Public Opinion Regarding Part-Time Military Service and Threat Perceptions

Charl Schutte and Bill Sass
Respectively Chief Researcher, Human Sciences Research Council and Deputy Director, Institute for Defence Policy

Published in African Security Review Vol 4 No 6, 1995


INTRODUCTION

The Minister of Defence, Mr. Joe Modise, presented a draft White Paper on Defence to Parliament on 21 June 1995. In this draft, as well as in the Interim Constitution, it is accepted that the SANDF will also include a part-time component. Internationally, defence experts are agreed that personnel make the most important contribution to any defence organisation. In fact, the skill and expertise of its human resources can and must often, compensate for failures or shortages in military equipment and technology, as well as deployment and employment problems. Part-time forces are also much cheaper. Because human resources are so important and because South Africa is to have an all volunteer force, public opinion of security matters and particularly about part-time service when a threat exists, should be considered by political and military decision makers. HSRC and IDP conducted an opinion survey of some of the human resources issues affecting national security. The MarkData Omnibus survey occurred between 27 May and 9 June 1995. This door-to-door survey is done quarterly and its purpose is to give clients an opportunity to participate in a national survey at low cost. A number of clients’ questions are combined into one questionnaire. The national security questions on which this report is based, were included in that survey. This questionnaire is normally administered to a probability sample of 2 200 respondents in South Africa - the present realised sample (June 1995) is 2 229.

The former TBVC states and self-governing areas were included in the proportional representation of the nine provinces. The universe of the sample design was all residents of the South African population of eighteen years and older. The sample was stratified according to provinces, i.e. the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Gauteng, North West Province and Northern Province, as well as according to socio-economic classification.1

The realised sample was weighted according to the 1991 biographic features of the South African population, eighteen years and older, and was thus a broad reflection of the perceptions of the adult population of South Africa. The first sections of the results of this public survey were published in the African Security Review, Volume 4, number 4 and 5.

PART-TIME MILITARY SERVICE


Following the recommendations of the Groenewoud Committee, a compulsory national service system for medically fit white males aged eighteen years of age was introduced in South Africa on 1 January 1968. Prior to this, South Africa had used a system of selected ballotees called up for service. Thereafter the first initial period of continuous National Service was subsequently increased to 24 months in January 1978. With effect from January 1983, the total service commitment period of part-time force personnel, subsequent to the completion of their initial training period, was extended to 720 days over a period of twelve years. In December 1989, the State President announced that the initial period of training would be reduced from 24 to 12 months with effect from 1 January 1990.

In 1993 it was announced that from January 1994, a new volunteer military system (VMS) of one year initial training and eight camps of thirty days was being introduced. A maximum of approximately six thousand selected, matriculated, volunteers are being accepted for training at present, although possible balloting remained a part of the Defence Act. In the draft White Paper on Defence, the Minister once more committed South Africa to using only volunteers for both its full-time and part-time forces. Switching to a VMS automatically reduces the numbers being fed into the part-time forces, while the outflow remains constant. If it is to succeed, any system must guarantee the availability of sufficient personnel, fully trained and available for operations, when and where they are needed.

In the questionnaire, respondents were asked the question: "Should military service be entirely voluntary or should all young men and women be forced to do it?" An overwhelming majority of 87 per cent of respondents (the highest percentage recorded for any answer dealing with security matters), answered that it should be voluntary. This strong preference for voluntary rather than compulsory military service, is probably related to, among others, association of compulsory military service with the ‘old’ SADF. Afrikaans speakers were the least likely to indicate that military service should be entirely voluntary, while English and African language speakers were more likely to say it should be voluntary (see Figure 1). Analysed according to population group, African and Asian respondents were more likely than white and coloured respondents (the two population groups who previously served on a legally enforced, part-time basis) to indicate that military service should be voluntary.2


Respondents were also asked: "Should South Africa have a system of compulsory non-military national service?" They were divided in their views on this matter. Approximately the same proportions were in favour and against such a system (42% in favour, 41% against). The issue of non-military service clearly deserves more thorough research and political attention than has been the case thus far. In fact, given South Africa’s unemployment levels that are approaching 45 per cent, such a programme, essentially targeted at the ‘lost generation’, could play a crucial role in reconstruction and development. It may also greatly assist the implementation of the RDP and would certainly benefit the Department of Health, whose Minister has already suggested something similar for newly qualified doctors.

