INTRODUCTION

As part of the process of political and constitutional reform in South Africa, the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) came into being on 27 April 1994. This new defence force consists of the statutory forces, the South African Defence Force (SADF), the four homeland armies1 and the non-statutory forces of the various political parties, such as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and a few smaller paramilitary groupings.

The integration of such diverse military groups immediately evoked concern over the future effectiveness of the armed forces. Would this restructured defence force be able to maintain the military professionalism and recognised high standards of the former South African Defence Force, considering the varied backgrounds of the other forces? For example, MK, by far the largest of the non-statutory forces to be integrated, had very little training and experience in conventional warfare.

Besides the discrepancy in training, the original entry requirements for the various armed forces differed considerably. While a Standard 8 school certificate was a prerequisite for entry into the permanent force of the SADF, attaining membership of MK simply required one "... to be against apartheid and to have the courage to take up arms. There was no educational or other prerequisite."2

In preparing for the integration process, however, it was agreed that the standards and qualifications of the SADF would serve as base line for the new defence force. Consequently, the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) was employed as monitors to ensure that all qualifications and standards would be equitably assessed, that the placement of personnel being integrated would be fair and would benefit the new defence force.

The integration process is not only an organisational one with discrepancies in standards and training to complicate it, it is also ultimately a racial integration.3 The estimated 20 000 to 30 000 members of the non-statutory forces are predominantly black, as are the members of the homeland armies. Although racial representation within the former SADF began to change rapidly with the end of white conscription in 1993, and the resulting shift to an all-volunteer force, the top structure of the former SADF remained almost entirely white.

Given the above realities, there was concern that the SANDF would be forced to lower its standards to accommodate the inevitable political appointments, the different levels of training experience and education, and the ethnic cultures now enclosed within its ranks.

This study examines how the South African Navy has attempted to meet the challenges accompanying the integration process. The focus is on the first intake of former MK recruits at the SA Navy’s basic training base at South African Ship Saldanha (SAS Saldanha). A brief historical background is provided, highlighting the complexity of the problems faced by the unit, followed by a discussion of adaptations made to training programmes to ensure that naval standards are maintained. It also discusses the integration process from the instructors’ point of view and the influence it has had on training methods.

A survey was conducted amongst the first intake of former MK recruits into the South African Navy. Their perceptions and experiences of the training they received at SAS Saldanha are analysed and discussed.

While large-scale problems have been experienced in the integration process elsewhere in the SANDF, this study will attempt to determine why SAS Saldanha appears to have been successful in creating a new Navy.

THE CASE OF SAS SALDANHA

Prior to 1991, SADF policy stipulated that the SA Navy was only allowed to recruit amongst ‘White’, ‘Coloured’ and Asian members of the South African population for its permanent force and national service contingents. Permission to recruit Black officers was obtained in 1991, resulting in the recruitment of eleven Black midshipmen.

It was, however, only with the demise of compulsory white military conscription in 1993 that Blacks entered the Navy in significant numbers, with the first major Black intake arriving at SAS Saldanha Naval Training base in September of that year. At that stage the Navy had very little experience in the training of Black sailors and expectations were based to a large extent on the experiences of the other arms of service and private sector organisations.

The most pertinent question to arise was whether the Navy would be able to maintain its training standards. With existing problems in schools under the Department of Education and Training4, it seemed obvious that Black recruits, being the products of those schools, would pose new challenges with respect to the maintenance of training standards. At a training conference at SAS Simonsberg in April 1992, Vice-Admiral R.C. Simpson-Anderson, the Chief of the Navy, said that "... ways and means of upholding standards have to be found, as training standards have to be maintained". It was thus made clear that the Navy had decided to maintain existing training standards, but that it was prepared to adapt and accommodate the challenges associated with the changing profile of its recruits.

CHANGING PROFILE OF RECRUITS

Until September 1993 intakes at SAS Saldanha consisted mainly of national service groups of up to a thousand trainees per intake. The vast majority were white with either Afrikaans or English as home language. A drastic change was experienced with the arrival of the September 1993 intake of 203 volunteers, with racial and language distribution as illustrated in Table 1 and 2. These trends continued as is illustrated in the two tables depicting language distribution among the following two intakes (Table 3 and 4).

