BACKGROUND

The discovery in September 1994 that a consignment of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) weapons, supposedly destined for Lebanon, had apparently been sold to Yemen, led to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry on 14 October 1994 (Government Notice R 1801) by President Mandela. Its task was to " ... comment - in the context of South Africa’s national and international obligations and responsibilities - on the appropriateness of:

South Africa’s current trade policy with regard to weapons and components with reference to weapons and related materials; and



decision-making processes with regard to such trade."

The ‘Commission of Inquiry into alleged arms transactions between ARMSCOR and one Eli Wazan and other related matters’ (the Cameron Commission) recently published its first report, dated 15 June 1995, on the Yemen transaction. A second report on other ‘similar’ transactions is expected shortly, as well as a report on South Africa’s arms trade policy.

In a press release on 26 April 1995, the Commission invited interested parties and members of the public to submit written presentations. It convened in Cape Town from 19 to 30 June for oral hearings. The Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) was among the organisations that responded to the invitation, submitting both a written document and an oral presentation on Thursday 22 June 1995. This article summarises important elements contained in the submission, and has been updated after recent announcements on the issue.

The purpose of the IDP submission was to present an analysis of the present South African Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Practice, and recommendations for the improvement of these measures. It has been achieved by presenting the framework within which South Africa pursues global and regional security, and through illustrating the advances that the country has made with regard to global arms control.

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY AS A CORNERSTONE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

A major factor that influences the arms procurement process is the regional and national security environment. The industrialised world appears to have escaped its cycle of war, evident in the wide realisation that possible losses in war could far outweigh its probable gains. This has led towards the development of pluralistic security concepts, attainable in a benign security environment. In contrast, much of the developing world is emerging from post-colonisation experiences wherein resorting to conflict is perceived as a means to redress their notion of deprivation. The end of the Cold War has not substantially altered the security environment in the Southern hemisphere. Here the spectrum of threats range from internal disorder to potential hostility to situations demanding high levels of military mobilisation. But as societies develop economically and industrially, economic interests start competing with security concerns for public attention.

It is our belief that the South African Government should continue to move, as it is indeed doing, to a comprehensive approach to global and regional security that emphasises transparency, confidence building mechanisms and co-operative engagement of its neighbours. The idea of comprehensive security co-operation to form an inclusive international and regional security arrangement has thus been acknowledged at numerous public events and in private discussions.

At the strategic level, the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ should prevail. According to this view, the central strategic problem, even in Southern Africa, is not deterrence, as in the Cold War, but reassurance. Unlike deterrence, which relies on strategic interaction between opposing states, the key to reassurance is reliable normative and institutional structures.

In the first place, security must be co-operative. No country should improve its own security (particularly through the use or threat of force) to the detriment of other states. A nation’s own security must consider that of its neighbours. In short, security can no longer be found in confrontation, but must be achieved in collaboration.

Secondly, the many facets of security are indivisible. International peacekeeping, therefore, cannot be isolated from a respect for human rights, pluralistic democracy and the Rule of Law. Security and stability cannot be separated from the development of economic, environmental, scientific and technical co-operation, as well as from social justice. Political pluralism is related to the functioning of the social market economy, and the stability of democratic societies depends on co-operation in the ‘war’ against terrorism, drug trafficking and other international organised crime.

Thirdly, security implies linkage, from individual, to community, to national, to sub-regional (e.g., ASAS/SADC), to regional (OAU) and global (UN) levels.

The appropriate principle for dealing with these new security issues is co-operative engagement. The form of security that results, offers the best prospect of addressing the problems of the post-Cold War world.

Comprehensive security is an aspiration that will only be partially fulfilled. It does not describe the world system, nor does it predict the future, or propose a theory of international relations. But aspirations give coherence to security policy. Organising principles like deterrence, nuclear stability and containment, embodied the aspirations of the Cold War, and were invaluable in guiding thought and action. Comprehensive security is the corresponding principle underlying international security in the post-Cold War era. The idea of co-operative security assumes that war, unlike disease and death, is not inevitable, and that commitment to prevention can be indefinitely effective.

A fully developed co-operative security framework, however, would still have to include provisions for collective security, such as an arrangement to deter and defeat aggression through counter-threat, as a residual guarantee to its members. Systematic prevention of aggressive military postures would make these residual guarantees easier to convey, as it is less likely that it would be required and, if so, easier to underwrite.

Since co-operative security arrangements are to be established through consent, rather than imposed by threat of force, all countries should be considered eligible to participate in these arrangements, provided that they conform to the rules. Indeed, the spirit of co-operative security is to ensure that all countries do belong and do conform. This requires incentives to induce voluntary compliance and careful formulation of the rules to be sure that they are reasonably equitable in international and regional terms.

A co-operative security order need not be a single, encompassing legal regime or arms control agreement, but would probably begin with a set of overlapping, mutually reinforcing arrangements derived from agreements already in force. The basic notion of reliable security co-operation clearly labours against the pervasive emotions and institutionalised practices of national rivalry.

THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

South Africa has the only defence industrial capacity of significance in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also the only country in the region with a defence budget of international significance apart from Nigeria. The South African defence industry, therefore, is potentially either a regional asset or a liability. The final verdict will depend on the successful consolidation of South Africa’s transition to democracy, and its conduct in the region and internationally.

Whereas South Africa’s neighbours have been dependent upon external sources for arms procurement, the opportunity now exists for countries in the region to become clients of the South African defence industry, should they wish to do so. This represents a small market, given the restrictions and size of the defence budgets of most of our neighbours, but has potential significance in foreign policy terms. Not only is South Africa a source of tailor-made defence equipment suited to African conditions, but assistance could play an important role in improving interoperability and standardisation - crucial components in the formation of multilateral forces, confidence building and eventually the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force.

A major challenge facing African governments en route to democracy, is the reform of the military and security forces into professional organisations that operate under civilian control and respect the human rights of citizens. Undoubtedly the abuse of the military by African leaders and the intervention of the military in politics have been major causes of instability and suffering on the continent.

