INTRODUCTION

History has taught India two bitter lessons: firstly, that neglect of maritime power can culminate in a cession of sovereignty, and secondly, that it takes decades to revert to being a considerable maritime power after a period of neglect and decline.

The implications of the end of the Cold War are now more apparent. An obituary for war would be premature, although the situation on the macro-level is moving towards reconciliation. At micro-level, however, ethnic strife, conflict and tensions have escalated. Low intensity conflict and crises are adversely affecting development and liberation processes in many states. Threats to internal security and sub-nationalism have preoccupied most of the governments, at least in the Asian region.

Alongside the end of Cold War, the historic treaty on laws of the seas has also revived latent maritime disputes and confrontation. While some neighbouring states have adopted a confrontational attitude over maritime zone delimitation, there is enough scope within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to settle disputes amicably through negotiation and arbitration. India has resolved maritime zone delimitations with all its neighbours, except Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Besides disputes over delimitation, clashes of interests in exploitation of marine resources and freedom of navigation are also likely to escalate. The multinational claims on the Spratley islands in the South China Sea, and the US/Libyan stand off on the ‘Line of Death’ are examples of such escalation.

It is therefore quite likely that the world will witness increasing clashes of interests at sea in future.

REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

An evaluation of the interests of developed countries reveals that the Indian Ocean will remain an area of interest to extra-regional powers. The region holds forty per cent of offshore oil reserves, 65 per cent of strategic raw minerals like uranium, 31 per cent of gas, comprises thirty per cent of the total world population, is a potentially large consumer market and has strong economies to match the consumerism.

The extra-regional interests go beyond access to resources or potential markets. The control of strategic choke points to the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Malacca Straits along the oil routes is strategically vital to these powers. The region’s proximity to Antarctica is another factor. Islands and bases in the Indian Ocean will continue to be of interest to extra-regional powers.

The vacuum created by the inadequate naval presence of ten littoral states also provides ample scope for extra-regional powers to operate with unrestricted flexibility. It is believed that strong regional navies would put great economic strain on the extra-regional powers to maintain their naval superiority. In the event, these powers would find it necessary to either accommodate regional powers or else withdraw from the area.

Having identified the extra-regional interests in the Indian Ocean region, it is necessary to emphasise the typical maritime interests of a littoral state and illustrate how these interests would change in the coming decades.

MARITIME INTERESTS

Maritime interests of a state could be broadly classified into three categories: strategic, maritime and resource based.

Strategic interests are primarily oriented towards safe-guarding the security of the state. It would have different connotations in peacetime than during war. The role of the Navy is also likewise oriented and will be returned to in detail below.



The maritime interest imply freedom of navigation for shipping, the enforcement of laws of the sea and, more importantly, it comprises the entire spectrum of shipping. In India, merchant ships carry 95 per cent of the country’s trade, with this figure varying between ninety and 99 per cent for most of the littoral states. It is therefore important that these interests are protected.



Subsequent to the UNCLOS treaty, resource based interests have escalated sharply. Exploitation of oil, gas and offshore minerals, fishing, harnessing of thermal, wave and tidal energy, creation of artificial space in offshore areas are some spheres where interests would grow. Resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) can be considered as an extension of those on land and therefore need to be viewed with the same security outlook.

It can be said, therefore, that the maritime interests of a state primarily concern security and economy, and have a natural tendency to expand with time.

Some information about India’s maritime interests and consequential naval development would serve to strengthen this argument.

Sub-continental India has a coastline of 6 300 kilometres with the island territories of Lakshadweep and Andaman, and Nicobar islands adding another 1 200 kilometres. This coastline harbours eleven major, twenty intermediate and 144 minor ports. When the new Law of the Sea are applied to the country’s coastline, it gives India a staggering 2,2 million square kilometres of EEZ.

India’s natural outlet is towards the sea, through which 95 per cent of its overseas trade passes. The country’s sea lanes are economically important and serve as vital seaborne trade routes through the Indian Ocean. India’s other maritime interests include high value assets in the form of offshore oil and the vast potential of minerals and seabed resources in the waters surrounding it. In addition, India has fishing interests in its EEZ, and the local shipbuilding industry has seen a resurgence in recent years largely due to the Indian urge for self-reliance.

The growth of the Indian Navy has mainly been commensurate with the country’s expanding maritime interests, and should be viewed in that light.

The Indian Navy has come a long way since independence, when India inherited a modest collection of five frigates and six minesweepers. Rightly recognising the vital role the Navy would play in the maritime defence of the country, the development of the Navy started slowly and progressed gradually over the years.

