The Link Between Security and Development: The Problem of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa

by Jacklyn Cock
Sociology Department, University of the Witwatersrand

Published in African Security Review Vol 5 No. 5, 1996


INTRODUCTION

This article focuses on the proliferation of light weapons, a key problem in the Southern African region, threatening the security necessary for sustainable development.

The Southern African region is awash with light weapons. In South Africa the level of violent crime linked to light weapons threatens the consolidation of democracy. In Mozambique, northern Namibia and Angola the proliferation of light weapons, especially anti-personnel landmines, threatens to subvert social and economic reconstruction. This is largely the legacy of armed conflicts in the region that have contributed to the creation of high levels of poverty and social dislocation, as well as deep seated ethnic, racial and ideological antagonisms. The proliferation problem is exacerbated by South Africa's arms manufacturing capacity that has been developed during the apartheid era. The declared intention of the new government is to increase arms exports by 300 per cent in the next five years.

In the Southern African context the problem of light weapon proliferation is grounded in four social processes concerning violence. The first social process is the armed conflicts in the region during the past thirty years and ineffective disarmament and demobilisation in post-conflict peace-building. The second related social process involves a broader and more encompassing trend militarisation during the 1976-1990 period as the apartheid state mobilised resources for war at political, economic and ideological levels.1 A powerful indigenous arms industry and a widespread ideology of militarism that views violence as a legitimate solution to conflict, are among the legacies of this process.

Since the 1980's there have been two further linked social processes concerning light weaponry in South Africa: the first is what Klare2 has termed the `privatisation of security', as increasing numbers of citizens have lost confidence in the capacity of the state to protect them, and have come to rely on individual gun ownership and private security arrangements. This trend is linked to the fourth social process in which the current problem of light weapon proliferation is grounded: the commoditisation of violence as increasing numbers of citizens come to rely on criminal violence of various kinds as a means of livelihood. In this process, light weapons are a means of subsistence as well as profit. Small arms are also used as currency in black market transactions throughout the region. Another aspect of the commoditisation of violence is increasing arms exports through the South African state's arms procurement agency, ARMSCOR.

BACKGROUND: THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION

Regional co-operation is essential to achieve sustainable development and overcome the legacy of the past. Current threat analyses acknowledge that there are no military threats and also take account of the variety of security problems in the region brought about by the effects of poverty, war, drought, disease and social dislocation. It is increasingly recognised that a broadened concept of `national security' that emphasises social, economic and ecological factors, is necessary. The current proliferation of light weapons is a major threat to the security of both citizens and states in the region.

However, the main source of light weapons is leakage from the various armed formations that have been involved in past armed conflicts in the area. This conflict has involved both wars of liberation against colonial powers and post-independence civil wars. In three countries of the region Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe the post-independence period witnessed the continuation of armed conflict due to ethnic or ideological differences.

In both Angola and Mozambique, as well as in the wars of liberation in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the apartheid state specifically the South African Defence Force (SADF), the South African Police (SAP), their surrogate forces and the apartheid arms industry played a crucial part in opposing these liberation movements. A `boomerang effect' underlies much of the current problems with criminal violence in South Africa, as it is fuelled by light arms from South Africa flowing back into the country, particularly from Mozambique, but also from Namibia and Angola. Furthermore, not all of the negotiated settlements which marked the end of these conflicts in Mozambique and elsewhere have involved effective disarmament and large quantities of light weapons have thus been released onto the black market.

Any attempt to deal with the problem, however, must be grounded in an understanding of the factors that create a demand for light weapons.

SOCIAL CATEGORIES OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS CREATING A DEMAND FOR LIGHT WEAPONS

There are general cultural meanings, social practices and economic motivations among the various social categories that possess light weapons that shape their demand. Such categories include extremist political groupings, criminal networks, hunters, poachers, mercenaries, self-defence units, the security forces, citizens and private security firms.
  • Many (though by no means all) of these actors rely on their weaponry for subsistence. In some cases weaponry is a requirement of their formal occupational identity; in others it is connected to the way light weapons have become a form of currency throughout the region. The outcome of this linkage between weaponry and livelihood is an attachment that will be difficult to dislodge.
  • Many of these actors define themselves as soldiers fighting a `war'.
  • Many share a gender identity that involves a militarised masculinity. Many young South Africans understand weaponry as emblematic of manliness; this militarised masculinity cuts across diverse cultures, as the following statements illustrate:

    "Buy weapons, collect weapons and clean your weapons, The boer and his gun are inseparable" (Afrikaans resistance leader, Eugene Terre Blanche).

    "The call to ban the bearing of weapons is an insult to my manhood. It is an insult to the manhood of every Zulu man" (King of the Zulus addressing a rally).

    "A Zulu man without a traditional weapon will be regarded as a half man. In my village a man has to carry a weapon even if he goes to the shop, so that everybody should see that it is a man that is walking" ( Zulu migrant, Johannesburg, 1991).

    "This my rifle; this is my gun. This is for fighting; this is for fun" (SADF conscript).
  • The SADF was an important source of ideas about the kind of behaviour appropriate to white South African men. A number of SADF conscripts emphasised that the core of military training was to inculcate aggression and equate it with masculinity. They reported that the army cultivated a form of masculinity that involved insensitivity, aggressiveness, competitiveness, violence and the censure of emotional expression.3 Thousands of white South African youths were exposed to these messages about their gender identity. This linkage between militarism and masculinity is frequently harnessed to an ethno-nationalism.
  • Many of the men possessing light weaponry have deep-seated fears and insecurities that are grounded in racial and ethnic identities that are antagonistically defined. For many South Africans, ethnic identities are the strongest source of social cohesion. As Drew Forrest has written of the Zulu emphasis on cultural weapons (rawhide shields, clubs and spears), "[s]upport for the carrying of weapons is often seen as a simple call to arms, but it is more than this ... it is a deliberate attempt to mobilize politically around symbols of nationhood."4 This politicised ethnicity often involves a dehumanisation of the `enemy' and feeds into an ideology of militarism.
  • Many of these actors accept an ideology of militarism that views violence as a legitimate solution to conflict, and a means both to obtain and defend power. This involves a range of social practices, including leisure pursuits such as hunting, war games, toys and films. None of these are insignificant in the light of Mann's definition of militarism as "a set of attitudes and social practices which regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity." 5
  • For many people light weapons are important symbols of liberation. Whereas Ellis6 has argued that the machine gun was a crucial means of colonial conquest and European domination, the AK-47 "is more than a weapon; it has become a symbol. The Maxim represented the power of the imperial armies, while the AK has become an icon for many of the anti-establishment insurgent, freedom fighter, and terrorist organisations that exist today." 7
Any attempt to control the proliferation of light weapons has to deal with these cultural meanings, social practices and economic motivations.