African countries need to establish greater transparency and accountability in the military sector. Civilian control over the armed forces, paramilitary groups and the police should be encouraged. They need to reduce the size of the military and adhere to international norms and arms control treaties. They need to promote the creation of new security arrangements that will provide the stability vital for sustained economic development. Their security forces should be restructured according to requirements of the new political environment and economic realities. South Africa can contribute to all of these goals, and collective action will no doubt render better results.

Provided that the transition to democracy in South Africa is institutionalised, its neighbours could benefit by the capabilities of the South African arms industry, in returning equipment (mainly former Soviet) to service, in establishing the capacity to maintain these systems within their territories, and generally, to place and develop the logistic infrastructure of the military. The development of capabilities of other countries in the region could be the most concrete example of South Africa’s commitment to building regional stability and good neighbourliness.

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY AND INITIATIVES WITH REGARD TO GLOBAL ARMS CONTROL

Armament policy, including that on arms exports and imports, is an essential element of defence and security policy. It is important to ensure that the South African arms export policy is in line with the wider security concept discussed earlier, as well as the UN Charter, which commits it to "... the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments".1

The South African Government of National Unity (GNU) has on numerous occasions committed itself to a policy of transparency in non-proliferation and arms control that covers all weapons of mass destruction and expresses its concerns about the proliferation of conventional weapons. The Department of Foreign Affairs is responsible for executing foreign policy and concluding international agreements, and the Department of Defence, with ARMSCOR, act within this policy framework. This represents a major departure from the situation where the Department of Defence, until a few years ago, deliberately sought to exclude Foreign Affairs from any involvement in or knowledge of arms acquisition and transfers.

A primary goal of the Government is to establish and reinforce South Africa’s reputation as a responsible arms producer, possessor and trader of defence-related products and advanced technologies. Despite those lapses that have been the focus of the Cameron Commission, South Africa wishes to be seen to support initiatives to curb regional and sub-regional conflicts through strict conventional arms control at these levels.

In its endeavours, South Africa should try to maintain a reasonable balance between, on the one hand, the interests of the domestic defence industry and trade in defence-related products to provide for future defence needs, while simultaneously contributing to socio-economic development through export earnings, and on the other hand, the control of such trade in accordance with international conventions and other control regimes.

It is a clearly stated objective of the GNU to develop and maintain a responsible approach to international trade in defence-related products. South Africa has thus supported all resolutions concerning transparency in armaments, regional confidence building, non-proliferation, weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. It has created a new basis for arms export policy and practices that differs extensively from the aims and approaches during the arms embargo.

The commitment of the South African Government is evident from the following:

The content of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, (No. 87 of 1993) promulgated into law on 16 August 1993 and Government Gazette Notice R1789 of 14 October 1994 and R888 of 13 May 1994.



South African participation on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement which South Africa negotiated with the IAEA.



South Africa’s acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 July 1991 and its recent leading role in the review and extension of the NPT;



and as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.



Its role in the Treaty on an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.



Its participation in the Zangger Committee.



Its bilateral agreement with the United States to accept an agreeable control mechanism in relation to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).



Its participation and assistance with the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).



Its application for membership of the Conference on Disarmament.



Its signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, and the role that it played in the region in this regard.



Its becoming a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1992.



On 31 August 1994 the Cabinet approved South Africa becoming a State Party to the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (Inhumane Weapons Convention).



South Africa’s decision to comply with UN Resolution 48/75 (K) of 1993 calling for all states to issue a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines.



Its decision, announced in March 1994, to place with immediate effect, an indefinite moratorium on the international marketing, export and transit of all mines.



And finally, the decision by South Africa on 26 October 1994 to participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UN Resolution 46/36 (L)). South Africa submitted its first report on imports and exports in terms of the Register during May 1995.

The objectives of the UN Arms Register were inspired by well-founded principles: the maintenance of international peace and security; the inherent right of self defence; reasonable defence sufficiency for preservation of regional peace, security and stability; undiminished security for all states at the lowest possible level of armaments; and finally, the need to exercise due restraint in arms transfers based on legitimate requirements to meet the security needs of the member states. The South African Government has made a clear commitment to these principles, having a direct impact on the country’s conduct in participating in conventional arm transfers.2

Proposals to establish a UN Register of arms transfers had been considered by the UN since the mid-1960s. However, no progress was made until the end of the 1980s when the international environment became more favourable with the Cold War’s end and as international experience with military transparency arrangements developed (particularly amongst Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) countries). Moreover, an increasing number of countries, such as France, Germany, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and the Soviets, began to publish details of their arms exports.

On 7 December 1988, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 43/75 I, which requested the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a panel of government experts, a "study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis."3 The resolution established a UN Register of Conventional Arms. The General Assembly hoped it would contribute to the timely identification and prevention of excessive and destabilising accumulations of arms, while at the same time recognising the rights of member states to procure and maintain armed forces for the purposes of self-defence.

The Register is a transparency arrangement, primarily designed to promote confidence building and restraint, rather than to impose limits or controls on arms transfers and military holdings. Participation is voluntary, and is based on political agreement rather than an international legal convention. As such, it is a relatively modest measure. Instead of pursuing arms exports before they take place, the purpose of the Register is to keep track of arms transfers after the fact. However, in view of the formidable obstacles to establishing international controls on conventional arms transfers, production or holdings, or even to achieve timely international agreement on the existence and character of destabilising accumulations of arms or regions of tension, it may be the best global arrangement in this area for the time being.

When the Register was established in December 1991, it was understood that it would be expanded in future. Paragraph 7 of General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L, therefore, invites Member States to provide available information "on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies".

The Register came into effect in January 1992. Among those efforts to promote transparency in armaments, the UN Register of Conventional Arms stands out as an important milestone, particularly deserving South African support in terms of subscribing to it and participating in its further development.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

South African defence expenditure has followed international trends in being reduced in successive years since 1989. Defence ministries in countries with defence industries cope with smaller defence budgets in four ways, all with inherent problems. Stretching the procurement cycle by delaying projects may not save as much money as anticipated, as it often means resources are poorly used. Reducing the required equipment quantities can significantly raise unit production costs. Cancelling programmes and withdrawing equipment require a reconsideration of military commitments, and an acknowledgement that procurement decisions have major economic and social consequences. Virtually all arms exporting countries are also trying to maximise exports. Finally, various attempts have been made to convert, commercialise and downsize defence industries. These problems are not unique to the defence industry, but characteristic of virtually any manufacturing industry which has to cut back due to a reduction in demand.

