INTRODUCTION

The debate on regional integration and security co-operation blossomed during 1995, and included a number of proposals for the creation of a regional peacekeeping capacity within the national armies of SADC member states. However, the burgeoning debate has yet to crystallise into concrete action aimed at giving substance to the idea of regional security co-operation. There was, however, some cause for optimism in this area when, in the final quarter of 1995, two Scandinavian funded projects were launched with the aim of creating a Southern African capacity for meaningful participation in future multinational peace operations, especially those which may be mounted in the sub-region or elsewhere in Africa.2 These initiatives derived partly from the realisation that African countries and organisations would have to accept an increasing burden of responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent, and that the capability to do so could best be created through co-operation at the sub-regional level.

It is envisaged that Southern Africa, particularly the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), will play a leading role in this regard. In order to make optimal use of the opportunity and resources provided by such projects, a clear conceptual approach will be needed for the successful preparation of the sub-region to handle this responsibility. Such an approach should obviously be consonant with contemporary thinking on security in the region, and with the evolving regional security architecture.

'New thinking' on security would define security in terms of the individual rather than the nation, and perceives threats to security in a far broader context than those originating from conventional military forces in the service of hostile nations. The quest for security requires co-operation among individuals, states, regions and the international community as a whole. It includes a range of threat perceptions that can be acted upon long before a state of war develops that robs individuals of their security in the crudest possible manner. Contemporary ideas on security, therefore, embrace the concept of peacekeeping, or operations in support of diplomatic efforts to broker or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict.

In traditional approaches to (national) security, military threat analyses provide an indispensable basis for determining the size, structure and role of the armed forces of a state. Threat perception was basically reduced to the quasi-mathematical formula of 'Estimated Capability X Estimated Intent'. Whereas effective intelligence services can provide a reasonably accurate estimate of military capability, the overestimation of hostile intent has generally led to an exaggeration of the military threat, and a concomitant, wasteful build-up of inappropriate military force in order to counter the perceived threat.

There has been little sign of a similar tendency to overestimate the capacity needed to bolster the fragile peace which exists in the many conflict-ridden regions of the world among those responsible for security at the national level. The mounting of peace operations remains largely an ad hoc affair, and the sum and quality of the national contingents deployed in support of multinational peacekeeping initiatives have often proved inadequate for the task at hand. This aspect needs to be placed squarely within the contemporary debate on security in Southern Africa, and is specifically relevant to current initiatives aimed at establishing an indigenous peacekeeping capacity.

Defence planners who subscribe to the broader precepts of security have an obligation to develop a capability, not only to wage effective war against a hostile nation or coalition, but also to keep that peace which exists in areas of potential or actual violent conflict, through, among other mechanisms, the development of an effective peacekeeping capability in the form of suitably trained, educated and equipped contingents of personnel. The establishment and maintenance of peacekeeping capacity also requires the necessary political will to commit designated contingents to operations designed to resolve or avoid conflict at an international, regional or sub-regional level. These two elements of peacekeeping capacity are therefore interdependent, in as much as they will have a direct influence on capability and vice versa.

This paper argues the case for a strong South African commitment to participation in efforts to establish a Southern African peacekeeping capacity, as a prerequisite for regional involvement in such an initiative. It also suggests what can be done, external to the traditional realm of peacekeeping training, to increase the chances of success of such a programme. Finally, a framework for action is proposed for the implementation of programmes designed specifically for the purpose of training and educating earmarked forces for participation in peace operations under UN/OAU auspices. In order to transcend the familiar 'plea of poverty' arguments, the material (logistic and financial) element of capacity is deliberately excluded in favour of a personnel-oriented focus. The terms 'peace operations' and 'peacekeeping operations' are used synonymously, partly for stylistic reasons, and partly from a conviction that overtures towards establishing a peace enforcement capacity, at least at this stage, would open a political 'can of worms'.

SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT AND COMMITMENT

At the international, regional and sub-regional level, it is obvious that a considerable amount of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity must occur before any agreement is reached on concretising the concept of and collaborative framework for the establishment of a Southern African standby capacity for peacekeeping operations (PKOs) under the auspices of the UN/OAU. The UN is struggling to come to grips with the whole concept of 'new generation' peacekeeping, in terms of adequate and appropriate doctrine, troop contributions, political will, and the ubiquitous problem of finance. The OAU is under increasing pressure to accept a greater degree of responsibility for peacekeeping efforts necessitated by conflict between or within its member states but, in spite of being willing to accept the burden of responsibility, currently lacks the finance and personnel capacity to fully operationalise the objectives of its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. At the sub-regional level, SADC member states have yet to operationalise an effective mechanism for dealing with the issues of security co-operation and conflict resolution.3