There are eight main (and often overlapping) categories of state and non-state actors who possess light weapons for various reasons.

Political Extremists

These are organised groups with an ethnic base within South Africa, seeking greater political power, autonomy and economic resources. There are two distinct groups of such political extremists the white right and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Both mobilise around a politicised ethnicity an Afrikaner identity in the case of the white right, and a Zulu identity in the case of the IFP.

There are strong separatist pressures in KwaZulu-Natal. Inkatha has always pushed for the maximum federal devolution of power to the province, but its proposals for a new provincial constitution include a provincial army and envisage virtually an independent state. Violent conflict between IFP supporters and the ANC in this area has peaked during the 1990-1994 period, but continues today. The weapons involved are mainly AK-47s, but include G3 assault rifles, R5, R4 and R1 rifles.

Elements within the white right are demanding session and territory for an independent Afrikaner homeland or volkstaat. After 1990, white right-wing organisations began mobilising armed commandos countrywide. The leader of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, Terre Blanche said on many occasions that his organisation was training Afrikaners for armed combat for the day when the ruling National Party handed over power to the ANC. Another Afrikaner leader, Robert van Tonder declared, "[t]he Boer Volk would start shooting on the day the Volk's right to decision making for itself was removed."8 Some of these right-wingers have engaged in random racist shootings. The best known of these was Barend Strydom who randomly shot 23 black people, killing six, in the centre of Pretoria in 1988.

Considerable quantities of light weapons have been obtained by white right-wing groups in thefts from various military bases and state armories. These thefts occurred largely between 1990 and 1994 and some of the weaponry was used in right-wing political violence prior to the April 1994 elections. In June 1995, it was reported that a right-winger, arrested as a suspect in the murder of a progressive church leader, was also linked to the discovery of an arms cache in a cave near Groblersdal in 1994. Most of these weapons had been stolen from the Swartkops Air Force base in March 1994. The suspect was also linked to a makeshift explosives factory discovered on a farm near Bronkhorstspruit earlier in 1995.9

According to a number of informants, there are links between these white right-wing groups and elements of the IFP. One informant maintained that the predominant weapons in political conflict in Natal until recently was the kwasha a home-made gun constructed from metal tubing that fires conventional ammunition. "From 1994 the pattern started to change ... IFP and ANC supporters now have serious fire power ... IFP supporters own G3s, R4s as well as AK-47s." This informant has maintained that gun-running in Natal is a massive commercial operation with the demand coming largely from IFP supporters who are supplied by white right-wing elements with connections to the SADF and the SAP. This obviously contributes to the current high levels of violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal; according to the Human Rights Committee seventy five people died in political violence in the province during August 1995.

Criminals

There has been a dramatic decline in political violence in South Africa since 1994; from the monthly average of deaths due to political violence numbering 244, it has declined to 144.10 However, this decline has been paralleled by an increase in criminal violence involving light weapons. For many this criminal activity is a means of survival; it is in this sense that there has been a commoditisation of violence. Recent economic difficulties in South Africa have deepened the vulnerability of marginalised social groups who have come to depend on banditry and criminal violence for their livelihood. At the same time, there is a normlessness that is characteristic of a society in transition; the repressive forms of social control of the apartheid system have not been replaced by legitimate forms of social control and cohesion.

There has been a dramatic increase in violent, recorded crime in South Africa, such as murder, armed robbery, car hijacking and sexual assault, since the political transition began in 1990. The World Health Organisation points out that South Africa's murder rate of 53,5 murders for every 100 000 people is more than five times that of the US.11

According to a police spokesman, "[t]he criminal element in this country is in possession of illegal firearms and their purpose is to stay in possession."12 In 1994 police confiscated 386 AK-47 rifles and 120 hand-made firearms. A total of 1 650 revolvers and pistols, 547 explosives and 67 301 rounds of ammunition were confiscated, while 1 214 suspects were arrested.13

The number of firearms used during robberies increased from 26 665 incidents in 1992 to 33 193 incidents in 1993.14 According to the police, "AK-47 assault rifles are increasingly used in armed robberies. During 1992 AKs were used in 165 cases of armed robbery compared to 272 incidents reported during 1993."15 In all, weapons were used in 28 797 crimes in Gauteng in 1994 and in eighty per cent of cases illegal weapons were used.16 In the first three months of 1995, armed robbery and car hijacking increased, and in 85 per cent of the car hijackings, firearms mostly illegal were used.17

The extent of violent crime is best illustrated by the fact that several satellite police stations in the Johannesburg area have been closed on the grounds that they are too vulnerable to gang attacks and are not safe for policemen. For example, in June 1995 a group of four bandits surrounded a satellite police station in Alexandria township, disarmed and shot a policeman before making off with "five weapons - an R1, an R5 and three service pistols."18

The AK-47 is the symbol of criminal violence, but "less than three per cent of all murders in 1992 were perpetrated with AK-47's."19 In 1994, only 7,63 per cent or 458 of the 15 999 reported murder cases involved automatic weapons a category that includes AK-47s, R1 rifles and sub-machine guns.20 This statistic would suggest that the obsessional focus on AK-47s in the South African media is an ideological hangover from the demonisation of ANC guerrillas that has been widespread during the apartheid era.

