INTRODUCTION

In the past, South Africa has attempted to attain a level of self-sufficiency in the design and manufacture of complete armament systems commensurate with the high threat perception prevalent at the time. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the negotiated settlement in South Africa which followed shortly thereafter, the strategic environment within the region has undergone a dramatic change. The central strategic challenge is no longer that of deterrence, but of building common regional security.2

In the absence of a clearly defined external military threat, and in accordance with many armed forces internationally, the South African Department of Defence has therefore adopted what is termed a `threat-independent' approach, based on the retention of balanced key or core capabilities. It is from this core capability that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) plans to expand, over time, its war-fighting capabilities to meet a future external military threat. Such an approach makes more sense than the reliance on hypothetical, far-fetched threat scenarios, but relies on adequate early warning of several years to allow the core capacity to be expanded to the level required.3

There are some exceptions to the adoption of a comprehensive threat-independent approach. Perhaps the best example would be the retention by South Africa, of its submarine capacity which, if closed down, would require anything between 15 to 20 years to re-establish. The deterrent capacity of the submarine flotilla in the turbulent oceans around the Cape places this system in a separate league to most other weapon systems. Submarines have the capacity to influence the actions and options of much more powerful countries than South Africa significantly as Britain found out during the war in the Falklands.4

South Africa cannot aspire to self-sufficiency in defence manufacturing within this changed strategic environment. Nor can the country afford such a programme. In order to maintain even the most rudimentary economies of scale to recover investment in plant and equipment while holding down unit cost, the defence manufacturing industry must be allowed to export vigorously.

A domestic defence manufacturing capacity has proven to be a source of additional foreign exchange for the South African Government through import substitution, as well as through enabling the transfer of high technology to civilian industry, skills training and the provision of employment. Yet, the real added value of these benefits have been the source of some debate within South Africa and elsewhere. For example, the Green Paper on Technology, published by the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, originally ignored the submissions made by the South African defence industry, despite the fact that the defence industry argued that it was a leader and a catalyst in the growth of the high-technology manufacturing industry in South Africa, as well as a leader in technology development, local systems and product design and development, quality standards, and export promotion.5 This deficiency was subsequently rectified in the Draft White Paper on Science and Technology.

Core defence capabilities, however, are not restricted to the retention of certain combat systems. They include the retention of key technologies to be able to develop and manufacture arms, and to improve, repair and maintain systems should the need arise. As a result, defence research and development funds become a strategic resource that requires careful management and investment in peacetime.

Similarly, without the retention of a core defence technology basis, that is able to evaluate, adjudicate and advise, the foreign (and local) procurement of arms becomes much of a hit and miss affair. Modern weapon systems are extremely complex, as are the accompanying tenders and specifications in particular when evaluating total life cycle costs and upgrade potential over several decades, as is the case with larger systems, such as aircraft and naval vessels.

In the management of defence requirements, the scientific and technology advisory function therefore takes on a specific importance. In South Africa, the Department of Defence has to grapple with the question of how to spend scarce defence research and development funds to the best advantage to enable sound and informed acquisition decisions, as well as to identify and retain core technology capacities. At least in theory, such a capacity should lead to more appropriate and cost-effective defence procurement decisions.6 Both are highly complex questions and in themselves require ongoing research and investigation.

This article presents a brief and admittedly incomplete overview of the South African defence research and development activity, particularly that of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and situates its capacity within the context of the wider defence debate. It draws extensively from official ARMSCOR documents, as well as a series of interviews with key persons within ARMSCOR and the CSIR.7 This is an area which has thus far been rarely subjected to publication.

DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D)

ARMSCOR defines defence related research and development as follows:

"R&D, in the broadest sense, may be interpreted as all scientific and engineering effort that precedes the production phase of any new item - i.e., operations research, basic research, applied research, experimental development, full-scale development, industrialisation and prototype manufacture. In the armaments industry, the full-scale development, industrialisation and prototyping phases are often referred to generically as product development (or engineering development) and are normally regarded as part of the acquisition process of which the result is the production and delivery of operationally deployable products to the SANDF.

Basic and applied research (and often also experimental development), on the other hand, is generally not aimed directly at the delivery of hardware products, but rather at establishing knowledge and skills (technology) that may be required for some future acquisition programmes - they are commonly referred to as technology development phases.

Although knowledge and skills are also established during the product development phases (indeed, the level of engineering effort and cost is much greater than in the earlier phases), it is important to understand the difference in the two driving forces of the various phases - i.e. technology driven or product driven - as this largely determines the management processes appropriate to the different phases.

