INTRODUCTION

In 1980, the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces consisted of some 320 000 members. By the year 2000 it is expected to have decreased to around 215 000. These figures would only apply to the uniformed military component. If civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence are included, figures would be 560 000 for 1980 and an estimated 316 000 at the end of the century. This reduction represents the loss of more than 240 000 military and civilian jobs, or more than 40 per cent, in the course of twenty years.

Needless to say, the United Kingdom has had plenty of experience in downsizing their military force.

More specifically, the Armed Forces experienced restructuring as a result of the Options for Change review of 1990 that was designed to adapt the military forces to changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. This led to an overall reduction of 20 per cent in all three Services, including their civilian support systems.

Currently, the Front Line First programme announced in July 1994, is being implemented. The review that produced the programme and its subsequent implementation was an unusual exercise, in that it initiated a process whereby we are attempting to cut the cost of defence, but without cutting defence itself.

The integral role played by civilians in the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, and in support of the armed forces, could be discussed at length. However, at this juncture it is important to point out those functions not being performed by civilians. Civilians never take military decisions or tender military advice. Decisions on the size of the forces are taken by Ministers. The system is intended to ensure that these decisions are based on the best possible analysis of all the factors involved: military, political, financial, industrial and so on. The advice on the military implications of the options is, of course, crucial and is provided by professional soldiers, sailors and airmen, and ultimately by the Chief of the Defence Staff and the other Chiefs of Staff.

"Downsizing" is a euphemism for "reducing" or, even more bluntly, "cutting". Management consultants have been overheard referring to this kind of exercise as "right sizing". The fact that cutting down on the size of any organisation is painful, not only for those who have to leave it, should not be disguised. The reasons for any reduction in the size of an organisation, therefore, should be very clear and care should be taken to ensure that the result is not only the "right size", but that it also "fits the purpose".

In the section that follows, the reasons for and the manner in which downsizing has been achieved will be discussed. Although the title specifically refers to ground forces, most of what follows applies equally to all three armed forces in the United Kingdom.

THE "WHY" AND "WHAT" OF DOWNSIZING

"Defence" is not the only purpose of national armed forces. Some tasks carried out by the armed forces, for example disaster relief operations, are clearly not about defence at all. Other tasks contribute to wider issues, such as foreign policy and security interests. The way in which the size and shape of the armed forces is determined, needs to be addressed. In doing so, it is also necessary to pay attention to affordability.

Defence serves most countries as a kind of insurance policy, and like ordinary policyholders, most treasuries want to pay as small a premium as possible. The analogy is imperfect only in one respect: insurance policies seldom deter burglars.

Any insurance premium is linked, moreover, to the degree of risk and the size of the possible liability. Defence is certainly no different in this respect, except that the term "threat" is used instead of "risk" or "liability". Since shortly after the Second World War until the end of the 1980’s, defence requirements were dominated by the massive threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. The likelihood of an immediate attack diminished over the years, and to some extent this affected the premium which countries were prepared to pay. But intent can change quickly and there was no doubt that the Soviet Union possessed the capability to mount a massive attack at very short notice. The keystone of the United Kingdom’s policy, was therefore to ensure that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a whole retained sufficient capability to deter any attack. Fortunately, no attack was ever made. NATO spent forty years training to fight the Third World War, but never conducted a single real operation.

During the same period, British forces took part in some seventy non-NATO military operations, which ranged in size from small to large, most in response to unforeseen developments. These responsibilities were essentially fulfilled by drawing on forces which were needed in any case to meet NATO commitments. The Falklands and Gulf War campaigns are classic examples.

The end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union brought about far-reaching changes. This was the trigger for the Options for Change policy review. The single largest threat to world peace vanished, and thus the capability for a massive surprise attack disappeared. All that remained was the awareness that such a threat could only have been recreated over a period of several years. At the same time, however, new risks emerged.

The disintegration of the Eastern Bloc brought with it the risk of political instability and thus of armed conflict having an effect on security interests, albeit on a smaller scale. This has been emphasised on a disastrous scale by subsequent events in the former Yugoslavia. At the same time the United Kingdom was conducting the Options for Change review, the Gulf War dramatically demonstrated the dangers that can arise in a world in which weapons of mass destruction and destabilising quantities of conventional weapons start to proliferate. It also served as a reminder that the country’s political and economic interests are increasingly linked to those of its international partners. In more general terms, it is expected that security interests will increasingly be pursued in a multilateral context. It goes without saying that defence and security policies will also retain distinguishable British characteristics. A related ability for independent national action, whether in Northern Ireland or in defence of the country’s dependent territories, must therefore be retained.