"About two-thirds of the firearms seized by the South African Police Service are of non-Eastern block origin, suggesting that the great majority of crimes committed with firearms are committed with firearms of domestic origin. These are either legally owned weapons used for an illicit purpose, or weapons that are stolen from their legal owners. Clearly, legally owned weapons are a large part of the problem."21

According to police, a total of 10 305 firearms were stolen during 1990, of which 3 088 were stolen from houses and 1 042 were stolen from vehicles.22 Whereas 4 034 thefts of firearms were reported in 1992, this increased to 4 758 cases in 1993 an increase of eighteen per cent.23 A total of 2 370 legally owned and licensed guns were stolen in Gauteng alone in 1994.24 A total of 6 614 illegal firearms were confiscated in KwaZulu-Natal in 1994 and 2 309 in Gauteng.25

There are reports that link former Mozambican soldiers, as well as their weaponry, to violent crime. For example, it has been reported that former Mozambican soldiers were being hired to eliminate rivals in South Africa's taxi industry feud. According to Major Pieter Swanepoel, "[w]e already know that former Mozambican soldiers have a thorough knowledge of terror weapons such as AK-47s, as well as Makarov and Tokarev pistols. The last killings in the province were carried out by skilled assassins using these weapons, as well as R4 and R5 rifles."26

As Shaw has pointed out, the availability of weapons "erodes one of the key requisites of democratic transitions, the State's ability to monopolize the instruments of coercion."27 It is in this sense that the extent of criminal violence linked to the proliferation of light weaponry, threatens to subvert South Africa's consolidation of democracy.

Since many people in South Africa feel that no strong central authority exists that can protect them, there has been a `privatisation of security' and increasing numbers of both black and white citizens have come to rely on individual possession of firearms. Affluent citizens have increasingly sought protection from security firms which advertise `Immediate Armed Response'. The social equivalent of this privatisation of security in impoverished black communities was the establishment of self-defence units (SDUs).

Self-Defence Units

Self-defence units were established by the ANC, as a response to the violence of the apartheid state. Both members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, and SDU members tended to define themselves as soldiers fighting a `war' against the apartheid regime and its supporters. SDUs continue to exist in diverse, fragmented forms and define themselves as "defenders of the community". They were established in many areas on the Reef during the 1990-1994 period when political violence peaked in what was widely understood as a `war'.28 During this time there was a notable failure on the part of the South African Police (SAP) to protect the private rights of black citizens against violent attack. The SAP was widely viewed as either partisan or ineffective. According to an ANC document, "in many instances weapons are acquired in crime ravaged areas simply to protect and to provide security for members of households threatened by criminal elements and political opponents. At the level of the (black) community, both self-defence units (SDUs) and hostel residents' associations demand access to firearms for the same reason, to protect themselves on account of the fact that they have limited or no faith in the Security Forces' willingness or ability to protect them."29 Until recently, because of difficulties in the licensing procedures, black citizens were forced to obtain firearms through the illegal arms market.

SDUs were initially armed with knobkieries, spears and home-made weapons, but later obtained access to a variety of firearms including AK-47s, and R4 rifles.30 Rosenthal found that SDUs were not armed by MK, but by gun-runners operating in terms of commercial rather than political interests.

Poachers

Poaching is an increasing problem in Southern African and poachers are an important criminal category involved in both the supply and demand ends of the illegal arms trade. According to two informants, there are strong links between the illegal arms trade and poaching, with ivory and rhino horn frequently being exchanged for weaponry. Poachers are also a source of demand for illegal weapons. The National Parks Board of Zimbabwe recovered a number of weapons, mainly AK-47s and many rounds of ammunition between July 1984 and July 1995, a period during which 954 rhino and 458 elephants were killed by poachers.31According to one source from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature in Zimbabwe, the AK-47 is the preferred weapon of poachers and is used to shoot elephants, hippo and rhino. The weapon does not rust, is mechanically simple, robust and quick to reload, enabling marksmen to shoot twenty rounds in 30 seconds. According to this informant, "there has been over the last fifteen years a major impact on wildlife populations in the Southern African region as a result of the proliferation of light automatic weapons."

It is alleged that most of the poachers in Zimbabwe and Mozambique are former combatants. In South Africa the head of the SAPs Endangered Species Unit maintained that in 1995 all the arrested poachers had been in the possession of AK-47s, "apart from one case in possession of an R-4 rifle stolen from the military base in the Kruger National Park."

The overlap between different social categories is evident in the numerous reports of the SADF's involvement in poaching. A US investigation concluded that members of the SADF in Angola and Namibia were "actively engaged in killing and smuggling of wildlife species - including rhinos and elephants - for personal gain and profit."32 The SADF was also involved in poaching in Namibia on a scale that led to dramatic decreases in the populations of springbok, elephants and black rhino.33 It is also well-known that SADF support to RENAMO in Mozambique has been paid for with ivory and that "tens of thousands of elephants were slaughtered by UNITA forces in southern Angola to pay for military assistance provided by the SADF."34 Evidence submitted to the Kumleben Commission of Inquiry suggested that the SADF was involved in illicit ivory and rhino horn poaching in Angola and Namibia until at least 1986.

Hunters

The culture of brutality referred to above is illustrated by the fact that SADF involvement in poaching has not always been confined to hunting animals. An investigation by the SADF in 1991 led to a report that a "group of officers", shot twelve Bushmen in Angola "when they failed to find game on a hunt near their base." 35

Hunters are a significant social category creating a demand for light weapons. Big game hunting is a growth industry in South Africa. "Tourists from America, Germany, France and Spain are drawn to the South African farms by the low value of the rand, by the selection of 31 species of big game trophies and ... by the fact that (unlike in the rest of Africa where hunting is seasonal), hunting takes place all year round."36 Hunting is extremely profitable, but, with the exception of the Campfire programme in Zimbabwe, mainly benefits the white safari operators who dominate the industry.

