MONEY IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLITICS
The party funding challenge in Southern Africa

Andile Sokomani
Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Cape Town

Published in African Security Review Vol 14 No 4, 2005

“Lack of money is the root of all evil”

George Bernard Shaw

Introduction

The party funding challenge is prevalent throughout the world, even in the comparatively older, more established democracies of Europe, North America and the rest of the developed world.1 The challenge, however, seems particularly acute in emergent democracies such as those of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) where “low levels of income, literacy and technology and preponderantly rural population, usually dispersed over large territories with only poor roads, [make] election campaigns … horrendously expensive”.2 Compounding the problem is the relative scarcity of party and candidate funds, which stems partly from the fact that “assistance to democracy since the onset of the democratisation process … in the early 90s has favoured electoral processes and civil society organisations more than political parties”.3 Furthermore, the majority of citizens in these new democracies tend to be poor and therefore unable to contribute meaningfully to the parties of which they hold membership. In addition, some SADC member states such as Botswana and Zambia provide no direct public funding4 to political parties and election candidates. Consequently, most political parties in the region, and the rest of the continent for that matter, remain mired in a perpetual state of financial poverty.

Such conditions generate heavy reliance on funding from business, foreign governments and other private sources, which render political parties, the ruling parties in particular, more vulnerable to illegitimate influence. Dwindling political party resources and skyrocketing campaign expenses, plus the absence of limits on donations and party campaign expenditures, create growing incentives for corruption in party financing. In the name of promoting multiparty democracy anonymous donors are increasingly investing in party coffers with tacit expectations of returns. No individuals or companies are on record as admitting that they give with “the expectation of enjoying the patronage which that political party will offer, whether in the form of appointment to a public office or parastatal institution or the award of lucrative construction, service or supply contract, if the party is elected to office”.5

Though political parties in Southern Africa may, and do, raise private funds from legitimate sources, it is still not uncommon to see individuals or companies suspected of funding incumbent political parties openly acquiring lucrative state contracts and other government benefits. Under the guise of building political stability, money is increasingly offered to political parties in exchange for favours. A recent study on political financing in 22 countries, including six SADC states, presents a similar finding: “50 per cent of respondents expressed the view, without prompting by a particular question, that money from the business sector is a negative influence on political parties and on governance in their countries”.6 The region has made substantial progress in terms of promoting the values of good governance within the relatively short democratic transition period, but the challenge of the negative impacts of money in politics is yet to be overcome.

Given the importance of political parties in the democratisation process it is vital to continually reflect on and examine the complex issue of party political finance. A thorough understanding of the role of money in Southern African politics is requisite for generating country-tailored solutions to combat the region’s party financing problems. This article seeks to explore the challenge of political financing in Southern Africa, focusing on six SADC member countries: South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania.7 It is hoped that such a discussion will contribute toward heightening awareness and stimulating creative solutions to the problem of political financing in the southern African region.

The article starts with a discussion on the nature of the problem of political financing, then highlights existing frameworks to combat the problem. Drawing from concrete examples of political finance improprieties in South Africa and Zambia, the article then explores the risks associated with unregulated political financing, and concludes with a set of recommendations for political finance reform.

The problem of political financing

Because there are still large gaps in research on ‘political financing’, it is difficult to present a concise, elaborate definition of the concept, since it may take various forms in different contexts. However, for the purposes of this discussion ‘political financing’ will be used as a generic term for ‘party financing’ and ‘campaign financing.’ The latter is the term of choice in presidential systems of governance, which are candidate-driven. Parliamentary systems, on the other hand, opt for the term ‘party financing’, since they are party-driven.8 But it is important to take into account that:

Beyond campaigns and parties, money is spent on other direct political purposes such as political “foundations” and other organizations which, though legally distinct from parties, are allied to them and advance their interests; the costs of political lobbying; expenses associated with newspapers and media that are created and paid to promote a partisan line; and the costs of litigation in politically relevant cases.9

Political financing is essential to the proper functioning of competitive multiparty democracies. This is why in many democracies, including a significant number of SADC countries, public money has been made available to candidates and/or parties. All this stems from the realisation that, for the purposes of good governance and sustainable democracy, political financing is essential. In other words, most states recognise that “[m]oney is an important resource and is instrumental to the competition for political power in any democracy”.10