At the national level, many Southern African countries still have to clarify their commitment to peace operations, in principle as well as in terms of human and material resources. It is especially important that South Africa makes a clear commitment to the establishment of a peacekeeping capacity. "As the most powerful state in Southern Africa, ... [South Africa] will have a strong international voice and will exert a decisive influence on the destiny of the region."4 Economic domination aside, South Africa has armed forces which number nearly twice as many as any other in the region, and (with the exception of Angola), spends fifteen times more on defence than the closest SADC contender, Zimbabwe. As Clapham has observed, "It cannot ... be assumed that any large African state with substantial military forces and potential hegemonic ambitions will be able to maintain a stance of permanent non-involvement in complex on-going conflicts in states in its own region of the continent and possibly beyond it."5

It is reasonable to expect that the enthusiasm of SADC member states to create a regional standby capacity of peace keepers will be largely dependent on South Africa demonstrating the necessary will to become involved in peace operations. However, there is presently a tendency towards caution, if not reluctance, in committing South African troop contingents to PKOs. South Africa's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad has, for example, stated that, "[t]he likelihood that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which must be regarded as one of the most advanced on the African continent, could or would be used to prevent or bring to an end conflict situations on the continent outside the Southern African region is small at present. The country's defence establishment is still completing its process of integration and restructuring."6

The political will of national governments to contribute material and human resources to peace operations depends in no small part on the orientation and advice of the military. In this respect, the stance of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is critical. The SANDF seems to have accepted the inevitability of future involvement in peace operations, but remains cautious on the issue of troop commitment. For example, the Chief of the South African Army has stated: "Peace operations is a priority area. As a regional and continental leader, and a country bestowed with moral credibility within the international community, South Africa will inevitably be called upon to participate in peace operations ... [however] it is not advisable for South Africa to field combat troops until such time as the integration process is completed... ."7

In similar vein, Williams has warned that, "[t]he SANDF should be wary of committing operational personnel to peace operations until such time as the integration process has been completed. The experience of South Africa's National Peacekeeping Force (a poorly trained multiparty paramilitary election oversight force created in great haste just three months before the voting) underlined the possible dangers - fragmentation of units under fire, undermining of internal cohesion, and discrediting of the structure in question."

Despite the conventional wisdom of the above sentiments (though Williams' own description of the ill-fated National Peacekeeping Force places the relevance of the example in doubt), there is reason to advocate training for participation in peace operations as an integral part of the process of integration and restructuring of South Africa's armed forces. Neither the former statutory nor the non-statutory forces can legitimately claim a monopoly of skills or experience in this area (with the exception of SADF counter-insurgency training and experience, some of which was directed against the 'non-statutory' forces!). Training for PKOs, with its emphasis on communication and mediation skills, appreciation for cultural diversity, and respect for international humanitarian law, may assist in breaking down attitudinal barriers between members of the various forces which now comprise the SA Army. Many of the skills involved could also be fruitfully utilised in the Army's current internal operations .

The SANDF also needs to shake off the legacy of domestic oppression and regional destabilisation. It should be in search of a just cause which legitimates the meaning and value of military service. Peacekeeping provides a noble cause, and SA Army involvement in third party PKOs would once again offer soldiers and potential recruits the promise of adventure, travel and danger; something which is at the heart of recruiting appeals for most effective armies, but seems to have disappeared from the occupational expectations of the current generation of South African soldiers.

The argument that South Africa, with "one of the most advanced defence forces on the African continent", cannot afford, in political or military terms, to commit ground forces to PKOs in Africa, also has an increasingly hollow ring. During 1995, eighteen other OAU member states provided the UN with a total of more than 6 000 peace keepers. Ghana, Chad, Egypt, Sudan, Senegal and Zambia have joined the 36 countries from other continents, participating in the UN Standby Arrangements System. This system is designed to provide forces for deployment anywhere in the world for UN peacekeeping duties within an agreed response time on request of the Secretary-General.9

Moreover, the expressed preference to limit South African participation in peace operations to those aspects which would utilise the SANDF's 'hi-tech' capabilities as a "modern, technologically advanced defence force" may also have its pitfalls. Sustaining current levels of technology hangs by a very thin budgetary thread. Should this be cut, the SANDF would lose the main thrust of its evolving posture, possibly resulting in a crisis in force morale and military legitimacy. Furthermore, should the SANDF take a back seat with troop contributions to PKOs, its expertise in the area of doctrinal and skills development would be lost to a regional effort.

In summary, the SANDF needs to demonstrate a willingness to engage in the type of soldiering that historically has proven to be indispensable to the success of UN PKOs. A clear South African commitment to prepare troop formations for peace operations, and involvement in regional partnerships in an effort to establish a standby peacekeeping capacity, should increase the individual and collective political will of SADC countries to become (or remain) involved in peace operations and contribute to mutual confidence-building in the security arena. This, in turn, should have an indirect, positive effect on the stabilisation of civil-military relations in individual SADC countries, for armies that can be called upon to execute third party peacekeeping tasks successfully, are not typically those that are inclined to usurp the political authority of their own governments.

STABILISATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Civil agencies are normally responsible for a variety of functions during PKOs. In fact, non-government organisations (NGOs) and private voluntary organisations (PVOs) may be responsible for the ultimate success of a particular peace operation. Such organisations are generally highly sensitive to the issues of impartiality and human rights.10 Pre-deployment briefings should obviously include information on the general nature, role, organisation and modus operandi of NGOs and PVOs that will be operating in the area of deployment, as well as the status of and relationship of members of such organisations with the peacekeeping force.11

However, pre-deployment briefings cannot overcome deep-seated civil-military misunderstanding, distrust, or dislike based on ingrained animosity or mutual ignorance. "Joint civilian-military efforts, which we believe to be essential for efficient and effective humanitarian response, are unknown or unfamiliar in many countries. The potential for misunderstanding is even greater in this interface given the traditional mutual ignorance between the military and civilian worlds." 12 This observation is particularly relevant to the Southern African region, where several countries have a history of unstable civil-military relations and a demonstrated lack of respect for the democratic principle of civil supremacy over the military. This deficiency must be addressed as part of the process of establishing a sub-regional peacekeeping capacity.

The scope and intensity of such a task should not be underestimated. Many of the armed forces of the region continue to enjoy a political virility disproportionate to their military significance. This may be ascribed to the fact that the social structures of the states concerned, exhibit many or all of the characteristics of a 'praetorian society'. These include fragmented social classes and low social cohesion; rapid social and economic change occurring simultaneously in many spheres; weak political culture and a lack of meaningful universal political symbols; direct engagement of all kinds of social forces in general politics; absence of political leaders who are generally accepted as legitimate intermediaries to moderate intergroup conflict; and lack of agreement among groups on the legitimate and authoritative methods to resolve conflict.13

Moreover, a significant number of SADC countries are attempting to change from hegemonic to more popular forms of rule. As the transition of a political system from non-democratic to democratic rule is often accompanied by a high level of internal political conflict and civil strife, these countries will remain highly susceptible for many years to pressures for military intervention in the domestic political process to restore order.

The structural causes of the relatively high potential for military intervention in civilian politics in some of the countries in the region seem fairly immutable, at least for the foreseeable future. However, a range of meaningful and concrete measures can be initiated to stabilise civil-military relations, independent of or in harmony with attempts to reform the structure of societies. These pertain to the role, structure, composition, ideological orientation, and motivation of the armed forces themselves, and are directly related to, if not an integral part of the process of creating a viable peacekeeping capacity.

For example, individual governments could initiate policy which would ensure that

the role of the military is clearly defined and delimited, and there is broad consensus between soldiers and society that this role is just and appropriate;



the structure of the military is consonant with the fulfilment of this role;



the personnel composition of the military reflects the broader population without perpetuating social divisions within the military; and



a high level of internal cohesion and compliance is maintained within the armed forces.

Furthermore, governments can take positive action to limit the potential for civil-military misunderstanding and conflict by

granting recognition to the military as a potentially formidable pressure group and assigning an appropriate political role to it;



fostering mutual respect and understanding between soldiers, politicians and civil society;



respecting a legitimate and clearly defined sphere of institutional autonomy for the military profession;



upholding constitutional principles and values in word and deed;



granting sufficient resources for the military to fulfil its constitutionally defined role; and



instituting and maintaining effective parliamentary control over the military.

Finally, military acceptance of and respect for the principle of civil supremacy would be enhanced if

members of the armed forces are sworn to uphold a democratic constitution;



a clear and widely comprehended distinction is maintained between the corporate ideology of the military and the contending political ideologies that prevail in society;



military socialisation stresses the rights and responsibilities of all citizens, including basic human rights;



the functional training of military leaders is supplemented by some form of liberal education; and



the appropriate status and level of esteem are granted to soldiers by both the military institution and society at large.

The measures suggested above are by no means exhaustive, nor is it the intention to be prescriptive. The point is that much can be done beyond the normal ambit of thinking on peace operations to strengthen the foundations upon which a regional peacekeeping capacity can be built. Regional peacekeeping co-operation should, in itself, help to stabilise civil-military relations in individual SADC countries. Should a common vision be established of third party intervention to maintain peace under the auspices of the UN/OAU, it may well counter inclinations that may be present among the leadership of national armies to intervene in the politics of their own country in order to promote sectional interests. A regional peacekeeping capacity-building process that includes joint civil-military training and education programmes would also foster civilian understanding of the military, including the latter's need for specific areas of policy autonomy. Policy autonomy is widely regarded as a fundamental component of professionalism, and remains a central element of contemporary theories of democratic civil-military relations.