FACTORS INFLUENCING TRAINING

The most important changes from a training point of view included the following:

Language: Instead of the usual two languages, trainees now spoke any of ten to twelve different languages.



Education (‘Skill gaps’): White trainees with a superior education were no longer the majority. The majority of trainees were products of a disrupted school system, characterised by poor quality instruction and inadequately trained teachers. The educational profile of the ‘integration intake’5, is represented in Table 5.



Table 5 Educational Profile: Integration Intake
Std 10	Std 9	Std 8	0 Level	N4
257	78	25	2	2
70.6%	21.4%	6.7%	0.5%	0.5%

With previous volunteer intakes, very few recruits did not have a matric certificate. Moreover, few of the Black trainees had mathematics and science as matric subjects, resulting in immediately excluding those without these qualifications from technical training and certain seagoing opportunities. It was felt that these skills had to be provided somehow, if recruits were to be productively employed in positions requiring military technical skills in the Navy.

Selection criteria for further training, such as officer training, were based on school results to a large extent, thus positioning the majority of trainees at a disadvantage when competing against trainees from a more privileged educational background. Other means of selecting potential officers had to be considered. They were now being identified by careful monitoring of academic progress during basic training. At the same time the instructors were asked to identify individuals with strong leadership potential. This led to a differentiation between two groups. The first group of trainees showed strong leadership characteristics combined with sound academic achievements and were selected for immediate officer training. The second group of trainees consisted of strong leaders who had to develop academically before undergoing selection for further training at a later stage. Two candidates selected according to this process from the previous volunteer intakes, are currently serving as divisional officers at SAS Saldanha.

Cultural differences: It was feared that cultural differences could lead to problems between instructors, consisting of a more or less even number of Whites, Coloureds and Asians, and trainees, and between the trainees themselves. At this stage there were still no black instructors.



New system: The new trainee was a volunteer, not a conscript. Failing basic training now meant that the recruit was going to lose his job.

THE NAVY’S NEW APPROACH

It was evident that a new training approach was essential if standards were going to be maintained. The basic viewpoint was taken that standards and discipline were not negotiable. A change in training philosophy was therefore adopted and formulated along the following lines to ensure an integrated, practical approach to training:

‘Value’ had to be added to the trainee. It was not necessary to ‘break him down’ and then ‘build him up’. Everyone involved in training had to realise that what they had to offer should serve to add value to the trainee, as he was a volunteer whom the Navy itself had selected during a recruiting process.



An atmosphere conducive to true learning had to be created in order to encourage the trainee to learn and to encourage him to question that which was on offer. Focus was placed on providing the motivation for trainees to achieve the desired standard of training, instead of coercing them with threats.



Trainees had to be taken to sea as often as possible and sea-related activities had to be emphasised, as a means of creating a neutral and mutual naval culture.



A realistic standard of cleanliness and hygiene had to be set, to ensure that available time could be used for educational purposes, instead of being wasted on extensive cleaning exercises.



Most importantly, the opportunity had to be given to the trainee to realise his true potential within the Navy, by enabling him to develop those skills necessary in the performance of his duties.

The word SALDANHA was transformed into an acronym representing the training philosophy of SAS Saldanha in an attempt to enable recruits to internalise it:

PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

The practical implementation of this new approach involved a number of changes. In the first place, the Navy decided to implement a new type of training to complement the existing basic training. The basic training curriculum covered 23 subjects of a theoretical and practical nature, such as naval terminology, military law, rope work, boat work, administration, naval customs and traditions and parade work. In order to successfully complete basic training the trainee had to pass written examinations in 17 subjects while the rest were evaluated through practical work. It is known as ‘enablement training’, aimed at developing those skills that could prevent or hamper the successful training of recruits. This became an integral part of the existing basic training programme and consisted of the following aspects :

Training in life skills, including problem solving, time management, study skills, conflict handling, and communication skills. This section was presented by members of the South African Medical Services during a four-day workshop. It was followed by a feedback session later in the course.



Computer based training (CBT) in English and mathematics formed the most important components of the enablement training. A CBT centre consisting of fifty work stations running a comprehensive software package (Plato 2000) was established at SAS Saldanha. This made it possible to implement individualised curricula according to the specific needs of trainees for the duration of basic training as the programme covers all levels from Standard 1 to tertiary level.