Respondents were asked to give their views on the type of military force that should defend South Africa. The question was: "Should South Africa in time of war be defended by a fully voluntary military force of professional soldiers, a part-time military force called up for compulsory military service, or a part-time military force volunteering to do military duty?" Sixty per cent of respondents wanted to see South Africa defended by full-time, professional volunteer soldiers. Only thirteen per cent wanted South Africa to be defended by part-time soldiers called up for military duty (as was the case in the recent past) and twelve per cent wanted South Africa defended by part-time soldiers volunteering for military duty (the World War II system). This support of a (larger) regular army, particularly for peacetime tasks such as assisting the police or international peacekeeping, as opposed to a military essentially based on part-time forces, who then preferably only form the emergency or wartime forces, could be considered by defence planners. Analysis by political party proved that supporters of all political parties supported this view (see Figure 2).


Another question enquired "If you were an employer, would you allow your employees to volunteer for part-time military service if it were for an uninterrupted three-month period?" More than half of the respondents (56%) answered in variations of the ‘affirmative’, indicating a positive attitude regarding the military. It should be noted, however, that the greatest single proportion of respondents (25%), did not think that their present employers would allow them to volunteer for uninterrupted military service of three months.

When asked whether they would personally volunteer for military service or not, respondents were divided in their response, with 47 per cent answering ‘yes’ and 44 per cent answering ‘no’. However, people living in the former white urban areas were the most likely to say that they would not volunteer for military service. One possible explanation is that many white South Africans have experienced career disruption as a result of the past military service. It may therefore reflect the result of a group who have experienced that their employers will not allow them to volunteer. A second explanation could be that whites, as a group, are mostly employed in the formal economic sector, and as a population group they are mostly employed. Finally, increased numbers of whites appear to question the legitimacy of using soldiers as quasi-policemen in the townships.3

It is therefore no surprise that the survey also revealed that white people as a group were the most likely not to volunteer for military service. The group most likely to volunteer were the African population group, followed by the coloured and the Asian groups (see Figure 3). The survey have also shown that younger people (18-24 and 25-34 years) are most likely to volunteer for military service, as is already evident in the VMS intake at the Army Gymnasium and elsewhere at present.


The respondents revealed a strong tendency towards being willing to protect South Africa for the sake of issues with a local impact, rather than for international reasons. This was notable in their response to the question: "How willing would you be to do part-time military service in the following circumstances?" Respondents were more inclined to be willing or very willing to do part-time military service only in their own areas, in times of internal national emergency, in support of the SAPS to maintain law and order, and in times of national disasters. In times of external threat (war), when volunteering for an international peacekeeping force or when asked if they are willing to volunteer for service "anywhere, anytime", respondents were inclined to be very unwilling or unwilling. This may indicate a willingness to serve rather in the Rear Area Protection Units (previously Commandos) or as police reservists, in opposition to serving in the Citizen Force intended for conventional operations. The recent decision by the Parliamentary Caucus of the ANC to request the disbanding of the Commando Force, appears to clash directly with the findings of the survey in which 52 per cent of ANC supporters expressed willingness to volunteer for part-time military service in defence of local issues, representing the essence of Commando service.

Analysis by population group indicated that white people (61%) were most willing to do military service in defence of issues of a local (national) nature, followed by coloured (58%), black (50%) and Asian people (46%). Analysed by language group, Northern-Sotho (65%) and Afrikaans speakers (64%) were most likely to be willing to serve South Africa in issues of a local nature. Those least likely to do so were English (47%), Tswanas (48%) and Zulus (49%).