ENHANCEMENT OF BASIC MILITARY SKILLS, DISCIPLINE AND PROFESSIONALISM

According to Roberts14, "troops involved in UN peacekeeping forces have been, and are, of extraordinarily uneven quality. Despite the UN's need for such forces, there must be a higher basic standard that forces are required to meet before they can be dispatched on a peacekeeping operation." Notwithstanding their special nature, PKOs require many of the personal qualities and training common to conventional military operations. These include professional competence, discipline, morale, sound leadership, initiative, flexibility and alertness. Forces ear-marked for PKOs, therefore, require a thorough grounding in basic military skills such as command, control and communications, navigation, weapon handling, tactical skills, deployment drills and administration.15 Although these aspects should never be taken for granted in any effective military organisation, laxity in this area will confound the effectiveness of PKOs, and elicit bad publicity for the operation within the afflicted area and abroad. In this regard, Boyd has issued the following cautionary note: "Consideration of the media's key role in today's high visibility information environment is also important ... peace operations require disciplined, versatile forces to respond to changing circumstances while in the full glare of the media's spotlight."16

The necessity for honing basic military skills may be readily grasped (if not embraced) by most military leaders. Indeed, there seems to be no critical shortage of institutions and personnel capable of imparting such skills to the armed forces of the region. However, the ethical dimensions of military professionalism are less tangible than those related to functional skills and parade-ground discipline. Those that cannot readily be observed, measured or evaluated, tend to be most easily overlooked. Unfortunately, these 'non-tangibles' normally manifest themselves in the aberrant (and abhorrent) behaviour of soldiers. As Roberts has observed, "... the expansion of UN peacekeeping activities has highlighted a huge range of ethical and disciplinary problems [such as] ... the illicit sale of diesel oil, use of child prostitutes and illegal smuggling".17 Many of the sub-region's armies have not proven immune to such maladies.

Force preparation for peace operations, therefore, should include the inculcation and/or reinforcement of universal military values such as courage, obedience, stamina, integrity, honesty, competence, loyalty, selflessness, respect for human life, commitment and self-discipline. If they are to be more than just words uttered by pseudo-professionals, these values have to be internalised by military leaders, and their behavioural manifestations regularly displayed to subordinates. Each value should, during the process of military education and socialisation, be articulated, analysed, debated and, ultimately, lived.

The honing of basic military skills and professionalism is the task of national militaries within the region. It is a responsibility which transcends the realm of peace operations and has a direct impact on the perceived collective and individual legitimacy of the armed forces of the region. Laxity in this area is inexcusable, for no expensive modern technology is needed. It is in the realm of humanness that the African soldier can perhaps make his or her greatest contribution to regional and international peace operations. Nor should the acquisition of relevant skills and values be the exclusive preserve of forces dedicated to or reserved for peace operations. The type of training and socialisation required would benefit Southern African armies as a whole, and contribute to healthier relations with their host societies and governments. Moreover, the more broadly established the requisite educational and skills base for peace operations within national militaries, the greater the flexibility of the operational planner, force designer and recruiter in constituting a force capable of executing a mandated mission.

The establishment of a universally accepted peacekeeping knowledge and skills base would also drastically reduce the lead time between the acknowledgement of a political (UN/OAU sanctioned) imperative to intervene, and the deployment of the appropriate groupings or forces to the threatened area. While the advance identification of the type of unit or capability available for deployment in support of peace operations within SADC member states is useful, this should not be interpreted as advocacy of a 'standing' regional army, but a plea for ear-marked forces that remain under national control with the possibility of combined exercises in order to improve regional interoperability.

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

Effective leadership is crucial to the success of any military operation, and fundamental to the establishment of an effective peacekeeping force. As Clapham has observed: "The choice of an individual to serve as commander is critical, since any such operation places a high level of initiative in the hands of whoever has to manage it on the spot." 18 The imperative to select suitable commanders is, however, predicated upon the existence of a meaningful pool of candidates. With regard to human resources, initial development efforts to establish a peacekeeping capacity should therefore focus on those candidates most likely to occupy positions of command during peace operations, such as general duties career officers, and junior leaders in the Infantry and Engineers Corps.

The development of potential commanders of forces for deployment in peace operations cannot be isolated from national systems of officer education and development. According to Boyd, "[l]eader development may be the single most important factor in achieving success in [peace] operations. ... Leader development for peace operations takes place at all levels of the military education system."19 This implies both a sound system of officer selection and development (including general education and military training), and the inclusion of peace operations in the curricula of military staff colleges and relevant corps schools. Suitable candidates could also be nominated for UN Staff Officers and Observers courses.

Formal training and education may be fruitfully supplemented by programmes designed to familiarise officers with the concept and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. UN military observer missions have historically consisted entirely of officers. Participation in existing UN observer missions by a select mix of officers from the SADC region would familiarise such personnel with UN procedures and practices. Deployed on a meaningful mission, but freed from the burden of command, such exercises should also allow junior and middle-ranking officers to establish intra-regional contacts, and contribute to the development of mutual understanding and trust. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the OAU is in the process of establishing a hundred-person preventive observer mission which will be kept on stand-by, and OAU member states will be approached to identify suitable personnel for participation on a stand-by basis.