Against this background the Options review concluded that defence policy should be formulated in terms of the following three overlapping defence roles:

ensuring the protection and security of the United Kingdom and its dependent territories, even in the absence of major external threats;



insurance against any major external threat to the United Kingdom and its allies; and



as contribution to the promotion of the United Kingdom’s wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability.

These roles are not placed in an order of priority, although, in determining the level of national resources and commitments, it seems as if the country has more room for choice in the second and third roles, where co-operation with allies and partners can be expected, than in the first role, which is purely of a national nature.

The Options review proceeded to reassess and measure the country’s potential commitments, and consequently its force requirements, against each role. The significant change was, of course, the noticeable reduction in the requirements for fulfilling the second role, as this had previously been driven by Cold War threats.

Nevertheless, the key to policy formulation in this area, continues to be collective security through NATO. For all its members, the Alliance offers the best and most cost-effective way of providing national security. The Alliance must therefore continue to be an effective military instrument, able to respond to military operations it is required to undertake in the new strategic environment. For instance, in Bosnia NATO forces may be required to undertake new roles to fit in with the new international situation. The ability to reconstitute forces and capabilities should they be required to respond to the re-emergence of a direct external threat, should also be retained. Nevertheless, in common with the country’s allies, the end of the Cold War clearly permitted a reduction in the scale of forces linked to the risk of a general war in Europe.

In the United Kingdom this led to plans for the reduction of all three Services. These were not simply uniform percentage cuts, but reflected specific changes in military requirements. In the case of the Army, for example, armoured regiments were reduced by just over forty per cent, while infantry and artillery regiments were cut by around thirty percent, which was significantly less. At the other end of the scale, there was no reduction in the helicopter capability, and plans are underway to enhance it.

Proportional savings of between twenty and thirty per cent, from the support services were also anticipated. For example, the number of Army training establishments was cut from seventy to forty and the number of barracks in Germany from 134 to 51. Together, the changes on the front line and in support services have reduced the number of military and civilian jobs by more than 90 000 over the last four years, involving more than 20 000 Service redundancies and 15 000 civilians.

Since the 1990 analysis, more changes have taken place and the country had to adapt accordingly. Although some of these events could not have been foreseen, the underlying assumptions of the Options analysis have remained valid. Indeed, since then, there has been a progressive reduction in the forces of the former Soviet Republics and co-operation between the West and countries of Central and Eastern Europe is expanding.

MATCHING MILITARY CAPABILITY WITH POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

Within the three broad roles described above, approximately fifty specific military tasks have been identified which the military forces undertake or might be required to undertake in support of Government policy. Two examples of national tasks under the first defence role would be the maintenance of the country’s nuclear deterrent force and the provision of a garrison and reinforcement capability for the Falkland Islands. An example of a task resorting under the second role would be the possible contribution to the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps. A task falling within the sphere of the third role, namely wider security interests, would be the contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, such as in Bosnia.

Having divided the United Kingdom’s defence policy into specific military tasks, the force package needed to accomplish each task is then analysed, for example, what number of infantry battalions and artillery units is required. This is, of course, done on a basis which includes the Defence Force in its widest sense. Few tasks presently only involve members of one Service. Requirements for air and naval support and for strategic lift needs to be considered. From the analysis of individual tasks, both current and potential, a picture can be formed of the total force requirements. This is not, of course, simply a question of adding the individual totals required for each military task. All tasks do not have to be done at the same time and individual units may therefore be earmarked for more than one task. This will depend on both military and political judgements.

In making judgements about the nature of the forces required to undertake specific tasks successfully, the likely capability of possible opposing and allied forces need to be assessed. The notice period required to assemble and deploy forces need to be considered. But it is also necessary to distinguish between those tasks for which operational capability must always exist and those tasks which could be abandoned in an emergency. In this regard, account must be taken of those forces engaged in training and transit, as well as other factors, such as possible require-ments for troop rotation and the replacement of battle casualties to provide operational endurance.

This can be illustrated best by considering briefly the task which constitutes the largest operational commitment in peacetime, namely military aid to and support of the police in Northern Ireland.

Approximately 18 battalion-sized units and various specialist groupings, that include about seventy aircraft, are deployed in Northern Ireland today. The total deployed equals some 19,000 servicemen and women from all three Services. The Royal Navy conducts maritime patrols around the Province to prevent arms smuggling; the Royal Air Force carries out a wide range of air and ground support tasks; and the Royal Marines provide both specialist and operational support for the Navy and Army. But the analysis shows that the total force structure required to support these tasks on a continuing basis is significantly larger, once the requirements for pre- and post- tour training and reasonable tour intervals have been taken into account. On the other hand, at least five battalions deployed in Northern Ireland will be earmarked for unforeseen tasks, such as the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps and two units will normally be armour or artillery, operating out of role.

