RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This article presents part of the results of an opinion survey conducted by MarkData of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) between 27 May and 9 June 1995. The quarterly Omnibus Survey is done from door-to-door and its purpose is to provide clients with an opportunity to participate in a national survey at minimal cost. The questions relating to the South African defence industry, peacekeeping and women in the military included in the survey, are the result of a series of workshops between the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) and the HSRC. IDP and the HSRC also co-operated in the interpretation of the results.

This questionnaire is normally administered to a probability sample of 2 200 respondents in South Africa, the June 1995 realised sample being 2 229. The universe of the sample is all South African residents of eighteen years and older and the sample is stratified according to the nine provinces1 and socio-economic classifications2.

The sample allocation is approximately proportional to the adjusted 1991 population census figures, with a few exceptions.

Multistage cluster (probability) sampling is used to draw respondents, with the adjusted 1991 population census figures as measure of size. Census enumerator areas and similar areas are used as the cluster in the penultimate sampling stage, from which an equal number - one or two by four - of households are drawn. All clusters are drawn from the final clusters with equal probability (systematically). Respondents are drawn at random from qualifying household members.

In addition, the population of live-in domestic workers is sampled in accordance with its incidence in already drawn households.

The realised sample is weighted according to the 1991 biographic features of the South African population, eighteen years and older, and is thus considered to represent a broad spectrum of perceptions held by the adult population of South Africa.

PUBLIC OPINION ON THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

In answer to the question how South Africa should obtain weapons and military equipment for its security forces, respondents were strongly inclined to opt for self-reliance in the provision of weapons. The largest single proportion (45 per cent) indicated that South Africa should make enough weapons for its own use. An additional 25 per cent indicated that South Africa should produce enough weapons for its own use and should also compete for weapon sales overseas. Only seven per cent of respondents said South Africa should buy all weapons overseas and four per cent expressed the view that South Africa should ask for aid, including weapons, from overseas.

Chi-squared analyses of the data relating to this question indicated that African, coloured and Asian respondents, although strongly inclined to say that South Africa should make enough weapons for its own use, are not as likely to adhere to this view as white respondents, of whom 53 per cent has indicated that the country should make enough weapons for its own use and should compete with overseas countries for the sale of weapons (see Figure 1).

*FIGURE 1: HOW SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD ABTAIN WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR ITS SECURTITY FORCES BY POPULATION GROUP
Further analysis indicates that the proportion of respondents contending that South Africa should make enough weapons for its own use and to compete with other countries for weapons sales, tends to increase in direct relation to the educational levels of respondents. Only fourteen per cent of persons with little or no formal education are of the opinion that South Africa should make enough weapons for its own use and also sell armaments, while 21 per cent of persons with a formal education of less than Standard 9 are of a similar opinion. Of persons with a Standard 10 qualification and higher, forty per cent are in favour of the production and export of arms. The proportions of persons who believe that South Africa should make only enough weapons for its own use remain roughly constant at 41 per cent for persons with little or no formal education, 45 per cent for persons with a formal education level of less than Standard 9, and 43 per cent for persons with a formal education level of Standard 10 and higher. One possible reason for this trend is that people with higher educational levels may see the arms industry as a source of employment and revenue to a greater extent than people with less education.

Supporters of all political parties included in the analysis, with the exception of those supporting right-wing parties, were inclined to respond that South Africa should make enough weapons for its own use. The majority of supporters of the right-wing parties (60 per cent) tended to respond that South Africa should not only make enough weapons for its own use, but should also compete overseas for weapon sales (see Table 1).

The largest single proportion of respondents also indicated that South Africa should increase its own weapon manufacturing capacity. The question asked was: "Should South Africa maintain, reduce or increase its own weapon manufacturing capacity in the present circumstances?" A total of 43 per cent of respondents were in favour of South Africa increasing its weapon manufacturing capacity significantly, or just increasing it. Only eighteen per cent felt that South Africa should reduce its weapon manufacturing capacity or reduce it significantly.

Those respondents who felt that South Africa should increase its weapon manufacturing capacity, were then asked what their single most important reason was for thinking that it should increase. The largest single proportion of respondents (48 per cent) indicated that a country should be defended by its own weapons, while the next largest proportion (32 per cent) said that an increase in weapon manufacturing capacity would increase job opportunities.

Further analysis of the responses indicating that South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity should decrease, was also conducted. Altogether 57 per cent of respondents who originally stated that the country should decrease its capacity indicated as the fact that weapons provoke violence as their main reason, while sixteen per cent felt that an increased crime rate will result and thirteen per cent said that South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity should decrease because the country is not at present under threat.