Whereas South Africa spent 4,3 per cent of its GDP on defence in 1989, by 1993 this had shrunk to 2,6 per cent and by 1995/6 was estimated to be about 2,2 per cent (R10 535 million). The global national average is between 4,5 and 5 per cent.4 Defence spending as a percentage of Government expenditure was only 9,8 per cent of the total budget in 1992 (down from 16,3 per cent in 1989), while economic services received 13,4 per cent, education 21 per cent, and social services 23,3 per cent.5

These cuts were achieved through the disbanding or scaling down of various former South African Defence Force (SADF) units; the closure or scaling down of military bases; the reduction in national service from two to one years and the eventual replacement of conscription by a volunteer system; retrenchments of former SADF and ARMSCOR personnel (close on 9 000 retrenchments, cost in excess of R400 million); cutbacks in capital and Research and Development (R&D) spending (in 1989/90, R1 010 million was invested, as opposed to only R329 million in 1993/94); the postponement and/or cancellation of armaments projects; and the sale and/or mothballing of redundant and obsolete equipment (during 1994/95 ARMSCOR sold SANDF stock to the value of R66 million). Of these, the greatest savings were made through the cancellation of projects and cutbacks in capital spending. This is evident from the fact that only 24 per cent of the defence budget is now spent on capital items as opposed to 44 per cent in 1990. Yet, despite these reductions, the potential for further limited cuts in defence spending in South Africa is real, as defence policy and organisations are in a process of restructuring and no clear threat is perceived in the short to medium term. Before major spending on the production of new equipment is undertaken, the entire structure of the SANDF and its equipment holdings must be reviewed, as has been proposed recently by the announcement of a defence review process in the draft White Paper on Defence.

The decline of the South African defence budget by 45 per cent in four years has had significant implications. It has resulted in plummeting turnover within the defence industry (down by 60 per cent), and the loss of tens of thousands of jobs in the public and private sectors. Local production of defence equipment has declined by 22 per cent in the last three years, from R4 826 million to R3 773 million. However, this still represents more than 4 per cent of all marketing output and contributes 1,1 per cent of GDP. Although rapidly declining, South Africa still has a formidable defence industry consisting of about 700 companies employing approximately 50 000 people in public and private sectors (down from 160 000 people some four years ago). Nearly all these companies are South African owned. According to SADIA, defence business constitute more than 50 per cent of the total business of 125 of these companies. Defence equipment represents more than 90 per cent of output of 21 companies. The vast majority of these 700 companies are small and micro-enterprises. Exports of R1 097 million in 1994 made the defence industry the second largest exporter of complex manufactured goods after the industrial machinery sector, and about the same size as the motor vehicle component sector.

The massive decline in defence capital expenditure has had a ripple effect in the South African economy in general and its manufacturing sector in particular. Between 1988 and 1994, employment in the manufacturing sector declined by 130 000 jobs. As many as 110 000 of these jobs may have been lost in the defence industry.

Apart from job losses, defence cuts result in retrenchments, the closure or scaling down of military bases (such as that at Pietersburg) and threaten the livelihood and even existence of defence-dependent communities and small towns, apart from the obvious loss of valuable expertise and skills. Similar to the international experience, South Africa has also found it difficult to convert defence industries effectively from military to commercial production. The old adage, ‘conversion leads to closure’, has come to haunt many smaller South African defence manufacturers.

Given the current rate of decline in the Defence Force’s procurement spending, the survival of the South African arms industry may presently be at stake. The arms industry cannot downsize indefinitely. With high fixed overheads and declining turnover, a point is reached where armaments can no longer be produced economically and entire plants have to be shut down. This has already occurred in a number of instances.

The tension between industrialists’ desire for freedom of action and the government’s requirement for control over military-related aspects of national life, finds expression in government regulation of the defence industry. It is a misconception that the defence industry in market economies is unregulated. Regulations can have many functions: to ensure supplies of critical products or materials; to ensure quality control in defence products; to permit supervision and audit of government expenditure; and to oversee the export and import of military-related goods and technologies. All forms of regulation impose costs on industry, but as each fulfils a legitimate function, none are likely to be abandoned completely.

ARMSCOR

As part of the downsizing, restructuring and commercialisation of the South African defence industry, the Government restructured the state-owned armaments company, ARMSCOR, into two organisations on 1 April 1992. A new state-owned industrial company, DENEL Pty (Ltd), was formed under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Public Enterprises and took control of ARMSCOR’s armaments manufacturing capabilities and facilities. ARMSCOR remained part of the Ministry of Defence and retained responsibility for:

the acquisition of armaments and related products for the SANDF, the SA Police Service, various other government departments and international clients;



arms trade control; and



market facilitation.

The formation of DENEL allowed ARMSCOR to move towards a more competitive and market oriented defence procurement policy. More importantly, the split between ARMSCOR and the state-owned defence industry restored a serious imbalance that arose in 1977 when ARMSCOR swallowed the Armaments Board and became both the acquisition agency and industrial producer of arms - in effect both player and referee. A recent submission by SADIA to the Cameron Commission is succinct in remarking: "In terms of this, the control of the defence industry markets and trade was vested in ARMSCOR. It meant that ARMSCOR was the customer of all output of the defence industry in defence production, issued the marketing permits to enable companies in the industry to explore export potential and issued the export permits."6

Now, with the balance restored, ARMSCOR is still saddled with the complex ‘buy-or-develop’ decisions, but should be less tempted to advance its own state-owned industry above either the private sector or international competitors in the allocation of defence contracts.

ARMSCOR, with less than 2 000 employees, defines its corporate mission to "... meet the needs of South Africa as regards armaments and related products/services and to maintain key industries and technologies".7 This is achieved through technology and project management, testing and evaluation, quality assurance, logistic support management and marketing of obsolete stock. The industry (both in the public and the private sector) undertakes research and development, industrialisation, production, and provides maintenance and spares.

