INTRODUCTION

The South African Army is at the cross-roads. Since the previous South African Army conference in November 1993, the country and its armed forces have witnessed changes that only a few years ago would have been unthinkable. At this juncture, some of these changes and the impact they will have on the SA Army in the immediate future need to be discussed.

THE CONTRADICTORY CONTEXT

The present South African context contains a number of contradictions. South Africa is faced with the peculiar dilemma of having the primary mission of its armed forces - the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country - diminished as a result of a "negative threat" scenario. Whilst the armed forces have a political, moral and constitutional responsibility to remain a credible deterrent, its secondary missions presently form the bulk of its responsibilities, namely border protection, internal stability and regional and international military commitments.

This context has become contradictory as a result of the following.

The SA Army is expected to fulfil its secondary functions, but within the context of far-reaching proposed budget reductions.



The fulfillment of these secondary functions contribute to the weakening of the SA Army’s budgetary, training and operational capability for the accomplishment of its primary mission.



If the SA Army neglects these secondary functions within the present scenario, the possible consequences for the maintenance of stability in the transitional period in the country and for the upliftment of its people, could be critical.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIMARY MISSION

Despite the fact that there is no external threat at present, according to the Interim Constitution, the State has a political and moral responsibility to provide protection for its citizens. Whilst this kind of protection must provide for both fiscal and force design considerations, neither the State nor the armed forces can abrogate this responsibility. However, given the nature of the negative threat scenario, certain further factors will have to be taken into account.

The absence of an external threat can lead to the development of more defensive postures and doctrines in accordance with the Constitution.



The absence of an external threat can lead to the development and prioritisation of the part-time forces as a cost-effective force multiplier.



Rationalisation of existing force levels will have to be executed over the next five years.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SECONDARY FUNCTIONS

In the light of the above, it is necessary to look at the importance of secondary tasks undertaken by the SA Army. At present the SA Army plays a vital role in providing internal stability. Without the support of the SA Army, it is highly unlikely that the South African Police Services (SAPS), by their own admission, would be able to maintain internal stability. Indeed, this service provided by the SA Army is indispensable to the transitional process in general. Without this support, the prospects for violence and political instability would be heightened considerably, thereby derailing the process of democratisation in general.

The function of protecting the country’s borders has been undertaken by the SA Army since 1986. Initially, this was meant to neutralise armed border crossings, but subsequently it became extended to the interception of illegal border trespassers, such as refugees and criminals. Money was spent on establishing and maintaining electrical and sisal obstacles, with varying degrees of success. Additionally, the SA Army was sometimes involved in search operations at certain border posts.

The effective and humane monitoring of the country’s borders is essential if the flood of illegal immigrants is to be curtailed, not to mention dealing with the associated problems of drug smuggling, stock theft, and weapons smuggling. In November 1994 there were seventeen infantry companies deployed on border duty at an estimated average daily cost in excess of R 400 000. The number of staff involved can be expanded should the need arise. Looking at statistics, the value inherent in the protection of South African borders speaks for itself. In the first nine months of 1994, a total of 35 812 border trespassers were arrested by troops. If it is considered that only 12 275 were arrested during 1993 and that statistics show only the small portion of illegals who are actually caught, South Africa is in danger of being swamped by illegals at a rate increasing at nearly 400% per annum. As for weapons retrieved, the figure rose from 1 329 for 1993 to 1 674 for the first nine months of 1994.

The Interim Constitution provides for assistance towards the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Whilst the SA Army clearly has the infrastructure and willingness to assist where the necessary capabilities do not exist within other state departments, the following should be taken into account.

Financing of such activities and projects must be provided for within a budget other than the defence budget.



As such activities are not part of the SA Army’s primary mission, it will affect the preparation of its forces and its operational readiness.



Such activities can, if allowed to continue without restriction, politicise the armed forces through their involvement in typically civilian administrative tasks. The dangers which may arise from highly trained and motivated army personnel being allowed to operate outside their natural environment are well-known. They tend to take command, easily resulting in accusations of a creeping coup!