Basic training was extended from twelve to sixteen weeks to accommodate the new training methods and compulsory revision periods.

Basic training was preceded by a course in cultural differences that focused on the customs and traditions of different ethnic groups. The instructors and divisional officers found this course to be a valuable preparation for the inevitable changes ahead.

English proved to be the common denominator and it was decided to use it as the official language in training sessions and to assist those trainees whose English was not of the required standard. Although English was the chosen language medium, many of the recruits were not proficient in either English or Afrikaans. Black interpreters were appointed to assist during classroom activities to overcome problems arising from language difficulties. They performed further valuable services in communicating with relatives of the trainees, who were kept informed of the trainees’ progress at SAS Saldanha.

As mentioned before, it was easier to motivate trainees as they had volunteered for service. Unlike with a conscripted force, failing basic training became a serious issue, as it could mean the end of the trainee’s career in the Navy.

PERCEPTIONS OF TRAINING OFFICERS

Against the background of this new approach to basic training at SAS Saldanha, the permanent instructors responsible for the actual implementation of the training programme were interviewed and asked to comment on their experiences. Without exception, the training officers maintained that a considerable process of adaptation, with respect to both theoretical and practical training, took place.

With regard to theoretical training, the nature of lectures changed fundamentally. Within the classroom, for example, it was no longer suitable to merely present a lecture or to hand out written notes. For the recruits to understand the subject matter, it was necessary to integrate both practical and theoretical elements of the courses. The preparation of lectures involved far more effort, as the subject material had to be explained and illustrated by means of demonstrations or examples. To enable the recruits to internalise information, the instructors sometimes had to demonstrate concepts physically.

Classroom participation became less, making it difficult to determine whether the trainees understood the lectures. They were hesitant to ask questions or to respond to questions being asked. Some instructors overcame this by asking the group to support each other in answering questions. In this way the fear of making a mistake was diminished and participation improved. The instructors also found that an aggressive approach inhibited participation. Instruction demanded a great deal more patience, time and explanation. It often involved spending time after hours with the trainees who had difficulty understanding the work.

With respect to physical training, instructors commented that there was a far greater sense of comradeship and fitness, in comparison to previous conscripts. This was particularly evident during class competitions and parade work.

The boat handling and sea-going phase of basic training, posed the greatest challenge for instructors, given that many of the new trainees had never seen the sea, been to sea or could swim. A great deal of time had to be spent building the confidence of the recruits before going to sea. During the boat handling phase, it was found that although the trainees had the ability to perform the various exercises at sea, they lacked the confidence and often panicked in difficult circumstances. Safety standards had to be doubled, and additional training had to take place on land before going to sea. The whole approach to sea exercises had to be revised.

Many of the instructors felt that standards had dropped, when compared to previous conscript intakes. Nevertheless, it was felt that the minimum standards required by the Navy had been maintained. It was further substantiated by the fact that the content of curricula was not amended, nor the examination requirements. While the approach to training was adapted, the basic standard remained. The only standard which the instructors felt had dropped, was neatness of mess decks, as less time was now devoted to cleaning, and more time to learning and to computer-based-training.

The majority of instructors were of the opinion that the standard of discipline had dropped with the integration intake, but explained this in terms of the process of adaptation and the political connotations of the integration process. As instructors, they felt that no lowering of standards in discipline could be allowed, no matter what the circumstances, who the trainees were, or what the political reasons may be. Discipline was imperative if standards were to be maintained.6

Instructors were frustrated by the lack of time management. All the instructors interviewed, commented on the fact that it appeared as if new recruits had ‘no conception of time’. Not only was valuable training time lost, but time was also wasted disciplining trainees to be on time.

Another change worth noting, was that the showing of ‘respect’ towards instructors or immediate superiors, ‘did not depend on rank’. Respect was a mutual concept. If the instructor respected the individual recruit and his culture, that respect was returned. For instance, the commanding officer and his instructors allowed the trainees to toyi-toyi, as a traditional means of expression. This fostered mutual respect, not only for the individual permitting these activities, but for the Navy as a whole. This is also substantiated by the findings of the survey conducted amongst the recruits.

AS Saldanha received widespread local and foreign media coverage of the integration intake, as well as high profile visitors from outside and within the SANDF. The instructors felt that this had a negative effect on training. Programmes were changed at the last minute, classes were disrupted, all of which affected the time available for training. Some of the instructors felt that the trainees took advantage of this, as it was not possible to enforce discipline with the media or visitors present.

