INTRODUCTION

As part of the process of re-inclusion into the international fold that has followed 2 February 1990, South Africa is expected to play a role in the activities of a rejuvenated Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and in increased regional economic co-operation and closer integration through a variety of regional bodies. This involvement, it is generally expected, will have a positive impact on living conditions in the region.

In line with this, the concept of formalised Southern African regional economic and security structures has again been proposed, with various existing organisations being examined as feasible conduits or building-blocks for such interaction. Unlike white South Africans who attempted to use South Africa’s economic muscle and the realities of economic development in Southern Africa to their political advantage, in this new era relations are construed around an interdependent but non-hegemonic philosophy. Areas of common interest are seen as the catalyst to bring the states of Southern Africa closer together: the mutual development of water resources, the conservation of soil and water, improved communications and the planning for a Southern African electricity power-grid, the boosting of two-way trade, the eradication of stock disease and the reduction in cross-border crime.

Being in possession of economic and military might unmatched in the region, South Africa’s influence will hopefully be exercised in a more positive manner than in the past. Internal and regional stability will influence South Africa’s patterns of trade and diplomacy with its neighbours. For South Africa to conduct normal and friendly relations, conflict elsewhere, for example in Angola, will have to be resolved. It will be impossible to consider areas of potential regional interaction, without identifying and addressing regional insecurities.

The hope is that Southern Africa will fashion a new political and economic relationship that will distinguish the region from achievements in the rest of Africa and can act as a model for future co-operation. For South Africa, it is a tall order, considering its already overburdened domestic agenda and responsibilities, following the heightened expectations after the elections. It is desirable for South Africa to engage the region, given that its development and security are linked to the affairs of larger Africa, in economic and military matters and in terms of the prevailing external (particularly Western) consciousness. An African policy will have to be built around economic and security co-operation, in which, no doubt, historical political commitment will also play a part.

This paper examines the potential for co-operation in Southern Africa, and starts with a brief overview of previous integrative attempts and an assessment of past characteristics of South African-Southern African relations. Security demands are relevant to what South Africa could offer to Southern Africa, and vice versa. Finally, co-operation between South Africa and the rest of Africa, its possible form and the impact of security liaison on non-military co-operation, will be examined.

PAST ATTEMPTS AT INTEGRATION

In 1974, the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) agreement was formulated between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. This was later superseded by the Common Monetary Area (CMA) in 1986 and led to the Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA) of 1992, that also includes Namibia. This recent agreement is designed to implement common exchange controls and a free movement of funds among member states.

The most successful and longest-standing of all attempts at regional integration in Southern Africa is the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement of 1910. At present, membership includes South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. It provides for the duty free movement of goods and services between member countries and a common external tariff. With a formula for distributing excise duties between member states, SACU is the only functioning economic arrangement in Southern Africa. However, with the political benefits of such co-operation no longer a necessity, a post-apartheid South Africa could seek to re-negotiate the customs revenue formula to the disadvantage of the other members. SACU certainly has not been the only South African attempt at formalised integration.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is at present the primary regional economic grouping not inspired by South Africa. Established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), it was formed to reduce the region’s economic dependence on South Africa, by acting as a conduit and a co-ordinating centre for international aid and investment, rather than through promoting formal integration. The founding membership of SADCC was Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined after independence in 1990 and South Africa in August 1994.

The SADC has not succeeded in reducing dependency on South Africa. While trade with the country has increased during the fifteen years of the SADC’s existence, donor financing still accounts for 86 per cent of all income.2 Although the organisation has suffered from a lack of financial and development resources, its activities have also been characterised by a lack of management proficiency.

Moreover, allowing each country to be responsible for the co-ordination of one sector of the conference’s Programme of Action, has been extremely unwieldy. For example, Angola was responsible for Energy Conservation and Development, Tanzania for Industry and Trade, Swaziland for Manpower Development, Mining was Zambia’s responsibility, Lesotho for Tourism, and Mozambique, Transport and Communications. Failure to prioritise projects hampered attempts at self-sufficiency. Greater political solidarity, however, was fostered through co-operation and through the activities of the Community’s political organ, the so-called Front-Line States (FLS) grouping set up in 1970.

The FLS intended to bring together the independent states of Southern Africa, notably Zambia and Tanzania, and to lobby for the liberation of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi were never members of the organisation for ‘security reasons’. While the FLS had some success in assisting the anti-apartheid struggle through its support of the national liberation movements in South Africa, its future is now unclear. Attempts have now been made to remould the FLS as the political and security wing of SADC, under the name of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS). According to arguments presented in July 1994 when ASAS has been formed, and given the role of the FLS, this seems to be the most suitable framework for new sectors dealing with political co-operation and joint security.3

In a political and military sense, the role of the South African liberation movements was related to that of the FLS during the apartheid years. While ‘official’ South African government policy sought specific regional objectives during this time, an ‘unofficial’ policy that was primarily conceived and nurtured by the ANC, but also by the PAC and AZAPO, often sought the opposite in the fight against apartheid. These movements were supported by the majority of South Africans; hence, the distinction between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ policy is seen as confusing and misleading, and perhaps inversely as a misrepresentation.