Public funding is intended to serve two major purposes: “first, granting to parties and candidates the essential resources for the exercise of their functions, promoting equality in their access to and use of resources, and correcting any privileges which may affect that equality; and second, promoting and stimulating citizen’s participation and involvement through private funding and achieving the maximum impact of civil society in politics”.11 The latter objective operates under regulated amounts and forms of private contributions. Public funding, however, presents difficulties of its own. To begin with, the basis for allocating public funds to political parties, particularly the disbursing of funds in proportion to seats and/or votes acquired, has largely been working to the advantage of ruling parties and has been unfair to opposition parties. There is therefore a dire need for “[a]n adequate system of rules for the funding of political parties [which] should improve the quality of opportunity for all parties competing in an election rather than work against it”.12 Public funding therefore should ideally favour no particular political parties.

Where it is provided, public funding, however, is rarely adequate. As a result, donations of various types, corrupt kickbacks, and returns on business investments are the prominent sources of income for Southern African political parties. As Argandoña notes:

If public funds are insufficient (from the viewpoint of parties and the candidates) incentives will be created to increase them either by means of … private legal resources … or by illegal means (for example by creating private companies whose profit are channelled to financing the party). Therefore the insufficiency of funds raises the possibility of illegal and immoral conducts.13

In Botswana the ruling Democratic Party is reported to have received financial support from the South African Anglo American Corporation, which has massive mining interests in the country.14 In South Africa – where the public funding of political parties has steadily been on the increase since the momentous elections of 1994 – it is well known that huge foreign contributions were key to the African National Congress (ANC) campaign funds for the 1994 and 1999 general elections. During the 1999 elections 50-80 per cent of all political parties’ campaign funds came from either business or foreign donors.15 In short, the problem of party and candidate financing in Southern Africa, and anywhere else for that matter, essentially stems from the very limited supply of party and candidate resources, which usually generates uneven access to and excessive reliance on private sources of income for political purposes. As Paltiel notes, “[t]he search for funds may induce politicians to listen more to those who give to their campaigns than those who vote for them, or for their party”.16

Private funding to political parties and candidates, in-kind contributions such as allowing a party or candidate to use a public hall and income from sale of goods and services take many forms: party membership fees, private individual donations and company donations. Not all private sources of income are undesirable. Non-state sources of income such as party membership dues, small individual donations by party members and sympathisers, and local fund-raising activities are not incongruous with democracy. In Zambia, for instance, the donations and dedication of the trade unionists brought about the existence of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which in 1991 ended the 27-year hegemony of Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP). These kinds of contribution, however, are usually a tiny proportion in relation to the income political parties require. This is where the problem of the private financing of political parties and candidates arises. The insufficiency of these relatively innocuous contributions makes the introduction of new forms of fund-raising inevitable, be they licit or otherwise. It is important to emphasise that political financing in principle is not a form of corruption, but unfortunately it is made so by:

[D]onors who try to use their contributions to obtain illegal and immoral advantages, whether explicitly or otherwise, form rulers, legislators and officials, through the parties they finance or the candidates whose campaigns they contribute to … [as well as] parties and candidates who may pressure donors to contribute to their (ordinary or campaign) expenses under the threat of causing them harm or the promise of providing them a benefit …17

But this is not the complete meaning of ‘corrupt’ political financing, as it does not cover all the instances to which the common parlance of corrupt political financing usually refers. For the sake of conceptual clarity it is worthwhile to point out that corruption in political financing refers to:

• political party contributions that contravene existing laws on political financing (eve n if the donor did not obtain any improper benefit in return for their contributions);
  
  

• the use for campaign or party objectives of money that a political officeholder has received from a corrupt transaction (in such a case, all that differentiates corrupt political funding from other forms of political corruption is the use to which the bribe is put by the bribe-taker,
  
  

• unauthorised use of state resources for partisan political purposes;
  
  

• acceptance of money in return for an unauthorised favour or the promise of a favour in the event of election to an office;
  
  

• contributions from disreputable sources (eve n though there may be no evidence of an exchange of favours or of promises of future favours, the presumption is that tainted sources are likely to have tainted motives); and
  
  

• spending of money on banned purposes such as vote buying.18

Left unchecked, corruption in party financing poses serious risks, which are the subject of the next discussion.

