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Integration, Demobilisation and Rationalisation1
BACKGROUND
Planning for the future South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was undertaken during the period January to April 1994. It was based on the Interim Constitution, the Transitional Executive Council Act, the Defence Act and various guidelines received from the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). It was undertaken by the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) and supervised by the Sub-Council on Defence of the TEC.
Members of the JMCC were drawn from the five defence forces (Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, South Africa, Transkei and Venda) and from Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). The future SANDF was designed under control of the JMCC (and approved by the Sub-Council on Defence). Implementation plans to realise this design were similarly prepared.
The SANDF came into existence at midnight on 26 April 1994. All the members of the forces mentioned above whose names appeared on the certified personnel registers of those forces automatically became members of the SANDF in terms of Section 224 (2) of the Interim Constitution. At a later stage, the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) entered into an agreement with the SANDF also to become part of the SANDF, but there were some differences regarding their integration, compared to those governed by Section 224(2), as APLA had not submitted certified personnel registers by midnight on 26 April 1994.
The Interim Constitution furthermore makes provision for the rationalisation of the SANDF, with "personnel exceeding the needs of the SANDF" to be retrenched (Section 236(8) and 237(1)(b)).
INTEGRATION, DEMOBILISATION AND RATIONALISATION
During the planning of the SANDF, it soon became clear that the integrated force would far exceed future defence needs and thus rationalisation was foreseen. Rationalisation is defined as down-sizing and right-sizing. As integration was the priority, little planning for rationalisation was undertaken. It was, however, foreseen that so-called "natural attrition", i.e. resignations, retirements, discharges, deaths, etc. would not be sufficient to trim the expected strength down to "the needs of the SANDF". As integration was planned to be completed by early 1995, it was envisaged that rationalisation would start in April 1995.
By mid-1994 it was clear that integration was going to take much longer than originally planned and revised plans issued in December 1994 made provision for its continuance until September 1996. As a result, rationalisation is planned to start in April 1996, a year later than originally envisaged.
Integration is the process of combining the seven military forces mentioned above into the SANDF. The numbers involved in this process are roughly:
APLA
MK
SADF
TBVC defence forces
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6 000
29 000
85 000
11 000
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TOTAL
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131 000 |
These figures are not final, for instance, numbers for the SADF decreased from about 90 000 in April 1994 to 85 000 in June 1994 and subsequently even further. It does, however, give some indication of the size of the problem. The SANDF, as envisaged in JMCC plans, called for a force of some 91 000 persons (both military and civilian) in full-time capacity. Consequently, rationalisation could mean 40 000 persons being retrenched. The latter figure will be amended by subtracting "natural attrition" and by the final strength of the SANDF which will emerge from the Defence Review (and further detailed planning) to be undertaken in 1996.
As far as demobilisation is concerned, it is defined as the process of assisting soldiers to re-integrate into civil society. During the initial implementation stages it became clear that not all personnel of MK and APLA who were to be integrated into the SANDF, were keen on a career in the military. They had joined those forces to effect the liberation of South Africa, not with a career as a professional soldier in mind. A demobilisation process to enable those who had not yet signed on in the SANDF to re-integrate successfully into society, was thus designed. Only members of MK and APLA can opt for demobilisation, as members of the various full-time components of the former defence forces are all career soldiers. In addition to this group who do not want careers in the SANDF, another group is unable to take up military careers for reasons of age, health, educational qualifications, etc. They too can opt for demobilisation. To date, some 1 500 persons have selected demobilisation, whereas some 14 600 have joined the SANDF. A further 1 200 have left for other reasons. If these figures are taken into account, 17 300 (50%) of MK and APLA forces have been called-up and have exercised their rights in one way or another.
The relationship between the abovementioned three concepts is thus as follows:
- integration: combining seven forces to create the SANDF; as this force is too large it will have to be down-sized;
- reduction of numbers via demobilisation and natural attrition; and
- reducing the balance through rationalisation to the desired strength of the SANDF that is still to be determined (the figure of 91 000 acts as a guide at this stage).
Policy for rationalisation has been submitted to the Ministry of Defence. Once this is approved, detailed planning will commence. It is an emotional issue which will be handled sensitively. Factors which will probably be considered in making decisions about individuals, include mental and physical fitness, standards of training and conduct, qualifications, meritorious performance and representativeness. Unfortunately, more cannot be said about this issue at present, due to its sensitive nature. The need for policy and plans to be made known is well understood and the authorities undertake to do so as soon as possible.
Endnote
- Edited version of a paper presented at Preparing the SA Army for the 21st Century: "A new army for a new challenge", Presented by the Institute for Defence Policy, the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Department of Political Sciences, UNISA, 19 October 1995, Pretoria.

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