As these movements were concerned with the political and military liberation of South Africa, economic strategies for interaction in Southern Africa aimed at isolating South Africa through sanctions, in line with the policy of the SADCC. Economic vision was generally limited to the ‘utopian school’, where Southern African nations being free from the barriers of apartheid, would prosper together. Perhaps this reflected a genuine belief, but it was notrooted in economic realities.

The Preferential Trade Agreement for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) established in December 1981, aimed to promote economic co-operation and self-reliance among its 23 Eastern and Southern African members. Created to establish a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), it set out to liberalise trade, foster co-operation in industry, agriculture, transport and communications, and create a regional common market through the dismantling of tariff barriers by the year 2000. When the PTA was formally absorbed by COMESA in December 1994, it represented the largest sub-regional group in Africa: Angola, Burundi, the Comores, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zaire has subsequently joined COMESA, leaving South Africa as the only non-member from Southern Africa. It overlaps with both the SADC and SACU, as well as the Common Monetary Area in its aims and objectives. The possibility of a merger with the SADC has been discussed, but with no concrete outcome. Indeed, by the start of 1995 attempts to establish a distinct ‘PTA North’ and ‘PTA South’, amongst others, threatened to spark a rift in COMESA.

LESSONS FROM PAST EXPERIENCES

It should be noted that co-operation within the Southern African region continued despite apartheid and, more relevant, despite the absence of an overarching structure and the fact that South Africa was excluded from membership of African institutions.

Past experience has shown that factors of common interest remained central to intra-regional relations and essential to the normal functions of member states. These included:4

Tariff and customs arrangements.



Co-operation with regard to water, electricity, agriculture, forestry, education, health, veterinary services. Note the R4 billion Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the Sua Pan Soda Ash Agreements, both reached during the 1980’s, as well as the Eskom power-grid linking the BLS states, Zimbabwe and Mozambique with South Africa.



The functioning of the Southern African rail network.



The conduit of normal, corporate business among Southern African states. The Anglo-American Corporation, for example, has always been involved in the region, through De Beers Central Selling Organisation, its direct involvement in mining, and through one of its many subsidiary interests. The latter involves countries in Southern Africa whose economies are closely related to South Africa’s, namely Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The importance of corporate-driven links with the region was illustrated by P.W. Botha’s attempts to forge an alliance with the corporate sector in pursuing the CONSAS regional scheme at the 1979 Carlton and 1980 Good Hope Conferences.



The extent of corporate involvement is illustrated by the increase in South African trade with African countries during the 1980’s. The bulk of direct trade, as opposed to that through third parties, was still with the SADC countries, in particular the BLS states. Exports to Africa accounted for ten per cent of South Africa’s total export figure, though this increased to approximately 13,5 per cent in the mid-1990’s. Approaching R1,6 billion in 1985, this figure excluded exports to the BLS states that were estimated at R2,25 billion for the same year, as official South African trade figures only referred to the Customs Union as a whole. In return, South Africa imported goods to the value of R675 million in 1985 from its African trading partners, excluding BLS states.



South Africa’s dependence on foreign, migrant labour is clear from the fact that, in 1986, more than seventy per cent of mine workers in the senior grades came from neighbouring countries (notably BLS and Mozambique). Conversely, only thirty per cent of the lowest, unskilled jobs were held by foreigners, who in turn occupied forty per cent of all jobs on the mines.



Security co-operation continued even during the 1980’s, when unfavourable security relations partly necessitated liaison.



On the other hand, Southern African co-operation agreements that excluded South Africa, focused on eliminating apartheid as a common political goal. On an economic level, Southern Africa strove to reduce its dependency on South Africa in order to realise the former political objective. Whilst successful at mobilising international support and achieving political solidarity, mainly through the Front-Line States, it did not translate into effective and co-ordinated strategies for economic development. Military defence was extremely limited, for example, in protecting ANC houses against South African Defence Force (SADF) incursions, or in assisting the Angolan government or SWAPO against UNITA and the SADF. Notable exceptions to this include Zimbabwe’s contribution to anti-RENAMO operations in Mozambique and the FLS’s military assistance at the time of Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique.

Moreover, there were disagreements among SADCC member states that affected trade relations, even during the destabilisation years. In the 1980’s, these included the dispute between Botswana and Zimbabwe over the local content of textile manufacturing, attempts by Tanzania to impose high harbour handling tariffs on Zambian goods exported on the Tanzam line, the failure of Zimbabwe to renew a hydroelectricity purchasing agreement with Zambia and the dispute between Zimbabwe and Mozambique over the Beira oil pipeline tariffs.

WHAT HOPE FOR AFRICA?

The value and scope of a future co-operative structure is closely tied to the political, social and economic future of the whole continent. South Africa’s ability and willingness to co-operate and/or positively influence African security affairs depend on its own efforts as much as on the future capabilities and the continued existence of ‘other’ African state structures. With regard to the latter, the prognosis looks bleak.

