INTRODUCTION

In this article, an idea of the various factors that will influence the nature both of South Africa's maritime commitments, and by implication, its naval capacity will be provided.2 These factors can be broadly subsumed into three areas, namely, security, politics and economics.

SECURITY

It is clear that in the case of a nation such as South Africa, which encompasses within its borders both components of the First World and of the Third World, the notion of security and the factors that influence its security are related more to issues of development than of pure military or territorial security.

During the Cold War era, mention of the word 'security' generally had military overtones. It could be equated with military force levels, military threat perceptions, views on territorial sovereignty, the control of weapons of mass destruction, war-fighting capabilities and technologies, the effectiveness of military alliances, and so on.

In the past, the state was seen as the major source of security in developed states. The military strength of the state protected its people against outside threats, its police force protected them internally, and its social security programmes protected them against ill-health, unemployment and extreme hardship. In contrast, in the undeveloped or developing world, states did not have the capacity to provide comprehensive protection. Worse, the state itself was often seen as the principal creator of insecurity through corruption, oppression and other forms of bad government.

However, in this new post-Cold War age 'security' has come to mean something different. The shift is away from the containment of an enemy, towards an understanding that there are common security fears and issues that cannot be tackled through military means and which transgress both state and ideological, political and religious borders. Today, personal security fears such as poverty, drugs, health matters, terrorism and environmental issues, rather than fears of state security, have been elevated beyond the local and national levels to a global prominence. This is particularly the case in developing nations, although there is a narrowing of the gap between issues that affect the developed world and the developing world.

This convergence between the developed and the developing world has also occurred as a result of an increased questioning of the role of the state, partially as a result of problems in the functioning of the nation-state concept, but also with the depreciation in the value of the external security role of the state with the end of the Cold War.

For a state such as South Africa today, security exists at a number of different levels: through national political consolidation or integrity, and also in the fields of socio-economic development that affects both political capacity and personal economic situations. The words of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert are worth noting in this regard: "development without democracy is possible, but democracy without development has a very short lifespan."3 Such development has to be achieved in a world of growing interdependence, where it is necessary at times for states to strike a balance between the needs of good internal governance, as well as the needs of the general population, and the requirements of an increasingly interdependent world.

Key areas that threaten positive socio-economic development and by implication political stability in South Africa include:

continued high levels of criminal activity;



lack of investment and aid;



regional instability;



a high population growth rate;



inefficient or expensive government; and



mismanaged or misconceived reconstruction programmes.

It is important for developing states to seek effective ways to cope with and manage these areas of insecurity in the quest for stability, security and development. In the maritime sphere, the challenges that must be faced cover a whole panoply of issues: from traditional security concerns (such as the safeguarding of trade routes and territorial integrity), to the need for effective management of resources in the fields of, amongst others, oceanography, hydrography, marine biology, and so on.

Traditional Areas of Maritime Security

Traditional areas of maritime security include territorial claims, dangers of sea-borne invasion and threats to seaborne trade routes. Martin Edmonds has argued that the power vacuum present as a result of the end of the Cold War has left "the door open to regional powers with the wealth, military potential or political ambition to attempt the imposition of their own military-political agendas."4 This statement is particularly true in areas which are highly militarised, yet it cannot really apply to South Africa or the region. Areas of Asia, and the Persian Gulf would outwardly appear to be good illustrations of the potential for armed conflict over territorial control in the maritime arena. For example, the South China Sea islands - especially the Spratly Island group - coupled to the establishment of a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) could, in this regard, be a cause of considerable friction between states. As Admiral Sir Jock Slater has reminded:5 "The bottom line is that developed and developing nations have a clear need to protect the international maritime system for their own use. Indeed, the corollary is that some regimes may look to benefit from a breakdown in the international maritime system to pursue regional ambitions, particularly if they are blessed with manpower, money, substantial amounts of modern military equipment and authoritarian political power."

South Africa's reliance on seaborne trade for between 90 and 95 per cent of its imports and exports in terms of tonnage (80 per cent in value), illustrates the importance of safeguarding trade routes. This also particularly applies to nations who, like South Africa, rely heavily on commodity exports, and for whom economic growth depends primarily on export-led industrial manufacturing.

