INTRODUCTION

Weapons kill and maim people, and destroy property and the environment. As a result of a growing awareness of the power of weaponry, defence-related issues have invariably attracted more focused attention from politicians and the general public. Since 1990 two particular issues have become central to the defence debate in South Africa, namely the cost of defence and the posture of the National Defence Force.

In recent years the objective has been, as is generally the case in other countries, to keep cost at a minimum. Cost and posture are inter-related, however, depending on the analytical point of departure chosen. A fixed amount of resources could be allocated to defence and thereafter it could be left in the hands of the defence establishment to formulate defence policy that is commensurate with the Constitution. An alternative could be to define a minimum defence posture to protect the sovereignty of the state and thereafter engage in a costing exercise. A third and preferred approach, is to define South Africa’s defence posture and the cost of defence in relation to the reality of our present-day situation.

Several defence analysts have recommended a non-offensive or defensive defence posture for South Africa and in recent years certain parameters or characteristics of this posture have been indicated. Its main features are that the force should only possess defensive weapons and should not be capable of attack. The question, however, is whether defensive defence, as defined, adequately addresses the triangle of cost, posture and the constitutional obligations of the force.

DEFENSIVE DEFENCE

The concept of defensive defence is not new to military thinking. Its philosophical roots extend deep into the history of the analysis of the causes of peace and war and date back to the 16th century. After 1945, leading defensive defence analysts have presented fresh proposals aimed at preventing war. The basis of their thought was that the defender had significant advantages over the attacker. Consequently, defensive defence was not only politically correct, but had the advantage of being a superior military strategy.

In closer examination, however, some of these views contained elements of attack capability. Horst Afheldt advocated the retention of some armoured units, as well as nuclear forces as an ultimate guarantee. Norbert Hannig proposed that a state under attack could strike back using conventionally armed missiles. Albrecht von Muller favoured a degree of conditional punishment in the event of aggression. He also recognised the need for both sufficient counterattack capabilities to retake lost territory and close strike force to retard and diminish the flow of enemy forces. Major-General Loser recommended that barriers be employed to funnel invading forces into "killing zones", where they could be destroyed by remotely-delivered, concentrated fire. John Grin and Lutz Unterseher maintained that a party that attacked, even with conventional weapons, ran the risk of nuclear retaliation, however irrational and self-defeating such a reaction would be. By the same analogy, a purely defensive operation might provoke the selfsame response from an aggressor, especially if he is losing. The renowned military thinker, Karl von Clausewitz, also regarded defence superior to attack, but only because it enabled the defender to take the offensive once he had gained the advantage.

Technological developments in weapons systems, the advent of nuclear weapons and the outbreak of two world wars have all had an impact on defensive defence thinking. With long range weapons, conflict no longer requires close combat. Furthermore, defensive defence principles clearly mean that military attempts to resolve any conflict would take place on one’s own territory. The decisive questions, however, are whether one does in fact commence some form of counterattack to regain lost territory and when and, more importantly, with what weapons. France’s Maginot Line is perhaps a modern day example of what could result from a purely defensive defence.

Another complication is the diminishing distinction between offensive and defensive weapons systems. An Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft, for example, can alert a defensive network to an impending aerial attack. By the same token, the same aircraft could be used to co-ordinate an assault on an opponent’s airfield. In a similar vein, save for the terminology used, it is difficult to distinguish between a strike aircraft and an air defence fighter, or which platforms are classified as tanks and which are considered to be armoured combat vehicles. Indeed, whether a cannon is defensive or offensive seems to depend entirely on whether you are standing in front of it or behind it.

The distinction between attack and defence provides further complications. On the battlefield, precision-guided missiles and long range weapons systems have served to blur this distinction. Politically, Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf War was an attack away from home in defence of principles. Honouring the South African Constitution for "the protection of sovereignty" and in order to meet the "international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states" may require some level of offensive capability.

The lack of an offensive capability, however small, undermines a basic tenet of defensive defence. The role of an armed force in times of peace is to prevent conflict and this can only be achieved through a credible deterrent. In other words, any potential aggressor should be dissuaded from even considering war as an instrument of policy.

Defensive defence also assumes a degree of mutual trust. Implicit in the decision to maintain an armed force is the belief that one could be attacked.

While arguing for offensive capabilities to be part of a strategy of defence, it should also be emphasised that the scale of planned counterattack operations, the size, configuration, training and deployment of troops are what matters most. For example, stationing troops instead of long range weapons along geographical borders is a clear signal of defensive intentions. Increased emphasis on human resources and potential as opposed to sophisticated weapons systems, is another signal demonstrating transparency and military capability. Military training that focuses on defensive tactics, is a further step in this direction. The real thrust behind the building of confidence does not lie in declarations, but in capabilities and intentions. The object of our military doctrine should be to protect the country, while at the same time not constituting a threat to our neighbours.

CONCLUSION

South Africa does not face any conventional threat. Within the Southern African region, it possesses an overwhelming military capability. Adopting a defensive or offensive posture has hardly any bearing on cost. Prices of weapons from both categories are essentially the same. To develop and train manpower are not more expensive. The country’s true dilemma at present, both in terms of cost and capability, is to decide how much is enough. In other words, at what point can South Africa be considered to be appropriately equipped? In 1987, the Soviet Minister of Defence, General D. Yazov, set out the following four principles of reasonable sufficiency or defence sufficiency:

the amount and quality of means must be strictly commensurate with the level and nature of the threat;



the means must assure the safety of the state;



the forces must be in a state of sufficient battle readiness to avoid any surprise attack; and



9in the event of attack, the forces must be in a position "to give a crushing rebuff to the aggressor."

As an isolated exercise it may be futile to determine a level of defence sufficiency for South Africa. Tailoring the financial requirements to meet the minimum needs of defence is a relative exercise. The ideal and most benign expression of intention of any state is total disarmament. Creating the conditions for a relatively stable Southern African environment and determining South Africa’s own defence needs can best be achieved through regional security.

South Africa is without a doubt ideally placed to initiate and play a pivotal role in this process.

David Gates, an advisor to the British Ministry of Defence, regards defensive defence as a concept that has thrived on the permafrost of the Cold War , but is at present melting away. That may be true in the European theatre. But in Southern Africa, defensive defence makes good political sense and is probably the most appropriate posture for the region.

However, good intentions form only half of the story. Unless and until South Africa comes to terms with the true purpose of a peacetime armed force, defensive defence may lose its value and our expressed constitutional intention may remain an article of faith.

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The author wishes to acknowledge Anders Boserup and Robert Neild (eds), The Foundations of Defensive Defence, Macmillan, London, 1990; and one of his past tutors, David Gates.