The colonial state is seen by some as the root cause of Africa’s woes. The 1960’s, seen as the era of liberation, was a period of intense and extreme confidence in the theological, administrative and technical competence of the state. The African state would, as Julius Nyerere noted then, "run where others walk". Yet, as many leaders and governments became increasingly busy with efforts to stay in power (and becoming rich), the shaky foundations of the African state, the social contract, the division between state and governance and the people, soon became evident. This undermined the potential for security, stability and legitimacy.5

In the present era of "Africa’s Second Liberation" where "an emboldened and deeply disillusioned civil society has confronted and ousted many of the continent’s military and one-party dictatorships"6, there are conditions of insecurity, that are perhaps more apparent now than during the Cold War years. Yet few, if any, are of a direct external military nature, a feature that will shape future security institutions and relationships. The following are factors creating conditions of civil strife and threats to state security:

Africa has one of the world’s lowest economic growth rates, namely 1,5 per cent, against an annual population increase of 3,2 per cent. This is exacerbated by environmental and agricultural degradation; drought; disease (especially AIDS, malaria and cholera); rampant corruption and mismanagement; refugee crises, coupled with civil strife and famine; and a debilitating debt burden of $290 billion, constituting approximately ninety per cent of the continent’s GDP (110 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa). For example, it required $26 billion worth of servicing in 1991 alone, an amount four times greater than health-care spending.7



Africa is increasingly marginalised in terms of the world’s consciousness. The relaxation in superpower competition has put an end to countries’ playing one side off against the other, in order to secure lucrative economic arrangements. Added to the difficulties of transition in the former Soviet Union, Central/Eastern Europe and in the Middle-East, and with massive emerging opportunities in the Far East, the Cold War ‘peace-dividend’ has not brought a diversification of resources, but donor fatigue and fiscal conditions. With competition at a peak and good opportunities elsewhere, coupled with a miserable record of thirty-something years of post-colonial rule (the colonial episode being a fast-fading memory for most in the West), the criteria for assistance have changed dramatically to focus on good governance.



Re-examining the obligations of the African state has also come at a time when closer attention is being paid to the future of those states racked by ethnic conflict and secessionism. The hold that the OAU placed on border adjustments is now more shaky than ever, and a negotiated settlement of the continent’s frontiers may be an option "infinitely more preferable to decades of debilitating civil war".8 The outcome of negotiations on Eritrea and Walvis Bay do not bode well for the continued border sanctity of Zaire, Tanzania, Angola, Somalia and perhaps even Nigeria. With the possibility of intensified ethnic conflict heightened by political pluralism, there is a potential for the collapse of states into competing and divided units.



Finally, with the end of apartheid, there is no real remaining moral or ethical reason for the international community to remain engaged with Africa’s problems.

Military co-operation and, perhaps in its ultimate form, intervention, will also hinge on the sanctity of the African state. It will have to be decided, probably by the OAU and its Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, when violations of a code of state behaviour demand external intervention and a foregoing of the principle of sovereignty. In addition, it will also have to be determined by the extent to which such action would serve the global community. Africa cannot afford further Rwandas, Liberias, Somalias and Burundis and African leaders will have to decide when intervention is desirable, what kind would be acceptable and how it should be carried out. Furthermore, they will have to decide who must decide on intervention. Individual nations like South Africa, must also determine when and in what ways intervention becomes necessary. Close attention will have to be paid to internal dynamics and reasons for conflict, before intervention or even co-operative assistance is pursued as a policy option, particularly if it is likely to alter the balance of power within a certain domestic power structure.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION NOW

The end of the ideological climate of the Cold War and the simultaneous end of apartheid and the liberation struggle, presuppose a new era of mutually-beneficial and ‘non-hegemonic’ regional relations.

Since 1990, the debate on regional integration and security has examined, in turn, the merits and demerits of the various regional bodies: PTA/COMESA, SADC, SACU, CMA, etc. It was initially concerned with the impact of a post-apartheid South Africa on these bodies and vice versa, and the redesigning of these bodies to accommodate the security aspirations of Southern African states. The debate has subsequently shifted to the means or method of accommodating South Africa. In the economic arena, it has been concluded with the ANC’s Macro-Economic Research Group recommending that South Africa should seek membership of both SADC and the PTA/COMESA "as a step towards working from the inside to develop an appropriate institutional framework for a development orientated regional programme, embracing elements of both sectoral co-operation and integration".9 This coincides with the position of the ANC’s Department of International Affairs.