The risks of unregulated political financing

While political parties are necessary conduits for political pluralism, they are major avenues of corrupting this process, resulting in “biases in public policy, deferential policies towards businesses, criminal and drug money, vote buying and patronage, buying positions on party lists and nominations, and the illegal use of state resources”.19 The ruling party in South Africa – the African National Congress (ANC) – is currently reeling from one of the biggest party funding scandals in the country, which implicates top ANC leaders and senior members of government. In what has been dubbed the ‘ANC Oilgate’ it is alleged that the ANC traded principle for profit by having no scruples about using state resources to obtain crude oil from former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in exchange for political solidarity with Hussein’s beleaguered regime and his campaign to lift sanctions against Iraq.20 An oil deal indeed ensued and a South African company, Imvume Management (Pty) Ltd, was chosen from nine qualifying companies to supply the South African government with Basrah Light, an Iraqi crude oil. The South African media and opposition parties have pointed out some strong evidence to the effect that Imvume Management, which channelled R11 million in state oil money to the ANC in the run-up to the 2004 general elections, was effectively a front for the ANC. The Office of the Public Protector undertook an official inquiry into the matter and pronounced that there had been no wrongdoing on the part of the ANC or Imvume management. The finding sparked an outcry from civil society and opposition parties.

In a environment where party financing, private funding in particular, is generally a laissez-faire business, as in most Southern African countries, there is a real risk that interest groups and wealthy individuals will buy influence in political parties and in so doing erode public confidence in the political system. The risks of the laissez-faire approach to party financing are nowhere as dramatically exemplified as in Zambia, where there are no laws governing political-party funding. Two main incidents capture this scenario: the political fallout from former president Frederick Chiluba’s unsuccessful bid to amend the constitution to run a third term, and President Levy Mwanawa’s strained relations with senior officials within the ruling MMD. To begin with, the inevitable mud slinging that ensued when some senior members of the MMD were compelled by Chiluba’s unconstitutional move to leave the party and form their own alternative parties revealed some troublesome financial improprieties. The wrangling between Ben Mwila, first MMD Defence Minister and now president of the opposition Zambia Republican Party (ZRP), and Republican Vice-President Enoch Kavindele is a case in point.

The filth came to the spotlight when Kavindele refuted Mwila’s US$1-million payback claim that he had ostensibly spent, in his capacity as MMD treasurer, on MMD activities in the run-up to the 1991 parliamentary and presidential elections. According to Kavindele, companies and individuals donated the money to the MMD, but it had to be kept in overseas bank accounts for fear that Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP, the then ruling party, might freeze it. When it was finally brought to Zambia, the money was deposited in Mwila’s company, Cordelia Investments, from where Mwila signed and issued cheques to the MMD.

Unregulated political financing contributes to the disempowerment of voters. The absence of disclosure rules on the private sources of funding to parties and candidates means that voters are denied information that could enable them to make informed choices during elections. Without such information, voters are not in a position to issue effective sanctions to get wayward parties and candidates to behave accordingly. Concerns have been raised about the extent to which voters would make use of such information. There is also a concern that public disclosure in emergent or unstable democracies would discourage donations to opposition parties for fear of reprisal by the governing party. Furthermore, disclosure information may be misused to intimidate and harass contributors. Valid as these concerns may be, they cannot diminish the value and importance of public disclosure as an instrument with which to combat corruption in political financing.

Nor is a level playing field of competition between political parties possible if there are no party funding regulatory mechanisms. Ruling parties, for instance, usually receive huge donations, which give them undue advantage over opposition parties (given that there is often a correlation between having the most money and winning the elections), thus stifling competition. This advantage of incumbency can be seen in those countries where elected officials and appointees are expected to give a percentage of their salaries to the party. This affords ruling parties exclusive access to steady income. Unfair competition among political parties does not augur well for multiparty democracy.

Linked to this risk of an uneven playing field is unequal access to office. Unregulated funding to political parties makes it difficult for the poorer sections of the population to run for office or achieve meaningful representation in parliament. The interests of wealthy donors usually take precedence over those of the poor masses because their secret, huge donations co-opt the politicians to pander to the donors’ self-interested agendas. By making elected officials more accountable to those who finance their election campaign than to those who gave them the majority vote, wealthy individuals are allowed to gain the upper hand over the political and economic functions of government. Because large corporate donor funding tends to dominate public policy decisions, state companies are consequently privatised to serve the interests of capital at the expense of labour – the critical mass that makes incumbency possible in the first place. Massive job cuts ensue, which hike up unemployment rates and perpetuate poverty. This ultimately not only undermines the democratic principle of self-determination and national sovereignty, but also threatens economic development, which is a backbone to democratic development. The political muscle of multinational corporations in most Southern African countries is still a force to be reckoned with.