It should be emphasised that the ‘model’ followed by ARMSCOR has proven highly successful, namely that of a state corporation run along strict business lines with high calibre skilled technologists at the core. ARMSCOR started participating in the international defence market during 1982. By 1992 the South African defence industry had achieved such success that the defence industry was the largest exporter of manufactured goods in the country, exporting to more than 50 countries and internationally recognised as an important defence supplier.

After massive cuts in the South African defence budget, ARMSCOR was still responsible in 1994/95 for total acquisition activities of R3 767 million. For these activities the Corporation received R189,5 million from the State, of which R169,8 million was used to defray operating expenditure, R17,6 million for technology development and R2,1 million for the acquisition of assets. While there can be no clarity on what premium, if any, ARMSCOR paid to ensure the survival of local industry as opposed to international acquisition, the move towards a more market-related acquisition policy must have reduced costs for both the military and Government, and therefore for the taxpayer.

There is little prospect of the highly complex defence acquisition process being managed by civil servants, either in uniform or in civilian musterings, given the requirement for highly skilled (and therefore expensive) persons and the need for total life-cycle support.

DENEL

DENEL is a public company with all its equity owned by the state, employing about 13 800 people (down from 28 000 persons in 1992). The company is managed by a Board of Directors, responsible to the Minister for Public Enterprises. DENEL receives no government subsidy, unlike many of its foreign competitors, such as French state-owned defence industrial companies that received close on $1 billion in government support for this year alone. It is presently structured as a single company with divisions and subsidiary companies. These companies include Atlas (aircraft), Eloptro (optronics), Kentron (anti-aircraft systems, missiles, RPVs, avionics), LIW (artillery, turrets, infantry weapons), Mechem (mine-protected vehicles, special equipment) and four ammunition producers - Naschem, PMP, Somchem and Swartklip. DENEL also controls several research and development facilities and test ranges.

State ownership of the defence industry is common. In the USA where, similar to South Africa, most defence industrial facilities are privately owned, government-owned factories nevertheless compete directly with private suppliers. In addition, some companies in the USA and the UK are ‘GOCO’ (government-owned, contractor-operated) with private management and administration, but state-owned land, buildings and machinery. Moreover, in the USA and the UK the armed forces retain significant industrial capacity within military units responsible for repair and maintenance. This is not yet the case in South Africa. In countries such as France, Israel and Italy, most or all of the defence industry is publicly owned, although privatisation is either under way or being considered in all these countries.

In its first year of operation, DENEL did business to the value of R522 million and exported R480 million worth of mostly military products out of a total income of R2 818 million. By 1994/5, the total income of DENEL reached R3 015 million, some R157 million higher than the previous year, although the termination of DENEL’s space activities (Houwteq) reduced its issued share capital by R749 million. Sales to the SANDF and SA Police Service decreased to less than half of its total income, from nearly two thirds in 1993/94. Exports and local commercial sales now account for more than 40 per cent of turnover. Importantly, DENEL spent R51 million on research and development in 1994/95 while doing an additional R280 million worth of research work on contract.

DENEL has actively pursued conversion and diversification. Conversion entails the transformation of military productive capacity into that for civil activities and production. Diversification implies that while commercial opportunities are pursued, these are not to the exclusion of military contracts. But just how successful it would be in diversification and commercialisation, and how dependent it would remain on defence contracts, is difficult to judge. Given the extent of defence cutbacks, however, Government-supported policies of diversification and conversion would appear to be necessary. The bottom line is not only about preserving jobs, but also industrial and technological capabilities.

What remains in DENEL is largely the strategic overhang of the South African defence industry. Although it has become a diversified international technology group to some degree (as it claims), selling to 65 countries, the arms business still forms its core, contributing about 70 per cent of its turnover. To DENEL’s sales of R1,3 billion to the SANDF in 1994/95, were added military exports of about R681 million (1993/94: R644 million) and commercial exports worth R124 million (1993/94: R68 million). The possible privatisation of DENEL may become a viable option within a few years, given the extent of commercialisation and diversification that has occurred thus far. However, there appears to be a considerable degree of cross-subsidisation within DENEL, allowing profitable divisions to fund unprofitable ones and therefore buying time for restructuring, commercialisation and diversification. This is particularly evident from the successes of DENEL’s informatics division that has increased its sales during 1994/5 by 22 per cent, while the income of a previous stalwart, LIW, which manufactures weapons systems, has fell by 30 per cent. There can be little doubt that a number of private groups would be interested in buying a profitable and going concern such as Infoplan, should the Government decide to sell it. Pressure for such action is bound to increase, as competition between DENEL and the private sector increases in non-military spheres.

DENEL has entered into a number of alliances with international partners. The group has an arrangement with Rolls Royce to supply auxiliary gearboxes for aircraft and has recently announced a deal with SNECMA of France and Spain’s ITP to upgrade and modernise engine components for fighter aircraft.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR DEFENCE INDUSTRY

By far the larger part of the South African arms industry is in private hands. Approximately 80 per cent of the 50 000 persons employed in the arms industry are in the private sector. In late 1994 these were concentrated in four major groups.8

Grinaker Electronics, part of Grinaker Technologies, that includes Grinel (tactical communications), Grinaker Avitronics (airborne ECM, avionics computers), Grinaker Electronic Systems (communication systems), and Grinaker Systems Technologies (Comint systems).



Altech Systems, that includes ISIS Information Systems (command systems), Teklogic (artillery target acquisition, tactical computers, naval and aircraft simulators), Synertech (anti-aircraft systems and simulators) and UEC Projects (naval command systems, armoured vehicle simulators).



Reunert Mechanical Systems (Reumech), that comprises Ermetek (combat vehicle design), OMC (tanks, heavy armoured vehicles), Sandock (light armoured vehicles) and Gear Ratio Engineering.



Reunert Technology Systems (Reutech), that includes Aserma (bombs, fuses, retarders), Barcom Electronics (radio’s, mine detectors), ESD (avionics, IFF), Fuchs Electronics (artillery fuses) and Reutech Radar Systems (air-defence radar).