Although utopian in outlook, the ANC’s working document on foreign policy presented in March 1994, provided insight into the future commitments and directions of the foreign policy of the Government of National Unity.10 It is made clear inn the document that South Africa’s role in the region and the African sub-continent will be greatly emphasised. It identified "a special relationship with the peoples of Southern Africa, all of whom have suffered under apartheid". The focus is on balanced regional economic development, that must transform the current "exploitative and socially undesirable features of the existing regional economy". According to President Mandela, South Africa will have to exercise self-restraint and sensitivity in achieving the necessary focus. A developmental thrust is also envisaged, with South Africa committed to compensate for the growing international divide between the rich North and the poor South. A prosperous and stable South Africa is seen to provide "the engine of growth" for Southern Africa. To support this, it is stated that intra-SADC trade amounts to only four per cent of total SADC trade, of which 25 per cent is with South Africa.11

As the most powerful state in Southern Africa, the country will have a strong international voice and will exert a decisive influence on the destiny of the region. No longer constrained by the political barriers of apartheid, trade with African countries could take place freely and openly. Although this scenario depends on the survival and relative prosperity of South Africa in political and economic terms, there are still inhibiting factors.

South Africa’s dominance cannot be avoided. The table illustrates its economic power. In 1992 South Africa exported more than R17 billion worth of goods to its neighbours, but imported only R4 billion from them; it has 23 000 of Southern Africa’s 42 000 km of railway lines; 58 000 of 87 000 km of paved roads, and over 5,1 million of the region’s six million motor vehicles; it handled nearly sixteen times more tonnage of goods through its harbours than those of the rest of the region; and it creates 75 per cent of sub-Equatorial Africa’s total installed electricity capacity.

Southern Africa: Population and GNP (1992)12

*1989

Next to such power and dominance, often an annoyance to the country’s neighbours, is the continued existence of insecurities in the region. The end of apartheid will not result in the end of regional friction. These relate to political factors, a lack of resources (particularly for the land-locked nations), the movement of legal labour migrants (160 000 in 1992) and illegal immigrants/refugees (over 1,5 million), as well as the focus of aid, investment and general international attention on South Africa.

In addition, Southern Africa is entering a world vastly different from that of 1985. A new region will have to take into account the absence of order in the new world, where the Third World, with Africa at the bottom of the pile, is increasingly marginalised. The formation of regional economic groupings is moreover the primary focus of the industrialised powers, with little attention being paid to the improvement of mankind to justify the rearrangement.

Trade between South Africa and Africa has increased considerably in recent times. Yet, further improvements in the trade relationship with Africa will demand that countries have something to offer South Africa in terms of credit facilities, as well as resources and expertise. While opportunities exist north of the Limpopo, these are constrained by the South African government’s scant available finances and internal demands for domestic development. It is relevant that, in 1992, South Africa’s trade with African countries outside of the Customs Union amounted to only seven per cent of its overall foreign trade. By comparison, trade with the EU amounted to five times this figure.13

The method of integration favoured by the ANC and others, amongst them the African Development Bank (ADB), is a ‘top-down’ approach where governments take the lead through the creation of institutional frameworks. Integration is thus often seen as an ‘end’ in itself, rather than as the means to facilitate the improvement of living standards. A ‘bottom-up’ approach that stresses the need to solve common problems and the importance of private sector regional interaction, has become a political casualty in this process. Such bureaucratic autism could impede rather than facilitate closer co-operation.

THE REGIONAL SECURITY DEBATE

Until recently, actual attempts at promoting regional security have occurred at two different levels.14 Institutional attempts to formalise regional security pacts have been of a largely bilateral nature and have incorporated efforts at crisis resolution and prevention. These include: the Nkomati and Swazi Accords; the Lusaka Agreement; informal meetings among Southern African states during the Botha years; the New York Accord signed on 22 December 1988, and finally, a bilateral agreement in June 1993 between South Africa and Mozambique on curbing cross-border criminal activity. Since 1990 and by contrast, mainly academic efforts have proposed relatively all-encompassing terms of collective regional security, in which multilateral arrangements would include non-military concerns.

The debate on the construction of a Southern African security alliance has taken two forms. On the one hand, it proposes the conversion of an existing institution to service these needs, and on the other, the formation of an entirely new regional body. While not necessarily mutually exclusive, these two schools of thought have been heavily influenced by the CSCE approach which found expression in the Kampala Document, prepared at the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) held in May 1991. A parallel school has appeared calling for the establishment of an all-African security regime, that would incorporate peace-keeping and disarmament mechanisms. The proposals were endorsed at the 29th OAU Summit in Cairo in June 1993.

Until now, the collective security debate have covered a wide range of policy issues. These include:

The appropriateness of the CSCE approach for Southern Africa, i.e. collective security rather than a defensive military alliance such as NATO.



The extent to which security is to be defined, beyond purely military matters, to include conflict mediation and arbitration, confidence-building measures, disarmament, food and health security, etc., and which of these should be targeted for co-operation.



The necessity for an African or regional effort, linked to an existing organisation such as the SADC or OAU or perhaps an entirely new body.



The inclusion of a peace-keeping force and non-aggression pacts in co-operation agreements.



The ideal country to take the leadership initiative in security co-operation. South Africa potentially stood a chance of being accused of ‘giantism’ or ‘hegemonic behaviour’ if it took the lead.