PERCEPTIONS OF RECRUITS

Two weeks prior to completion of basic training, a descriptive questionnaire survey was conducted amongst hundred naval recruits of the integration intake, to assess their perceptions of the training they had received at SAS Saldanha.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The sample for the survey was drawn from the 364 recruits undergoing basic naval training. The intake consisted of volunteers and members recruited from the Wallmansthal assembly point, of which 61,3 per cent were members of the former Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). The recruits were divided into six divisions, of four classes of approximately seventeen each. For the sample, one class from each division was randomly selected to participate in the survey. The stratified sampling method ensured that a cross-section was obtained of the broader recruit population. It also minimised possible extraneous influences, such as that of a particular instructor or divisional officer.

The demographic characteristics of the sample correlated with that of the broader population in terms of race, sex, age, educational levels and military background, being the most important variables that could influence the survey findings. The results were compared with a random selection of nine respondents, who were interviewed on the same issues covered by the survey, but who were not part of the survey sample. No significant deviation was found between the responses of the interviewees and the survey responses. Questionnaires and interviews were anonymous and were conducted in a relaxed atmosphere. The results of the survey compared favourably with other surveys conducted by the instructors.

The sample consisted of 81 male and 19 female trainees between the ages of 18 - 37 years, the average age being 22,3 years.

Besides the general demographic information, the recruits were asked to respond to the following questions.

WHY DID YOU CHOOSE TO JOIN THE NAVY?

When recruits were asked why they joined the Navy in particular, most respondents (46 per cent), claimed that they joined the Navy for national security reasons, to protect the coasts of South Africa. This could be due to the promotional video shown to recruits during the recruitment process. Quite a large proportion (22 per cent), cited that they joined the Navy because they saw it as an adventure, a challenge, an opportunity to see the world and to experience something new. Some recruits were quite specific in stating that they joined because they saw the Navy as a secure job (9 per cent) and others (8 per cent), because of their love for the sea (see Table 6).

Other reasons varied from the Navy having a large diversity of career prospects, that they considered the Navy the most disciplined force (this reason was frequently cited), liked the uniform, because they considered it an honour to serve in the Navy as only the best are selected for this arm of service, and because of the image society has of the Navy. These responses are significant when compared to the previous volunteer intake, where 77,3 per cent indicated that they joined because they needed a job. The above reasons could perhaps be ascribed to the fact that the integration intake already had a military background and wanted to remain in the military. However, many of these trainees had joined the former Umkhonto we Sizwe just prior to integration and only a small proportion had full or part-time employment.

DO YOU WANT A LONG-TERM CAREER IN THE NAVY?

The most startling finding was that 98 per cent of respondents wanted a career in the Navy. This may have serious implications for the Navy, considering the fact that the recruits are employed on a two-year service contract. Many may opt to leave in time, but the majority hope to pursue a long term career in the Navy.

WHAT DO YOU HOPE TO ACHIEVE IN THE NAVY?

A significant number of recruits (34 per cent) were not sure what they wanted to achieve, even though they indicated that they wanted a career in the Navy. This could be ascribed to the fact that they had just completed basic training and were unsure what the future may hold (Table 7).

Many merely stated that they wanted to achieve something they could be proud of. They wanted to be successful and respected within the Navy and the community. A proportion (21 per cent) indicated that they wanted to complete their chosen mustering, as a first priority, and then make longer term decisions. To become a member of the military police was a popular choice. Fifteen per cent of the trainees’ immediate ambition was to obtain rank, while eight per cent hoped to become officers. With respect to their future career, thirteen per cent saw the Navy as an opportunity to improve their educational qualifications, by obtaining an apprenticeship, improving their level of education or obtaining a skill which could be of use outside the military. Job security was once more stated as a career motivation by some trainees.

ANY DIFFICULTIES OR PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO TRAINING?

During the analysis it became clear that, while there was very little difference between the responses of males and females in the previous questions, the types of problems experienced had a significant gender base. While only 18 of the 81 male recruits experienced problems or difficulties with training, 15 of the 19 female recruits in the sample listed that they had difficulties or problems.