In selected areas key technologies will be maintained at an advanced level through the concept of advanced technology demonstrator development. This concept requires the almost continuous development and upgrading of prototypes of new weapon systems with state-of-the-art technology, without necessarily going into full-scale development or production, unless there is a need for the replacement of equipment due to age or obsolescence, or for force expansion. This strategy has been employed to good effect by South Africa with the Rooivalk helicopter, the Tank Technology Demonstrator and Advanced Artillery Demonstrator."8

Given the decrease in the defence budget, the future structure of the South African defence industry will primarily be determined by market forces. However, strategic non-profitable facilities with limited commercial applications have to be retained in the public sector. These include specialised defence research and development facilities, test ranges and test laboratories. A national defence technology development programme also requires the selection of `preferred suppliers' and `centres of expertise', to achieve the necessary long term commitment from both the State and industry to develop and maintain certain levels of technological expertise. These facilities are presently structured as a national defence research establishment within the CSIR, ARMSCOR and other public organisations, and maintained as strategic facilities by the State.9

The commitment to defence research requires minimum levels of funding to maintain the required levels of competence. As a result, the Department of Defence (DoD) supports, directs and contracts the defence industry to run a limited number of long term core research and development programmes to enable it to maintain the necessary width and depth of engineering and production skill to provide support and produce products for local use and export.10 These core programmes "... are planned and updated on a continuous basis, will look at least 15 years into the future and will cover all aspects of the product life-cycle, from technology to production and product support to enable the industry to maintain its core capabilities. They will create new or upgraded products for the local and/or the export market to enable the industry to keep its production capability alive and to earn income, and they will be selected to be of maximum economic and strategic value to South Africa within affordable cost."11 As a result, the Department of Defence publishes a Long Term Defence Requirements Statement (20 years) annually to guide long term technology and industrial planning.12

According to its draft position paper for the Defence Review,13 the Department has identified the following strategic non-profitable research, development, test and evaluation facilities which will be retained in the public sector:

CSIR's Aerotek Wind Tunnels (see below);



Denel's Overberg Test Range and Gerotek Environmental Test Laboratory;



ARMSCOR's Alkantpan Artillery Test Range, the Institute for Maritime Technology, the Elandsfontein Vehicle Test Range and the Protechnik and Hazmat Chemical Defence Laboratories; and



the Paardefontein Antenna Test Range.

The Government has further determined that, in principle, no new defence industry will be established with State funding, either in the public or private sector. The use of the commercial industrial base will therefore be maximised.14

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE BUDGET

The South African defence budget is spent through three channels the SANDF direct expenditure on salaries and administration, the Defence Account for non-military or civilian type items, and the Special Defence Account for military specific items called `armaments'. Of the 1995 defence budget of R10,5 billion, R4 billion was directly expended on salaries and administration, R3,05 billion through the Defence Account, and R3,5 billion through the Special Defence Account. Most of the Defence Account purchases are made through the mechanism of the State Tender Board, while all the Special Defence Account purchases are expended by ARMSCOR, on behalf of the Defence Force.15

Purchases are either of a capital nature or an operating nature. Thus, of the R3,05 billion expended in the Defence Account, R334 million is for capital items, among them motor vehicles and furniture, while R2,7 billion is for consumable items or maintenance, such as stationery, food or fuel. Most of the Special Defence Account of R2,5 billion is spent on capital items, mainly major systems such as aircraft, ships and armoured vehicles, while R957 million is spent on consumable items, including ammunition, spares and maintenance of military equipment. Included in the allocation of the Special Defence Account is an amount of R520 million for research and development.16 This represents approximately fifteen per cent of the acquisition budget of the SANDF, compared to 44 per cent in the US and 28 per cent in the UK respectively.17

Of the total of R3,5 billion spent by ARMSCOR, an estimated R800 million is used on imported equipment leaving slightly less than R2,7 billion for the local defence industry.18

The Department of Defence is therefore one of the largest government clients of the local industry. Through its capital procurement programme, the National Defence Force is also one of the largest end-users of science and technology in the country. The advanced technological nature of defence equipment development programmes, and the current world-wide decline in the production demand for such equipment, often result in very high development to production cost ratios. According to ARMSCOR, this makes such programmes unattractive for private funding by industry.

R&D SPENDING WITHIN THE SA DEFENCE BUDGET

As a general rule, military R&D in South Africa is undertaken by private and non-defence public industries, and not through a dedicated state institution as is the case in countries such as Britain, Canada, Holland and Sweden. As a result, the larger portion of R&D contracted by the DoD takes place outside the Department of Defence, with ninety per cent of such activities being undertaken either within Denel or the private sector. Within the Department there are, for example, only three facilities belonging to ARMSCOR for R&D purposes, namely:19

the Institute for Maritime Technology (IMT), dedicated to research and problem solving for the SA Navy;



Protechnik Laboratories, dedicated to research on chemical defence technologies; and



the Alkantpan Artillery Test Range.

The total expenditure at these facilities constitutes less than five per cent of the Department of Defence's total research and development spending.

Defence R&D spending in South Africa occurs through two mechanisms: Technology Development Funds and full-scale developments. Based on the Rand's value in 1994, this funding occurred as indicated in Table 1.

TABLE 1

The R300 million R&D spending from the Technology Development Funds is divided into eight programmes (aircraft, missiles, vehicles, weapons and ammunition, maritime, chemical defence, personnel support, electronics), consisting of some 200 projects, ranging in value from R300 000 to R3 million annually. The projects cover:

strategic necessities, such as Electronic Warfare;



new technologies for leading edge armament;



development and retention of capabilities to provide short term technical support;



consultation on new acquisitions;



extension of the useful life of current systems; and



upgrading of the performance of current systems.