A number of related factors, such as the nature of both the military and non-military insecurities faced by Africa, influenced the course of the debate. Furthermore, the record of existing regional efforts at peace-keeping and military co-operation (such as ECOWAS and also the FLS grouping), as well as the record of economic integration attempts had to be considered. Finally, the ability of African states to contribute to security arrangements, whether bilateral or multilateral, in the form of administrative, technical and military skills, or economic resources was also seen to be crucial.

Since April 1994, a large number of regional security initiatives was undertaken, that reflected both the academic topicality of the issue, as well as the urgent need for regional security co-operation.

The so-called ‘British initiative’ was suggested by Prime Minister John Major during his visit to South Africa in September 1994, when he called for "new mechanisms to head off conflicts before they become unstoppable". The design of a new umbrella organisation to form regional peace-keeping units in Africa and train mediators and peace-brokers, has been followed up, amongst others, with British-organised training seminars on peace-keeping in Cairo and Harare in January 1995.



The OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was formally established at the Tunis Summit in mid-1994, with South Africa as one of its eleven members. The Mechanism will operate on three different levels: annual heads-of-state meetings; biannual foreign ministers’ meetings; and monthly meetings of ambassadors. A ‘political’ rather than ‘military’ body, it will presumably focus on preventive diplomacy and not peace-keeping/ support/ enforcement operations.



The move to establish the Association for Southern African States (ASAS) out of the old FLS grouping in July 1994, in terms of the Treaty of the SADC. With membership open to all SADC member states, its objectives include to: "protect people of the region against instability arising from the internal breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and from external aggression; co-operate fully in regional security and defence, through conflict prevention, management and resolution; give maximum support to the organs and institutions of SADC; mediate in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts; co-ordinate and harmonise, as far as possible, policy on international issues; promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within each member state, and to encourage each and every member state to observe universal human rights", and "to promote peace and stability". ASAS meetings are only held at a summit level (heads of state), called only when required, and do not necessitate a formal, permanent bureaucracy. The costs are hence minimal.



The Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) which was a sub-structure of the FLS. With representatives from the police, defence, internal, intelligence and foreign affairs sectors, the ISDSC met annually to discuss ‘security’ matters in three sub-committees: State Security, Defence and Public Security. The future of this body was deliberated in Arusha, Tanzania in October 1994, the first meeting attended by South Africa. Following a proposal made by General Ian Khama of Botswana, it was decided that the ISDSC will continue to exist, but in a revised structure discussed at a seminar in Gaborone on 16-17 March 1995. One of the proposals made by South Africa is to expand the Defence sub-committee to include the portfolios of Logistics, Operational Intelligence (OpInt), Personnel Development and Operations, possibly with Aviation, Maritime and Medical sectors, as well as other ad hoc Chaplain and Military Lawyers’ committees also represented.



The SADC sector on Political Co-operation, Democracy, Peace and Security. The latter proposal emanated from a SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security held in Windhoek from 11-16 July 1994 and attended by ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Security and Police, as well as parliamentarians and representatives of political parties. Discussions showed that the Development Community seemed "set to enter into the fields of security co-ordination, conflict mediation and even military co-operation on a grand scale".15 The workshop was followed in August 1994 by a SADC summit that approved the formation of a new sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security, Peace, Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution. The Windhoek Workshop recommended a non-aggression and mutual defence pact for the region, and a new role for military forces and defence industries to meet civilian needs.16 These proposals were refreshing in their logical linking of security and development. However, economic development is no longer synonymous with security. The reverse is rather true: that regional economic integration depends on political and military stability. As the SADC Executive-Secretary, Kaire Mbuende17 has said: "Economic development cannot take place in an insecure environment, and now is the time to consolidate democracy and peace in Southern Africa."

The Windhoek Workshop raised misgivings about these arrangements, which some saw as endowing the SADC with the power to usurp national sovereignty while potentially overburdening South Africa. Deputy-President Thabo Mbeki, however, was quick to placate such fears. He argued that events in Rwanda demanded the existence of a regional security system, agreed on by members, that could intervene in the interests of peace and democracy. Noting that the carnage in Rwanda had its roots in an "African paralysis" and internal conflicts, Southern Africa needed a "regional security system. We must show our neighbours that we are non-threatening. It is necessary to go beyond such statements".18

CRITICISM OF THE SADC

Despite Mbeki’s platitude, many important issues remain.

Countries in the region need to get their own houses in order before embarking on intervention elsewhere.



A huge diversity of political systems and security requirements exist in Southern Africa that make regional security co-operation difficult if not impossible.



Co-operation is one thing, a regional alliance or an overarching security regime is another, more expensive matter, especially in the light of the fact that its contribution to regional security will be little more than facilitation at best and bureaucratic madness at worst.