In Table 8 the main problems or difficulties are divided into categories, separating the responses based on gender distinction. In some instances, recruits listed more than one problem.

Male recruits experienced very little problems or difficulties with their basic training. The difficulty experienced with respect to physical training was considered normal to basic training. The women however, found the physical training particularly difficult.

Complaints about discrimination (42 per cent) mostly came from female trainees. Some complained about sexual discrimination and that the instructors did not understand their problems or address them in the appropriate manner. They suggested that women should be in charge of physical training. On the other hand, some women proposed that they should receive the same training as the men as they felt excluded from some activities. Racial discrimination was primarily experienced between trainees themselves and not between instructors and trainees.

Although payment posed problems initially, towards the end of basic training it was largely sorted out. This was due to the concerted effort made by the commanding officer at SAS Saldanha.7

ANYTHING YOU PARTICULARLY DISLIKE?

The list of dislikes expressed by recruits, corresponded with problems or difficulties experienced during training (see Table 9).

The majority of male recruits (53 per cent) affirmed that there was nothing they particularly disliked. The most prominent dislike, however, concerned corrective training, where the whole division had to suffer due to the fault of one person. Some did not agree with the motto used to create a sense of cohesion, namely that of ‘one for all and all for one.’

Some recruits made an issue of their allotted mustering. It was of serious concern to them that they could not change their mustering, once it was allocated. Some felt that too much time was spent on cleaning, washing and ironing and too little on reading, resulting in failure in their chosen mustering.

ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE?

When asked if there was anything they would like to change in their basic training, it related to previous responses in the survey (see Table 10).

The one significant finding was the recruits’ desire to change their allocated mustering, should they not be satisfied. It becomes complicated if five people, for example, apply for a mustering for which there is only one vacancy. In such a case, the trainee who performed best during basic training will get the billet. This procedure is explained to trainees at the beginning of basic training in order to motivate them to work hard. However, where the Navy could accommodate changes to musterings, this was done.

The survey showed that trainees attached a great deal of value to the computer training they received and emphasised their desire for this aspect of training to receive greater prominence. For example, one trainee stated that they needed "more time on the computers, and time to read". The need for more sporting facilities and entertainment, especially on weekends, was also expressed.

A small percentage of recruits wanted to see an improvement in the quantity and quality of food, but this was not listed as an overall grievance. Some recruits also complained that the uniform is too thick to work in, the Navy should not use old SADF stationery, since it is now a new integrated defence force, that the ladies should be mixed with the men, that there should be a set programme for the day and that they should do more practical work.

WHAT CHANNEL WOULD YOU FOLLOW TO ADDRESS YOUR PROBLEMS?

When asked what channel they would follow to bring about the necessary change, or how they would inform the Navy of their problems, approximately 49 per cent of the trainees were aware that channels existed through which they could direct their grievances and had a relatively sound understanding of the Navy’s divisional system.8 Many even stated that they had already used these channels and their problems had been resolved.

However, 46 per cent were unsure of the appropriate channel to follow should they have a problem or grievance. A small percentage stated that they would prefer to go straight to the training commander or commanding officer, in order to avoid confusion, if they had a major problem. This response causes some concern. If recruits know how to lodge a complaint or grievance and have faith in the existing channels, it would minimise the desire to channel grievances, especially individual ones, through other avenues.

WOULD YOU ACCEPT ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT?

When recruits were asked if they would still serve in the Navy if offered alternative employment, the majority (78 per cent) responded that they would definitely serve in the SA Navy, even if they were offered another job elsewhere. This overwhelmingly positive response correlates with the question dealing with whether recruits wanted a career in the Navy. Fifteen per cent of the recruits who were unsure or did not want a career in the Navy, however, stated categorically that it depended upon whether the Navy could offer stable employment, the career prospects the Navy could offer, whether alternative employment offered the same job security or a better salary. This further reflects on the positive attitude of trainees towards the training they received at SAS Saldanha and their commitment to the Navy.

WAS THE TRAINING OF ANY VALUE?

When asked whether they considered the training thus far of any benefit to them should they leave the Navy, 85 per cent of the trainees indicated that they had benefited from the training. Responses were varied and not limited to the development of literacy and mathematical skills through computer based training. The most frequently cited benefits were personal: they were more disciplined, had gained self-confidence, respect for others, had a better understanding of different cultures, were more tolerant of others and had acquired a sense of pride.