Further analyses of the willingness to do military service for the sake of local (South African) issues according to support for political party, showed that supporters of the right-wing (68%) and the NP (66%) were most likely to be willing to do military service in defence of local issues. Those least likely were supporters of the DP (47%), perhaps as a result of a more international outlook, and the IFP (48%), who might feel more threatened by forces within the country itself than the others. Among the respondents who classified themselves as supporters of the ANC, 52 per cent were willing to volunteer for service, while only 34 per cent claimed to be unwilling. The figures for the PAC were 50 per cent ‘willing’ and 36 per cent ‘unwilling’ (see Figure 4).


Regarding issues involving an international character/threat, the two items enquiring after respondents’ willingness to do part-time military service in times of external (international) threat/emergency and their willingness to serve in an international peacekeeping force, were combined. The combined response to this item was that 31 per cent of respondents were willing or very willing to do part-time military service under these circumstances, while 42 per cent were unwilling or very unwilling, and 26 per cent uncertain. Respondents in former white urban areas were the most unwilling to do part-time military duty for international rather than purely South African interests/threats. Respectively 52 and 56 per cent of respondents in the applicable categories expressed unwillingness to do part-time military service under such circumstances. Those most willing to do military service were respondents in the former self-governing states (42%), residents of hostels and hotels (37%), and squatters (36%). This response may be related to the depressed economic circumstances of these three categories of respondents, who may see military service, under whatever circumstances, as an employment opportunity to a greater extent than other respondents.

Analyses of willingness to do part-time military service in defence of basically international issues/threats by population group indicated that white (51%) and Asian people (50%) were most inclined to be unwilling or very unwilling to do part-time military service for international purposes. These were followed by black (37%) and coloured people (30%). All four population groups were more inclined to be unwilling to do part-time military service for basically international issues/threats.

PERCEPTION OF THREAT


The tendency to be willing to protect South Africa appears to be confirmed by respondents’ reaction to another question. "Compared to the past (especially before the election last year) and considering the degree to which the country is now threatened, to what extent does South Africa still need a strong defence force?" Altogether 56 per cent of respondents felt that a strong defence force was still "much needed" or "needed", while only twenty per cent felt it was now "unnecessary" or "very unnecessary". All population groups confirmed the need for a strong defence force.

As stated previously, all four population groups were more inclined to be unwilling to do part-time military service in respect of basically international issues/threats. If the intensity of international threat were to increase, people’s perception of threat could change quickly and drastically. Chi-squared analyses were done of the data relating to willingness to serve in the case of international threats/issues, according to support for political party. The figures indicated, somewhat inexplicably, that supporters of the DP (59%), and more predictably, supporters of the right-wing parties (56%) were most likely to express unwillingness to serve because of international threats/issues. The greatest single proportion of NP supporters (39%) also expressed unwillingness to serve should the country be involved in international issues. Supporters of the PAC (50%) and the ANC (39%) were most likely to be willing to some degree to serve the country under these circumstances.

Reasons provided for the necessity to maintain a strong defence force, again referring mainly to local rather than international issues, were also probed in a question. These answers included the following, all referring to violence locally: "support the SAPS to end the violence" (9%) and "there are still problems with violence in South Africa" (23%). Reasons referring neither to local nor international issues were:"the country is threatened" (7%),"the country should be prepared" (7%), and "would provide the nation with more security" (25%). Only one reason referred to an external threat: "war against us" (18%). These trends may be partly explained by the perception that, relatively speaking, crime has become a greater threat to South Africa than external pressures on the country.

The Afrikaans and English language groups (again mainly the white population) were by far the most inclined to respond that South Africa still needs a strong defence force. This same trend is further confirmed by an analysis of the data on the question by population group. Asian and white, and to a lesser degree coloured respondents were more inclined than African respondents to state that South Africa should still have a strong defence force. This can probably be explained by the degree of empowerment being experienced by African people at present, making Africans less likely to feel threatened by present changes in South Africa than the other population groups (see Figure 5).