The Windhoek Workshop called for reductions in force levels and military expenditure, the conversion of defence industries, demobilisation programmes, as well as the "development of regional mechanisms for peace-keeping and peace-enforcement activities" and the "equipping and training of national forces for peace-keeping roles". Yet, the cost and logistics of running a regional peace-keeping force would probably be beyond the SADC, even with South African participation. Moreover, the criteria for involvement in peace-keeping operations would have to be clarified.



The Workshop also recommended that SADC member states should conclude a non-aggression and mutual defence pact. Given that much of the potential conflict in Southern Africa is internal and not between countries, action against extra-SADC members is a possibility, where all SADC members’ interests are not at stake or, perhaps, where the non-SADC member is not objectively at ‘fault’.



The proposal to group economic and security or conflict resolution structures together, is arguably inappropriate. These require functionally different skills and tasks, while the SADC has not yet proved to be the most efficient or effective organisational framework even for economic development, especially if its historically fragmented approach to sharing out the hypothetical foreign aid spoils is born in mind.



Given the past regional excesses and the difficulty in prioritising domestic needs, SADC member states are understandably cautious about the effects of agreements that might constrain freedom of policy and drain severely limited resources. The emphasis should rather be on small-scale undertakings, than on the ambitious endeavours currently proposed.



The SADC’s approach of sectoral co-operation, co-ordinated by one member nation, could lead to problems in the area of defence and security where one state (South Africa, Zimbabwe?), though on an equal level with the others, would have to accept responsibility for leadership.



Finally, seen from a purely South African perspective, a too close or complex relationship would impose an unnecessarily severe burden on South Africa’s administrative skills at this stage, and it would become bogged down in regional inertia and inadequate funding - unless South Africa is to pick up the tab!

THE WAY FORWARD?

Whilst acknowledging the potential role of economic factors in stimulating co-operation in the region, it could be argued that a focus on the security difficulties between states should precede economic integration. Economic growth will hinge on the creation of stable economic and political systems in the region, that will inspire business confidence in the West, and among external governments and local businessmen. Regional co-operation will depend on the establishment of a ‘common interest’. Realistically, integration will take place by stealth rather than with the imposition of a top-down integration ideal.

In this regard, the centrifugal forces of security are greater than political and economic forces in the region that, at times, have pushed countries apart. While multilateral arrangements pursued through a small, ad hoc body such as ASAS, best express broad political solidarity, countries of the region might be well advised to focus their attention firstly on functionally driven bilateral agreements.

The potential areas for inclusion into wider regional security co-operation, are:arms and drug smuggling;

cattle rustling;

nature and game conservation;

vehicle theft;

disaster relief;

security training and co-operation;

sea fisheries and maritime exclusion zone policing;

lifting of land mines; and

peace-keeping and monitoring operations.

Economic factors will also serve to stimulate regional integration, especially through private institutions. The business community could play a prominent role. The formation of the Eastern and Southern African Business Organisation (ESABO) in August 1994 that links countries from the Sudan to South Africa, is a step in this direction. ESABO is expected to operate alongside the PTA/COMESA, SADC, SACU, the Indian Ocean Community (IOC) and the East African Community (EAC), with its incorporation of national business organisations, such as Chambers of Commerce, and associations representing banking, manufacturing, agriculture and tourism sectors, as members. Its goals include the removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the pooling of services, information, skills, resources and goodwill.

WHERE CAN SOUTH AFRICA HELP?

South Africa will obviously involve itself in regional matters that pertain directly to domestic security. Insecurity is experienced in different ways and at different intensities. In South Africa, the stability and viability of the new constitution is potentially the greatest area under threat. Without economic and social progress and development, the stability of the state cannot be assured. Key areas and interrelated factors that threaten positive socio-economic development or contribute to slow economic growth, include the following:

continued high levels of criminal activity;



political instability;



lack of investment and aid;



regional instability that leads to increased levels of violent crime and numbers of refugees, and curtails regional trading opportunities;



high population growth rates;



inflated and/or expensive and/or inefficient government; and



structurally misconceived and mismanaged reconstruction programmes.

How can South Africa contribute to regional co-operation? A distinction should be made between police, military and private efforts. Given South Africa’s conception of security, regional co-operation will most likely be focused on the following areas:

Border Liaison and Surveillance

In the light of the levels of cross-border movement of refugees and criminals involved in gun-running, drug-smuggling, cattle-rustling, poaching, banditry, etc., border liaison and surveillance are essential. This could be effected through joint land, air-surveillance and maritime operations, and could conceivably embrace the Angola and Mozambique coastlines. It will involve the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

Illegal immigrants are a "serious problem" and "a source of concern", as the minister of Safety and Security, Sidney Mufumadi, has put it.19 The question here is whether these concerns could not be addressed politically through bilateral/trilateral arrangements. This would appear to be Pretoria’s pragmatic preference in the pursuit of a border security arrangement between South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland, mainly to combat gun-smuggling.20

Training Missions

This would mainly involve the SANDF, but also the SAPS and the private sector. At an institutional level, it could be used in confidence building and could reduce crime. The private sector are already being used to train civilians in the lifting of mines. Additionally, South African mercenaries, employed by the company Executive Outcomes, have been involved in training Angolan government soldiers to operate against UNITA.