However, the analysis is not static. It is adjusted as commitments and potential commitments change, in response to world events or in line with Government policy. Nor is it only focused on the present, it is also a powerful tool in planning for the long term. The nature of changes to future tasks as a result of current policy is also considered, for example, the withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997; or how the introduction of new equipment may affect those forces required to carry out a specific task. For the last two years, the results of this analysis have been summarised and published in the Defence White Paper in order to demonstrate the direct relation between the country’s forces and its defence needs.

What has been discussed so far, is the way in which required military capability is derived from Government policy. Or, in other words, how policy determines the nature of the front line. It also establishes basic requirements for support, since successful military operations depend on more than just the existence of appropriate forces. They must also be properly trained, equipped and supplied. Nevertheless, any particular level of support may be provided more, or less, economically.

THE DEFENCE COSTS STUDY

Another major study was conducted four years after the Options for Change review. The impetus for the recent Defence Costs Study came from the Government’s drive to reduce the level of public expenditure. Over the last two years, government departments have been carrying out fundamental expenditure reviews. The Defence Costs Study was the contribution made by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to this process.

The Defence Costs Study, however, was a review with a difference. The Defence policy and force levels have only recently been subject to the Options for Change review and the subsequent analysis has, apart from marginal adjustments, remained valid. The Defence Costs Study was intended to reduce costs without changing defence policy or reducing the military capability available to carry it out. For this reason, the study was also called Front Line First.

This seems unnecessary in the light of the department’s established good record for reducing costs. As has been indicated, the restructuring of forces as a result of the Options for Change review was expected to produce significant savings in support costs and a successful efficiency programme was already in operation. However, most of these savings were directly linked to reductions in and restructuring of the front line.

There was a feeling that so much had changed, in the strategic environment, technology, in the size and nature of the country’s forces, as well as in activities within the private sector, that a completely fresh look at the way in which support to the front line was provided, was called for. The object was to identify different ways of doing things, which would not only be cheaper, but also better. It must be emphasised, that the effectiveness of forces depends not only on their size and equipment, but also on the amount and quality of support provided to them. The consensus was that the country did not want to produce a front line consisting of cardboard cut outs.

Many of the far-reaching questions that had to be asked, were similar to those asked by major corporations restructuring under the pressure of recession. There is though, a key difference in that the bottom line for any defence establishment is never cost or profit, but defence capability. This is difficult to measure. Ultimately, it can only be judged if tested by the pressures and circumstances of specific operations. Often this test never arises, for example when deterrence has been successful. More generally, defence capability cannot be judged directly by how defence services are organised on a day-to-day basis in peacetime. Nevertheless, the question asked by the United Kingdom’s defence services were whether attempts were being made to provide too much of the necessary support in-house. Clearly, some defence support services must be provided by the forces themselves. As a rule, the arguments for independence become stronger the closer the forces are to the front line. But, outside operational areas, military logistics is no longer unique in scale or complexity.

Before turning to results, it is valuable to say a few words about how the Defence Costs Study was carried out. Twenty major and thirteen minor studies that looked at all aspects of support were commissioned. Most of these were deliberately designed to step beyond Service and other organisational boundaries. Maximum scope for rationalisation and for spreading best practice from one area to others were required. Perusing so many areas simultaneously in such a short time, most of the actual studies being carried out within three months, has its disadvantages. But it also had major advantages compared with the usual, piecemeal, approach. Potential improvements in one area, frequently depend on making changes in other areas. In this regard, the study teams soon identified such links and, through co-operation were able to exchange and develop ideas. Conducting the work in such a short period also implied that the results of the other studies were available for round table discussions before taking individual decisions. And finally, but very importantly, it meant that the period of uncertainty and disruption to normal business was minimised.

Each team’s first task was to reassess the basic requirements for defence support in their specific focus area, before proceeding to identify the best and most cost-effective way of providing them. The teams were carefully selected to provide a mix of individual skills, expertise and experience appropriate to the subject. The teams comprised members of all three Services and MOD civilians, assisted by experts from other government departments and external experts. Leadership was generally at the level of Major General and equivalents from the other Services and the civil service, and each leader was personally sponsored by the Minister responsible for his or her individual study. Members of cabinet were involved throughout the studies, both in providing strategic direction and in taking a close interest in the individual studies sponsored by them.

The study teams were encouraged to think radically and to challenge established thought. Ideas were also garnered from those working in the Services and the department, leading to several thousand proposals being received and fed into the studies. At the same time, the need to test results for practicality and to ensure that none of the proposals involved risk to operational capability, were also recognised. Before decisions were taken, therefore, each report was considered at a special meeting, chaired by the sponsoring Minister, where senior officers and officials from the areas concerned were able to probe the evidence and arguments and the teams could be cross-examined on the results of their reports.