Army equipment is tailor made for specific combat environments and purposes and is expensive to replace. To use this equipment in support of the RDP would be tantamount to using bank notes to light cigarettes - totally inefficient and extremely costly. Once military equipment has been exhausted, it must be replaced. It would therefore be much better to use the expertise residing in military personnel to support the RDP, rather than military equipment itself.



The danger exists that through active participation in the RDP, the SA Army can inadvertently come into competition with the private sector. This in itself will defeat one of the objectives of the RDP and should be avoided at all cost.

Following this, the total commitment of the SA Army to the RDP must be stressed. Ways and means must be found for the SA Army to become involved in the RDP, whereby the citizens of this country could be reimbursed for the substantial amount they have invested in the Army.

Although the SA Army is designed and trained for war, it possesses certain inherent abilities that are not restricted to the battlefield. This is referred to as collateral utility. The mere fact that the Army has watertankers to support troops during operations, automatically means that the same vehicles can be used to transport water to drought stricken areas. The collateral utility of Army engineers played a determining role at the Merriespruit disaster. However, the use of collateral utility is not without cost. The SA Army remains willing to make its collateral utility available to other state departments, but because of budgetary cuts, funding for its use will have to come from other sources.

OPERATIONS

The SA Army gets its mandate from that of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which, in turn, is contained in the Interim Constitution. The SA Army’s mandate include the following.

The SA Army may be deployed for service in defence of the Republic of South Africa to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is its main role. To do this, its posture will primarily be defensive in nature. In the Government’s attempts at solving conflict through diplomatic means, the SA Army will render non-combat support. It will, however, be capable of using military means to resolve conflict as a last resort. To be able to do this, a credible deterrent capability to enhance diplomatic initiatives is presently in existence. Its mobile forces serve as the first line of defence and must be regarded as a priority where maintenance and development are concerned. Structuring, planning and development are therefore taking place around these mobile forces to ensure that the Army’s primary task can be executed as and when required.



The SA Army may also be employed for service in compliance with international obligations. Its aim is to strive for the promotion of collective security in southern Africa, thus establishing mutual confidence and trust in the region.



It may also be employed for the preservation of life, health and property and for the provision and/or maintenance of essential services. It may also be used to uphold law and order in the RSA in co-operation with the SAPS and under circumstances as set out legally, where the SAPS alone is unable to maintain law and order. Finally, the SA Army may also be employed in support of any state department for purposes of socio-economic upliftment.

In order to execute its secondary functions effectively, the SA Army relies on its collateral utility supported by funding from the relevant departments. Such expenditure is not catered for in the Army’s budget.

UNIONS AND LABOUR UNIONS

The SA Army’s primary and secondary tasks will be useless to the country if a mechanism, such as a union, exists that can prevent it from being used. At present, this is a contentious issue within the SANDF, arising during a period in which unions have already become a part of the security establishment. Apart from POPCRU within the SAPS, it is also a growing phenomenon within private security organisa-tions. For a number of reasons the SA Army is of the opinion that unionisation is undesirable.

Mass strikes and mutinies can undermine the operational readiness of the armed forces in times of peace, but during periods of war they can paralyse it.



Within the present context, it can contribute to the politicisation of the Defence Force - the creation of a centre-left union could precipitate the counter-creation of a right-wing union.



It could divide both the rank and file along racial and institutional lines (former non-statutory versus statutory), as well as separate the officer corps from the enlisted cadre.



Perhaps most seriously, it could contribute to the creation of an "us and them" scenario, dividing the SA Army as the institution that handles the bulk of the integrating forces in its entirety.

All members of the National Defence Force, whether uniformed or civilian, fulfil an essential role. Uniformed personnel, whether on regular or short service, constitute the final protection for the Constitution as the supreme authority in the RSA.

Because of the nature of the trust put in members of the Armed Forces, it is proper for them to subjugate their personal interests to the greater task of protecting the sovereignty of the RSA. If they fail to do so, they cannot claim to be military professionals. It is therefore, equally proper that their services be voluntary, because on entering the service, they irreversibly exchange their right to belong to a union for the right to wear a uniform. In this regard, section 126B (1) of the Defence Act (Act No. 44 of 1957), which came into operation on 12 November 1993, clearly states: "A member of the Permanent Force shall not be or become a member of any trade union as defined in section 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 (Act No. 28 of 1956:....)".