Mercenaries

Another category of non-state actors involved in the demand for light weapons, are mercenaries. According to one source in South Africa there are several highly organised mercenary operations, with extensive sub-contracting to smaller companies, involved in a range of activities concerning drugs, car theft, ivory, rhino horn, and illicit diamond buying. There are at least two large private firms of mercenaries operating from South Africa Security Options and Executive Outcomes (EO). EO has apparently provided armed personnel to assist both UNITA and the MPLA Government forces in Angola. It is reported to have stationed a 2 000 strong force, including some 300 former South African soldiers, in Saurimo, near the northern border of Angola since 1993.37 Sources have told Human Rights Watch that EO has assisted the Angolan Government in weapons procurement. According to one informant, EO is highly internationalised; it operates in Turkey and seven African countries, including Angola and Sierra Leone, has offices in Europe and is active in a number of other sectors, such as the construction industry. The personnel of EO are reported to be veterans of conflict in Namibia, Angola and Mozambique.

Private Security Firms

The number of private security firms providing armed guards to companies and residences has increased dramatically in recent years. Security is the fastest growing industry in South Africa after tourism, and the number of private security guards estimated at 180 000 is now larger than the size of the police force. In 1994 there were some 130 000 registered security guards employed in 2 700 companies in South Africa, around 40 000 of whom were armed.38 Johannesburg alone has 120 security companies. Some of these companies operate throughout the Southern African region; for example, Gray Security Services, the second-largest security company in South Africa, also operates in Lesotho and Namibia. The privatisation of security is also illustrated by the number of citizens acquiring firearms.

Licensed Firearm Holders

White South Africans are rated among the most heavily armed groups in the world. There are 3,8 million licensed firearms in South Africa owned by 1,8 million licensed gun owners.

The dramatic increase in firearm sales dates from 1976 and mirrors increasing black resistance to apartheid. In 1985 there were 135 382 applications to possess a firearm license, increasing to 256 989 applications in 1993 with 248 976 licenses issued.39

Since the start of the transition to democracy many whites cite security as their reason for owning a firearm.40 According to the director of a shooting range near Johannesburg, "[t]he big problem is that everybody is now scared, nobody knows which way the country is going ... The whites are terrified, they want to protect themselves."41

Licenses are fairly easily available and law enforcement is minimal. The vast majority of licensed gun owners in South Africa are white. Whites have traditionally been granted firearm licenses more easily than blacks.42 It was customary during the apartheid era to demand that blacks, coloureds and Indians had training before they were granted a firearm license, although whites were not required to undergo such training.43 According to one informant there is also a massive amount of forged firearm licenses.

Many young white South African men are subject to a `gun culture' and militaristic social practices such as participation in war games, membership of rifle clubs, frequenting of shooting ranges, and readership of gun magazines.44

Most licensed firearm owners acquire their weapons from dealers who are supplied both by local manufacturers and importers. In 1993, 640 licenses to deal in arms and ammunition were issued.45 According to one source, gun dealers import from countries such as Brazil, Spain, the US, Germany and Israel. These are said to be cheaper and of superior quality in comparison to locally manufactured handguns.46 There have also been reports of dealers' involvement in the illegal arms trade. For example in 1993, the owner of an arms and ammunition shop in Witbank was found to be illegally in possession of arms and ammunition worth more than R100 000.47

The Security Forces

The largest category of people who possess light weapons are the security forces in the region. The new Angolan army will have force levels of 70 000, the Namibian National Defence force numbers 7 000, the Mozambican army 12 000 (considerably less than the 30 000 planned), and Zimbabwe is currently reducing force levels from 51 000 to 40 000. The integration process that created the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is aimed at hugely inflated, overblown force levels of 130 000 before `rationalisation' and demobilisation begins. This structure inherited the weaponry of the SADF the most powerful army in sub-Saharan Africa. Considerable numbers of weapons were issued to security force personnel in KwaZulu-Natal, the Transkei and Lebowa before the 1994 elections. It is estimated that some 3 000 G3 rifles were issued by the KwaZulu police to civilians such as "headmen and self protection units at this time. The government is currently attempting to repossess these arms."48 However, the IFP has said that it would resist moves by central government to disarm traditional chiefs of Kwa-Zulu issued with firearms, such as shotguns and G3s.

Arms were also issued to commando units of the SADF's Area Defence System in rural areas. According to Colonel Williams of the SANDF, there has been poor weapons control, and "it is doubtful whether the SANDF can provide an audit of the weapons it has provided the commandos in the past 20 years." On the assumption of seven weapons to each security force member, Mills estimated that there could be 4,9 million small arms in the South African security forces (including government issue to the police and the army and confiscated arms); 1,1 million in the Angolan army, 600 000 in the Zimbabwe army and 700 000 in Mozambique, "making a total for the security forces of the region of around 8,7 million."49

Demand from the social categories listed above means that there is a resilient market in both legal and illegal arms. Arms smugglers operate in secrecy, but with relative ease. The market involves an expansive social network and incorporates diverse social groups. Money is not the only means of exchange since ivory, rhino horn, diamonds, drugs and even second-hand clothing may be tended in exchange for weapons. This suggests that light weaponry is a wide-spread source of currency in the region. Much of the available supply dates back to the period of armed conflict in the region.

PAST SOURCES OF SUPPLY

Original Suppliers of Light Weaponry During Armed Conflict in the Region

During armed conflict in the Southern African region from 1975 to the present, there were three main sources of light weaponry.