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE EXPORTS

In the past, South Africa sold armaments to a number of countries which subsequently were guilty of human rights abuses, were involved in internal and external conflicts and were generally dealing in the ‘grey’ market. Navias9 described past South African arms exports as "... characterised by efforts to employ front and false companies, to disguise sources of supply and import, to offer no end use clauses with transferred items and to focus on other pariah states who had their own import difficulties. Joint marketing operations were set up with states and companies willing to sell South African products under another guise and the laws of many countries were broken as South African agents attempted to procure or sell weapons and weapons technologies. ... South African national security was of primary import and a pariah state had little option and far less cause to be pedantic about with whom it dealt." Though this is hardly unique to South Africa, it is nevertheless still an unacceptable and illegitimate practice. Governments are routinely under substantial pressure from arms manufacturers to allow exports to countries with dubious intentions and hard currency. This may also be the case in South Africa in future if stringent oversight measures are not implemented. However, the formal system of oversight that has developed in recent months is believed to be sound and comprehensive.

Since the first cuts in the South African defence budget, the defence industry has embarked on a major export drive, but increased exports and civilian business could only maintain some of the technology and jobs that would otherwise have been lost. It could not compensate for the greater number of jobs lost due to reduced South African defence spending. In an attempt to slow the technology loss, ARMSCOR embarked upon a Technology and Industrial Survival Plan, but there is little data available on its content and effects.10

At present, in a declining international market, South Africa has less than 0,5 per cent of the international arms market, exporting on average less than R900 million ($250 million) worth of armaments annually. Although this is a very small global proportion, it is important in terms of quality and content within the wider South African context of manufacturing exports. ARMSCOR appears to be confident that it would be able to increase its share of the international arms market, which would go a long way to replace the orders previously received from the former SADF, thereby subsidising local production, but would still require a painful process as unprofitable products and developments are closed down and priorities are redirected.

The decline in the size of domestic production orders means that overhead rates charged to procurement authorities are increasing. Failure to take adequate account of the export potential of equipment clearly has financial implications. The Director-General of Defence Contracts at the British Ministry of Defence has, for example, estimated that their department saved £340 million in 1992 because exports of defence equipment spread overheads over a wider base and thus lowered unit costs. During 1994/95, South Africa had a positive arms trade balance of R335 million, after having paid for R519 million worth of armament imports. In a wider context, exports are also a source of Government revenue and help to subsidise national strategic industries.

The importance of export sales to the defence industry is evident from the fact that it has increased from R702 million in 1992 to R879 million in 1994, and from 21,9 per cent to 27,2 per cent of defence equipment output.

A PROPOSED SOUTH AFRICAN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER POLICY11

INTRODUCTION

The South African arms industry has been supplying a variety of locally designed and manufactured weapons systems and other equipment to the South African National Defence Force, the Police Service and other government departments. Many of these systems will still be in operation well into the next century. Since much of the equipment is unique, only the local defence industry will be able to provide spares, ammunition and life-cycle support. Whatever happens to DENEL, the private defence industry and the South African defence budget, a minimum of defence manufacturing and maintenance infrastructure will have to be retained, even if South Africa foregoes the export of arms completely.

The SANDF will also require military hardware in future. This not only includes the replacement of obsolete equipment and the procurement of new items, but also the upgrading and maintenance of such equipment. The local industry has excelled in this area in the past, namely that of life cycle extension, upgrades and conversions.

The conventional arms transfer policy of the South African Government should serve the security interests of the country in two important ways:

The South African Government should support arms transfers that meet its own continuing security needs, and those of its friends and allies.



The Government should not participate in arms transfers that may destabilise or threaten regional peace, or undermine global and regional security.

Transfer of conventional arms is a legitimate instrument of South African foreign policy, deserving Government support, when it enables South Africa to help friends and allies deter aggression, promote regional security and increase interoperability between South African and allied forces. Judging when a specific transfer will meet these criteria requires an examination of the dynamics of regional power balances and the potential for destabilising changes in these regions.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM

Previously, South African control of arms sales through a formal system that assessed and allocated import, export, transit and marketing permits, has come in for considerable local and international criticism, despite the fact that it had been vastly improved recently.12 At the time of the Cameron Commission hearings, the essence of this system was consolidated in Notice no R888, Government Gazette No 15720, of 13 May 1994, the Armaments Development and Production Act (No 57 of 1968) as amended, and SANDF policy directive Log 17 Pam 19.13

According to this adjusted system, no armaments manufacturer or contractor is permitted to market and export any armaments without first obtaining marketing and export permits, until recently issued through ARMSCOR. Various committees handled the process of evaluating requests for permits and other related policy aspects. For example:

The National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), until recently under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of Defence, undertook a quarterly strategic review of the countries to which armaments may be exported. The recommendations of the NCACC eventually served as a basis for final approval by Cabinet. The following were represented on the NCACC:



SANDF, Department of Foreign Affairs, the Non-Proliferation Secretariat of the Department of Trade and Industry, the SA Secret Service and the SA Police Service.



The Armaments Marketing Permit Committee (AMPC), a subcommittee of the NCACC, under the chairmanship of ARMSCOR, evaluated all marketing and export applications and made recommendations to the ARMSCOR Management Board, which then decided on the issuing of Marketing and Export Permits. The following were represented on AMPC:



SANDF (Chiefs of Staff Intelligence, Operations and Logistics), Department of Foreign Affairs, the Non-Proliferation Secretariat of the Department of Trade and Industry, various ARMSCOR branches.

During the first quarter of 1995 ARMSCOR changed the name of the AMPC to the Committee for Armaments Marketing and Export Control (CAMEC).

Quarterly reports on armaments exports were submitted to ARMSCOR’s Board of Directors, the SANDF and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

There is no extra-government (private sector, academic or non-government) representation on the various committees, even after recent changes to the system, as described below.

At the heart of the arms export control system under the NCACC and CAMEC was the classification of countries into three groups (no restrictions, limited exports allowed and no exports) and categories of armaments. These classifications and categories have been widely quoted in the press. One of the important reforms implemented by ARMSCOR was the transfer of responsibility for the classification of a country from Military Intelligence to the Department of Foreign Affairs, which based its decisions on the following criteria:

the country’s human rights record;



the likelihood that a country may use the products to suppress its own population;



the impact that weapons sales to one or more countries in a region could have on South Africa’s bilateral or other relationships, or its image in the region;



the impact that weapons sales to a country could have on South Africa’s bilateral relations with other countries or on its image in such countries;



the possibility that arms sales to a country or countries in a region could be detrimental to the balance of power in that region;



UN sanctions/embargoes under Chapter Vll of the UN Charter; and



the categories of armaments as defined.