Piracy and smuggling pose a threat to such trade, and appear to be on the increase internationally, again particularly in the South China Sea. These have ranged from highly organised commando-style raids, to those of the more opportunistic plunderer. Though there has reputedly been an increase in minor incidences of piracy against yachts in Southern African waters, smuggling poses a far more serious threat. Arms and especially drug smuggling, together with cargo fraud, create an increasing problem world-wide which requires new protective measures, such as comprehensive intelligence and tracking facilities, and improved enforcement through regional and international co-operation.

Yet, it is clear that internationally, the end of the Cold War would appear to have brought with it a change in attitude about the seriousness of threats in what could be termed traditional areas of maritime security, and/or in the value of naval forces in meeting such threats. With the Middle East and parts of East Asia as the notable exceptions, naval forces have suffered in terms of fleet numbers as a result of this change in perception: for example, according to The Military Balance,6 the Royal Navy has reduced in number from fifty surface combatants in the 1980s to 38 today; and the US Navy from approximately 239 principal surface combatants in 1988 to 137 today.

The second issue which will affect maritime responsibilities and capacities, namely economics, must also be considered.

THE ECONOMIC REALM

As has been stated already, the primary insecurity facing developing countries centres around issues of socio-economic development and its impact on stability. In the maritime domain, the issue of economics works in two different ways: on the one hand, it is uneconomical to spend more on armed forces than is required; on the other, the state has to secure the ability to provide for the security of its citizens. In the latter area, the extent to which the economies of many developing nations are dependent on fishing is of major importance. This is particularly emphasised in view of the rapidly dwindling fish stocks in the northern hemisphere, resulting in affected states ruthlessly exploiting the stock in less-effectively policed areas. An ability to police natural assets is thus essential, particularly in the protection and development of harbours, and mineral and marine resources. Fishing is one example, not only of a significant export earner, but especially in terms of its nutritional importance in the Third World where fish products form an important percentage of daily protein supply.

A similar feature of the nature of developing economies is their heavy reliance on mineral and oil exports, some of which is derived from sea-bed deposits. In Southern Africa, South Africa's Mossgas oil-from-gas scheme, the Cabinda fields in Angola, and the potential Kudu field in Namibia and Pande gas in Mozambique all underline the importance of this area of economic activity. South Africa is also heavily involved in offshore diamond mining, and the importance of sea-bed mining and exploration is linked to the safeguarding of the Exclusive Economic Zone created under UNCLOS III.

The need to safeguard natural sea resources represents one area of environmental security, while oil spillage and the dumping of toxic waste material in the oceans are others with an equally important maritime dimension.

The dumping of toxic waste materials particularly affects developing nations, both because these areas are frequently used as cheap and willing depositories, and sometimes because developing nations have little means to resist such practices. Fortunately, the Brent Spar episode in the North Sea earlier in 1995, and the persistent, if unsuccessful, campaign to stop nuclear testing in the South Pacific, illustrate how international public opinion can be mobilised to prevent toxic contamination. This, in part, compensates for the limitation of the power to prevent such incidents that smaller nations experience in this regard.

Crucial to the debate around the protection of maritime resources and the safeguarding of seaborne trade routes, is the issue of new international stipulations for the use of the sea. The stipulations of the new Law of the Sea which came into effect in 1994, cover almost the entire range of ocean issues. In particular, the Convention affirms the twelve nautical-mile limit of the territorial sea, and accords sovereign rights to the littoral state over the use of natural resources within a 200 mile EEZ. It also provides, inter alia, rules for navigation through straits, for prevention of marine pollution and, importantly, also rules for the conduct of marine scientific research, the transfer of technology, fisheries management, the settlement of disputes and deep-sea mining.

All these stipulations point to a need to expand rather than contract the abilities of a state to safeguard and police maritime resources and trade routes. Furthermore, the necessity to safeguard natural resources is, as has been illustrated, exacerbated by the economic situation in which most developing nations, including South Africa, find themselves.

However, it must be questioned whether naval forces are the best and most cost-efficient manner in which to safeguard these vital interests. This question is as necessary as it is unpopular, particularly in a society, such as South Africa's, with a commitment to transparent and accountable government. Other equally difficult questions are: which combination of naval forces is the most affordable for South Africa, and, related to this, what is the best combination for the job? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are not clearly discernible.