The SA Army is compelled to comply with the provisions of section 126B (1) of the Act until such time as the Defence Act itself is amended or the Constitutional Court decides otherwise.

Civilians serving in the Defence Force retain their right to belong to a union. In as much as they have voluntarily entered employment with the view to support their colleagues in uniform, it could be accepted that they have also given up their right to participate in strikes. Otherwise the implication would be that they are indifferent to the essential service rendered by those in uniform.

Whoever is promoting the idea of a union for soldiers, is not only encouraging soldiers to commit an illegal act, but is also doing a disservice to our country. Their motivation for doing it, must therefore be open to question. Are they actually worried about the soldiers themselves, or are they following a hidden agenda, serving only their own interests?

If the present mechanisms for addressing grievances as taken up in the Defence Act, specifically the well-known Redress of Wrongs, prove insufficient for our times, alternative mechanisms must be found. These could possibly include staff associations and the resolution of conflict at grassroots level through established mediation skills.

WOMEN

In our country’s history and specifically in early battles waged on the subcontinent, women played an important part. At times they were thrust into the midst of the fiercest fighting imaginable, not out of any bloodthirsty desire for combat, but out of the need for survival. As children, the stories of these heroines were told to us, irrespective of the differing backgrounds from which we come. As history is often highly subjective, it would be inappropriate to name some of these heroines. One group’s hero may be a villain in the eyes of another group.

Being exposed to Western notions of chivalry, the idea that women could be used as front-line soldiers was completely unacceptable to the prevailing way of thinking in the old SADF. In actual fact, even the idea of women in uniform took a long time to be accepted. After this was accomplished, they were still barred from doing anything that could lead, even remotely, to them ending up on a battlefield. They were thus mostly assigned to logistic, administrative and telecommunication posts. The Israelis and, more recently, Operation Desert Storm, caused a reconsideration of the approach to employing women in the armed forces.

At present, the SA Army prohibits any form of discrimination against women employed as members of the Permanent Force. They are offered the same career opportunities and scope as men and enjoy exactly the same service benefits. This is in line with the Government’s stated intention of ensuring equality for women. Women are now free to choose whether they want to be employed in infrastructure posts, the support services such as administration, personnel, finance, logistics, signals, catering, training as instructors, or in combat positions.

They undergo basic training, junior leadership and/or formative training and thereafter specialist career or corps training. For basic and junior leadership training, women are separated from men. All career training thereafter is done jointly, with the same academic and physical requirements expected of both men and women.

At present nearly 2 000 women are employed throughout the SA Army, with the exception of the armour corps. Despite the military atmosphere, the refinement and femininity of women are held in high regard. Utilisation of women in traditional combat situations must be voluntary.

It will take time for the hardened male soldier to accept that a woman has as much right to become a combat soldier as he has. This is not as a result of the misconception that women are of the weaker sex, but because of the values instilled by the environment in which he grew up. For this to change, a process must be put in motion enabling him to accept the need for change. He must gradually be exposed to the idea of women on the battlefield.

The SA Army must strive in all sincerity to become non-sexist as outlined in the Interim Constitution and the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC) agreements. Certain factors are important in this regard.

Representation of women at all levels of the command and staff hierarchy is needed.



The sensitisation of all Army personnel in issues of gender awareness is required.



The participation of women in all spheres of military endeavour, subject to ministerial approval, should be encouraged.

THE FUTURE OF THE PART TIME FORCES

Much has been said about the Army’s part time forces in recent times. The news media made mention of a ten per cent turnout of personnel being called up. The correct number is immaterial, because of the moratorium on prosecuting these offenders. The moratorium brought about a significant change within the SANDF. Changed circumstances in the country, as well as a change in the willingness of members of part time forces to serve, have necessitated serious consideration of the future of the part time forces. A complete investigation was therefore commissioned into this matter. The investigation will be completed by March 1995.