During July 1995 the Mail & Guardian14 published the country categories, commenting that "... Armscor ... has come a long way in a year of gruelling public exposure by the Cameron Commission, and some soul-searching of its own."

Category 1 (no arms restrictions): Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Benin, Cape Verde, Senegal, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Eritrea, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (but all sales on hold pending peace referendum in Western Sahara), Oman, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia (since put on hold), Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Macao, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pacific Ocean Islands, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka (since put on hold), Republic of China, Thailand, Vietnam, United States of America, Canada, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, French Guyana, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Bahamas, Bermuda, Belize, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Grenada, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Vatican, San Marino, Malta, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Andorra, Albania, Hungary, Turkey (since changed to lV), Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russian Federation, Belarus.



Category ll (some arms restrictions): Comores, Madagascar, Mali, Cameroon, Congo, Sao Tomé and Principe, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Palestinian National Authority, India, Pakistan, Bulgaria, Romania.



Category lll (non-lethal equipment): Angola, Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Zaire, Djibouti, Algeria, Lebanon, Moldavia.



Category lV (no arms sales): Lesotho, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanese Christian Militia, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), North Korea, Cuba, Haiti, Tadjikistan, Kirghistan, Uzbekistan, Croatia, Slovenia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan.

In accordance with this system, the Department of Foreign Affairs approved the issuing of a Marketing Permit which was valid for two years. This approval did not, however, automatically allow the export of equipment as became evident by DENEL’s claims that it was refused some R40 million worth of potential contracts because it could not obtain export permits. A valid Marketing Permit normally implied that ARMSCOR would issue an Export Permit upon application within the two year period. Even if significant changes can occur in two years, the marketing of defence equipment is a notoriously lengthy process and requires some leeway in this regard. However, changes to a country’s classification meant that Marketing Permits were withdrawn immediately, as was recently the case with Turkey. The legality of terminating contracts that have already been signed and for which Export Permits have been issued, is unclear. Under this system, Marketing and Export Permits, therefore, were dealt with on the same procedural basis.

It has become standard practice to insist on End User Certificates to substantiate the identity of the export item and the end user. Following the Wazan affair, ARMSCOR now attempts to independently verify the validity of transactions and the authenticity of End User Certificates, notorious for being falsified. Diplomatic channels are used for this purpose and arms are only sold to a government.

Product classification is done by teams of technical and military experts of ARMSCOR and the Chief of Staff Logistics of the SANDF.

Even in terms of the adapted system discussed below, handguns such as pistols, revolvers and shotguns are not controlled by ARMSCOR, but by the SAPS in terms of the Arms and Ammunition Act (Act 75 of 1969), as well as teargas (in terms of the Teargas Act (No. 16 of 1964)) and explosives in terms of the Explosives Act (No. 26 of 1956). This is an anomaly which, to some extent, detracts from the effectiveness of a comprehensive armaments control system controlled by a single agency. Perhaps more importantly, control of weapons of mass destruction and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) related products occur under the Department of Trade and Industry. It does not appear as if South Africa has yet identified an agency or organisation to be responsible for control of the proliferation of military or dual use technology.

Since December 1994 an ARMSCOR permit was required for all armaments imports, sub-systems, components and materials required for the execution of a contract.

In the case of armament transfers, the Minister of Defence authorised ARMSCOR to regulate the movement of armaments through South African ports and airspace, and over South African territory. Such transfers must be verified by the end user through the Department of Foreign Affairs and by the forwarding or customs clearing agent to ARMSCOR, who consult with the SANDF before issuing a transit permit.

In considering the system described above, ARMSCOR’s introduction of a number of significant measures to tighten up control of the export, import and transfer of armaments should be credited to the Cameron Commission. In fact, there appears to be no major structural flaw in the formal arms control regime developed by ARMSCOR in recent months.

However, given the lack of confidence amongst certain sectors within South African society in its policy on conventional arms transfers, and the real concerns raised by the Cameron Commission’s investigation, Cabinet recently decided to implement a case-by-case examination for South African decision-making on conventional arms transfers, instead of the country classification system and to remove the final control of arms sales from ARMSCOR and the Ministry of Defence.

In what must be a unique appointment, even in South Africa, Water Affairs and Forestry Minister Kader Asmal was appointed chairman of the NCACC, with public effect from 30 August 1995, replacing Deputy Minister of Defence Ronnie Kasrils. According to newspaper reports the committee had been functioning informally since August 1994 and had turned down deals with two countries, of which Turkey was probably one.15 Apart from Asmal, the NCACC is comprised of the ministers of Defence, Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs, Safety and Security, General Services, and Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, as well as the deputy ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence Services and Safety and Security. Each weapons sale is subject to an export permit. The permit is first scrutinised by a Vetting Committee, consisting of the Secretary of Defence and the Directors General of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry, and if approved, recommended to the NCACC. Cabinet also decided to establish an independent inspectorate, to ensure that the guidelines and decisions emanating from the NCACC were adhered to. The inspectorate will periodically report to the NCACC and Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence. In the announcement, Cabinet was at pains to point out that the NCACC itself would also report to Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the UN Register on Conventional Arms - a salutary move. Finally, it would appear, arms transactions would also no longer be confidential, except for considerations of national interest and through bilateral agreements.16

Responding to the Cabinet decision, ARMSCOR stated: "The decision taken by cabinet embraces the most important principle ARMSCOR has been promoting: that the organisation should be relieved of the regulatory function. ... The NCACC will now continue with the structuring of control procedures, revising legislation and will attend to a multitude of aspects and problems associated with such trade control. The NCACC will thus form the first level of political guidance and could, if it so wishes, refer matters for decision to the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence Affairs and eventually to Cabinet. It is also understood that the NCACC will study the report to be made by the Cameron Commission on their findings on South African arms trade control policies and practices. All applications with reference to trading in conventional arms will now be treated on a case-by-case basis and no longer will the use of a country grouping system be followed."17

Against this background the following sections present the possible goals of a South African conventional arms transfer policy and criteria for decision-making on arms exports.