There are some who argue that naval forces are inappropriate for this task,7 as most of the incidences requiring the protection of these natural resources target one's own citizens who are illegally exploiting the oceans, rather than foreigners. Moreover, some contend that it is likely that the financial implications inherent in the enforcement of the provisions of UNCLOS III will be beyond most developing states, unless technology is developed that will enable surveillance at a relatively low cost. Indeed, a state which accepts the rights conferred by UNCLOS III, is of necessity obliged to conduct marine research, enforce conservation measures and manage resources in order to derive maximum economic benefit from its zone. It should then also be able to patrol such a zone in order to deter poaching and to apply domestic legislation throughout that zone.

In this regard, however, it is doubtful whether naval surface vessels alone can adequately hope to be able to cover an EEZ effectively. It is possible that a combination of effective radar and surveillance aircraft are better suited to carry out these tasks. Naval vessels obviously have the additional benefit of being able to carry out diplomatic and surface interdiction missions, but the efficacy of a small number in patrolling an EEZ as vast as that of South Africa's is limited. The future utility of naval power in guarding the rights of states in an EEZ is, however, ultimately dependent on the development of international authorities and organisations, such as the Seabed Dispute Authority, in enforcing such rights. In turn, the strength of international law is conversely dependent on the support given by responsible states in upholding that authority. A navy with, at best, only limited surface capabilities might find it easier to justify the continuation of its functions and potential increase in its capacity through an emphasis on the political rather than the purely military advantages of such a force.

POLITICS

The importance of politics cannot be underestimated in the future of naval forces in Southern Africa. In a domestic sense, this applies to the manner in which the South African Navy's role and future is justified and handled. In a wider external sense, it applies to the acceptance and carrying out of regional responsibilities and tasks in Southern Africa, and in providing an 'insurance policy' against outside intrusion.

The corvette debacle illustrated to the public how the SA Navy misread the current political dynamics in South Africa.To the outsider, it was, to use a nautical term, left beached through a mishandling by the political actors, in particular the Department of Trade and Industry. In this, the corvette debate boiled down to an unfortunate and inaccurate choice between 'guns and butter', or in this case between corvettes and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). It looked as if the Navy had not done its homework effectively, when it considered the multitude of permutations available in procuring new vessels. For the public, it was a choice of Yarrows, the Spanish offer and one or two others. For the most part, they did not know of the long and complex procedure in which the SA Navy had been involved. Greater transparency about various available options would ironically have placed the SA Navy in a much better political and tactical position. This is a lesson which must be learnt, not by the SA Navy as much as its ministry, so that future arguments are pitched to the politicians and the public alike, in a manner sensitive to political and especially economic realities.

As such, politics, more than any other factor, are likely to shape the nature of maritime forces and thus South Africa's ability to service maritime responsibilities in the future. The RDP and, after 1999, the continuing focus on socio-economic upliftment, will demand astute justification and deft political footwork.

The corvette issue also raises the need for the procurement of defence equipment to be made within the context of wider strategic vision and review. How can it be possible to procure naval vessels, intrinsically involved in the pursuit of foreign policy without clarity of that policy - in the form of a Foreign Policy White Paper? The debate was not about corvettes, it was about South Africa's future naval, defence and foreign policy requirements. This applies equally to other items of materiel, land, air, or naval. Important, too, in this, is the necessity for South Africa to accept its regional and international responsibilities - if it is to appear a responsible, wise power - in Southern Africa and the indian Ocean Rim in particular.

Within the Southern African region, the South African government's acceptance of regional responsibilities and indeed the repayment of a regional debt of allegiance, will inevitably shape the nature of naval responsibilities. This will extend to areas as diverse as training, collaborative patrols, and perhaps even to joint shipbuilding and ship repair initiatives. As the Deputy Minister of Defence foresaw during the SA Navy conference in August 1994, the South African Navy could become the "leading edge" of the SANDF in promoting peace, stability and economic development in Southern Africa, and could assist in the development of neighbouring navies and foreign ports, such as Luanda, Mombasa and Dar Es Salaam. This will include being a full participant in regional peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance tasks, a role for which the SA Navy already has several impressive assets.