The Indian Navy of today is a three-dimensional combat force which is capable of performing multifarious tasks. The teeth of the Navy are the ships, submarines and aircraft of its Western and Eastern fleets. The elements of the fleet include aircraft carriers, versatile missile destroyers, indigenous missile frigates and missile corvettes. The amphibious ships provide the Navy with a sea-lift capability. India operates a 130 ship navy, with 46 000 uniformed and 48 000 civilian personnel

THE PRESENT DAY INDIAN NAVY

Over the last three decades, the Indian Navy has established a capable in-house design organisation which has designed a whole range of ships, including seaward defence boats, landing craft, landing ships, survey ships, corvettes and frigates. Particularly commendable achievements are the Godavari class frigates, the Khukri class corvettes and large 6 000 ton destroyers built and being built at Indian shipyards. The other indigenous construction programmes in India’s shipyards include the Shishumar class SSK submarines, landing ships and missile vessels. As for the future, India has an on-going programme for the construction of frigates, corvettes, submarines and a fleet tanker to meet the force level requirements of the Navy. Keeping the considerable interests of the country and the prevailing environment in the Indian Ocean region in view, the requirement for a strong navy is evident. What is equally important is that this need is recognised by the Government and people.

THE RELEVANCE OF SEA POWER IN THE MODERN ENVIRONMENT

The classic constituents of sea power have remained unchanged in the last century - naval power, technology, port and maritime infrastructure, political will, seafaring population and economic strength have only gained significance with time.

Sea power is also a reflection of a country’s status and stature. Take for example the permanent members of the UN Security Council. All of them are historically acknowledged sea powers. As of today, India, Brazil and Nigeria are some of the aspirants for permanent seats in the UN Security Council, and it can easily be assumed that a nation without a strong maritime power would stand a small chance of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Sea power is vital to the growth of commerce. With increasing transnational trade, shipping assumes considerable significance. Protection of home shipping and cargo fosters economic growth. In India, for example, Indian hulls carry 25 per cent of the outbound cargo, a figure which is likely to increase to forty per cent by the turn of the century. Associated with trade, is the development of ports and maritime infrastructure. These can neither be neglected nor left unprotected.

Tensions in the region are likely to provide an opportunity for foreign military forces to intervene, either directly or under the auspices of the UN umbrella. Indian Ocean littoral states should take note of these developments. Very often military deployments are preceded by naval deployment for power projection and deterrence. The large-scale extra-regional presence in the Gulf and the recent Chinese initiative in the Indian Ocean are indications of the trends for the future. If these situations are analysed, it will become clear that sea power is increasingly relevant in the modern context.

FEATURES OF NAVAL BUILD-UP AND DEPLOYMENT

There are a few vital general features of a navy that need to be understood and taken into account by naval planners and authorities that deploy a navy in pursuance of national interests.

Briefly, a navy has to be built on maritime interests rather than on threats. If a state plans and develops its navy based on threats, it will end up with a reactive navy. This will require steep mid-course investments in order to reorientate such a navy to the changing threats, and will also cause rapid obsolescence.

substantial part of the navy should be indigenous. War-ship design and construction, and the development of weapons and sensors should therefore form priority areas for growth of maritime power. A look at developed navies reveal that they have extensive shipbuilding capability. Needless to say, joint development programmes are welcomed and makes better economic sense.

A navy cannot concentrate entirely on coastal areas, despite any forms of budgetary constraints, as coastal concentration neither caters for the protection of shipping, nor does it allow such a navy the necessary flexibility to choose a point of engagement at sea should the occasion arise. Quite obviously such a navy will be tied down to the coasts, whereas reach and sustainability, important factors in the planning of naval forces, will be neglected. Smaller ships are obviously somewhat restricted by heavy seas and bad weather, and under such conditions ‘Cape’ fever will affect the efficiency of these small vessels. The Soviet change from being a coastal navy to a blue water navy in the early 1960s was the result of a realisation of these shortcomings.

Sea power can be used very effectively to support political and diplomatic objectives. This has been seen first in the days of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and is equally prevalent today. US naval deployments off Granada and Haiti support this argument.

A warship can be a symbol of goodwill or threat. It is a versatile platform, which is almost self-contained, and can be deployed quickly at the scene of action and as easily be disengaged. This versatility in managing a crisis through graduated response is only peculiar to a warship. It can send out signals ranging from friendship to menacing threats.

CHANGING ROLE OF NAVIES

Traditionally, the roles of the navy could be classified into four broad categories - policing, diplotic, crisis and military. All these roles are oriented and weighted to meet the maritime interests in the prevailing environment.

With changes in the political and geo-strategic environment, some of these roles become predominant. The end of the Cold War and consequent mitigation of threats of general and limited wars have shifted the focus of the navies away from the military role, but political situations can change rapidly, faster than the rate at which a navy can reorientate itself and it may therefore not be prudent to side-track the military role.