The aim of this investigation is to ensure that there will still be a part time force in future, but structured to provide for the changes taking place in South Africa. The idea is to have a totally voluntary part time force, thus conforming to present trends in democratic Western countries.

To achieve this, it is necessary to take a new look at the relationship between the SA Army as an organisation, the individual as a volunteer, and his employer as the one relinquishing the services of the volunteer. It is important that these three are in harmony. The needs of the SA Army must be satisfied, while the individual feels that he can voluntarily follow a second (albeit part time) career according to his own wants and needs. On the other hand, the employer must also be taken into consideration and be recompensed for his sacrifices.

It therefore follows that one of the cornerstones of such an approach will be a system of incentives aimed at both employee and employer. It is foreseen that the future volunteer will be consulted on the number of days per year that he wants to serve. This must be done with the approval of his employer. Furthermore, the volunteer will probably receive some kind of remuneration, over and above normal wages, as an incentive for specific progress and expertise.

A contract will have to be entered into between the SA Army, the volunteer and his employer. For his sacrifices, the employer could possibly be compensated through a tax concession of some kind.

INTEGRATION

A regular news feature during the last couple of months, has been integration. Integration can be a success, as South Africa’s history has already proven. It was the case in 1912, when the personnel units and traditions of both Boer and Brit, were integrated into a cohesive national Union Defence Force (UDF). This, however, was not brought about without problems.

Division existed in the ranks over the role of the armed forces. This was clearly indicated by the 1914 rebellion against the use of the armed forces in the First World War, as well as the division over the use of the UDF against strikers in 1914, 1915 and 1922.



Perceptions of inequalities in Boer and Brit representations within the Union Defence Force were a point of contention for both.



However, integration was managed successfully despite teething problems and the UDF went on to acquit itself with great distinction in the First and Second World Wars, as well as in the Korean War. Key aspects of its success were:



Fair representation of both Boer and Brit within the command echelons. The parallel with the present South African situation is obvious.



Retraining of all personnel regardless of background.



Creation of a common set of values and institutional loyalty.



Creation of a culture that synthesised both traditions.

How should integration take place in the SA Army? Some things will have to be done, while others are less important. Some red lights have already come on, while certain issues have the potential of becoming very difficult to manage.

As a point of departure it must be understood that integration does not mean assimilation. Unfortunately, some personnel of the old SADF are still under the impression that forces to be integrated can simply be absorbed into existing structures, and everything carry on as before. This is most definitely not the case. Integration means taking separate entities and joining them together to form a totally new one. None would retain their original form or shape, but would hopefully contribute their best attributes to the new organisation. It also means eliminating redundant parts from the former organisations to ensure a streamlined new one. Integration means change. All old baggage in the form of misconceptions, fears and preconceived ideas and impressions will have to be left behind and a new start be made. Soldiers are past masters at managing change and crisis. With the necessary commitment, integration will turn out to be a resounding success.

It must also be visible at all levels of the command structure, if it is to be successful. The importance of the appointment of senior officers within the SANDF therefore outrivals senior appointments within any other state department. No fewer than nine officers from the non-statutory forces have been appointed as Generals, whilst hundreds of senior officers from all the participating forces have been appointed within the SA Army alone. After having undergone bridging training, these officers will undoubtedly make valuable contributions to the SA Army in future.

Integration should also take into account the diverse traditions and cultures of the different armies being integrated. When our military ties with Britain were cut in the early sixties, it led to an upsurge of patriotism, causing many sensible traditions to be discarded as being non-South African. As traditions take many years to develop, it caused a vacuum, which left us poorer as a result. We should not repeat the same mistake. Where a tradition is offensive, it must have no place in our future and must be abolished. However, we should strive for understanding and tolerance, so that new traditions based on the old can be developed. This is already in progress, in many respects as a result of the JMCC process.

The major challenge of the integration process is the development of mutual trust. In 1993 in this venue, three pillars on which the future army is to be built, were proposed. These were the upholding of standards, an a-political army and part time forces. They have been discussed and debated at various occasions in different venues and have mostly been accepted. New developments have now forced us to consider possible new pillars to ensure that mutual trust can develop.