Given the limited amounts involved, R&D in South Africa focuses on applied rather than basic research, strongly driven by user requirements. In selected areas, key technologies are maintained at a more advanced level through the concept of advanced technology demonstrator development.20

The amount spent by the defence industry on research and development has decreased significantly inrecent years. By 1996 there is a clear risk that the technological advantages that have been developed and achieved by South Africa during the preceding years will be lost if additional R&D investment is not made.21

LOCAL INDUSTRY SUPPORT

Adjudication of tenders for defence procurement within the DoD will, according to official policy, "... not necessarily be based on the lowest price, but on value for money and industrial development goals. As part of the tender evaluation process, the concept of cost evaluation based on life cycle costing (cost of ownership) shall be employed."22

In accordance with international practice, general preference is given to the local procurement of defence products and services, provided that such preference does not exceed ten per cent of a hundred per cent local content product, and provided that such procurement represents good value for money.23 Specific negotiations obviously occur in the case of an item composed of a mix of local and foreign components.

Officially the Department has committed itself to a policy of "no preference for the public sector industry (i.e. Denel) versus the private sector industry in the allocation of tenders."24

The policy in the case of the foreign acquisition of defence equipment and related items is that all contracts with a value of R5 million and more, are subject to a counter trade and/or offset requirement of at least sixty per cent with the stated goal that this figure is increased to a hundred per cent by 1998.25

The DoD has formulated a set of policy guidelines for the acquisition of capital equipment based on the premise that South Africa will only strive for limited self-sufficiency in key areas. According to the input by the Department to the Green Paper on Science and Technology,26 key areas for local acquisition take the following aspects into account:

the military need for local defence industrial capabilities as dictated by: operational requirements; environmental requirements; logistic requirements; and vulnerability of foreign supply;



the opportunities for the industry in terms of: future local military and security equipment needs; regional and international niche markets; and civilian applications of technology; and



the current capabilities of the defence industry.

From these considerations a preferred acquisition option for particular types of equipment and services is derived, which could be either:27

dedicated local procurement (self-sufficiency);



outright foreign procurement (with counter-trade);



competitive procurement (competing local and foreign suppliers); or



procurement from local suppliers with foreign partners.

R&D programmes aimed at the acquisition of equipment are therefore targeted primarily at those areas where self-sufficiency is to be maintained. In other selected areas, R&D may also be undertaken in order to secure an adequate technology base to provide the SANDF with the necessary logistic and maintenance support, as well as to provide advice and consultation on technical operational problems and the procurement of foreign equipment.28 As a result, the DoD selects `preferred suppliers' and `centres of expertise' to achieve the necessary long term commitment from both the State and industry to build and maintain certain minimum levels of technological expertise. These are discussed in greater detail below.

JOINT VENTURES, ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

As a result of the high levels of spending in the past and the innovation of the local industry, South African defence technology has achieved a world-class reputation in certain select areas. With a dramatically reduced military budget, foreign partnerships and joint ventures with industries in other countries could potentially provide for the valuable transfer of technology and expanded marketing opportunities. This could partially serve as a mechanism to offset the reductions in local military R&D spending. In this context, the DoD Defence Industry Policy states that, "[t]he government shall enter into agreements with other governments to enable the industries to co-operate and each government will financially support and maintain its own industry ... The governments shall be committed to eventually acquire the successful products produced by the partnerships."29 These aspects are generally included in a Memorandum of Understanding between the respective countries, examples are those signed between South Africa and Britain and Israel. Foreign companies wishing to enter the local market are further required to form partnerships with local accredited defence suppliers.30

Amongst the companies surveyed by the South African Defence Industry Association (SADIA) during the latter half of 1995, twelve companies reported to have entered into a total of 93 joint ventures with companies in other countries. Of these, 29 per cent involve technology with a civilian application, 63 per cent with a defence application and seven per cent with an application in both areas. Thus, seventy per cent of the joint ventures are dealing with defence technology applications. In only 27 per cent of the joint ventures, the source of the technology is outside South Africa, in 46 per cent the technology source is from within this country, while in 28 per cent of ventures, technology is expected to flow in both directions. These figures reveal the considerable degree of technical competency that has been established in the defence industries, as more than 74 per cent of joint ventures will involve technology sourced in South Africa.31 At the same time, the real fear remains that, without additional R&D funding, the technological edge built up by the local defence industry over the years will soon be `transferred', reducing the South African contribution to such partnerships in the future.

According to SADIA, most joint ventures are with companies in the UK, numbering 26, followed by France with twelve. There are nine joint ventures with companies in each of the US, Germany and Malaysia. Joint ventures have been established with companies from twenty different countries.32

Clearly, South Africa will have to rely in future on the international defence industry for its defence R&D requirements to a much greater extent than has been the case in the past. South African production of large and complex defence systems, such as the G5 and G6 artillery systems or the Rooivalk helicopter, will not be possible with the reductions in defence expenditure in recent years. As local spending declines, the careful management of the available R&D funds is increasingly important and will require appropriate and detailed oversight by suitably qualified personnel within and outside of the DoD.

TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

The Department of Defence defines acquisition as "[a]ll actions that have to be taken to satisfy the need for materiel, facilities or logistic services. It involves, in sequence, requirements planning, operational research, technology acquisition, design and development, operational qualification, industrialisation, initial procurement and commissioning."33 All four components of the Department of Defence are involved in acquisition, namely the Ministry, the Secretariat, the SANDF and ARMSCOR. The ultimate political authority and responsibility for acquisition rests with the Ministry. The SANDF is responsible for the determining its armaments requirements. The Defence Secretariat undertakes the high level programming, budgeting, control and audit of defence expenditure. ARMSCOR undertakes programme management and contracts industry for armaments acquisition. ARMSCOR also oversees local industrial development to support acquisition programmes.34

The relationship between top level organisations involved in R&D within the broad acquisition process within the Department are depicted in the Figure. The Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC), chaired by the Minister of Defence, approves departmental industry and acquisition policies, as well as high level plans for acquisition and technology development. This council includes the Chief of the SANDF, the Secretary of Defence and head of ARMSCOR.

The Armaments Acquisition Steering Board (AASB), chaired by the Secretary of Defence, co-ordinates acquisition planning and technology development planning and ensures compliance with long term SANDF requirements planning. It also approves identified `core' R&D programmes. The AASB consists of senior personnel of the SANDF and the Defence Secretariat, and personnel of ARMSCOR involved in acquisition.

The Defence Research and Development Board (DRDB) is responsible for policy, guidelines, value systems and overall budget and strategy for the entire technology development effort, as well as the referral of core R&D (Technology) programmes to higher level. As such, the DRDB has, as its primary function, the prioritisation and executive management of technology projects within the available technology budgets.

As the primary agent responsible for defence technology management within the Department, the DRDB is accountable to the Secretary of Defence through the Armaments Acquisition Steering Board (AASB) that, in turn, reports to the Minister of Defence via the Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC).

The DRDB, in turn, oversees the activities of the Armaments Technology Acquisition Secretariat (ATAS) that is charged with the daily management of technology development programmes.

The development programmes are grouped into a number of specialist technology areas, each of which is controlled by a Steering Committee, comprising representatives from the SANDF and ARMSCOR at operational management level. Steering Committees, in turn, are subdivided into specialised Study Teams, comprising specialist representatives at the operational level from the SANDF and ARMSCOR, as well as technical specialists from industry and other science and technology institutions.

Although the structure is permanent, only the ATAS is staffed on a full-time basis. The other structures meet at regular intervals to provide input for planning, budgeting, co-ordination and control.

Having presented the framework within which R&D occurs within the Department of Defence, the remainder of this article describes the specific contribution of the CSIR.

THE CSIR AND DEFENCE R&D

Introduction

The CSIR has been involved in defence research since its establishment in 1945. In that year, Field Marshal Jan Smuts, the country's Prime Minister, asked the developer of and expert in the application of radar in South Africa, Dr Basil Schonland, to establish a council for scientific and industrial research. A member of the British War Cabinet during the Second World War and the intimate advisor of Churchill, Smuts was a keen amateur scientist, avid reader and visionary with an acute appreciation of the impact of technology on the conduct of war. The involvement of the CSIR in defence-related research would subsequently be accelerated by Smuts' political defeat in 1948 and the increased international isolation in the years that followed the election victory of the National Party.

With the arms embargo against South Africa gaining momentum, a National Institute for Rocket Research was established within the CSIR during 1963. The Institute was converted into the National Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) in 1965. The goal of the Institute was to develop those capabilities in science and technology associated with modern weaponry and in particular in guided missiles in South Africa. NIDR became the National Institute for Aeronautical Systems Technology in 1978, when Kentron was split off and ARU was integrated. This changed to the Division of Aeronautical Systems Technology (DAST) in 1988 and was subsequently transformed into the CSIR's Division of Manufacturing and Aeronautical Systems Technology (Aerotek).35 At present, Aerotek has the largest defence-related R&D programme within the CSIR (see below).

Important components of the South African defence industry therefore originated from the CSIR. On 6 February 1978, for example, the Minister of Defence announced that the development and manufacture of missiles was to be transferred from the CSIR to a wholly owned affiliate company of ARMSCOR, Brimstone Projects, since the increased manufacturing activities were contrary to the statutory mandate of the CSIR.36 Brimstone eventually became Kentron, presently part of Denel. Among other facilities and companies that in one way or another originated from the CSIR, are Techlogic (part of the Altech group), Atlas, and a large part of the electronic warfare capacity.

Since 1965, the CSIR has been specifically contracted to supply some typical Defence Research Institute (DRI) functions in support of the goals of the Defence Force and ARMSCOR. These functions are the development and maintenance of a core technology base and its application in a number of agreed key technology areas in line with the SANDF's military technology strategy. The purpose of the technology base is to:

provide an agreed set of strategically important technical support services to the SANDF; and



support the local military industry with leading edge technology required for the development and production of military products that are competitive on the world market.