DISCUSSION

The integration of the various armed forces into the South African National Defence Force has not been an easy process. At assembly points in particular, ex-MK cadres deserted in protest against low pay, poor camp conditions and the painfully slow integration process. According to De Ionno, many of the MK cadres felt "intimidated and belittled in their struggle to prove themselves against the formally trained soldiers from the homeland armies and the SADF."9 In comparison, the integration of the non-statutory forces into the Navy was relatively successfully. This could be attributed to a diversity of factors.

When it was decided to recruit from Wallmannsthal for the September 1994 volunteer intake, the Navy was in a position to select the best available candidates who volunteered to serve in the Navy. Although candidates with a minimum Standard 8 qualification were accepted, most of the recruits had a Standard 10 (matric) certificate.

Unlike the other arms of service, that were involved in training black soldiers for many years, the Navy only had experience of two predominantly black volunteer intakes. An awareness of the need to adapt training to meet the challenges posed by the changing profile of their recruits, already existed. The Navy was committed to finding ‘ways and means to uphold training standards’ and to ensure that the integration process was a success.

The most important challenges from a training point of view centred around the need to bridge cultural differences, discrepancies in educational levels and language difficulties. Two weeks prior to the commencement of basic training, courses were presented on cultural differences, that fostered a greater tolerance and acceptance of the different cultures. As a result, trainees were permitted to toyi-toyi as a means of expression and thus motivated classmates. Captain Koos Louw, officer commanding SAS Saldanha, commented that "the toyi-toyi can be a very positive experience as it helps to build team spirit." Under the right circumstances, it clearly does not challenge authority or is defiant, but becomes a means of expression.10 During basic training ‘liberation songs’ were even sung. As such "a recruit undergoing training should not have time to sleep," the words of a Swahili training song, were taught to their new cadres in arms by Tanzanian trained MK-comrades.11

Trainees also attended a course in general life skills. It was presented by military psychologists and taught skills such as conflict resolution within the group, building trust between individuals and building team spirit.

Computer based enablement training, aimed at developing the basic English and Mathematical skills of the trainees, became central to basic training. These skills were necessary if trainees were to complete written examinations successfully. An academic improvement became evident after computerised evaluation. On average, trainees managed to improve their English grammar by three school standards and by more than a standard in Mathematics.

As eleven different languages were spoken by the recruits, multilingual communicators were appointed to ensure that trainees understood what was expected from them. English was by far the preferred language medium.

Basic training was extended from twelve to sixteen weeks to accommodate the new demands on training.

As a result of adaptations to basic training, it was not necessary to terminate the services of any trainee in the Navy. Secondly, the units conducting functional training that follows basic training, as end-users, have expressed their satisfaction with the product received from SAS Saldanha on various occasions. This implies that their own training standards could also be maintained.

A final indicator of success lies in the fact that no trainee had to be charged with being absent without leave (AWOL) during basic training, or having failed to return from leave. This was in spite of the fact that the September 1994 intake made contact with some of their disgruntled compatriots still at Wallmannsthal.

Much of the success of the integration process at SAS Saldanha can be attributed to the basic training instructors. The fact that they were adequately prepared for change simplified the process. Being responsible for the maintenance of standards and discipline, it undoubtedly took considerable effort on their part to adapt their training methods to meet the minimum requirements set by the Navy.

The volunteer status of recruits also contributed to the success at SAS Saldanha. Judging from the survey, they experienced training at SAS Saldanha as worthwhile. This was further substantiated by the fact that 98 per cent of the trainees in the survey indicated that they wanted a long term career in the Navy and 78 per cent that they would definitely still serve in the Navy, even if they were offered another job elsewhere. Perhaps it could be ascribed to the fact that the recruits did not experience any major difficulties or serious problems in their training. Only some of the female trainees complained about the physical training and racial and other forms of discrimination.