Former Warsaw Pact countries, Cuba and China


These countries supplied arms to the MPLA in Angola, PLAN in Namibia, Umkhonto we Sizwe in South Africa, ZIPRA in Zimbabwe, and Frelimo in Mozambique. These included rifles, carbines, AK-47s, landmines, limpet mines, mortars, hand grenades, pistols and ammunition. "Control over this material was uneven."50

"From 1987-1991 the Angolan government imported $4,6 billion in arms, 90% of them from the former Soviet Union."51 Russia remains a major supplier since the conflict was resumed in 1992.
A South African police source estimated that the former Soviet Union had dumped an estimated 300 000 AK-47s in Mozambique during the mid-eighties.52

Western countries, including the US, West Germany, France, Great Britain and Israel

All these countries provided the apartheid state with military hardware. Various western arms manufacturers sent clandestine military aid to South Africa in defiance of the UN arms embargoes. For example, during the 1970s, two US gun manufacturers shipped thousands of firearms and millions of rounds of ammunition to South Africa through front companies.53

Both apartheid South Africa and the US were major sources of weaponry in Angola. According to Klare in "1975-76 the CIA provided anti-Communist insurgents in Angola with 622 crew-served mortars, 42,100 antitank rockets, and 20,900 rifles, and millions of rounds of ammunition ... So abundant was this assistance that ... UNITA in Angola have been able to keep fighting for years after the cessation of US aid with arms stockpiled during the Reagan period."54

The apartheid regime

During 1976-1990 the ideology of `total onslaught' provided the underpinning for the militarisation of South African society, as the apartheid state mobilised resources for war on political, ideological and economic levels.55 This process was spearheaded by the SADF. It was at the centre of an undeclared war of destabilisation that was directed first against neighbouring states creating what has been described as a `holocaust',56 and later against the ANC inside South Africa.

As part of this process, the apartheid state supplied weapons to the SADF, SAP and various `homeland' armies and surrogate forces inside the country, as well as to UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique and other rebel movements in the Southern African region. This was done via the former SADF Directorate of Special Tasks (operating under Military Intelligence). According to Roland Hunter's court evidence, at least during 1982\3, four such projects existed - Operation Disa (support of UNITA in Angola), Operation Drama (support of Zimbabwe dissidents), Operation Latsa (support of Lesotho Liberation Army in Lesotho) and Operation Mila (support of Mozambican, RENAMO dissidents.)

Weapons for these projects were procured either via the South African arms procurement agency, ARMSCOR, or through capture by the SADF during their direct military action in Angola and Namibia. Many of these arms were of Soviet and Eastern bloc origins and included AK-47s, LMGs, RPG-7s, hand grenades, mortar bombs and mines. Almost 40 000 AK-47s were purchased from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and China between 1976 and 1986 specifically to be given to UNITA.57 AK-47s from Hungary and Bulgaria obtained through ARMSCOR, were also supplied to RENAMO.58 In all, the South African Government amassed a large stockpile of captured light weapons.

One of the most deadly light weapons produced and supplied by the SADF was anti-personnel landmines. It is estimated that 10 to 20 million landmines currently lie undetected in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia. This was part of the apartheid state's destabilisation strategy; the SADF delivered anti-personnel landmines, as well as other weapons, ammunition and `propaganda material' including maize seed, sugar and tobacco to RENAMO. According to an informant who was involved in Operation Mila, the material supplied was fairly constant from month to month and in August 1983 involved 500 AK-47 rifles, as well as various other types of weapons and large quantities of ammunition.59 There were many reports of how South African assistance was paid for with ivory and rhino horn.60

After 1990 the destabilisation strategy of the apartheid regime was turned inward to weaken the ANC and block the democratisation process. A crucial element in this strategy was the training and arming of a surrogate force in the form of Inkatha vigilantes who operated largely under the direction and control of what came to be known as a `third force'. This `third force' consisted of elements of the army and police, and evidence suggested that much of the township violence between 1990 and 1994 was organised by them. For example, clear evidence exists of SADF training of Inkatha agents as hit squads deployed against the ANC; the SADF supplied these agents with arms, as well as training.

Deaths involving light weapons and resulting from violent conflict between supporters of the ANC and the IFP peaked between 1990 and 1993 when almost 10 000 people were killed. The apartheid regime was not the only source of weaponry. Several informants maintained that IFP members had been involved in buying arms directly from Renamo. In 1991 an extensive and sophisticated arms network supplying members of Inkatha in the Johannesburg area with AK-47s, shotguns, Makarov pistols and scorpion sub-machine guns was exposed. The source of weapons was cited as former Mozambican soldiers and distribution was co-ordinated by an Inkatha supporter, originally from Natal, with strong links to hostel residents.61

Hostels housing mainly Zulu, Inkatha supporting migrants from Natal were crucial elements in the political violence on the Reef. Violence included terrorist attacks on train and taxi commuters, and ethnic cleansing of hostels as non-Zulu migrants were driven out. The hostels were used as launching pads to attack surrounding township residents and ANC supporters. These antagonisms were rooted in the social construction of different political, ethnic and class identities.

In this `low-intensity conflict' many migrant workers defined the conflict as a `war' and many hostels on the Reef became armouries. In a recent study of the relation between hostels and political violence on the Reef, all 31 of the residents of Meadowlands hostel interviewed, mentioned one or more of the following weapons as frequently used by hostel residents against township inhabitants: AK-47s, R5, R4 and R1 rifles, pistols, shotguns, knives, axes, spears, knobkieries, sharpened iron poles, sticks, tomahawks, pangas and machetes.62 In the same study, a third of the residents interviewed from Merafe hostel maintained that many of the weapons used in political violence were manufactured in the hostel by inmates themselves. These handmade guns fired various objects, such as nails, as well as conventional ammunition.63 Thus hostels became not only armouries where weapons were stored, but factories where they were manufactured.

While the apartheid regime, the US and the Eastern bloc countries, as well as China and Cuba have been the major sources of supply of light weapons throughout the region during the period of armed conflict, the lack of effective disarmament in the settlement of the conflict is behind much of the current proliferation of weaponry.

Ineffective Disarmament in Post-Conflict Peace-Building


The assembly, audit, control and disposal of weapons was an important feature of most of the comprehensive peace settlements in the region. While the UN has played an important role in most of these settlements, disarmament has not been totally effective.

Throughout the region, in Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, the cessation of armed conflict involved the creation of new national defence forces that integrated previously antagonistic guerrilla and conventional armed formations. The process of integration theoretically involved the disarming of rival armies and the collection of stocks of weapons and ammunition.