The data relating to the possible increase, decrease or maintenance of South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity, were analysed by means of Chi-squared analyses according to population group (see Figure 2).

The largest single proportion of three of the four population groups - Africans (42 per cent), coloured people (29 per cent) and white people (50 per cent) - stated that South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity should increase. Only the Asian population group was more inclined to say that this capacity should decrease, with 36 per cent in favour of a decrease, and 28 per cent in favour of an increase. The reasons for the disparity between the responses of the Asian and the other population groups are probably partially to be found in cultural determinants. Large proportions of respondents, especially amongst coloured people, expressed uncertainty in response to the question.

Chi-squared analyses of the data on South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity were done according to support for political party. The results show that supporters of the main political parties are in favour of an increase in South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity. This is especially true for supporters of the right-wing, 55 per cent of whom indicate that South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity should increase. However, many respondents amongst all support categories have been inclined to an ‘uncertain’ response, as can be expected in answering a question that requires some knowledge of the arms industry. Of supporters of the ANC, the majority party in South Africa, 43 per cent are in favour of an increase in arms manufacturing, twenty per cent support a decrease in arms manufacturing and 36 per cent are undecided.

An interesting result has been that those persons who feel that their standards of living will rise under the Government of National Unity, are most likely to want an increase in South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity (50 per cent), with a slight decline in the case of those seeing their living standards falling under the GNU (44 per cent) and those feeling that they will remain unchanged (35 per cent). The high figure in the case of those who think that standards of living will deteriorate, can possibly be partially attributed to feelings of being threatened or unsafe.

A number of other questions on the weapon industry were also included in the survey. One was: "Assuming South Africa does maintain its weapon-building capacity, to whom should the country sell arms?" The following represent the most common responses: any country (15 per cent) and non-African countries (13 per cent). Another question was: "Who loses the most if South Africa no longer produces and sells weapons?" The largest single proportion of respondents (30 per cent) thought that arms manufacturers would lose the most in this case, followed by the GNU (19 per cent), the South African public (15 per cent) and the country’s work force (13 per cent).

A further question was: "Who should give final approval of arms exports by South African arms manufacturers?" The response was the President (27 per cent), Parliament (27 per cent) the Ministry of Defence (22 per cent) and ARMSCOR or the weapon industry (11 per cent). In answer to the following: "Any decision about the future of the South African arms manufacturing capacity should be taken by:", responses were only Parliament (36 per cent), the workers and management or owners (15 per cent), only the workers (11 per cent), and the public (11 per cent).

In summary, support for the arms industry is especially evident among white respondents, while it is also significantly supported by African, coloured and Asian respondents. Increased support is also found among those with higher education levels and those who foresee a rise in their standards of living under the GNU.

It is further significant that respondents of three population groups, namely African, white and coloured people, were in favour of increasing South Africa’s weapon manufacturing capacity. Support has therefore clearly been shown for the maintenance and even strengthening of the arms industry in South Africa, depending on Government’s future decisions in this regard.

SOUTH AFRICA AND PEACEKEEPING

Almost two-thirds of the respondents involved in the Omnibus Survey indicated that they want the country to have a peacekeeping force that can be utilised externally to help other countries maintain peace. However, not many respondents appear to be willing to volunteer for service in such a force. Rather than serving as a basis for policy formulation, these results are seen to reflect ignorance about the subject and about the debate on the issue thus far in the country.

The idea of a peacekeeping force to help maintain peace internationally is especially popular among supporters of the traditionally black parties, namely the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Thus 71 per cent of supporters of the ANC, 71 per cent of PAC supporters and 69 per cent of IFP supporters approved the creation of a peacekeeping force by the South African Government to help maintain peace internationally. The idea of a peacekeeping force is much less popular among supporters of the traditionally white parties - 44 per cent of the National Party (NP), 41 per cent of the Democratic Party, and only nineteen per cent supporters of right-wing parties support the idea of such a force.

Analysing the data according to the different race groups in South Africa, it is noticeable that the idea of a peacekeeping force is most popular among Africans, of whom 68 per cent expressed support for such a force, followed by Asians (70 per cent) and coloured people (57 per cent). Only 28 per cent of white people support the creation of a peacekeeping force. This may be due to their greater awareness of hardships especially endured by white soldiers and their dependants in the seventies during operations in Angola.

The data showed conspicuously that the creation of a peacekeeping force was supported to a far greater extent among English speaking persons: 54 per cent were in favour of such a force, while the corresponding proportion among those speaking Afrikaans was only 35 per cent.