GOALS OF A SOUTH AFRICAN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER POLICY

South African conventional arms transfer policy must promote restraint, both by South Africa and other suppliers, in transfers of weapons systems that may be destabilising or dangerous to international peace. At the same time, policy should support transfers that meet legitimate defence requirements of friends and allies in support of South Africa’s national security and foreign policy interests.

The South African conventional arms transfer policy should arguably serve:

to ensure that South African military forces can continue to enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries;



to help allies and friends in the region deter or defend themselves against aggression, while promoting interoperability with South African forces when combined operations are required;



to promote regional stability, while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems;



to promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights, democratisation, and other foreign policy objectives; and



to enhance the ability of South Africa to develop its industrial base to meet South African defence requirements and maintain a long term military technological capacity at lower costs.

A critical element of South African policy on arms control must be to promote control, restraint, and transparency of arms transfers. The centrepiece of South African efforts should be to promote multilateral restraint, to put in place a successful regime to establish effective international controls on arms sales and the transfer of sensitive technologies, particularly to regions of tension and to states that pose a threat to international peace and security. At present, the most appropriate vehicle appears to be the expansion and extension of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (to include military holdings and procurement through national production) as part of a range of efforts to counter the proliferation of conventional weapons. While pursuing multilateral restraint through this and other mechanisms, the South African Government should exercise unilateral restraint in cases where overriding national security and foreign policy interests require it to do so.

The South African Government should also:

support regional initiatives to enhance transparency in conventional arms trade, such as those being examined by the OAU, SADC/ASAS and possibly soon the ISDSC;



support efforts to establish an international export control regime to increase transparency of transfers of conventional arms and related technology, to establish effective international controls of these transfers, and to promote restraint - particularly to regions of tension and to states that are likely to pose a threat to international peace and security;



support current arms control and confidence building efforts to constrain the demand for destabilising weapons and related technology;



act unilaterally to restrain the flow of arms in cases where unilateral action is effective or necessitated by overriding national interests. Such restraint should be considered on a case-by-case basis in instances where South Africa has a substantial lead on weapons technology, where South Africa has no fielded countermeasures, and where the transfer raises human rights issues or indiscriminate casualties, already the case with landmines; and



assist and support other suppliers to develop effective export control mechanisms to support responsible export policies.

Once a transfer is approved, the South African Government must provide support for the proposed export. This could include the following: tasking overseas mission personnel to support overseas marketing efforts of South African companies bidding on defence contracts, actively involving senior Government officials in promoting sales of particular importance to South Africa, and supporting official Department of Defence participation in international defence and trade exhibitions. All these measures also add transparency and government control.

CRITERIA FOR DECISION-MAKING ON SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS EXPORTS18

Given the complexities of arms transfer decisions and the multiple South African interests involved in each arms transfer decision, South African decisions should in future be guided by a set of general criteria that draw the appropriate balance between legitimate arms sales to support the national security of friends and allies, and the need for multilateral restraint in the transfer of arms that would enhance the military capabilities of hostile states or that would undermine the stability of certain regions of the world.

Arms transfer decisions should be guided by the following general criteria:

Consistency with international agreements and arms control initiatives (such as the P5 guidelines of 1991, the European Council Criteria of 1991-92, UN decisions, arms control regimes, etc.).



Appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate security needs in South Africa and the recipient country.



Consistency with South African regional stability interests, especially when considering transfers involving power projection capability or the introduction of a system that may foster increased tension or contribute to an arms race in the region.



The degree to which the transfer supports South African strategic and foreign policy interests through increased access and influence, burden sharing, and interoperability.



The impact of the proposed transfer on South African capabilities and technological advances, particularly in protecting sensitive software and hardware design, development, manufacturing, and integration knowledge.



The impact on the South African industry and the defence industry base if the sale is approved or not.



The degree of protection afforded to sensitive technology and the potential for unauthorised third-party transfer, as well as in-country diversion to unauthorised users.



The risk of revealing system vulnerabilities and adversely impacting upon South African operational capabilities in the event of a compromise.



The risk of adverse economic, political or social impact within the recipient nation and the degree to which that country’s security needs can be addressed by other means.



The human rights, terrorism and proliferation record of the recipient and the potential for misuse of the export in question.



The availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers.



The ability of the recipient to effectively field, support, and appropriately employ the requested system in accordance with its intended end use.

Additionally, South African arms export policy should also adhere to the following specific requirements:

Armaments are sold only to internationally recognised governments, i.e. not to guerrilla or other movements.



Armaments offered for sale must be released for export by the South African National Defence Force.



The sale or transfer of weapons of mass destruction (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons and associated delivery systems) or the technology associated with them, is prohibited in terms of the Non-Proliferation Act of 1993.



Specified (supplier, product and recipient country) Armaments Marketing Permits must be Issued by the Minister of Defence or a person/organisation authorised by him in terms of the Armaments Development and Production Act regulations (Act no. 57 of 1968).



End-user certificates must be required in all cases and the validity of these certificates confirmed.

Upgrading equipment, particularly from the former Soviet-bloc, is a growing segment of the market. The South African Government should support companies’ participation in this segment, consistent with its own national security and foreign policy interests. In addition to the general criteria listed above, the following guidelines should govern South Africa in this regard:

Upgrade programmes must be well-defined to be considered for approval.



There should be a presumption of denial of exports to upgrade programmes that lead to a capability beyond that which South Africa would be willing to export directly.



Careful review of the total scope of proposed upgrade programmes should ensure that South African licensing decisions are consistent with its policy on transfers of equivalent new systems.



South African contributions to upgrade programmes initiated by foreign prime contractors should be evaluated against the same standard.



Protection of South African technologies must be ensured because of the inherent risk of technology transfer in the integration efforts that typically accompany an upgrade project.



Upgrades should be subject to standard written end-use and re-transfer assurances by both the integrator and final end user, with strong and specific sanctions in place for those who violate these conditions.