The first new pillar that immediately presents itself, is the maintenance of discipline. A soldier is universally known for his discipline. Without it, he can turn into a rogue element in the force. It is therefore with concern that the lack of discipline exhibited by some of the personnel to be integrated is noticed. It is unacceptable for soldiers to call on the Minister of Defence to resign or to demand the appearance of the President to listen to grievances. This violates the fundamental principle of civil military relations, namely the subordination of the military to the political authority. Until now, this lack of discipline has been tolerated in the light of the overriding desire to integrate the different forces successfully. This can no longer continue. An army without discipline within its ranks, is maybe even worse than having no army at all. People in the assembly areas are there of their own free will. They must now start acting like responsible soldiers or find another career to pursue. The SA Army will remain a disciplined force and a revolt, which seems to be the aim of some soldiers, will not be tolerated.

Having said this, it must be stressed that there is sympathy for some of the grievances and everything will be done within reason to resolve those that have a direct military bearing. The SA Army cannot become involved in a dispute that arose prior to the April 1994 elections. It cannot be held responsible for those members whose names were not included in the various certified personnel registers. Nor can it accept blame for people who are dissatisfied with the present political dispensation and who try to use integration as a political platform to express their demands. There are people who are dissatisfied with the rank they have been allocated, but the relevant decisions are taken by an impartial agency and are therefore out of the hands of the SA Army.

A second additional pillar will support training. Soldiers from various military backgrounds have to be integrated into a cohesive fighting force. This implies training which will align everyone to the same doctrine and provide the same foundation for all. Training needs are possibly the biggest challenge facing the SA Army in the forthcoming decade. Training should strive, as far as possible, to conform to international standards.

Maximum involvement and exposure of SA Army personnel to appropriate foreign courses which will enhance these levels of expertise, are therefore required. Selective attendance of foreign students at our own courses must also be welcomed. Not only does it serve a marketing purpose, but combined with mobile warfare exercises, it enhances mutual understanding and co-operation, especially with respect to possible future involvement in the southern African context.

With respect to joint exercises with other armed forces, the SA Army will co-operate with any friendly neighbour within the restrictions laid down by the Government. This type of training will essentially revolve around the maintaining of peace and stability in the subcontinent and assistance during national disasters.

Training for international purposes will develop as the need for it increases. For the immediate future, bridging training should urgently be provided to qualify integrating army personnel to meet appointment requirements or to prepare them for particular courses required for leadership development. This training is available to all personnel who want to pursue a successful career in the SA Army, but lack the specific knowledge required for it.

In this regard progress has already been made. Officers’ courses have been presented at the Army Gymnasium and at the School of Infantry. A substantial number of junior leaders have been trained. Bridging training for other enlisted personnel have also been given. It is obvious that the SA Army has accepted the challenge of integration and is proceeding with its realisation, regardless of the problems that crop up.

The standardisation of training and learning within the SA Army is imperative, given the diversity of training cultures and operational experiences of present members of the Armed forces. Essentially, conventional forces are being integrated with guerrilla forces. Both cultures are making an important contribution to the end result, but it will take time, patience and a tremendous amount of goodwill from both groups to ensure successful integration. Training must be the cement and the bonding factor of integration.

The third pillar is command and control. As this is obvious, it will not be dwelt on, except to state that if the integration process does not succeed, the SA Army will only have themselves to blame.

Morale is an important fourth pillar. Some staff members of the old SA Army feel that they have been forgotten. This is certainly not the case. They will have to understand, however, that the immediate priority is to concentrate on successful integration, while at the same time managing a perpetually shrinking budget.

The last additional pillar is the effective management of the SA Army in turbulent times. Over the last two years the SA Army has developed a strategic management process to achieve this. The process is now in place, and with the exception of a hiccup now and then, is up and running.

To be credible, integration should reflect the different national, gender, ethnic and language groups in South African society. The Army must become truly representative, thus making it acceptable to the population as a whole. To this end, applicable service systems will have to be developed.

The integration process must be managed in an objective and fair manner. Failure to do so will lead to accusations of partiality. Dragging integration into the political arena should be avoided at all costs.