Once a basic pool of peacekeeping competence has been established, the best leaders may be chosen for specific missions according to appropriate selection criteria and a thorough system of evaluation. Officer candidates, for example, should be evaluated in terms of command and staff experience, professional competence, attitudinal propensity, doctrinal knowledge, language proficiency, as well as physical and mental fitness. As Boyd has remarked, peacekeeping operations require quality soldiers, led by capable leaders armed with solid doctrine.20

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

Peacekeeping capacity is established through an adequate distribution of the attitudes, skills, and resources which are essential to the successful execution of peacekeeping missions. These requisites must be encapsulated in a clear and coherent doctrine, appropriate to the most probable peacekeeping contingencies in which Southern African forces may become involved. 'Doctrine' may be loosely defined as a set of interrelated principles and beliefs. Basic military doctrine associated with war fighting is traditionally predicated on the identification of an enemy, and is based on a number of clearly-defined principles of war in most armies. Applied wholesale to peacekeeping, such principles are bound to prejudice the fundamental peacekeeping principle of impartiality, which would dangerously destabilise an operation. Although some principles of war remain key guides to conduct, their overall ethos is largely irrelevant and inappropriate to a peacekeeping context.21 For this reason, war fighting and peacekeeping cannot be guided by a common set of principles. Effective peacekeeping therefore requires the development and utilisation of a separate and appropriate doctrine. Whereas war fighting doctrine has evolved over millennia, the concept and conduct of UN peacekeeping is a post-World War II phenomenon.

Despite the relative infancy of third party peacekeeping as practised by the UN, a large body of peacekeeping doctrine has already been generated

at the international level (for example, the Peacekeeper's Handbook compiled by the UN's International Peace Academy);



by individual countries which have become involved in peacekeeping (for example, the US Army's FM 100-23, Peace Operations and the British AFM Volume 5, Operations Other than War); as well as



those that are subscribed to on a multinational basis (such as the Nordic UN Tactical Manual developed by the Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters [NORDSAMFN]).

Much of the aforementioned doctrine encapsulates the lessons learned through participation in 'new generation' (post-Cold War) operations, although there is continuing effort to develop doctrine that can prepare contingents for the complexities of intervention in communal conflicts. There is, therefore, a considerable doctrinal pool from which SADC countries (especially those with little or no experience in UN peacekeeping) can borrow. Some work in this area has already been undertaken by individual military staff colleges in the region.

However, a direct doctrinal transplant should be avoided, given the disparities in the levels of development, sophistication and experience between the countries of Southern Africa and those which have taken the lead in developing peacekeeping doctrine. There is also the problem that existing conceptual frameworks have proven to be increasingly inadequate for addressing operations related to intra-state conflict, where the basic peacekeeping principle of consent cannot be upheld (commonly associated with new generation peacekeeping). There seems to be an operational drift towards 'peace enforcement' that is sometimes reflected in the contemporary doctrinal debate by the blurring of boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Peace enforcement is largely based on conventional war fighting principles, and should thus remain beyond the ambit of initial efforts to establish a peacekeeping capacity (though it may be an area for informed military-academic debate within the region). Similarly, the temptation to evolve peacekeeping doctrine from existing war fighting doctrine should be firmly resisted. Counter-insurgency doctrine and training, for example, provide an army with a repository of useful peacekeeping skills. However, even in doctrine designed for low-intensity conflict, an enemy is posited, which makes the ethos imparted by the training derived from such doctrine totally inappropriate for peacekeeping forces.

Those principles contained in the various doctrinal schools which are universally applicable to PKOs, and may be simply and unambiguously articulated and adhered to by Southern Africans, should rather be adopted as the basis of an emergent, indigenous peacekeeping doctrine. These may be adapted and refined with experience in teaching and practice. (The British concept of 'wider peacekeeping' encapsulates such a clear set of principles, and is already being propagated in the region via the National Staff College of Zimbabwe.) To avoid total confusion, there must be a concerted effort among the nations of the region, and any external actors assisting in the development of a peacekeeping capacity, to co-ordinate the introduction of an appropriate baseline doctrine and its evolution into a comprehensive and appropriate set of principles and beliefs which would guide Southern African peacekeeping efforts.

Ideally, initial doctrinal development should precede education and training, although there is dynamic interaction between the two spheres. Some form of training and operational experience is needed to feed the cycle of doctrinal evolution. Initial efforts to establish a regional peacekeeping capacity should concentrate on the type of background training and education that is essential and universally applicable to UN PKOs, and which may be derived from the 'non-contested' portion of the existing doctrinal pool.

BACKGROUND EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING

A comprehensive educational process is the foundation of training and preparation for peacekeeping tasks. As indicated above, all meaningful training derives from doctrine that provides an intellectual underpinning and imparts meaning to actions. A clear explanation of theory should therefore precede the practice of its application. A dedicated educational programme is thus an essential element of training, and classroom tuition and study must precede the teaching and practice of specific peacekeeping skills. Peace keepers who understand the long-term purpose of their activities, including those related to training, will perform their duties more effectively than those who are ignorant of this dimension. The understanding fostered through education allows individuals at the most junior level to exercise initiative and flexibility to the full. This is a critical attribute during PKOs in complex and volatile environments.22

The primary purpose of PKOs is to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. Military action must complement diplomatic, economic, informative and humanitarian efforts in pursuit of the political objective of the mission. This implies a realisation among peace keepers that decisions taken at the tactical level may have immediate strategic and political implications. Therefore, they require an understanding of the overall strategic and political context of the operation, as well as an awareness of the history, culture and economy of the area of deployment.23

While area-specific education and training is only possible once the decision has been made to mount an operation and the participation of the specific contingent is agreed upon, the type of insight and understanding referred to above presupposes a particular educational basis among soldiers as a starting point for effective mission and area-specific training and education. As outlined below, such an educational basis would not be inappropriate for all African soldiers, regardless of whether or not they will be required to participate in peace operations, for it should help to reduce the level of brutality which has characterised many of the military operations in the region.