In South Africa, this was particularly complicated as it involved the integration of seven different armed formations into a single, legitimate and representative defence force. The most significant of these armed formations were MK, the SADF and the four homeland armies. During the process there was meant to be a full disclosure of arms caches established in South Africa by MK.

However, a `leaking' of weapons from MK, as well as military arsenals of the homeland armies, has occurred since 1990, and has undoubtedly contributed to criminal activity. MK arms caches were only cleared by the new defence force earlier in 1994. During the course of peace negotiations, similar to what has happened in other countries, weapons and equipment have been held back for a variety of both individual and political purposes, including the desire for an insurance policy if peace negotiations were to fail, or to maintain a material base for future political bargaining.

In several countries of the region there was weak control over the former guerrilla armies and their weaponry in the run-up to the integration process. "[M]any armories and caches established prior to independence were not claimed during the post-election period and these either lay dormant (and were incrementally reclaimed for various uses) or `leaked' into civil society for use in a range of criminal and political activities."64 Williams cites the following examples:
  • The weapons depots in central and southern Mozambique established by the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ((ZANLA) during the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe: in 1980, with the advent of independence in Zimbabwe, "many of these armories and caches were left in the rear bases as ZANLA combatants returned home to be integrated into the new Zimbabwe National Defence Force. These caches were to be used, variously, by FRELIMO, RENAMO and commercial arms smugglers depending on access and identification during the 1980's and the early 1990's."65
  • The arms caches established within South Africa by MK, including AK-47s, pistols, landmines, hand grenades and limpet mines: Williams gives particular weight to the weaponry smuggled in during Operation Vula, an ANC initiative carried out between 1988 and 1990 to establish MK operatives with access to weaponry inside the country to promote the armed struggle against the apartheid regime. Williams estimates this weaponry to be in the region of 20 tons, an estimate confirmed by another source from the state intelligence service. Williams maintains that "the mass repatriation of guerrillas during the 1990-1995 period, the inadequate accounting of MK inventories within the country after 1990, and the use of weapons by besieged ANC communities during the political violence of the 1991-1994 period, saw the gradual, and uncontrolled, decimation of these caches inside South Africa."66
In the last three years there have been frequent press reports of arms caches discovered near the Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambican borders. During the course of 1992, 25 arms caches were uncovered by the police.67 In 1993, a cache of about 10 000 AK-47 rounds of ammunition was discovered near the Lesotho border. A police source said they suspected the ammunition was hidden years ago by the Lesotho Liberation Army.68 Arms continued to be smuggled into South Africa after the cessation of hostilities by MK. In January 1993 police discovered arms, ammunition and explosives hidden in the false bottom of a car allegedly belonging to a member of the ANC on the Transvaal\Swaziland border. Five alleged members of MK were arrested in the same month in connection with arms smuggling.69

A SAP source estimated that there were some 1,5 million AK-47s in existence in Mozambique in 1993, remnants of the war.70 According to a number of informants, the integration and demobilisation process in Mozambique involved substantial leakage of weaponry. Hidden arms caches were of major concern to the Cease-Fire Commission as Mozambique prepared for national elections. According to one source in Mozambique many weapons were stored in the assembly areas and were not secure. (This is in contrast to Namibia where, according to Batchelor, weapons were moved from the assembly areas to a central state armoury and subject to very strict verification and control procedures.) A total of 186 000 weapons were collected by the UN, registered and handed over to the Mozambican Government. The serial numbers of the weapons collected was supplied to the South African Government. However, "many weapons were kept in unguarded buildings", and there was no independent verification of the storage. According to one source, the UN later located some 200 undeclared arms caches. A source has pointed out that 186 000 weapons is considerably more than is required by the new national defence force with force levels of 12 000.

The lack of effective disarmament in the negotiated conclusion of long-standing armed conflicts has generally been a major problem in the region.

Inadequate Control Over New Armed Formations

The problem of light weapon proliferation is sometimes due to inadequate control over the armed forces. Only South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe possess well-organised, cohesive armies.

Leakages from various official armouries not only occurred during the demobilisation process, but continued after the formation of new national armies. The new Mozambican army is not strong or cohesive: "Low military salaries, inadequate discipline, low levels of morale, and a ready market for the weapons in South Africa, has led to senior members of the Mozambican armed forces being implicated in illegal arms deals ... the Mozambican armed forces have in the past, according to one source, `leaked like sieves'. South African members of the joint task force ... estimate that the rate of recovery of weapons is fractional and isolate Mozambique as the major and unaudited ongoing source of arms transactions in the region."71

The Failure of Demobilisation Policies to Provide for the Effective Social Integration of Former Combatants

The lack of control over new armed formations is related to the failure of demobilisation policies particularly in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia. Demobilisation rarely has involved effective social integration in the sense of restoring former combatants to their communities with access to employment, supportive social networks and a culture of peace and respect for human rights. Instead, many former combatants throughout the region have reported a sense of marginalisation and social dislocation.72

In Mozambique, the UN set up some 49 assembly points where RENAMO and Frelimo soldiers were demobilised and disarmed. Some 90 000 soldiers have been demobilised and supplied with transport to the district of their choice, as well as eighteen months' salary "as a personal incentive to actively reintegrate into economic and social life."73 However, integration has been problematic, given the general lack of economic opportunity in Mozambique. Several informants reported that demobilised soldiers had sold their weapons to support their families. As Rana observes, "[t]he sale of [a] weapon spells cash to buy transportation, food, shelter and medical equipment for those who have left war behind."74

The SANDF has begun the process of reducing its present inflated force levels of 130 000 to 75 000. This is planned to occur over the next four years and will involve cash payments based on years of military service, as well as low level skills training in the Service Corps. The inadequacy of these measures to provide for effective social integration is obvious. Angola has begun the integration of the 150 000 strong government army and UNITA's 90 000 strong rebel army under UN supervision. It is planned that the new Angolan army will have force levels of 70 000, leaving 170 000 soldiers to be demobilised; each is scheduled to receive $2 000 per year for two years.