The commonly accepted notion that integration is a short-term process, is incorrect. As its completion is envisaged by the end of March 1998, ample time remains. Initially, the transfer of staff involved in the integration process will be kept to an absolute minimum. In the medium term, personnel will of necessity have to be posted to other parts of the country. This is common to the life of soldiers the world over.

Integration naturally leads to inflated force levels, a bloated officer corps and excess units, something the economy can ill afford. It thus follows that the "down management" of the army will have to run concurrently with integration. During this process medium to long-term objectives should be kept in mind, namely a lean, effective and high-technology army consistent with its primary and secondary roles.

The inevitable result of integrating different armies into a cohesive whole, is an officer corps that is divided on military, political, and factional lines. Should a division along racial or cultural lines become evident, however, attaining the ideals of integration will be in danger. The key to successful integration therefore, lies within the officer corps where the maximum degree of homogeneity should be achieved.

The success of civil-military relations and the defence transition hinges on the successful outcome of integration. Failure to integrate successfully, will lead to the following problems:

Loss of legitimacy for the military in the eyes of the public.



Political isolation of the Defence Ministry within the State, with further negative consequences for the defence budget.



Possible disintegration of the armed forces themselves, characterised by mutinies, low levels of morale and severe divisions within both the officer corps and other ranks.



A deterioration of the proud standards of training and service to the country.

RATIONALISATION

Integration will put immense pressure on the salary costs of the new Army, to the detriment of the capital budget. In the past, the capital budget absorbed huge amounts of financial cuts. It cannot sustain further cuts without the army entering the danger zone where future capital spending will be of no avail, irrespective of the size of such spending. Even in the short term, rationalisation of army personnel will have to receive serious attention. The country can only afford a certain size army, and the integrated army is way beyond that size.

Attempts will be made to ensure that rationalisation is as painless as possible for Army personnel, but major cuts in staff numbers inevitably will have to be made. Personnel qualifying for pension will be afforded the opportunity to go on early pension where it is deemed to be in the interest of the service. Personnel who do not have enough service years to their credit, will be assisted in their efforts to find new careers. A fact that is sometimes forgotten, is that early retirement represents a saving on the SA Army personnel budget only. These retirees become an immediate pension liability for the State, though at a lower expense rate than before.

Rationalisation will also have an effect on the private sector. If the Service Corps concept is managed correctly, it will have positive results. The success of the Service Corps is therefore of paramount importance. Rationalisation should not be seen as an unavoidable burden, but rather as an opportunity that can be of benefit to the country as a whole. Through rationalisation skilled manpower becomes available that can be used to support the RDP. Often the only thing that prevents a person from starting a business of his own, is lack of capital and time. Knowing soldiers, it would be surprising if the majority of those being rationalised, do not start a business of their own.

The planning of rationalisation should take note of the democratic rights of individuals. It must therefore be managed impartially and without fear or favour to anyone. The origin or background of a staff member will play no role in the decision to rationalise his or her position. Whether he or she comes from the statutory or non-statutory forces is of no concern. Ability, capability, service requirements and a member’s own situation should be some of the deciding factors. It is foreseen that personnel could indicate their desire to leave the Force in order to pursue a second career, thereby providing new jobs for others.

When rationalising, we should be aware of the following:

The potential loss of expertise if former SA Army members are rationalised. Looking holistically at the whole matter, it is obvious that the Army will be weakened by rationalisation. But this weakening must be seen in context. The country’s priorities have changed. The potential for military aggression against South Africa has diminished drastically. Personnel being rationalised will not be totally lost to the military, as they will become part of the reserve force.



The loss of legitimacy if former non-statutory forces are rationalised. It is obvious that some of them will have to be rationalised. The challenge is to do it in such a way that it does not become a political issue.



The problems of internal cohesion which could be created if rationalisation is not managed correctly, creating an "us and them" scenario for instance. This will happen if personnel involved in the rationalisation process are perceived as partial.

THE SERVICE CORPS

Much has been written and even more said about the Service Corps. At the Army conference in 1993, the whole idea of a Service Corps (then still termed a Service Brigade) was publicly mooted by Gen Meiring as the newly appointed Chief SADF.