While the Navy gives another 'edge' to the combination of forces which provide security against outside aggression (and this is a role that one can either argue for or against given the vagaries of international politics), it is arguable whether defence forces should be styled on a country's own political perceptions of its status. In other words, force composition should not be based on arguments, such as 'if we are a regional power then we need a navy...' or 'if we want a seat in the United Nations Security Council, then we have to be a naval power'. These arguments have to be carefully scrutinised in an age where economic power is more important than military strength - the former Soviet Union, or China, or from another vantage point of relative decline, France or Great Britain could attest to this. Navies can contribute or add value to diplomatic status, but such contributions are not decisive determinants of national standing.

CONCLUSION

In future, South Africa's naval capacity will be determined by a combination of demands. On the one hand, this refers to the functional demands of policing and providing what could be described as traditional security, or, in other words, the security of the South African state in the maritime domain, protection of sea routes, and so on. On the other hand, and probably far more relevant, naval capacity will also be shaped by the demands of a developing economy and by the socio-political situation within South Africa. In this regard, the capability and strength of the SA Navy will specifically relate to its portion of the budget and the size of the budget itself.

If South Africa is to follow the World Bank/IMF prescription to keep defence spending to just two per cent of GNP, then the Navy will have to work hard to increase its slice of a reduced budget pie in order to afford new equipment. The size of its slice of the budget will critically depend on the role of land-based military forces, as much as it will on the strength of the economy.

If the internal security situation in South Africa, particularly the levels of criminal activity, continues in its present downward spiral, then land-based forces - whether willingly or not - will find themselves maintaining law and order. Their role in this regard also hinges on the success of both the socio-economic upliftment programme (RDP) which could potentially remedy this situation, and the reorganisation and reinvigoration of the South African Police Services.

However, the prognosis in this case is not good for the SA Navy. While one cannot deny the importance of naval forces in meeting a wide variety of functions and tasks, particularly in the realm of so-called traditional security, it is questionable whether a future South Africa will be able to afford this guarantee. The South African economy, in the first place, despite hopeful signs, has yet to display the kind of post-apartheid recovery and growth that everyone wishes and hopes for.

Secondly, despite the existence of the RDP, South Africa has seemingly almost insurmountable socio-economic obstacles to overcome. And these, whether or not the RDP finally gets off the ground, are more likely to get substantially worse, rather than better soon. If one considers population growth rates as an index of the extent of the challenges facing the country in this area - South Africa's current population of 41 million is expected to increase to 58 million in 2010 and 73 million in 2025 - then the scale of the challenge can be appreciated. Moreover, this situation is coupled with extreme inequalities in wealth, with the per capita income of whites approximately twelve times that of blacks, and the income of the richest twenty per cent of households 45 times that of the poorest twenty per cent. This is further compounded by inequalities in the access to educational opportunities.

The SA Navy has become extraordinarily adept at operating with very little money and most of the time with unsuitable equipment. Unless something dramatic occurs to bring about positive change in the country's socio-economic circumstances, or unless a need for naval forces can be found within a broader strategic policy union, this situation could continue into the next century. It might also be, that in purely functional terms, South Africa would be better advised to invest its meagre resources in those equipment that will best enable surveillance of its coastline. Will this be ships, as every sailor would seemingly wish for, or will it be an investment in radar and air-surveillance equipment? Which combination of new or second-hand ships and aircraft will be best suited to the country's needs? Is there a role for increasingly outdated submarines? Which would be better value for money?

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the international ship market is a buyer's and not a seller's market. South Africa has to use its international standing and its status as a regional power to extract the best possible concessions in the procurement of second-hand or new equipment.

ENDNOTES

Edited version of a paper read at the National Maritime Strategic Conference, Navies in Peace and War, Simon's Town, 26 October 1995.



Many of the arguments around maritime threats presented here are contained in Greg Mills, Insecurity and the Developing World, in Greg Mills (ed.), Maritime Policy for Developing Nations, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1995, pp.12-38.



Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition, Penguin, London, 1992, p.91.



M. Edmonds, Current Trends in International Defence Spending, in Greg Mills, et. al. (eds.), South Africa in the Global Economy, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1995, p.133.



A Fleet for the 90s, RUSI Journal, February 1993, p.11.



See The Military Balance, IISS, London.



See, for example, H. van Niekerk, The Implications of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 1982, in Greg Mills (ed.), op. cit., pp.110-128.