There is, at present, considerable debate on South African arms export policies, control mechanisms and criteria. Following the abortive AK-47 arms exports to Lebanon, the South African Government appointed the Cameron Commission of Inquiry and, more recently, a seven member cabinet commission under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defence to investigate existing arms export control measures and policies. The mandate of the cabinet commission is much wider than that of the Cameron Commission, namely to present appropriate proposals and recommendations on the future of the South African defence industry as a whole, that would include arms control regulation.

South Africa has the only defence industrial capacity of significance in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also the only country in the region with a defence budget of international significance apart from Nigeria. The South African defence industry is therefore potentially either a regional asset or a regional liability. The final verdict will depend on the success with which the South African transition to democracy is consolidated and institutionalised and the manner in which South Africa conducts itself in Africa and internationally.

Clearly, South Africa could use its arms sales as leverage, to advance, amongst others, the cause of democratisation. But what is the definition of ‘undemocratic’, particularly in Africa? Does steady liberalisation meet this requirement, or should there be a ‘checklist’ against which a potential client should be measured? Against this background it is interesting to look at the criteria that the USA, with seventy per cent of the international arms export market, applies in decisions on arms transfers.

Applied to South Africa, the Clinton administration’s guidelines would probably read as follows1

Is the sale consistent with international agreements and arms control initiatives?



Is the transfer appropriate in that it responds to legitimate security needs in South Africa and the recipient country?



Is the transfer consistent with South African regional stability interests, especially when considering transfers involving power projection capability or the introduction of a system that may foster increased tension or contribute to an arms race in the region?



To what degree does the transfer support South African strategic and foreign policy interests through increased access and influence, burden sharing, and interoperability?



What is the impact of the proposed transfer on South African capabilities and technological advantages, particularly in protecting sensitive software and hardware design, development, manufacturing, and integration knowledge?



What would the impact be on the South African industry and the defence industry base if the sale is approved or not?



Does the transfer provide a sufficient degree of protection to sensitive technology - is there a potential for unauthorised third-party transfer, as well as in-country diversion to unauthorised users?



Does the transfer have an inordinate risk of revealing the vulnerabilities of systems and could it thereby adversely impact upon South African operational capabilities in the event of a compromise?



What risk does the transfer carry of having an adverse economic, political or social impact within the recipient nation and to what degree can the security needs of that country be addressed by other means?



What is the human rights, terrorism and proliferation record of the recipient and what is the potential for misuse?



To what degree are comparable systems available from foreign suppliers?



What is the ability of the recipient to effectively field, support, and appropriately employ the requested system in accordance with its intended end use?

The obvious advantage of adhering to principles similar to that of the USA is that it will enhance the international and domestic legitimacy of the South African arms trade and that it will equally improve aspects of accountability. Furthermore, given the fact that arms trade has a bearing on foreign policy, trade guided by such principles will play a supportive role in enhancing confidence and security building and the status and prestige of South Africa. Yet, in listing these principles, both American foreign policy interests and commercial interests are clearly evident, as they should indeed be in any South African set of criteria. Equally evident is the complexity of factors and considerations - moral, commercial, national and international - that have to be balanced and juggled in the harsh world of international competition.

Using the same approach of adapting the terms of reference of the US Government, the criteria listed earlier would be expected to achieve the following goals of South African conventional arms transfer policy2:

to ensure that South African military forces can continue to enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries;



to help allies and friends in the region deter or defend themselves against aggression, while promoting interoperability with South African forces when combined operations are required;



to promote regional stability, while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems;



to promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights, democratisation, and other foreign policy objectives; and



to enhance the ability of South Africa to develop its industrial base to meet South African defence requirements and maintain a long term military technological capacity at lower costs.

Elsewhere in this Review, the South African Defence Secretary provides justification for the retention of a South African defence industry, albeit smaller, leaner and under clear accountable control. South Africans have yet to decide how much they are prepared to invest in the retention of an indigenous defence industrial capacity and how dependent they wish to be on foreign defence suppliers. Should the Government decide to retain such an industry, cost considerations will also force the country to adopt a fairly aggressive international marketing policy. South Africa cannot afford to retain an industry that is as capital intensive as the defence industry, without significantly increasing its international sales from the present level of less than US$200 million per annum.

In contemplating the future of the South African defence industry, clear cognisance will therefore have to be taken of the importance that access to the international defence market would play in enabling such an industry to be a commercial and strategic asset and not a liability. It would be of little value to decide in favour of the retention of the South African defence industry without allowing that industry to co-operate and compete in a responsible manner with the defence industries of other democracies. Market access, in turn, implies careful consideration of export criteria which, in the aftermath of the diversion of AK-47’s to Yemen, has become an emotional issue to many South Africans.

_________

See British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Report 43, 15 March 1995.



Ibid.