The Service Corps is an essential component of future rationalisation within the SA Army and has the following advantages:

It provides a potential "cushion" for demobilised soldiers prior to their release into civilian society. Should this "cushion" not exist, the possibility of some former MK and SADF personnel resorting to brigandage and crime becomes a reality.



It can provide people with marketable skills which they can gainfully use in different employment scenarios once reinstated into the civilian economy.



It can contribute to the effectiveness of the RDP via the following:



The training of personnel for utilisation in a wide range of spheres.


The utilisation of personnel in tasks aiming at socio- economic upgrading.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Whilst many overseas countries can learn much from the South African military experience - a rich tactical tradition, experience of joint operations in combat, and in internal stability deployment - South Africa also has much to learn from the international community.

Peace operations is a priority area. As a regional and continental leader, and a country bestowed with moral credibility within the international community, South Africa will inevitably be called upon to participate in peace operations. Whilst it is not advisable for South Africa to field combat troops until such time as the integration process is completed, it may be called upon to field infrastructural support, such as medical, logistical and communications facilities. South Africa can learn much from the international experience in peace operations in the spheres of doctrinal development, training programmes, combined operations and inter-operability.



Secondly, the SA Army must carefully assess the range of training and doctrinal development in other countries and integrate this into its programmes and culture.

THE FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE SA ARMY

The Minister of Defence, in his policy debate speech to the Senate on 23 August 1994, mentioned some startling figures on defence spending since 1989. Despite the serious effect that financial cuts have on the Army, the need for financial discipline is recognised and the SA Army will strive to accommodate these cuts without endangering the capacity to fulfil its function.

In the past, cuts could be absorbed by a mix of retrench-ments, cuts in the capital budget, as well as savings in operational costs. The point has, however, been reached where very soon the Army will no longer be in a position to render effective

support to the SAPS or execute border control. Within the conventional forces, which must remain a priority, serious strategic gaps have been left as a result of cuts to the capital budget. The former three conventional divisions have effectively been reduced to a single one, not because of insufficient staff, but because funding does not exist to equip them all.

The Minister recently mentioned the matter of a core force in his speech to the Senate. Should South Africa have to go to war, the Army will require a full wartime force to be confident of victory. Given sufficient funds and at least five years, this will be possible, but conflicts have the habit of developing virtually overnight. The SA Army has therefore, as part of its structure, a core combat force which is about a third of the size of the full wartime force. This core combat force is a balanced fighting force that can deal with limited conditions of conflict for a limited period only. It consists of a rapid deployment force, a fighting division and necessary rear area support units. Should the need arise, this core force will form the basis from which to expand to a full wartime force.

Sufficient financial means to realise this core force, however, does not exist. Affordability has forced the force to be downsized even further, to a force which will take two years to expand to the core force. This implies the closure of various units and a rethink of the geographical distribution of forces. The new provincial boundaries have provided the opportunity to achieve this.

This process of integration, demobilisation and, most importantly, rationalisation is undertaken firstly, through a scientific project to determine where additional cuts can be considered resulting in the least negative effect on the operational capability of the SA Army. This project has already provided some interesting preliminary results and has indicated areas for consideration that up to now have been considered untouchable.

Secondly, three teams consisting of original thinkers from both statutory and non-statutory forces, including the Citizen Force, have been formed to investigate the possibility of a new army structure and to propose a design for such a force which will be within the expected future financial ceiling of the SA Army. For the first time, a notable military research institution outside the SA Army have been approached to put together a team of academic specialists to provide another design option. This was prompted by, amongst others, the valuable inputs received from the academic sector for the design of the Ministry of Defence.

These investigations will be completed early in 1995 and will be considered carefully. An open invitation is furthermore extended to any organisation who feels that it can also make a contribution, to submit its proposals.

A paper presented at a conference on The SA Army - Futures and Forecasts, jointly presented by the Institute for Defence Policy, The Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Department of Political Sciences, UNISA in co-operation with the South African Army on Tuesday, 8 November 1994, at the Senate Hall, Theo Van Wijk Building, UNISA.