The undue influence of money in politics weakens political party organisations by eroding their accountability and transparency. Under such conditions it is difficult to have parties who are responsible agents for change and reform. Finally, political funding scandals that stem from unregulated party and candidate financing may create perceptions of corruption, which may taint the political process and obscure its true value. But there are some efforts, albeit barely adequate, at addressing the challenge of political financing that are worth noting.

Existing regulatory frameworks

Increased international attention to the problem of party financing has prompted governments worldwide to introduce legislative initiatives to address the issue. These range from restrictions on spending, disclosure of expenditure and sources of income, and prohibition of foreign donations to barring parties from owning businesses. Similar initiatives have been undertaken in Southern Africa. This section therefore highlights existing party finance regulations in the selected countries.

Botswana has only one regulatory mechanism pertaining to political financing: the Electoral Act, which stipulates that a candidate’s election campaign expenditure may not exceed 10,000 pula (about US$1,500). Apart from a clause that examines disclosure of expenses, the Act does not cover party financing. In fact nothing restrains the political party affiliated with the candidate from providing him/her with limitless cash or in-kind support (campaign material, vehicles, staff, etc) to compensate for the P10,000 expenditure cap. Donations to political parties or candidates are not restricted either.

The Malawian constitution, under Section 40(2), on the other hand, devotes several clauses to political financing. It stipulates that funding be provided to political parties in a proportional manner, and that any party that acquires a minimum of 10 per cent of the national vote is eligible for funding:

The State shall provide funds so as to ensure that, during the life of any parliament, any political party which has secured more than one-tenth of the national vote in elections to that parliament has sufficient funds to continue to represent its constituency.21

State funding is disbursed quarterly – during both election and non-election times. There are no specifications as to what the funding from the state may or may not be spent on, and no spending disclosure law. The allocation of the money is not publicised and informing party members on the amounts received is left to the discretion of party leaders. As in Botswana, political parties in Malawi are at liberty to receive funding from any source, as there are no laws to bar them from doing so. Nor is there a law that prohibits political party ownership of businesses. But unlike Botswana, Malawi has no explicit provisions for election expenditure capping.

In terms of its party finance laws Mozambique presents an exemplary case. Chapter III of the 2004 Mozambican Electoral Law Act provides for public party and campaign finance. While parties represented in parliament receive both forms of state funding, non-represented political parties receive state support in terms of campaign funds. Direct private party campaign funding is illegal. Article 36 of the 2004 Electoral Law Act stipulates that:

[t]he election campaign of political parties or party coalitions shall not be financed by foreign governments. These entities may contribute to financing or strengthening the state budget allocation for the election campaigns.22

Compared to the other five countries, Mozambique is unique in this regard. Though annual auditing processes oblige Mozambican political parties to justify their expenditure, there are no set limits on how much they can spend in a given period.

In South Africa the public funding of political parties represented in parliament is a right enshrined in the constitution. In terms of Section 236 of the 1996 constitution, “national legislation must provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis”.23 The Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act of 1997 embodies this constitutional provision. The Act specifies that 90 per cent of the funds should be disbursed:

… in proportion to each party’s share of seats in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures jointly. The remaining 10 per cent is shared equally among the nine provinces and then is subsequently divided among the parties in each provincial legislature.24

The funds, which the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) distributes quarterly, cannot be used for electoral campaigns, business ventures, buying property, or remuneration of public officials.

The regulation of non-state party financing in South Africa remains a glaring legislative loophole, which has prompted a network of civil society groups, such as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), to bring the issue to the public attention. Outside the public funding domain parties are not required to disclose how they spend their finances. Nor is there a law prohibiting South African political parties from owning businesses. But, as noted earlier, parties cannot use public funding for business ventures, as the law on public funding explicitly proscribes the direct or indirect use of the fund:

... for the purposes of establishing any business or acquiring or maintaining any right or financial interest whatsoever in any business, or in any immovable property, except where the right or interest in the immovable property is to be used by the party solely for ordinary party political purposes.25

The prohibition of the purchasing of campaign advertising on television is the only spending limit that exists in South Africa.