Deputy Defence Minister Ronnie Kasrils has proposed that the South African Navy could become the "leading edge" of the SANDF in promoting peace, stability and economic development in Southern Africa. He has argued that the SA Navy could assist in the development of neighbouring navies, and foreign ports such as Luanda, Mombassa and Dar Es Salaam.21 These suggestions, however, received severe criticism from the press. The Cape Times22 noted that "(i)t would be interesting to know where all the money is coming from. Creation of a strong Southern African bloc makes sense both strategically and economically, so long as it is managed according to sound business principles. But the considerable capital required should come from private enterprise, not out of South African taxpayers’ pockets. There are more than enough domestic demands on the country’s revenue funds without dishing out our limited resources to neighbour states."

Joint Peace-Keeping Operations

There are significant dangers in joint peace-keeping operations. South Africa might find itself involved in missions that are not necessarily in the best national interest of a target-state. With the majority of Africa’s post-Cold War instabilities being domestic rather than inter-nation or as a result of external (non-African) intervention, the likelihood is that peace-keeping operations will be faced with the invidious and impossible task of maintaining state integrity in untenable colonial constructs. South Africa’s potential quandary is exemplified by calls for its involvement in a regional military force to assist the government of Ntsu Mokhehle in Lesotho against striking soldiers and policemen in 1994, even in the light of Lesotho’s fears of possible South African domination.23

South Africa will no doubt be expected to contribute the ‘lion’s share’ to these operations in terms of personnel and finances. Given the general lack of funding for African militaries and the poor state of equipment, this contribution could involve the ‘heavy technical troops’ whose modern firepower and mobility would support the infantry from African countries. Criteria will also have to be established for South Africa’s engagement and disengagement from any peace-keeping or -making ventures. Moreover, if such operations are conducted under the auspices of the UN, South Africa will have to ascertain its financial obligations beforehand, for example, so that it does not find these obligations being offset against the Republic’s existing debt of US$101 million, or being paid for UN operations with IOUs! With a total UN revenue for peace-keeping bodies of US$3 billion per annum and costs for the sixteen UN operations undertaken in 1994 amounting to US$31,4 billion, full reimbursement for peace-keeping contributions is highly unlikely.

Payment issues have already been recognised as a stumbling block to future South African contributions. As Thabo Mbeki24 commented, "Part of the African problem with regard to peace-making and peace-keeping is that you are asking poor countries to shoulder expensive operations". South Africa’s offer in July 1994 of fifty Armoured Personnel Carriers for Rwanda was suspended because of a dispute about payment. Any form of direct military involvement in this conflict was ruled out in order not to divert funds from internal priorities, such as the RDP.

Disaster Relief

Parallel to the civilian use of military forces, for example in tracking stolen cars, game conservation, development and engineering projects, disaster relief is another likely role for the SANDF in the region. However, given the military capabilities of the region and the importance of air-power resources in these operations, such assistance is likely to flow from South Africa to Southern Africa and not vice versa.

This role is specifically provided for in the South African constitution and is particularly applicable to the Air Force. As Chief of the SAAF, Lt-Gen James Kriel25 said the "(t)he military can contribute substantially to the alleviation of the basic survival-needs of the population in terms of natural adversity. While the military is not maintained for that purpose, it does represent a considerable investment in equipment and manpower that can and should be employed in a humanitarian role, including disaster relief, the maintenance of essential services, and so forth. It is in fact one of the universal subsidiary roles of the military."

Arms Sales

Although there is a demand for arms in Africa, there are greater constraints on South Africa’s ability to sell or to enter into joint procurement ventures. Kasrils has outlined the self-imposed restrictions to which South Africa will adhere. These include UN restrictions and a black list of "non-democratic and dictatorial nations, or those where there is ongoing conflict", drawn up in conjunction with the Department of Foreign Affairs.26 Pledges not to sell arms to nations involved in civil war, constituting the greatest potential for conflict, together with most African nations’ lack of financial credibility, make arms sale an unlikely growth area. South Africa has also been called upon to restrict sales to ‘defensive’ weaponry in support of such principles. Yet, even without such moral criteria, international arms sales to Africa have declined rapidly in recent years (see the following table).

CONCLUSION

The Kampala document illustrates how security, stability and development are intertwined in Africa and suggests that these issues have to be resolved simultaneously. The focus of this approach should remain firmly on conflict resolution and prevention. Parallel to this are the challenges of rethinking norms of intervention and state sovereignty, that are still required as a form of preventive diplomacy. In Southern Africa such diplomacy can be fostered through emphasis on the security concerns of states, and could act as a catalyst for wider integrative co-operation. Yet, due to the limited ability of many Southern African states to contribute effectively to institutionalised co-operation, this process will have to proceed at an appropriate level and pace.