The policing role entails the protection of resources, enforcing national maritime laws relating to merchant shipping, fishing, fiscal, marine environment, contraband control, drug running and immigration. Some states, in recognition of the need to police long coastal lines and large EEZs, have created Coast Guard services to manage and fulfil these functions. A maritime nation has to evaluate whether it makes economic or management sense to do so. Co-ordination, duplication of force levels and interservice rivalry are some of the pitfalls. Integrated management is the key to effective handling of maritime affairs and navies could continue to perform these functions, albeit with platforms suitable to enforcement. There are certain advantages, however, to having a Coast Guard which concentrates its energies on law enforcement in the EEZ, leaving the navy to hone its war-fighting skills.

The diplomatic role of navies is often not fully understood. Navies can create a favourable national image abroad, establish states’ rights at sea and show interest in offshore and distant areas. It can influence the behaviour and response of other states and provide timely help and protection to friendly governments. Navies achieve these roles through interaction with foreign navies at sea and ashore in training and joint development projects. Interaction of Indian Ocean littoral states in this respect is vital to regional peace. White ensigns are symbols of influence and should be seen more often at sea and in foreign ports. Diplomacy without military power is like music without an instrument.

The concept of freedom of the seas makes navies a potent instrument in handling crises. It is not important whether the area in question is coastal or land-locked. Preceding ‘Operation Desert Storm’, US carrier forces stationed off Lebanon conveyed a serious threat to the Iraqi regime hundreds of miles away.

The world is likely to witness increasing crises and states should establish an operational philosophy to enable them to deal with such situations. An imperative for the navy is to establish co-ordination procedures that include diplomatic services and other elements, such as the merchant navy and ocean agencies. The deployment of navies in UN peacekeeping missions is also likely to escalate.

In summary, the policing, diplomatic and crisis roles of a navy would become predominant in the near future. Navies will be called upon to perform the difficult task of policing open seas and at times will also be expected to provide assistance in humanitarian missions. World-wide navies can no longer act in isolation and will have to co-ordinate with other elements of seapower effectively. Calls on foreign ports and interaction with regional navies at sea will provide an impetus to the fostering of friendly relations.

The development of the Indian Navy has been geared towards the establishment of a balanced navy. In the past many people accused India of ambitious naval expansionism. Yet the size of the navy is dependent on the maritime interests of each individual country. Other states therefore need not imitate the size or the strength of India’s navy, a country which also has one sixth of the worlds’ population.

India would like to contribute towards peace and stability in the region. In view of the prevailing environment, the Indian Ocean littorals have no alternative but to increase their maritime capability progressively and start the process of co-operation. The aim of such an arrangement would be to create an atmosphere conducive to the peaceful resolution of all disputes and ensure that proper and immediate steps are taken to defuse the potential areas of conflict. If this arrangement is to function effectively, the major powers would have to endorse such a move and extend active co-operation to ensure that lasting peace and stability is maintained in the Indian Ocean.

An excellent starting point would be to initiate co-operation between regional navies. The fraternity of the seas is universal and men in naval uniform speak a common language, regardless of nationality, colour or creed.

Broadly the specific areas where naval co-operation and initiatives could be developed are:

exchange of ship visits and conducting of joint exercises;



striving for greater transparency by setting up a regional ship plot and providing advance information about exercises;



setting up of joint task forces to respond to natural calamities, such as cyclones, famines and rescue operations at sea;
making joint efforts to tackle maritime pollution, the conservation of the marine environment, combatting drug trafficking, smuggling, terrorism and piracy; and



pooling of the expertise of littoral nations in specific areas of training and technology, interaction in ship design and construction, hydrography and the development of hi-technology equipment.

These proposals envisage the perfect cocktail of international relations, where the balance of power, the balance of interests, and respect and sensitivity for each other are maintained. Once naval interaction occurs it would open a window of opportunity for major initiatives in regional co-operation.

The significance of such a regional arrangement is that it is not intended to be based on a military alliance nor to revolve around a political axis. It would merely be an alignment of the Indian Ocean states in an effort to promote co-operation and dialogue to ensure that extra-regional powers do not exploit regional conflicts. The long-term objective should be to convince the extra-regional powers that the Indian Ocean community is able to take care of itself through mutually beneficial regional arrangements.

CONCLUSION

The lessons of history have clearly shown that nations who neglected the sea, paid dearly for this neglect, often with the loss of their independence, while strong maritime powers flourished and prospered.

Today, the relevance of sea power is greater than ever before. Since the national interests of a nation are congruent with its maritime interests, which in turn have expanded enormously with time, it is imperative that mindsets that are dominated by an orientation towards the land, are balanced by the proper recognition of the importance of the power of the sea.

1Paper read at the Annual Navy Conference: Navies in Peace and War, Simon’s Town, 26 October 1996.