The general effect of background training and education should be to foster the attitudes and personal qualities required by members of a peacekeeping contingent. "In the field of operations the activities of each individual should be characterised by professional, disciplined conduct seasoned with practical common-sense, a flexible outlook, patience, restraint, tact, a good sense of humour, vigilance and an objective approach." 24

It is difficult to measure the intensity and direction of attitudes, especially on a collective basis. However, attitudes are created through a process of socialisation, and can, at least partially, be deduced through the observation of repeated behaviour (including verbalisation of preferences). Soldiers are subjected to an intensive process of institutional socialisation, and are required to exhibit a higher degree of conformity in their behaviour than most other occupational categories. It is therefore possible to make some generalised observations on the nature and intensity of traditional military attitudes that have an impact on a peacekeeping capacity.

The socialisation and training of soldiers for combat normally leads to the development or reinforcement of salient chauvinist or anti-foreigner attitudes. The basic military attitude of being there to 'win', is also decidedly inappropriate to PKOs. Aggressive alertness is typically inculcated through military training. While alertness is a positive and essential attribute in the peace keeper, aggression contradicts the principle of 'minimum necessary force'. The aggression associated with traditional military training is partially fostered through the positing of an enemy and the engendering of hatred. In PKOs, there is no 'enemy', and the building up of 'hate figures' is certain to endanger the mission. Related to this point is the practice of disparaging other nations' military abilities. In PKOs, this can lead to resentment by the parties to the conflict, as well as the other contingents which constitute the peacekeeping force.25 The bottom line is that some traditional military attitudes, often presumed to be morale-boosting for combat purposes, must be eradicated, or at least re-aligned during education and training programmes aimed at preparing for peacekeeping tasks.

Many of the accepted principles of peacekeeping, such as impartiality, patience, trust, confidence and restraint, are also unique human character attributes. If these principles are to be adhered to during the conduct of PKOs, such human qualities will have to be predominant in the make-up of the individual peace keeper. Since the average human being is likely to be lacking in at least some of these qualities, they will have to be cultivated and nurtured in soldiers earmarked for participation in peace operations.

Impartiality may be regarded as both a personal quality and as a fundamental principle of peacekeeping. This principle should not be foreign to professional military leaders, for internal and external affective neutrality are fundamental and definitive attributes of any profession. Dobbie26 explains the critical importance of impartiality in the peace keeper through the analogy of a rugby referee. The latter acts as supervisor and supreme adjudicator between two opposing sides. He controls the course of the contest, even though he is outnumbered 30:1 on the field of play, and therefore cannot exert his will by force. His ability to control the contesting players depends on the perceived legitimacy of his status as referee. This legitimacy depends, in turn, upon his impartiality. If he is perceived to favour one side above the other, his status as a legitimate authority will be lost, and he will lose control of the game. When this happens and tempers flare, the referee may himself be drawn into the ensuing conflict, where he will be vastly outnumbered by his adversaries.

The principle of impartiality should be explained in similar graphic terms during formal background education and training for peace operations. It can be further emphasised through the use of case studies, simulation, and role-playing exercises. However, the personal quality of impartiality will only be effectively internalised by prospective peace keepers if military leaders at all levels are seen to act impartially in their authoritative relationships with subordinates. This is nothing more than sound leadership.

Patience and perseverance are also character attributes which are desirable in all soldiers, and attempts are normally made to inculcate these during the course of general military training. However, there is also a contradictory tendency amongst military leaders to favour decisive action and 'quick fix' solutions in the resolution of problems. During background training for peace operations, personnel should learn to recognise and accept the fact that, although some peace operations might be of short duration, they may take years to achieve the desired results in other cases and will involve more than military efforts alone. Peace keepers have to balance the soldier's inherent desire for quick, decisive action with sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and restraints of the mission.27

Restraint, compassion and kindness are also desirable qualities of the peace keeper which are often sadly lacking in soldiers trained exclusively for combat operations. "In peace operations, every soldier must be aware that the goal is to produce conditions which are conducive to peace and not to the destruction of an enemy". 28 Reflecting on Malaysian participation in UN peace operations in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hashim bin Hussein29 has observed that "... [O]ur soldiers have been exposed to dealing with civilians, especially children and the aged who make up the majority of victims in a war situation. It is a far cry from the rigours of soldiering, as one has to be full of restraint, compassion and kindness." These qualities should be present in all good military leaders, but they could be enhanced during background training through, for example, exposure to welfare work and casualty treatment centres.