There is a clear need throughout the region, not only for effective disarmament, but also for demobilisation policies that provide for the effective social integration of former combatants. Such social integration involves a complicated process of re-socialisation and re-casting of social relations a process that is far more complex than one-off cash payments.

In summary, the tragic case of Angola described by Mathiak75 illustrates the social processes outlined above. These processes armed conflict in the region, ineffective disarmament in the negotiations ending these conflicts, inadequate control over the new armed forces and ineffective demobilisation policies provide important sources of supply for the diverse social categories representing markets for light weapons.

In South Africa, as elsewhere, the arms market contains both `deep black' and shades of grey: both dead-of-night smuggling of undocumented weapons and covert shipment of arms licensed under false pretences. While it seems unlikely that the illegal arms market in Southern Africa is controlled by some co-ordinated cabal of `deep black' operators, both the scale on which it occurs and the links between illegal arms and a diverse range of economic activities connected to the trades in ivory, diamonds and rhino horn to second-hand clothing, are striking.

PRESENT SOURCES OF SUPPLY

The Illegal Arms Market

No one has any idea how many illegal firearms are in circulation. According to a 1993 report, "whites are at the head of many of the illegal arms smuggling rackets in Southern Africa..."76 The state is presently using a combination of amnesty, reward and heavy penalties to deal with the proliferation of illegal firearms. The South African police seized a total of 70 925 illegal weapons between March and July 1995.77

Among illegal firearms, the AK-47 is especially popular, and the seventy million Kalashnikov-style weapons estimated to have been produced to date, carry powerful social meanings. "The Kalashnikov isn't just a gun; it's a legend, a currency, a symbol of liberation..."78 By contrast, according to a SAP source, "the AK-47 has become one of the greatest curses in this country."79 It is durable and robust with a simple mechanical structure, light, easy to conceal and transport, capable of rapid fire and relatively cheap. It is called the `Soweto blank cheque', as it enables its user to obtain whatever he wants.80 According to one informant, an AK-47 can be bought in parts of Mozambique for a chicken or a small quantity of maize. In northern Namibia, an AK-47 in good condition can be purchased for R25, and in the Johannesburg area and KwaZulu-Natal one costs as little as R500. According to a police source, an AK-47 in working condition could be swapped in Angola for an old pair of shoes. Other weapons that have been described as especially popular with township youth, include Makarovs and small automatic pistols.

At present there are three main sources of supply of illegal arms.

Cross-border smuggling

Smuggling of light weapons across the porous borders of Swaziland, Namibia and Mozambique into South Africa is common. According to the SAPS Centre for the Analysis and Interpretation of Crime Information and numerous informants, the main source of illegal weapons is former Mozambican soldiers. Such arms are often swapped for basic commodities or carried across the border by illegal immigrants and then sold. There are also reports of young women exchanging AK-47s for second-hand clothes on the Namibian border with Angola.81 The exchange of guns for food by Angolans and Mozambicans is also said to be contributing to the dramatic increase in armed criminal violence in Zambia.82

Weapons are smuggled into the country by air, rail, road and on foot. According to one source, smugglers use many ingenious methods, including hiding weapons in specially adapted fuel tanks. According to another source, smuggling into KwaZulu-Natal is organised as a large scale commercial operation and involves ski boats and sugar cane trucks, as well as private aircraft. This source also reported offloading of weapons off the coast from Czech arms factories.

In 1992 the police established a special task force to deal with cross-border arms trade, and in January 1995 Presidents Mandela and Chissano of Mozambique signed an agreement for cross-border police co-operation to find illegal weaponry. Operation Rachel was launched in June 1995, and within the first three months traced 1 164 weapons, including 685 AK-47s.83

Illegal imports

Illegal exports from various countries to South Africa, in defiance of US law and the 1977-1994 UN arms embargo against the apartheid regime, are another important line of supply. There have been media reports of an illegal trade in weapons from the US to South Africa, including shotguns made by US companies that have been used in township political violence. In May 1992, a sergeant in the Kwa-Zulu police was arrested in connection with an arms cache that included shotguns made by a US gun manufacturer, Mossberg and Sons of Connecticut.84 According to the Africa Fund, hundreds of semi-automatic pistols, revolvers, rifles, magazines and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, worth millions of dollars, left the US, but never arrived at their stated destination in Harare, Zimbabwe.

In June 1995, a former US gun dealer, Robert Mahler, was sentenced to 18 months in jail for illegally shipping more than 200 guns from Oregon to South Africa. South African police reports said that Mahler belonged to the right-wing Afrikaans extremist group, the AWB. In October 1993 South African authorities seized a container on a plot near Pretoria belonging to Mahler that held more than 220 rifles, pistols and shotguns and 46 983 rounds of ammunition.85

Leaks from state armouries and security force personnel

There is weak control over weapons issued to the SANDF and inadequate control over state armouries. According to one informant, attacks on members of the security forces are much more common than is publicly admitted. The Annual Report of the Commissioner of the South African Police in 1992 registered a 10-14 per cent increase in the number of firearms stolen from the national security armoury.

Several informants maintained that security force personnel were themselves involved in the illegal arms trade largely for profit. There were also reports of sales of R4s and R5s by "high ranking former SADF officers", who had obtained them when the SADF left Namibia and Angola. Several sources maintained that poorly paid black policemen frequently sold their semi-automatic rifles (R5s), shotguns and handguns on the black market to the highest bidder. There are also reports of Mozambican policemen selling their weapons.86

In 1993, two policemen were arrested in connection with a large illegal arms network.87 In 1995, five policemen were arrested in connection with the theft of weapons from the police training college at Koeberg on the Cape West coast in July. Thirty eight firearms, 203 magazines and more than 2 000 rounds of ammunition were taken in the theft. A police spokesman said he believed the theft had been "for financial gain and not for any political reasons."88

In 1993, it was reported that a Ciskei state armoury had been broken into and R4 rifles stolen.89 Several informants maintained that large numbers of G3s and ammunition issued to the KwaZulu police had made their way onto the black market.