The data relating to South Africa’s needs for a strong defence force was also analysed according to support for political party. The pattern of responses indicates that supporters of the right-wing and the NP are considerably more inclined to claim that South Africa still needs a strong defence force. Those least likely to support the idea of a strong South African defence force are the supporters of the IFP and the PAC.

All groups felt South Africa should be prepared to provide military help and assistance to neighbouring countries.

Respondents were specific in indicating the type of regional role South Africa could play in Southern Africa, as was evident in responses to the question: "What kind of help do you think the SANDF should provide to neighbouring African countries?" A number of situations were provided. Approximately two-thirds of respondents indicated in reaction to each situation that they agreed that South Africa should provide help to neighbouring countries, thereby providing strong support for South Africa’s involvement in the rest of Africa. The kinds of help respondents agreed to were:
  • maintaining internal stability (72%);
  • defending those countries’ borders when these are threatened (63%);
  • patrolling the borders between those countries and South Africa (76%);
  • keeping a legitimate government in power (64%);
  • assistance in training (73%); and
  • the provision of equipment (67%).
These items were indexed for analysis according to population group. This indicated that Asian (80%) and black (78%) respondents were the most likely to feel that the SANDF should provide different kinds of assistance to neighbouring African countries. Coloured respondents (73%) were slightly less inclined to state that the SANDF should provide such assistance to neighbouring African countries. White respondents were less inclined to offer the help of the SANDF to neighbouring countries, with 48 per cent prepared to offer help. This proportion is still the largest single one, indicating that more white people are willing to offer such help than those refusing it (see Figure 6).


Analyses according to support for political party confirms the general expectation that supporters of the PAC (86%), as might be expected of a party with a strong Pan-Africanist policy, are most likely to respond that the SANDF should help neighbouring African countries in the ways described above. They are followed by the ANC (78%) and the IFP(73%). Almost two-thirds (62%) of respondents supporting the NP are also inclined to express support for the idea of SANDF assistance for neighbouring African countries. The only parties whose supporters are more inclined to respond that the SANDF should not provide help to neighbouring African countries are the right-wing parties. Altogether 39 per cent of supporters of these parties were in favour of help, and 45 per cent against (see Figure 7). Analyses according to the legitimacy of the Government revealed that those respondents with a positive view of the legitimacy of the Government are most inclined to state that the SANDF should provide help to neighbouring African countries.

CONCLUSION

Although questions included in the Omnibus Survey were not intended to be either exhaustive or definitive, the results pointed to important human resources factors that should be considered. Attitudes towards these issues need to be born in mind in the formulation of a future policy for the part-time forces and may warrant further and more extensive opinion surveys. The general public does not seem to be adequately informed about these issues and efforts should be made to involve all South Africans in discussions and debates before accepting their opinions. However, as it is the public who must volunteer to do part-time service, the sooner their knowledge of the issues is improved, the better.

With respect to respondents’ willingness to do part-time military service, the results of this or similar surveys should be considered during the Defence Review that has already been announced by the Minister of Defence. Until now, well trained part-time forces that can react in large numbers at short notice, have almost been taken for granted in South Africa. In future, the provision of these forces will require careful planning and preparation. Given the results of the survey, and the Government’s policy of eradicating racism, affirmative action, and promoting gender equality, a major reorganisation of the part-time forces is on the cards.

The overwhelming preference for a voluntary rather than a compulsory military service should provide sufficient grounds for the authorities to plan for future military needs, particularly short term assistance to the police or for border security. This would not be applicable if the country is threatened by a major war, but would indicate that, for any lesser service, emergency or police assistance, the majority of respondents do not want to be involved. A war force should, according to public preference, be a full-time, professional force rather than a part-time force such as in the past. In view of the pending rationalisation of the SANDF, this needs to be considered.