As might be expected, people who were unemployed and looking for work, were most inclined (69 per cent) to support the idea of the force. The second largest group were students, of whom 67 per cent supported the creation of the force. A smaller percentage, namely 56 per cent, of those in full-time employment supported its creation.

Younger respondents were especially supportive of the idea that South Africa should have a peacekeeping force. A total of 63 per cent of respondents between 18 - 24 years of age, 65 per cent between 25 - 34 years, and 60 per cent of those between 35 - 44 years gave their support to the idea. In all other (older) age groups, the level of support varied between 47 and 56 per cent.

Analysis of the data also showed that the largest single group of respondents, although not the majority (37 per cent), felt that the South African Government should pay most of the costs of deploying a peacekeeping force beyond the borders of the country. In this respect, fifteen per cent of respondents said that the country to which a peacekeeping force is deployed, must bear the brunt of the costs, while thirteen per cent thought the United Nations should foot the bill. Presumably, the level of knowledge of the massive costs of such operations must be low amongst the vast majority of participants.

Analysed by political parties, the highest levels of support for the idea that the government should pay the greater part of the costs for such a force was found among the ANC (46 per cent), PAC (32 per cent) and IFP (38 per cent). Supporters of the NP expressed greater reluctance for the Government to spend money on the force with only fourteen per cent supporting it, while only six per cent of right-wing supporters were in favour of the Government financing the force.

A large proportion of those questioned (46 per cent) was satisfied that such a peacekeeping force should serve world-wide where it is needed. A total of 21 per cent felt that such a force, should it be established by South Africa, should be deployed only in other African countries.

The largest single proportion of respondents (45 per cent) were in favour of the peacekeeping force serving solely under the command of the South African Government, rather than under the command of another country. In this regard though, a slightly smaller proportion (37 per cent) felt that a South African peacekeeping force should also be prepared to serve under the command of another country.

The ideals represented above, however, did not reflect a personal willingness or commitment to put it into practice. While South Africans are keen to have a peacekeeping force, not many are prepared to volunteer for the job. More than half of the respondents (54 per cent) say they would not be prepared to volunteer for the force, although 39 per cent would indeed be prepared to do so. A considerable percentage of African people (44 per cent) was prepared to volunteer for duty in a peacekeeping force outside South Africa. Only 29 per cent of coloured, 27 per cent of Asian and fourteen per cent of white respondents indicated their willingness to volunteer in this respect.

Analysed by political parties, the supporters of the ANC and the PAC (both 46 per cent) and the IFP (43 per cent) were most inclined to volunteer for duty in such a force. Only 21 per cent of NP supporters and eight per cent of right-wing supporters would be willing to do the same.

This lukewarm response to volunteering for peacekeeping duties outside South Africa appears to be confirmed by the response to another question that enquired about the willingness of respondents to do part-time military service in an international peacekeeping force. In this regard, 42 per cent of respondents were either willing or very willing, while 43 per cent were unwilling or very unwilling.

As might be expected, it is especially male respondents and younger respondents who are more prepared to serve in a peacekeeping force, should it be created by South Africa. Thus 39 per cent of male respondents and more than half of those between the ages of 18 and 24 personally would be prepared to volunteer for service in such a force.

Whereas in countries such as the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, participation in peacekeeping operations has been the subject of an informed and ongoing public debate, this is not the case in South Africa. In fact, ignorance about the implications of South African participation in peacekeeping operations, including the possible cost in terms of human life, foreign policy implications and the financial burden of operations are impediments to sound policy decisions. This has underlined the importance for South Africans to discuss and debate participation, especially in view of unrealistic and very high expectations from Africa and the international peacekeeping community, worn out by the burden of Africa’s troubles, that South Africa could make a significant contribution in this regard.

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Strong opposition to equal participation of women in the armed services was expressed by respondents in the survey. They overwhelmingly rejected the idea of women taking part in police patrols in dangerous areas and of women doing combat duty in the front lines. This response is representative of all population groups. Despite these objections, respondents were positive about more women being recruited into the armed forces.

The findings on the whole suggest that South African respondents do not wish to relegate women to positions of inferiority within the security services or to reject the idea of women providing a service to the country within these structures. However, it is clear that there are deeply entrenched cultural factors within South Africa predisposing people to reserve positions for women which cannot be reconciled with the performance of such duties as fighting in wars or patrolling dangerous areas.