Background education should also aim at imparting specific knowledge that gives meaning to the concept of peace operations, and which should be part of every peace keeper's intellectual equipment. In this regard, curriculum content for Southern African peace keepers should typically include the following:

the UN Charter, organisation and role of the UN, and the pragmatic development of UN peacekeeping;



the principles of UN peacekeeping;



the rights and privileges of a peacekeeping force, as well as the duties, responsibilities, and obligations which result from its legal international status;



relevant lessons learned from past and present UN peace operations;



an overview of the operational skills and techniques of peacekeeping;



International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict;



civilian and humanitarian tasks during peace operations;



media relations;



normative and behavioural bases of civil-military relations; and



the role and structures of the OAU and SADC, specifically those pertaining to conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

As far as background skills training for peace operations is concerned, the most important are those related to communication, liaison, negotiation and mediation. The concepts of negotiation, mediation and conciliation are the precepts on which peace keepers base their initiatives for settling disputes and preventing violence. As Nhara30 has noted, "...the weapons of the peace keeper are those of negotiation and quiet diplomacy, not the rifle."

Effective liaison has, for example, been identified as a major determinant of the successes achieved in peacekeeping operations. Commenting on the experiences of the British contingent participating in UNPROFOR in Central Bosnia during 1994, Williams31 has stressed the centrality of linguistic ability to the liaison task: "Liaison could ... only be effective if sufficient high quality interpreters could be found to support it. With far too few native Serb-Croat speakers in the British armed services and training facilities for military interpreters unequal to the demands, there had to be a general reliance on locally recruited Bosnians, drawn from all ethnic communities. ... [I]t was to a great extent thanks to the interpreters' skills that critical misunderstandings were avoided and an effective regime of mutual respect between formerly warring parties was established."

There is also a critical need for effective communication between the organisation or organisations authorising a peacekeeping mission, the peacekeeping force (including the communication between the various national contingents), and the disputing parties. The latter can be fundamental to the success or failure of the efforts of national contingents and the entire mission. Communication and linguistics should therefore form an integral part of background education and training. Multilingualism cannot be established overnight, but perhaps multilingual proficiency could become a recognised component of military leadership development. Proficiency in Swahili, English and Portuguese would probably enable personnel to communicate fairly effectively throughout Southern Africa. At a minimum, leaders should be practised in the art of communication via interpreters, and be well versed in the importance and conduct of sound media relations.

Training in negotiation and mediation skills should also form an essential part of background training. While these skills are particularly relevant to officers, all members of a peacekeeping force may find themselves in situations in which they will have to mediate, negotiate or liaise with members of the conflicting parties or local inhabitants. As is the case with much of the background training suggested above, these skills have a utility beyond the realm of peace operations, particularly for military leaders, as they can be fruitfully applied to the day-to-day problems of managing armed forces and dealing with disgruntled individuals or groups. They could contribute to both intra-force cohesion and improved civil-military relations at various levels of contact.

While the adoption of the attitudes, knowledge and skills outlined above is of particular importance to peace keepers, it is also applicable to the general soldiery. Such training and education, even if conducted throughout a national army, need not detract from the professionalism and combat effectiveness of soldiers, nor in any way impair their capacity to fulfil primary missions other than peace operations. There would not necessarily be an additional budgetary burden involved, as existing resources, institutions and personnel could be oriented to cope with the task, perhaps with the assistance of outside agencies such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the various NGOs involved in the enhancement of regional peacekeeping capacity. Effective background training is, however, time consuming. Since mission-specific training derives much of its value from background education and training, the longer the delay in its initiation, the less meaningful mission-specific training will be when initiated in a crisis situation where there are severe time constraints on force preparation.

MISSION-ORIENTED TRAINING

Unlike background training, mission-oriented training can be conducted in a relatively short period of time. The focus is more on the techniques than on the principles of peacekeeping. The exact content and duration of such training will depend on the quality and type of training to which members of the contingent have already been exposed. As mentioned previously, certain peacekeeping skills are developed as part of counter-insurgency military training programmes; for example, mine awareness, observation and monitoring, patrolling, first aid, signals, cordon and search, key point protection, use of minimum force, construction of fortified shelters and helicopter drills. In armies trained exclusively for conventional warfare, such skills may be sadly lacking. Mission-specific and pre-deployment training would therefore typically comprise a mix of some or all of the following:

checkpoint and observation post duty;



search operations;



surveillance;



patrolling by day and by night;



the handling of infiltrators;



confiscation of arms and ammunition;



escorting;



key point protection;



field construction;



first aid and casualty evacuation;



map-reading and navigation;



signals;



mine awareness; and



use of minimum necessary force.

Pre-deployment training should also include refresher training in the techniques of negotiation and mediation, UN and regional structures and procedures, the work of international humanitarian agencies operating in the area, and media relations. Participants need to be schooled in the history and the background of the dispute which precipitated the conflict, the customs and culture of the local population, essential phraseology, health and hygiene hazards, recognition of regular forces and militia, protocol and insignia. Finally, contingents must be thoroughly briefed on the mandate and protocols of mission, the rules of engagement, and the role of civilian NGOs and PVOs.