The fact that respondents are divided in their support for non-military national service indicates that the authorities may need to rethink any plans to institute non-military national service, such as broadening the present Service Corps objectives to include the disadvantaged youth. However, this does not mean that they have to discard such plans.

Clearly, any appeals for voluntary part-time military service should be done on the grounds of local (national) issues/threats rather than on international issues, as the South African public appears to be motivated by local issues/causes to a much larger extent than by international ones. However, these findings were expected, given the low external threat perception at present.

Contrary to views expressed by various pressure groups, the South African public support the retention of a strong defence force. No attempt was made, though, to quantify the ‘trade-off’ between defence and other spending priorities. Support is thus at a general level. It appears to be necessary for the authorities to note the respondents’ (and, by implication, the South African public’s) clear view that South Africa still needs a strong defence force.

There should be an ample supply of volunteers to meet the reduced numbers required to man the likely part-time element of the smaller Core Force. Comparing the figures above - and bearing in mind the need for specialist musterings and the Citizen Force, where possible, to reside close to their headquarters - the fact that the white group (the existing trained group) are unlikely or unwilling to volunteer in large numbers, may mean that an extensive programme of retraining and reorganising the part-time force will be necessary. The political necessity to create non-racial units, and providing for gender equality and affirmative action, means that there is a lengthy period ahead of integration, reorganisation, bridging training, rebuilding of leader group cadres, unit and formation training for the part time forces. Clearly, this is not a quick or easy task and demands specific and direct attention. The survey deals only with perceptions and responses to questions, whereas the reality requires people to actually come forward, sign on as volunteers and to start training - a direct and demanding commitment. A first step (a paper exercise) might be to release the existing members of the Citizen Force and Commando from further service and actually determine how many of them will volunteer for further/continued training, and whose employers will agree to this. Whatever course is followed, the part-time forces of South Africa are at a cross-roads and their future needs practical planning by well informed leaders. Trained part-time forces, which can react in large numbers and at short notice, have been taken for granted in South Africa in times of national need such as the 1994 elections. The role of a countrywide system, such as the Commandos, has seldom been appreciated. In many areas of rural South Africa they provide essential support to the SA Police Service. The process of reforming the part-time forces will require attention and detailed planning, not only to attract sufficient volunteers, but also to satisfy government policy regarding gender equality, affirmative action and reduced expenditure, while still providing effective part-time units.

The authorities should continue to view the issue of voluntary military service as a sensitive one. Further research is needed in order to investigate the underlying reasons for volunteering. Appeals for voluntary part-time military service should rather be made on the grounds of local (national) issues/threats, than on the grounds of international issues, as the South African public appears to be motivated militarily to a much larger extent by local issues/threats such as perceptions of an increase in crime, than by international ones such as peacekeeping overseas.

Endnotes  

  1. Rural areas in former self-governing and TBVC states; squatters in former non-white urban areas (metro and non-metro); hostels and hotels; former urban areas for Coloured people; former urban areas for Asians; former urban areas for Black people; former urban areas (non-metro) for white people; former urban areas (metro) for white people; and rural areas, excluding the self-governing and TBVC states. The detailed tables containing these figures are available at the Centre for Socio-Political Analysis of the HSRC.
  2. Only statistical relations showing significance at the 1% level are included in this and all other relations analysed by means of Chi-squared analyses. Initially, dependent variables were analysed according to combinations of the following independent variables: gender; age; province; socio-economic category, an index of various social and economic indicators; marital state; educational level; type of employment; satisfaction with political situation; satisfaction with economic situation; feelings of security; perceived rise / fall in standard of living; whether respondent was in favour of attacks on the police; whether respondent was in favour of protest action; an index of the perceived legitimacy of the Government; the Government’s control over crime; whether personal life circumstances have improved or not and the perceived manner in which the Government has governed.
  3. This variable was constructed out of the following sub-items: respondents’ rating of the Government regarding its fairness, its effectiveness, its transparency, its strength, its honourableness and its credibility.