In response to the question: "Should women be allowed to do combat duty in the front line or not?", the majority of respondents (59 per cent) felt that women should not do combat duty. Similarly, respondents felt that women should not be allowed to do police patrols in dangerous areas (70 per cent). The question, "Should women on police patrol always be accompanied by a male?" yielded a positive response of 83 per cent of all respondents. A large percentage (77 per cent) also felt that women in the SANDF should carry weapons (probably for self-defence), and that women who are taken prisoners of war while on combat duty, should be treated differently from their male counterparts (50 per cent). However, 55 per cent felt that special efforts should be made to recruit more women into the defence force.

Four of these questions were indexed to form an indicator of attitudes to women in the military. These were the questions enquiring whether women should be allowed to do combat duty on the front lines, whether a special attempt should be made to recruit women into the defence force, whether women in the SANDF should be allowed to carry weapons or not and whether women should be allowed to do police patrols in dangerous areas or not. The first attitude categorised was ‘positive’ (that is, inclined to be in favour of equal participation in the military by women), the second was ‘neutral’ and the third was ‘negative’ (in other words, inclined to be against equal participation of women in the armed services). Almost equal proportions of responses fell into the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ categories (37 per cent ‘positive’, 38 per cent ‘negative’), with the ‘neutral’ response being 25 per cent.

Chi-squared analyses of the indexed values according to population group indicated that African and especially white respondents (42 per cent) have a negative rather than a positive view of equal participation of women in all aspects of the armed services. Coloured and Asian respondents have a more positive view on such participation.

Chi-squared analyses of the results showed clearly that, in accordance with world-wide trends, younger people, and Asian and coloured respondents have a more positive attitude to women fully participating in the armed services of the country, than older people, African and white respondents. Analysed according to affiliations to political parties, the results showed that respondents supporting right-wing parties are most likely to be against the full participation of women in all aspects of the security services (54 per cent). However, supporters of the Democratic Party (47 per cent), the Inkatha Freedom Party (46 per cent) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (43 per cent) expressed a similar view. Supporters of the African National Congress were more in favour of participation (39 per cent), while supporters of the National Party were equally divided between being in favour and being against full participation (both 30 per cent).

Analyses of the results according to gender only indicated negligible differences.

Although the results of this survey alone cannot be regarded as a direction for policy-making, many factors make it important for feminist groups and the government to heed the findings of the survey. These factors are, amongst others, general feminist trends and women’s emancipation that are characteristic of the late twentieth century as expressed in a variety of changes occurring in South Africa at present.

South Africa has a long history of women participating in various roles in the security services, stretching back to the previous century. As a result of deep-seated cultural attitudes and job reservation, women have been seen fulfilling supportive roles for many decades. It is only recently that, for instance, the South African Police Service has started a conscious recruitment drive to provide a service that is more representative in terms of gender. Defence policy has also been changed to remove gender discrimination. On a practical level, however, it will take far longer to remove the remaining obstacles that still exclude women from certain positions. These obstacles include, amongst others, appropriate facilities, physical standards, etc. With a Defence Review and rationalisation of the number of people to be retained in the Defence Force already announced, as well as the pressure to reduce defence spending, it is at this practical level that the implementation of the Government’s decision of no discrimination may take a longer period to materialise.

In a cultural level, there are no doubt still deeply entrenched stereotypes that prevail in South African society as a whole. The drive towards women’s emancipation is far from being complete. With patriarchal attitudes abounding amongst all population groups in the country, and in the context of an historically male dominated terrain such as the security forces, women are sometimes still seen as being unsuitable to take up positions of their own choice, particularly where these involve risk or danger. Often also, women are revered to the extent that their role in society is seen as irreconcilable with that of a soldier or policeman constantly exposed to danger.

CONCLUSION

Although questions included in the Omnibus Survey did not intend to be either exhaustive or definitive, the results pointed to important factors that should be considered further. Attitudes towards all three these issues need to be born in mind in the Government’s formulation of future policy. It may warrant further and more extensive opinion surveys in the near future. The general public does not seem to be adequately informed about these issues and efforts should be made to involve South Africans in discussions and debates. Where a peacekeeping force and the South African arms industry are concerned, participation on all levels of society in the decision making process is especially important, as both have an indirect or direct bearing on society, especially with regard to employment opportunities and personal safety.

The former TBVC states and self-governing areas were included in the proportional representation of the nine provinces.



Rural areas in former self-governing and TBVC states include: Squatters in former non-white urban areas (metro and non-metro); Hostels and hotels; Former urban areas for Coloured people; Former urban areas for Asians; Former urban areas for Black people; Former urban areas (non-metro) for white people; Former urban areas (metro) for white people; Rural areas, excluding the self-governing and TBVC states.