Obviously the CSIR only focuses on a small number of key technology areas. Currently, these areas are radar, electronic warfare, infra-red missile evaluation and countermeasures, electro-optics, aero-elasticity, aerodynamics, turbine engine and airframe repairs and life extension, and composite materials and structures.37

In 1987 the CSIR started with a restructuring that saw its external income grow from almost nothing (i.e. entirely dependent upon government funding) to a situation where it derives close to sixty per cent of external revenue from the private sector. The CSIR has a turnover of R497 million at present and a staff component of almost 2 700 scientists, technologists, engineers and support staff. The Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology appoints the members of the CSIR Board in terms of the Scientific Research Council Act, 1988. Executive responsibility for the organisation rests with the Executive Management Board.38

The objective of the CSIR is to foster industrial and scientific development through directed and particularly through multi-disciplinary research and technological innovation.39 It attempts to achieve this through interaction with its clients at four levels,40 namely:

the provision of specialist services, generally on a consulting basis;



contract research to solve immediate problems;



contract research to produce a new product or process; and



a strategic partnership between itself and its client. This implies that the CSIR becomes involved in the long term strategic planning of its client's technology base and direction and provides decision support and technology development.

After its most recent changes the CSIR has the following operational divisions:41

Manufacturing and Aeronautical Systems Technology (Aerotek)



Environmental Technology (recently amalgamated from Water, Forest Science and Earth, Marine and Atmospheric Science Divisions) (Evironmentek)



Materials Science and Technology (Mattek)



Mining Technology (Miningtek)



Building Technology (Boutek)



Food Science and Technology (Foodtek)



Microelectronics and Communications Technology (Mikomtek)



Roads and Transport Technology (Transportek)



Information Services (Informationtek)



Textile Technology (Textek)

The turnover of the CSIR, according to most important category, for the period 1992-1995 is indicated in Table 2.42

TABLE 2

By 1995, more than half of the total income of the CSIR was derived from contractual income, as opposed to a parliamentary grant.

The various divisions within the CSIR are managed as business units, with most being market-related a development necessitated by the steady reduction in the parliamentary grant which is annually allocated to the CSIR. Within the CSIR, collaboration occurs across business units with the result, for example, that Mattek and Aerotek often collaborate.

The CSIR is predominantly involved in what it terms `the technology development and transfer business', attempting to work with an industrial partner from an early stage and is prohibited, by law, from becoming involved in production work, although the dividing line between prototypes, demonstrators and `production' is often a thin one. Most of the CSIR `production' work derives from the special facilities that have been established at the CSIR.

By running this limited `development production' service, the CSIR supports South African industry in general. The customer may knock on the door of the CSIR or the CSIR may market its services to a client for joint development. The CSIR, for example, is the statutorytesting laboratory for the mining industry and has the largest mechanical testing machine in the country. The tendency is rather to offer value-added services and not merely instrumentation services.43

With South Africa's return to the international community, the climate is particularly favourable for international science and technology co-operation. As a result, the CSIR has forged international co-operation agreements with foreign research establishments, such as the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation in Australia, and the Industrial Technology Research Institute of the Republic of China. The organisation also actively participated in existing inter-government agreements, such as those with the Republic of China and France, the latter especially in terms of the Satellite Application Centre at Hartbeeshoek, which the CSIR took over in 1973.44

During 1994/5 the CSIR income from defence-related work was essentially divided between three of its operating divisions:45

Aerotek 74%


Mattek 17%


Mikomtek 8%


Other 1%

In summary, the CSIR is a statutory body organised as a contract research organisation. Aerotek, the division most heavily involved in defence research, has a special `strategic partnership' with the SANDF to operate a Defence Research Institute for the military, which is responsible for the cost-effective development, maintenance and application of an advanced ready technology base concentrating on offensive and defensive air capacity.46

The following sections will each briefly describe the more important activities of the three divisions of the CSIR most heavily involved in defence R&D, namely Aerotek, Mattek and Mikomtek.

Aerotek

The CSIR's Division of Manufacturing and Aeronautical Systems Technology (Aerotek) is considered to be the South African leader in aerospace research and development, and has by far the largest defence-related R&D programme within the CSIR.

Aerotek has particular experience in fields such as turbo-machinery, structural design and analysis. Its expertise in the application of composite materials in South Africa has resulted in a large range of products, such as radar domes, remotely piloted vehicles, airframe components and complete aircraft. Among its more important developments is a world-first carbon fibre turbo-prop trainer aircraft which was publicly unveiled in December 1991. At the time, the South African Air Force considered the acquisition of the trainer, but eventually decided in favour of the Pilatus from Switzerland largely due to the fact that the CSIR aircraft had not yet achieved industrial production status. Other products include an armoured seat developed in collaboration with Atlas Aviation for protecting aircraft personnel against small-arms fire. Aerotek also provides a range of personnel protection equipment, such as composite/ceramic panels and curtains and also undertakes small-arms threat evaluation, and the manufacture of aircraft fuel tanks from composite materials. Another Aerotek product is a new vortex tube filter for helicopters, developed by the CSIR in collaboration with ELOSEP.47

Aerotek presently has a structural laboratory and nine test facilities for experimental aerodynamics. All the facilities are equipped with advanced data acquisition and analysis systems. Services are focused on the aerodynamic characteristics of new and modified aircraft, vibration analyses of airborne structures, flutter flight testing (airframe modal frequencies and damping) and other incidental aero-elastic phenomena. Aerodynamic analyses have been performed on more than 120 different aircraft compositions, ranging from military fighters to microlight aircraft. Vibration analyses have been done on structures, ranging from industrial turning and mining machinery to helicopter engine cowls. A variety of numerical and theoretical techniques is used to analyse the flow over structures including aircraft, helicopters, missiles and cars.48

Aerotek operates four wind tunnels for its major contracts, namely:49

a high-speed wind tunnel which is a trisonic blowdown tunnel equipped with a colour Schlieren flow visualisation system;



a medium-speed wind tunnel which is Aerotek's major testing facility, operating from Mach 0,2 to Mach 1,5;



a low-speed wind tunnel which operates up to a speed of 120 m/s. Models are mounted on a variety of six-component balances for testing the three aerodynamic forces of lift, drag and side-force and the three movements of pitch, roll and yaw; and



a seven metre continuous open wind tunnel circuit test facility powered by 28 axial flow fans. The speed in the test section ranges from 2 to 3 m/s and is adjusted by switching on one of thirteen different fan patterns.