Like South Africa, Malawi and Mozambique, the Republic of Tanzania has a provision for the public funding of political parties. In terms of the Political Parties Act any party that wins “at least five percent of the total votes cast in the presidential elections and … in addition … a seat in parliament”26 qualifies for government subsidy. This works largely to the advantage of the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which, by virtue of winning 202 of the 232 parliamentary seats in the 2000 elections, “draws a monthly subvention of US$547,000, while a combined parliamentary opposition parties draw less than US$50,000 a month”.27

Though opposition parties are crying foul over this arrangement, the Tanzanian public does not seem very much concerned.28 Unlike in Botswana, expenditure limits for Tanzanian political parties are not a legal requirement. The 1992 Political Parties Act also allows political parties to receive funding from the “proceeds of any investment project or undertaking in which the party has an interest”.29

Finally, the Republic of Zambia currently has no legislative frameworks on party financing. As the recent study on party financing in Zambia has found, “there are no laws regulating disclosure, spending limits, restrictions on donations to candidates or parties and … no legally defined campaign period”.30 The Zambian president and vice-president have an exclusive right to the use of state resources. Party officials are not entitled to this privilege. Those who do not favour regulation argue that a party financing law in Zambia would not be necessary as the Prevention and Prohibition of Money Laundering Act is adequate to ensure that dirty money is kept out of the country’s political finances see (Table 1).

Table 1: Regional regulatory frame workes

Southern African countries, including those not discussed here, are also obligated, under the 2002 Draft African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, to “proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties; and [somewhat vaguely] to incorporate the principle of transparency into funding of political parties”.31 This obligation can only be enforced if nations agree to sign the convention. However, as of August 2004, only three member states of the African Union (out of 53) had ratified the convention.32

A recent roundtable discussion held at Lusaka’s Hotel Continental and consisting of delegates from the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF), the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) Economic Parliament, the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), and the Pan African Parliament (PAP) also resolved that parliamentarians would intensify their oversight role on electoral processes, restore public trust in the institution of parliament and attain the goal of good governance.33 Thus there is general recognition of the challenge of corruption in party and candidate financing and certain measures have been devised to address it. However, as noted earlier, these measures are barely adequate.

Conclusion and recommendations

This article has sought to highlight the problem of political financing in Southern Africa, focusing on six SADC member countries: Botswana, South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. It has shown that in some Southern African countries there is recognition that money in politics, if not properly regulated, presents real hazards and undesirable consequences – such as biases in public policy, deferential policies towards business, weakened and unaccountable political parties – that jeopardise democracy. Existing regulatory mechanisms on party financing, however, are largely focused on public funding, which leaves private funding a viable channel for party financing corruption. Though there is no overarching solution for the whole Southern African region, there are basic cross-country measures which, if enforced, could minimise the negative influences of money in politics.

Disclosure laws

Southern African countries require enforceable laws that would govern private funding to political parties in a manner that is accountable to the electorate. Though it is important to emphasise country-specific solutions, as the sets of party finance challenges are not exactly the same in all the countries given the different colonial legacies, it is essential that disclosure of funding sources should be incorporated into these laws. The merits of disclosure cut across unrelated political cultures – hence the efforts of Western democracies to curb corruption in party financing are worth emulating. Though such restrictions would not prove a panacea, they are a necessary foundation on which to build a strong ethic of accountability in Southern African political parties. In fact, most political party and civil society leaders are already aware of the negative social and political consequences of corruption, which has in a way helped generate some political will to tackle the issue. This is a crucial advantage, given that no legislation can be enacted unless it enjoys the full support of the incumbent political parties.

Public funding

Besides creating a platform for political parties to compete on equal footing, generous public funding reduces dependence on private sources of income. This in turn minimises the impacts of self-serving donors on party and candidate policy. Though public funding alone cannot eliminate political finance corruption, it does to a certain extent decrease its scale. A likely drawback of this measure is the possibility that public funding may reduce membership fees and donations, which can lead to a decline in grassroots participation. This may result in political parties that are controlled from the centre, a situation that would not bode well for the idea of majority rule. Furthermore, where public funding is provided, as in South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania, it usually excludes those political parties that are not represented in parliament. This unfortunately suppresses the possible emergence of an alternative political force and favours the maintenance of the status quo. Access for small and new parties is a critical dimension in levelling the playing field for political competition. The Mozambican approach to public funding, where non-parliamentary parties are at least provided with campaign funds (albeit the money is usually late and therefore of not much use), is worth considering.