Although nothing went unchallenged, not all studies produced proposals for radical change. In some areas, changes already under consideration were merely accelerated. It was also necessary, in some instances, to make choices between quick savings and longer term but larger benefits. Inevitably, many studies also led to further investigations to consider promising ideas in greater depth.

The fact that the study achieved its objective though, is the major point to be made. It identified ways of saving more than three quarters of a billion pounds annually from 1996. This would be sufficient, not only to sustain the envisaged capability within the planned reduction in defence spending, but would also allow the government to re-direct funding towards the reinforcement of key capability areas.

About half the savings, representing several hundred million pounds, were in the areas of equipment and logistic support, ranging from more cost-effective procurement methods, to the rationalisation of supply depots and major facilities. For example, the original Options plan involved reducing the number of spares, repair and storage facilities from 141 to 107. The Defence Costs Study plan will cut the number to 65, with the possibility of being reduced even more depending on the outcome of further studies. Essentially, this was achieved through more efficient management, including the use of modern logistics and storage techniques as utilised in the commercial sector and adapted where necessary to take account of specialised needs.

Approximately twenty per cent of the total savings will be derived from changes in recruitment, manning and training policies. For example, for professional, non-conscript Services, the ability to recruit sufficient volunteers is vital. A lot of effort and resources have therefore been invested in the organisation of recruitment. This has proved effective, but expensive. There are some 1 450 dedicated recruiting staff and, at street level, a network of over 200 careers offices. Nevertheless, there are still many towns and parts of the country that are not included.

In future the initial contact with potential recruits will be through the national job centres run by the Employment Services Agency. Recruits will then be referred to a small number of regional military centres for evaluation and selection. This should be less expensive and, in particular, save significantly on fixed overheads. It would also provide a wider base for recruitment, since job centres are in existence throughout the United Kingdom and will provide better coverage than the existing network. Before finally committing the defence services to this approach, however, a pilot scheme is being conducted in selected regions of the country and early indications are encouraging.

Another fifteen per cent is saved through the concentration and rationalisation of infrastructure, such as bases and ranges. The final fifteen per cent will be saved by organisation and management, from all levels of headquarters from the Ministry downwards, the procurement executive and research organisation.

CONCLUSION

The Defence Costs Study so far has been a success. It has reached its objective of putting the Front Line First. General consensus seems that it will improve, rather than reduce defence capability. It is, however, accepted that the process will not be painless. Approximately 19 500 military and civilian jobs will disappear from the Services and the Ministry of Defence, on top of those lost as a result of the Options for Change review. It is further envisaged that 2 000 additional jobs will be createdas a result of the shift of some activities at present being carried out by military personnel, into the civilian sphere. Closure of support units will also have negative results for the areas where they are located. Moreover, those who do not lose their jobs will face further upheaval and concern about their career prospects.

The cuts and reductions discussed in this article flows inevitably from reductions in defence expenditure. Redundancy packages and assistance with resettlement can ease the pain, but will not avoid it. The announcement of any cost cutting exercise is therefore always bad news for those serving in or supporting the Forces, of whom many will be engaged in difficult and dangerous operational tasks while such an announcement is made. Such reviews will never be good for morale. The problem can be minimised, amongst others, by doing it speedily. Uncertainty affects everyone, while the outcome will only affect some. The best approach is to explain, honestly, the process and the reasons for engaging in such a reduction. This should be part and parcel of the process. Attempts at dressing up bad news only encourages cynicism. It is vital that people believe that, for those who remain, there will be a worthwhile future.

The object of the Options for Change review was to reshape the forces to ensure their relevance to changing policy needs as we approach the 21st century. Options for Change and subsequent events have reinforced the requirement for highly professional and flexible forces able to operate in all forms of warfare. They will still need to be well equipped, well trained and well supported. But this has to be done at a cost the country can afford. The objective of the Defence Costs Study was to ensure that every pound spent on support was spent as efficiently as possible, implying that every pound was directly linked to producing front line capability. At the outset there was understand-able scepticism about whether it would be possible to achieve the aim of finding ways of cutting expenditure without damaging the front line. But it was an aim that everyone could identify with and that was achieved in the study. The front line is intact, major new procurement plans have been announced and there will also be some additional investment in key areas of operational support and training.

Thus, the real challenge of downsizing a ground force does not lie in identifying savings, but in actually realising them.

A paper presented at a conference on The SA Army - Futures and Forecasts, jointly presented by the Institute for Defence Policy, The Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Department of Political Sciences, UNISA in co-operation with the South African Army on Tuesday, 8 November 1994, at the Senate Hall, Theo Van Wijk Building, UNISA, Pretoria.