A further five facilities are available for a wide variety of tests: a water tunnel, a cascade tunnel, a two metre wind tunnel, the calibration tunnel and the turbine test facility.50 The Department of Defence has classified Aerotek's wind tunnels as one of eight `strategic research, development and evaluation facilities' in the country.51

Radar and electronic warfare technologies are also part of Aerotek's capacities. In the mid-1980s, the CSIR was involved as a technical consultant to the South African Air Force and ARMSCOR in several overseas acquisition projects, one of which was the airborne fire-control radar of the Cheetah aircraft. A contract for the development of the Meccano radar was placed with Aerotek and the sub-system technologies have been developed. Development of the full three-channel monopulse tracking radar is currently under way, and a project to develop a one-dimensional active phased-array antenna for integration with the Meccano radar has begun in 1995.52

Aerotek employs about 470 persons, has a capital investment estimated at R220 million, a budget (1995/6) of R94 million, of which 76 per cent is not from the CSIR's annual parliamentary income. This contract income of R77,4 million was divided as indicated in Table 3.53

TABLE 3

Aerotek lists the following core military technology competency areas:54

Radar and radar countermeasures;


Infra-red evaluation and countermeasures;


Electro-optical systems;


Aeroelasticity;


Experimental aerodynamics;


Computational fluid aerodynamics; and


Composite material technology.

Mattek

In 1982, the National Institute of Materials Research was established, and in 1988, with the restructuring of the CSIR, it became the Division of Material Science and Technology (Mattek). Since that time, it has employed chemists and energy technologists so that its engineering component has been strengthened to complement its expertise in materials technology. This, according to Mattek Director, Dr Neville Comins, has enabled Mattek to vertically integrate to component and sub-system level.55

Today, Mattek has a staff complement of some 400 persons with an annual turnover of R70 million of which about R10 million is defence-related. Mattek earns about two-thirds of its turnover from external contract work (i.e. outside of government grant).56

In terms of the ARMSCOR systems hierarchy, materials are obviously at the bottom. The military technologies within Mattek can be listed as follows:57

gas-turbine materials;



airframe structural integrity and failure investigations;



thermal spray repair technology (high quality surface engineering, welding and brazing technology support, supported by thermal spraying and advanced robotic welding facilities);



sonar transducers; and



solid state gyroscopes.

Its focus implies that Mattek deals in the life cycle of components during their manufacture, erosion, fatigue, mechanical damage, and so on. Other areas are those of failure investigations, ways to produce better materials for component manufacture, with a significant amount of work being done in materials research, components repair and sonar sensor development.58

Mattek's expertise is often used by the South African Air Force during investigations for boards of enquiry, failure reporting and incident reporting normally/ideally the output from these investigations is fed into the logistic maintenance cycle and converted to cost saving measures.59

Mattek's most important expertise lies in the field of underwater acoustics. This capability developed from an original involvement in the manufacturing of transducer material (typically used in sonar applications within water). The technology has both defence and civilian applications and is presently being marketed internationally (the supply of transducers and fully integrated detectors and transmitter heads). Mattek has a number of instruments in the commercial marketplace that have been fully manufactured and designed.60

The ultrasonic environment has also enabled Mattek to move into the development of solid state gyroscopes. Two different systems have been developed, namely piezoelectric gyroscopes based on transducer technology and fibre-optic gyroscopes. Both are at a stage where discussions with overseas partners are taking place and both have potential commercial applications. Mattek is also moving into the area of actuators, but this is still at an early development stage.61

Mattek was originally involved in improving the performance of gas-turbine engines, such as those for the Air Force, where high temperature materials were an important component. This led to its involvement in single crystal turbine technology, which was developed and demonstrated in engines for upgrade potential. At the stage that the technology became viable for production application, the requirement from the SAAF changed. The capacity remains, however, and is considered for repair and maintenance purposes, both in gas-turbine engines and in commercial and industrial plants. A development programme with superalloys (very high temperature alloys used in gas-turbine engines) is also in existence. Some of these superalloys have already been internationally patented and an international agreement with a non-defence related partner is in place.62

In the past, Mattek was also involved in advanced ceramics, but most of this work has now been phased out.

Mikomtek

Mikomtek was established in 1988 through an amalgamation of a number of divisions within the CSIR, and included among its staff persons with a physics, materials research, telecommunications and radion propagation and electronic engineering background.63 It has the smallest involvement in defence-related R&D of the three operating divisions within the CSIR, with a staff complement of approximately 220 personnel.