Another aspect that facilitated the integration process in the Navy was the equality between former MK soldiers and other volunteers during the basic training period. The importance of equality among recruits, as was the case at SAS Saldanha, is supported by Moskos12 : "Basic training is the levelling experience par excellence. The common uniform, the rigours of basic training all help to reduce pre-existing civilian advantage. For many youths from impoverished backgrounds, successful completion of basic training is the first occasion on which they can outshine those coming from privileged backgrounds". With respect to racial integration, that presented as much of a challenge as the maintenance of standards, Moskos points out that "race relations can best be transformed by an unambiguous commitment to non-discrimination coupled with uncompromising standards of performance."13 This can only be achieved, however, if educational and training programmes are aimed at raising performance standards of soldiers. This has been the case at SAS Saldanha, with the implementation of their educational enablement programme.

The experience at SAS Saldanha showed that the changes in training techniques ensured that the integration process in the Navy was more successful than elsewhere. It implied a change in training culture, a move away from first ‘breaking down’ and then ‘building up’ the recruits to a culture based on mutual respect and understanding of different cultures, backgrounds, levels of military training and education.

CONCLUSION

The integration experience at SAS Saldanha is heralded as a success story in the SANDF. This accomplishment can be ascribed to the tremendous effort that has been made to adapt training to ensure that minimum standards were maintained in the light of the changing profile of naval recruits. The experience at SAS Saldanha can serve as a useful case study for the rest of the SANDF.

The success of the exercise can be summarised in the experience of four partners aiming at a common goal in the training process. The trainees as volunteers, experienced the process as worthwhile. The instructors were adequately prepared for the changes about to take place and proved that they had the ability to adapt to the new training methods of the Navy. Parents of trainees were involved in the process and kept informed of trainees’ progress. Last, but not least, the immediate support from authorities such as Naval Headquarters and visits from former MK leaders such as Lt Gen Siphiwe Nyanda greatly encouraged the trainees.

The above factors and the tremendous effort made to adapt basic training requirements and accommodate cultural differences, have uncovered an important principle: That in creating a new Navy, even if standards are given, the Navy and the rest of the SANDF will only be in a position to maintain the present level of professionalism required from a modern, technologically advanced defence force, in compliance with international standards of competency, if training methods are revised.

The homeland armies include the Defence Force of Bophuthatswana (3 500 men plus 5 300 reserves), Ciskei Defence Force ( 2 000 men plus 2 000 reserves), Transkei Defence Force (3 500 men plus 3 300 reserves) and the Venda Defence Force (1 800 men plus 2 000 reserves). See G. Mills and G. Wood, Ethnicity, integration and the South African Armed Forces, South African Defence Review 12, 1993.



T. Motumi, Umkhonto we Sizwe - Structure, Training and Force levels (1984 to 1994), African Defence Review 18, 1994, p. 4.



C. Moskos, Racial integration in the US Army - Any lessons for South Africa, African Defence Review 15, 1994, p. 4.



Education of Whites, Coloureds, Asians and Blacks was administered by separate Departments of Education for each population group in South Africa. The education system for Blacks was characterised by poor quality instruction by inadequately trained teachers.



The ‘integration intake’ refers to the intake which had the first members of the non-statutory forces. Full racial integration in the Navy had already begun in 1993 with the first intake of volunteers.



An interesting aspect, relating more to self-discipline, was that vandalism declined significantly since the end of conscription.



To alleviate any pay problems, trainees were paid in cash out of the ‘ships fund’. Based on the experiences elsewhere in the SANDF, the officer commanding at SAS Saldanha saw this as the single most important factor that could have derailed the success of the integration process. All attempts were made by SAS Saldanha and Naval Headquarters to solve problems in this regard.



The ‘divisional system’ is geared at solving problems at the correct level in a short time. A trainee will submit a written request to the divisional officer (via his instructor), who will, if unresolved, forward it to the training commander. If he cannot solve it, he will forward it to the officer commanding. In this way it can be taken all the way to the Chief of the Navy.



P. De Ionno, The Stick and carrot save Modise’s day, Sunday Times, 16 October 1994, p. 24.



Interview with Captain J.C. Louw, SAS Saldanha Naval Training Base, Saldanha, 4 November 1994.



P. Malan, MK naval recruits are no landlubbers..., Weekend Argus, 27/28 August 1994, p. 5.



Moskos, op. cit., p. 1.



Ibid., p 40

AUTHORS’ NOTE: The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the South African National Defence Force or the South African Navy. The authors are grateful to the trainees, instructors, and senior officers at SAS Saldanha, who participated in the survey, and to Louis du Plessis and Mark Malan from the South African Military Academy for their valuable comments.