Unlike background education and training, there would probably be a marked variance in the duration, intensity and scope of mission-specific training required by the various national armies of the sub-region. These needs could be identified and articulated during the course of background training, with a view to country-specific curriculum development. The identification of regional 'centres of excellence' for specific areas of mission-oriented training, and their utilisation by all participating SADC countries would enhance mutual confidence-building, as well as the quality of training through specialisation.

CONCLUSION

Preparation for participation in peace operations fits within the framework of contemporary thinking on security, which shifts the focus away from narrow conceptions of national security, towards concepts of sub-regional, regional and global security. Southern African co-operation in building a peacekeeping capacity will provide a common denominator, or major vehicle, for confidence-building in the sub-region, while contributing to the creation of a viable capacity for conducting peacekeeping operations. The multilateral contacts and co-operation implied by the process should also address narrower 'national' security concerns and facilitate the professional development of national defence forces. Engagement in the process may also allow otherwise insignificant armed forces to gain international prestige and respect, provide opportunities for enhancing military institutional pride, promote the concept of military professionalism, and contribute to stable civil-military relations.

This article has attempted to identify broad areas in which the process of establishing a Southern African stand-by capacity of peace keepers can be started. It is by no means an exhaustive review, and leaves much room for further debate, conceptualisation and action. For example, an inventory is needed of existing peacekeeping skills, capacity and potential in the region.

Suggestions are needed for developing this capacity on a national and regional basis. At an intergovernment level, an appropriate framework for co-operation and co-ordination has yet to be institutionalised, and some indication provided of the type of force levels and resources national governments would be willing and able to commit to peacekeeping efforts. Certain countries may favour the creation of a dedicated peacekeeping force, while others may prefer to earmark certain units or sub-units for peacekeeping training and deployment. Finally, areas of responsibility and action need to be negotiated and allocated to those countries, individuals and organisations willing to work towards the ideal of an effective regional peacekeeping capacity.

ENDNOTES

This article is published as part of the Training for Peace Project, a joint venture between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), and the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP).



IDASA, in conjunction with the Centre for Conflict Resolution, obtained funding from the Government of Denmark to undertake a project which aims "... to determine the ability of states in Southern Africa to participate in international peacekeeping operations on the basis of a common perspective and knowledge of peacekeeping operations, and to assess possibilities for the development of joint training programmes". Similarly, IDP, in conjunction with ACCORD and NUPI obtained funding from the Government of Norway to undertake a project which aims "... to contribute to ongoing processes of building up stand-by capacities of qualified and readily available personnel for peace operations, primarily under UN or OAU auspices, in as many countries of the region as possible".



For a detailed exposition of progress and problems in this regard, see Jakkie Cilliers, The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa, African Security Review 4(5), 1995, pp. 30-47.



Greg Mills, South Africa and Africa: Regional Integration and Security Co-operation, African Security Review 4(2), 1995, p.7.



Christopher Clapham, A Comparative Assessment of OAU and ECOMOG Peace-Keeping, paper read at an IDP/SAIIA conference on South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, p. 14.



Aziz Pahad, South Africa and Preventive Diplomacy, in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa, Volume 2, IDP/SAIIA, Midrand, 1995, p.161.



Johan Pretorius, Integration, Rationalisation and Restructuring of the SA Army: Challenges and Prospects, African Security Review 4(1),1995, p. 27.



R.M. Williams, South Africa's new Defense Force: Progress and Prospects, CSIS Africa Notes 170, March 1995, p. 8.



J. Scharling, What Does a Country Require to Participate in Peace Support Operations?, paper read at an IDP/SAIIA conference on South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, p.7.



M.J. Boyd, Peace Operations: A Capstone Doctrine, Military Review, May-June 1995, p. 28.



British Army, Wider Peacekeeping, HMSO, London, 1995, p. 7-5.



Michael C. Lemmon, Role of the US in Peace-Keeping, paper read at an IDP/SAIIA conference on South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, p. 8.



A. Perlmutter, The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army, Comparative Politics, April 1969, p. 385; S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, pp. 194-7.



A. Roberts, The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, Survival 36(3), 1994, p. 116.



British Army, op. cit., p. 7-2.



Boyd, op. cit., p. 28.



Roberts, op. cit., p. 114.



Clapham, op. cit., p. 15.



Boyd, op. cit., p. 29.



Ibid.



C. Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, Survival 36(3), 1994, p. 141.



British Army, op. cit., p. 7-2.



Boyd, op. cit., p. 22.



British Army, op. cit., p. 7-4.



International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook, Pergamon, New York, 1984, p. 373.



Dobbie, op. cit., p. 133.



Boyd, op. cit., p. 24.



Ibid., p. 25.



MD. Hashim bin Hussein, The Experiences of a Smaller Nation, paper read at an IDP/SAIIA conference on South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, p. 31.



William Nhara, The OAU and the Potential role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations, paper read at an IDP/SAIIA conference on South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, p. 14.



P.G. Williams, Liaison - The Key to Success in Central Bosnia, Army and Defence Quarterly 124(4), pp. 391-2.