Mikomtek receives fifty per cent of its total annual income of R50 million via the parliamentary grant to the CSIR. The R25 million earned through external work originates in roughly equal portions from the South African defence industry, the South African private industry and overseas work. In the latter case, most of the income is derived from the Hartbeeshoek satellite tracking station. Through Hartbeeshoek, Mikomtek is involved in all Ariane satellite launches of the CNES group in France and has been approached by a number of other companies for similar work.64

The Mikomtek product `Supertag' has been licensed in Britain (ECL) and with a number of Japanese, Canadian and South African companies. This product is based on proximity fuse technology with a potential application of instantly counting items in a shopping basket, for example, without the requirement to scan each item separately.65

In terms of military technology, Mikomtek traditionally worked in the following sectors:66

initially working in traditional military intelligence applications such as scramblers, activities developed, in time, to an involvement in computers and secure information networking systems (through applications such as secure routers and firewalls);



radio frequency propagation; whereas this was initially a military application, the major client in South Africa is now the police;



infra-red detection materials and electronic identification systems (which led, amongst others, to the Supertag system); and



geo-information systems (in particular through its magnetic observation laboratory situated at Hermanus in the Western Cape; which has a space qualified magnetometer). It includes the ability to do extensive digital terrain mapping.

CONCLUSION

Due to the requirement for comprehensive evaluation and thorough verification of a system from the earliest phases of development through to production and product performance, the defence industry argues that it has led the manufacturing sector in the application of modern quality management systems and their applications. Typical of the situation in many countries, the real contribution of the defence industry to the wider manufacturing industry remains contested in South Africa. But, it is clear that the industry has developed a number of advanced testing facilities to ensure the achievement of required quality goals, some of which are located within the CSIR.67 It should also be apparent that the Department of Defence will continue to have a requirement for a scientific advisory function, for the management of key military R&D programmes, as well as an active strategic military R&D programme. This requires the highest quality of technical brainpower available to the country, and there are disturbing signs that the small pool of scientists in the country is dwindling either fleeing rampant crime and violence, or attracted by lucrative defence contracts in foreign countries.

With a technically competent local defence industry, it is possible to keep systems in service much longer than would otherwise be the case in the normal life expectancy of these systems. Such an ability enables effective maintenance programmes and life extension developments. Both of these can be converted directly into cost reduction, as many systems would have to be replaced if this capability is unavailable. As a result, the South African defence industry has gained considerable expertise in upgrading outdated systems, so much so, that in many cases it has led to significant exports. An example is the Eland armoured car, which was originally designed and developed by Panhard in France in 1962.68 After a series of updates and redevelopments, this vehicle has emerged as the Eland Mark 7 DT, using a locally manufactured ADE diesel engine that is now successfully being exported. The developments have incorporated local innovation and ingenuity to produce a superior product, more suitable for African conditions and, at the end of its apparent life cycle, turning it into an export product.69

Most of the companies in the defence industry have been diversifying their technological capabilities to provide for civilian production. This ranges from process to complete systems, and includes components and sub-systems. While there is a long list of products and technologies that have been converted to commercial applications, not all defence production can be converted to civilian production. Certain production and research and development capabilities have to be retained at the State's expense or foregone.

The bottom line is that the South African defence force will continue to require a technology support base, irrespective of the future of the South African defence industry to enable informed decisions to be taken on prospective defence acquisitions. For a number of reasons, not least related to cost considerations, the need will remain for the CSIR to provide scientific and technical support to the SANDF and ARMSCOR.

If it is to retain a competent defence force, the Department of Defence requires, above all else, to allocate sufficient funds for military R&D. While much of the South African defence industry may wither away, transform or even flourish, defence R&D is a strategic necessity to support the SANDF in:

operational problem solving;


equipment upgrades and life extension programmes;


trend and impact analyses of technology development; and


specification, test and evaluation of sophisticated procured equipment.70

The SANDF further argues that the following local technology capabilities are strategically essential:

"Strategic and tactical intelligence.



Capabilities to ensure the survival of combat equipment, e.g. electronic warfare, secure communications systems, command and control systems and specified smart weapons and munitions.



Capability to counter rapidly emerging threats, e.g. the ability to integrate, qualify and release to service of weapons, systems and platforms. The engineering capability need to develop a variety of weapon systems.



Capability to maintain and alter major equipment, life-cycle support of all major equipment, the ability to develop and implement repairs outside Original Equipment



Manufacturer (OEM) specifications in certain areas and to upgrade/alter software of certain systems to counter a changing threat or environment."71

The Department of Defence "... also determines the levels of technology required, e.g. full capability in respect of design, development, manufacture, maintenance and upgrades for strategic essential equipment down to maintenance technology only for others."72

Historically, South African expenditure in military R&D has been shrouded in secrecy. Access to information by the public and by scientists and engineers in other fields was severely restricted. It is, however, time that the requirement for and involvement of organisations such as the CSIR in defence research, are subject to proper scrutiny and gain its rightful acknowledgement. In this process, defence R&D needs to be established as a primary strategic requirement for defence expenditure within the budget of the Department of Defence. This is important, since all the available evidence points to the fact that the Department is presently underspending on R&D to an extent that will soon undermine the capacity of the Department significantly to evaluate defence equipment acquisitions, to upgrade and improve existing systems, to invest in strategic technology projects and to support defence exports.