Controlled spending

Measures that control spending are often-overlooked devices that could yield significant results if given due attention. Because corruption in party financing tends to be concomitant with high spending, the demand for money, particularly during election campaigns, should be minimised as much as possible, otherwise its corrupt use would be very difficult, if not impossible, to regulate. This is pivotal in refocusing election campaigns on the message of political parties rather than on the resources expended on disseminating it. Besides avoiding the immorality of spending obscene amounts of money amid deplorable conditions of poverty, such a move would contribute towards enabling political parties to compete on an equal footing. In addition to minimising the disadvantages less wealthy political parties face, the levelling of the playing field of competition would again facilitate the entry of new parties into the political arena. The banning of television campaigning in South Africa and the Botswana P10,000 expenditure cap are good starting points.

As this discussion on Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Malawi, Botswana and Zambia shows, the challenges of political financing – particularly those pertaining to unregulated private political financing – in Southern Africa are real and urgent. This calls for urgent enforceable regulatory measures, such as those recommended above, which are requisite in making democracy a lived reality rather than a professed ideal. It is also essential that efforts at tackling corruption in political financing are not conducted in isolation, but exercised in tandem with other anti-corruption measures.

Notes

1. A Argandoña, Political party funding and business corruption, Research Paper No 458, Chair of Economics and Ethics, University of Navarra, Spain, 2002, p 1 notes that in these democracies “politicians who are accused or tried in irregular funding cases are legion and span the full parliamentary spectrum. In France: Emmanuelli, from the Socialist Party; Juppé, from the RPR … In Italy: Forlani from the Christian Democrats … Berlusconi from Forza Italia. In Germany … Johannes Rau from the SPD, and […] in the midst of an enormous scandal Helmut Kohl and Schäuble …”
   
   

2. Y Saffu, The funding of political parties and election campaigns in Africa, in R Austin and M Tjernnström, Funding of political parties and election campaigns, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Handbook Series, Washington, DC, 2003, p 21.
   
   

3. S Fambon, Public funding of political parties in Africa, paper submitted at the Africa Conference on Election, Democracy, and Governance, 7–10 April 2003, Pretoria, p 29.
   
   

4. This is the money that the state sets aside to fund political parties. It differs from private funding, which parties have to raise on their own.
   
   

5. J Pope, Confronting corruption: the elements of a national integrity system, TI Source Book, Transparency International, Berlin, 2000, p 50.
   
   

6. S Bryan and D Baer, Money in politics: A study of party financing practices in 22 countries, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington, DC, 2005, p 17.
   
   

7. Compared with other SADC member states, political financing in these countries has been subject to more research, which makes them easier to use as reference points.
   
   

8. USAID, Money in politics handbook: a guide to increasing transparency in emerging democracies, 2003, p 1.
   
   

9. M Pinto-Duschinsky, Financing politics: A global view, Journal of Democracy 13, 2002, p 1.
   
   

10. Ibid, p 15.
    
    

11. Ibid, p 8.
    
    

12. Ibid, p 14.
    
    

13. Argandoña, op cit, p 8.
    
    

14. Saffu, op cit, p 24
    
    

15. This is according to a survey conducted shortly after the 1999 general election in South Africa.
    
    

16. K Z Paltiel, 1981, Campaign finance: Contrasting practices and reforms, in D Butler, H R Penniman and A Ranney (eds), Democracy at the polls: A comparative study of competitive national elections, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, p 138, in Austin and Tjernnström, op cit, p 6.
    
    

17. Argandoña, op cit, p 8.
    
    

18. Pinto-Duschinsky, op cit, p 1.
    
    

19. Ibid, p 10.
    
    

20. The story broke in the Mail and Guardian in early 2004. Following this particular exposé the paper was temporarily gagged.
    
    

21. Bryan and Baer, op cit, p 87.
    
    

22. Ibid, p 100.
    
    

23. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Section 236.
    
    

24. Bryan and Baer, op cit, p 122.
    
    

25. Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act, 1997, Section 5(3)(c).
    
    

26. Bryan and Baer, op cit, p 128.
    
    

27. Ibid.
    
    

28. Ibid.
    
    

29. United Republic of Tanzania, Political Parties Act (No 5) of 1992, Article 13, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1992.
    
    

30. Bryan and Baer, op cit, p 140.
    
    

31. Draft African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 2002, Article 10, p 11.
    
    

32. <www.u4.no/themes/conventions/auconvention.cfm> (15 August 2005).
    
    

33. L Moonze, The Post (Lusaka), 11 August 2005.