Benchmarks should be established for upgrades of specific types of systems to provide a policy baseline against which individual arms transfer proposals can be assessed, and proposed departures from the policy must be justified.

COMMENT

Given the fact that arms trade has a bearing on foreign policy, trade guided by these principles will play a supportive role in enhancing confidence and building security, and the status and prestige of South Africa. Yet, in listing these principles, both foreign policy interests and commercial interests are clearly evident, as they should indeed be in any South African set of criteria. Equally evident is the complexity of factors and considerations - moral, commercial, national and international - that have to be balanced and juggled in the harsh world of international competition.

Greater control and transparency of arms exports are fraught with international undertones. Typical of nations all over the world, there are legitimate considerations relating to military and commercial security which impinge upon blanket transparency. In a country such as India, for example, it is possible to be both anti-nuclear and anti-NPT, because of the political North-South undertones in the debate. In any case, if one country publicises its armaments development and manufacturing programmes and exports, and another does not, the former country will be at a commercial disadvantage. However, although certain factors may restrain transparency, they should not limit the control or responsibility of a democratic government.

Finally, South Africa should place due emphasis in its international relations on strengthening the various international efforts aimed at greater transparency and international control of the global conventional defence trade, in particular through the UN Register on Arms.

CONCLUSION

South Africans have yet to decide how much they are prepared to invest in the retention of an indigenous defence industrial capacity and how dependent they wish to be on foreign defence suppliers. Should the Government decide to retain such an industry, cost considerations will force the country to rely to a large extent on the international defence market. South Africa cannot afford to retain an industry that is as capital intensive as the defence industry, without significantly increasing its international sales from the present level of less than $250 million per annum.

In contemplating the future of the South African defence industry, clear cognisance will therefore have to be taken of the importance that access to the international defence market would play in enabling such an industry to be a commercial and strategic asset and not a liability. It would be of little value to decide in favour of the retention of the South African defence industry without allowing that industry to co-operate and compete in a responsible manner with the defence industries of other democracies. Market access, in turn, implies careful consideration of export criteria which, in the aftermath of the diversion of AK-47s to Yemen, has justifiably become an emotional issue to many South Africans.

It should be possible for South Africa to pursue an assertive, but circumscribed armaments export policy, transparent and sensitive to international security sensibilities. Such a policy should support the broader objectives of South African foreign policy. Whereas South African arms exports have a direct impact upon bilateral and multilateral relations, the export of armaments potentially is a powerful foreign policy instrument.

South African arms exports earn significant foreign currency (equal to R854 million in 1994/95), provide both skilled and unskilled jobs (about 60 000) while exports reduce unit costs for weapons designated for the SANDF. It would also appear that there is considerable potential for this country to increase its market share, presently estimated at less than 0,5 per cent of the international market. A decision to forego potentially lucrative contracts would further reduce the poor returns on the South African defence industrial investment, which is estimated to be in excess of R4 billion.

Article 26.



These principles have identified a key objective of the Register as serving the need to prevent excessive accumulation of destabilising weapons systems. While criteria for identifying destabilising systems have been developed, the term ‘excessive accumulation’ still defies acceptable operational definition. Since this objective is defined in the context of terms like ‘reasonable defence sufficiency’ and ‘legitimate security requirements’, the UN Arms Register would also need to develop acceptable definitions of such terms based on the interpretations of different regions and political cultures.



UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L, on 9 December 1991 entitled Transparency in Armaments.



E.g. Australia at 2,3%, Portugal at 2,8%, Tanzania at 3,2%, UK at 3,2%, Egypt at 3,7%, Botswana at 3,8%, Mozambique at 9,8% and Angola at 32,4%.



A. Buys, The case for the retention of the Arms Industry, paper delivered at a workshop on Arms Trade and Arms Conversion in a Democratic South Africa, 28-30 June 1993, Pretoria, p. 2.



SADIA and AIRASA, Submission to Commission of Inquiry in terms of Trade Policies in Respect of Weapons and Components with Reference to Weapons and Related Materials, 5 June 1995, p. 2.



In terms of the Armaments Development and Production Act, ARMSCOR is mandated to: develop, manufacture, provide, repair and maintain armaments; exercise control over the development, manufacture, acquisition, marketing, distribution and export of armaments; negotiate contracts in the RSA and elsewhere for the development, manufacture, modification, maintenance, testing or inspection of armaments. ARMSCOR, Annual Report, 1994/95, p. 32.



International Defence Review 8, 1994, p. 39.



9M. Navias, Towards a new South African arms trade policy, unpublished paper, Department of War Studies, Kings College, London, March 1992, p. 3.



Local technology development and retention programmes focus on the following areas: extending the usable life of equipment currently in use; reducing the cost of ownership of existing equipment; developing technologies for future equipment in niche areas for either economic or strategic areas; and maintaining sufficient knowledge in non-strategic areas to remain a knowledgeable buyer of sophisticated equipment in the future. ARMSCOR, Annual Report, 1994/95, p. 12.



Based on Statement by the White House Press Secretary - Conventional Arms Transfer Policy; White House Fact Sheet on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy; and White House Fact Sheet on Criteria for Decision-Making on US Arms Exports, 17 February 1995.



ARMSCOR, Annual Report 1994/95, p. 24 and ARMSCOR Planning Department, Submission to the Cameron Commission on Arms Trade Policy, June 1995.



The armament acquisition management policy of the SANDF is set out in policy document VB1000, General Policy for the Management of the Acquisition Process of Category 1 Material.



S. Brummer, Revealed: where South Africa can sell arms, Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 28 July to 3 August 1995, p. 6.



R. Rohan, Sting removed from the tail of Armscor, City Press, Johannesburg, 3 September 1995.



P. Bulger, Armscor stripped of powers, The Star, Johannesburg, 31 August 1995.



ARMSCOR News Release, ARMSCOR response to cabinet decision, 31 August 1995, Pretoria.



Asmal listed the following criteria to City Press, namely that South Africa would not make ‘deals’ with countries that: violate or suppress human rights; contravenes South Africa’s international commitments, such as its obligations under arms embargoes adopted by the UN Security Council; endanger peace and destabilise regions; divert arms to countries that South Africa disqualifies; support or encourage terrorism; and contribute to regional conflicts.