more particularly, within the security institutions?
  
  

• Leadership: As in any organisational context, much depends on the character and quality of senior leaders. This becomes particularly important in periods of change and in contexts of organisational challenges and weaknesses. Is sufficient attention being given to the process of developing and appointing appropriate leaders and developing succession strategies?