The fears of economic domination by South Africa, coupled to a weakening and increasing dependency within the region, leave little room for hopes of economic development and prosperity through South Africa’s philanthropy. This forms part of the legacy of years of colonial appropriation and, most recently, destabilisation. Although South African domination is ultimately perhaps an "undeniable inevitability", a sensitive approach and the terms that future co-operation is built on will be important in breaking down past prejudices and in developing a better understanding of needs and abilities. A focus on military security issues is likely to be a cornerstone in this approach.

Ultimately the effectiveness of any regional institutions being formed will be dependent on the coherence and legitimacy of emergent state formations in Southern Africa. This, in turn, relates to the nature of the domestic processes and the tolerance of diverse political cultures. It also hinges on the success of efforts at conflict resolution and reconciliation. As in the past, the future of the region depends on what happens in South Africa.

Table: Africa's Militaries at a Glance12

Notes

Edited version of a paper presented at the biennial African Studies Association (ASAUK) Conference, Lancaster University, 5-7 September 1994. Also based on a presentation made at the AIC Conference on Defence, Midrand, 11-12 October 1994. The assistance of the British Council towards travelling expenses to the Lancaster Conference is gratefully acknowledged.



For details see C. Coker, South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa, Survival 25(2), March 1983, p. 59.



The Africa Institute puts the figure at ninety per cent. See P. Esterhuysen (ed), South Africa in Sub-Equatorial Africa: Economic Interaction, The Africa Institute, Pretoria, 1994, p.19; also New Focus on Southern Africa’s Search for Economic Viability, Southern African Facts Sheet 110, August 1988. For a complete summary of the future of the various regional institutions, see J. Potloane, Integrating Africa, Indicator SA 11(3), Winter 1994, pp. 63-68.



See the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, Nathan Shamuyarira, cited in The Star, 1 August 1994.



For figures on migrant labour and remittances, see E. Leistner and P. Esterhuysen (eds), South Africa in Southern Africa: Economic Interaction, The Africa Institute, Pretoria, 1988, pp. 123-126. For figures and information on transport services, see Leistner and Esterhuysen, ibid., p. 45.



See C. Younge, The African State and the Post-Colonial Crisis. Paper delivered at a conference on The New Stage of Political Development in Africa, Beijing, 23-26 May 1994.



S. Baynham, After the Cold War: Political and Security Trends in Africa, Africa Insight 24(1), 1994, p. 38.



This burden has promoted the argument for the scrapping of all Africa’s debts. Those who forward this move contend that the debt figure is small in global terms, and would only affect a small number of countries, without being harmful to the global economy. S. Riley, Africa’s Second Liberation. Presentation at SAIIA, Jan Smuts House, 29 July 1994.



M. Chege, What is Right with Africa?. Paper delivered at a conference on The New Stage of Political Development in Africa, Beijing, 23-26 May 1994.



R. Davies, Approaches to Regional Integration in the Southern African Context, Africa Insight 24(1), 1994, p. 11.



See essays on the foreign policy debate in G. Mills (ed), From Pariah to Participant: South Africa’s Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1994.



P. Esterhuysen, op. cit., pp. 3, 14.



J. Spence (ed), Change in South Africa, Francis Pinter, London, 1994, p. 16.



In 1993, 47,5 per cent of South Africa’s exports went to Europe; 30,1 per cent to members of the EU (R16,4bn). Of imports, 49,1 per cent were from Europe and 44,4 per cent from the EU (R23bn). See The Citizen, 2 July 1994.



For a concise summary of the debate on a regional security regime, see W. Breytenbach, Conflict in Southern Africa: Whither Collective Security, Africa Insight 24(1), 1994, pp. 26-37; S. Baynham, Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa, Africa Institute Bulletin 34(3(, 1993; also, G. Mills, Searching for the Eye of the Needle: South Africa and Southern African Security, in G. Mills (ed), op.cit., pp. 70-90.



J. Cilliers, Future Challenges for the Security Forces. Paper delivered at a conference on Rethinking South African Security Architecture, Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand, 28 July 1994.



The Citizen, 18 July 1994.



Ibid.



Sunday Times, 24 July 1994.



This was stated by the Minister during his opening address at the conference on Rethinking South African Security Architecture, Institute for Defence Poiicy, Midrand, 28 July 1994.



Weekend Star, 18 June 1994. For details on the international landmine trade and the efforts to ban it, see The Independent, 6 June 1994.



These opinions were expressed at a conference on South Africa and International Naval Co-operation, jointly presented by SAIIA and the Institute for Defence Policy, Cape Town, 9 August 1994.



See SA needs a coastguard and Defence dish-outs, Cape Times, 10 August 1994.



Quoted in Business Day, 5 July 1994.



See UN battle puts Clinton in a tight spot, Weekly Mail and Guardian, 24 February - 2 March 1995.



J. Kriel, The South African Air Force after Integration. Paper delivered at the Sir Pierre van Ryneveld Air Power Conference, Pretoria, 3 August 1994.



SIPRI World Armaments and Yearbook; The Military Balance, various press reports.