ENDNOTES

This article is based on research conducted for Oxford Analytica Ltd. Certain sections rely heavily on a compilation of material from unclassified papers/reports. The specific information on the CSIR and the technology management process was gained through a series of interviews with Mr Paul Hatty of SADIA, Dr Andre Buys and Mr Frik Beyers of ARMSCOR, Neville Comins of Mattek (CSIR), Mr Francois Anderson of Aerotek (CSIR) and Dr Harry Booyens of Mikomtek (CSIR). Their kind assistance is appreciated, but the conclusions and interpretation remain my own.



See Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, pp. 22-24; Department of Foreign Affairs, South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, released during July 1996, n.d.



Although it is not a popular view, I believe that the military will find increasingly that its force design will reflect its participation in so-called secondary tasks (support to the SAPS, border security, humanitarian and disaster relief and peacekeeping), while attempting to maintain a core capability much smaller than the Defence Review has mandated or that the Department of Defence may desire.



During that war, the Argentinean submarine capacity served as a major deterrent and influenced British deployment and tactics possibly more than any other single operational consideration.



Department of Defence (DoD), Defence Industry Policy, 19 January 1996, p. 9



In reality, a variety of political and other factors influence defence procurement as is evident from the approval by the South African cabinet of the procurement the Rooivalk attack helicopter for the South African Air Force (at a cost in excess of R800 million). By all indications, this decision has not been motivated by the requirement of the SANDF for such a system, but rather by the knowledge that foreign orders for the Rooivalk would be enhanced by the domestic purchase of the system. Equally, the recent attempt by neighbouring Botswana to procure 54 Leopard 1-V tanks appeared to be motivated by the `give-away' price tag of US $14,2 million (the price includes 279 trucks and 50 recoilless guns) and, perhaps, an inadequate appreciation of life-cycle costs.



See first endnote.



DoD, Input of the Department of Defence into the green paper on technology, n.d., p. 5



Defence Industry work group, Draft position paper on the Defence Industry for the Defence Review, 6, 1 August 1996, p. 29



Ibid.



DoD, Input of the Department of Defence ..., op. cit., pp. 4-5



DoD, Defence Industry Policy, op, cit., p. 5



Draft position paper on the Defence Industry ..., op. cit., p. 29



DoD, Defence Industry Policy, op. cit., p. 9



P Hatty, Defence Industry Overview - Today and the Future, presented by Maj Gen J Kriel (ret.), Defence Industry Conference, Midrand, 27 March 1996, p. 2



Ibid.



DoD, Input of the Department of Defence ..., op. cit., p. 2



SADIA members supply about 94 per cent of these local purchases, and hence is a good representation of the industry; Hatty, op. cit., p.3



DoD, Input of the Department of Defence ..., op. cit., p. 9



DoD, Defence Industry Policy, op. cit., p. 10



Hatty, op. cit., p. 12-13



DoD, Defence Industry Policy, op. cit., p. 6



Ibid., p. 5



Ibid., p. 6



Ibid., p. 7



DoD, Input of the Department of Defence ..., op. cit., p. 3



Ibid.



Ibid., p. 4



DoD, Defence Industry Policy, op. cit., p. 11



Ibid., p. 12



Ibid.



Ibid.



DoD, Technology and Armament Acquisition in the Department of Defence, 10 (final version), 7 February 1995, p. 13



Draft position paper on the Defence Industry ..., op. cit., p. iv.



G Cockram, Vorster's Foreign Policy, Academica, Pretoria, 1970, p. 108; Anon., The History of Radar at the CSIR, pp. 1-2



Anon., Missiel-werk nou weg van WNNR, Die Transvaler, 7 February 1978.



CSIR, Input into Minister of Defence budget speech, April 1996, p. 1



Ibid.



CSIR Annual Report and Technology Impact, Pretoria, June 1995, p. 4



Interview with Mr F Anderson, Aerotek, 7 May 1996.



Various interviews and CSIR Annual Report, op. cit., p. 10



CSIR Annual Report, op. cit., p. 4



Interview with Dr N Comins, Director, Mattek, 6 May 1996.



CSIR Annual Report, op. cit., p. 3



Interview with Mr Anderson, op. cit.



Ibid.



Anon., Aerotek's Wide Range of Capabilities, African Armed Forces, April 1996, Johannesburg, p. 28



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Draft position paper on the Defence Industry ..., op. cit., p. 28



Anon., Aerotek's Wide Range of Capabilities, op. cit., p. 28.



Interview with Mr Anderson, op. cit.



Ibid.



Interview with Dr Comins, op. cit.



Ibid.



Interview with Mr Anderson, op. cit.



Interview with Dr Comins, op. cit.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Interview with Dr Harry Booyens, Manager: Logistics Engineering Technology, Mikomtek, 12 May 1996.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.



It was marketed as the Panhard AML61, and imported by South Africa as the Eland Mark 1.



Interview with Dr Booysens, op. cit.



Draft position paper on the Defence Industry ..., op. cit., p. 30



Ibid., pp. iii-iv.



Ibid