In 1994 an official investigation found that only 3 514 of the 5 634 firearms issued to police stations in the former homeland of Transkei could be accounted for. The missing 2 000 firearms included R4 rifles and various handguns.90

Many of these light weapons are locally produced. A range of domestically manufactured small arms is available commercially and includes semi-automatic rifles modelled on the R4 in standard use in the South African army, and small handguns manufactured by Lyttleton Engineering. They are an important part of South Africa's indigenous arms industry, the other crucial source of supply.

Legal Arms Marketing and Manufacture

South Africa's armaments industry was ranked as the tenth largest arms industry in the world in the mid-1980s, and one of the leading Third World arms producers. This was largely due to the state production and procurement organisation, ARMSCOR.

ARMSCOR developed into one of the largest industrial organisations in the country, and its importance to the national economy was demonstrated by its export performance arms became "the country's principal manufactured export, and the third largest export after gold and coal."91

In 1992, there was a reorgani-sation and `commercialisation' of ARMSCOR into two parts, Denel (production) and ARMSCOR (procurement) A new government-owned company, called the Denel group, assumed all ARMSCOR's manufacturing capabilities and facilities; ARMSCOR remained the state procurement agency.

In all, ARMSCOR, Denel and the 700 private companies comprising the local arms industry, contributed nearly one per cent of GDP in 1994.92 The Denel subsidiaries, mostly involved in light weapon production, are Atlas Aviation, Swartklip Products (pyrotechnic products, ammunition), Pretoria Metal Pressings (small and medium calibre ammunition and small arms), DIW (heavy arms), Musgrave Bloemfontein (rifles), LIW (small arms) and Naschem (filling and assembly of large calibre ammunition and heavy arms). According to Krish Naidoo of ARMSCOR there are six major companies involved in the production of light weapons: Pretoria Metal Pressings, Musgrave and LIW from the Denel group, and three independent companies, Republic Arms in Pretoria, Tressitu Ammunition and Aserma (part of the Reutech group)

The total number of people employed in South Africa's arms industry is in the region of 50 000. This figure reflects a decline since 1989 when military spending reached R20 billion and employment in the defence industry was 160 000. The sector is dominated by white Afrikaners at senior management levels and includes highly skilled workers.93 In this sense, "the defence labor market distorts human capital formation by absorbing disproportionate numbers of science and technology graduates and skilled technicians ... It is estimated that almost 15 000 workers in the sector are technically highly trained and of the upper income group."94

South Africa is the largest but not the only source of arms production in the region. Other sources are:
  • Namibia: Namib Arms and Ammunition at Keetmanshoop is Namibia's first arms factory. It has been claimed that this company will supply weapons for the Namibian Defence Force and be able to produce 30 000 rounds of ammunition a day;95 and
  • Zimbabwe: in Harare a small arms factory employing 300 people, is producing up to five million bullets a month and is exporting small arms ammunition and explosives to at least six African countries.96 A new landmine factory has been established.

South African Arms Exports

Largely due to the Cameron Commission, a significant restructuring of South Africa's arms production and export policies is presently underway. South Africa has become a key player in the world's small arms export market with $187 million worth of arms exports in 1993 to more than fifty countries.

During the apartheid era, legislation regulating arms exports was weak, susceptible to duplicity, and void of any ethical considerations. Arms sales to repressive governments were sanctioned, as well as to countries involved in civil war. South Africa provided arms to both sides in the Iran\Iraq war, to the Pinochet regime in Chile, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, as well as Israel, Taiwan, UNITA and RENAMO. The bulk of weapons have been going to the Middle East, but there is evidence that South Africa has supplied arms to Rwanda, as well as Croatia, in defiance of UN arms embargoes. Despite the transition from apartheid to democracy, ARMSCOR has announced plans to expand arms exports by 300 per cent over the next five years, increasing South Africa's share of the global arms market from its present level of 0,4 per cent to two per cent, and raising export earnings from $244 to $800 million annually.

Until 1995, ARMSCOR operated officially in terms of a world-wide country and weapons categorisation that was instituted in 1983 in order to regulate the marketing and sale of arms. The Defence Foreign Policy Committee was responsible for the list of countries that was subject to Cabinet approval and based largely on Cold War thinking and attitudes to the apartheid regime. This included a category of countries to which only `non-sensitive' armaments could be exported.

ARMSCOR was obliged to adhere to this system when issuing permits for the marketing or sale of armaments abroad. Permits were the main mechanism for controlling the marketing and export of arms. There were no restrictions on light weapons, as these were considered not "militarily-sensitive". `Non-sensitive' armaments included "all small calibre, infantry type, hand carried weapons" as, according to an ARMSCOR source, these were not regarded as militarily important. The Cameron Commission regarded the classification of AK-47s as `non-sensitive', as "wholly inconsistent with a responsible arms trade policy."97 It pointed out that "it is no small irony that the previous South African government which publicly regarded AK-47s as a symbol of `communist terrorism', was clandestinely purchasing, selling and distributing thousands of these weapons."98 These AK-47s were purchased from China and Eastern bloc countries and were intended for distribution to UNITA in Angola.99 Other `non-sensitive' items were vehicles, radio, and anti-riot equipment.

In 1993 the complete restriction on information regarding weapons sales was lifted and the first annual report on ARMSCOR's activities was published. It revealed that in the financial year 1992\3, ARMSCOR issued 407 marketing permits, 246 export permits and 40 import permits.

South African arms trade policy is currently in limbo while new policy guidelines and legislation are determined. The crucial events leading to the current situation are firstly the discovery in September 1994 that two consignments of surplus SANDF weapons 8 500 AK-47s, 15 665 G3 rifles and 14 million rounds of ammunition supposedly destined for Lebanon, had apparently been sold to Yemen, a prohibited destination for South African arms. This was followed by the appointment of a judicial commission by President Mandela in 1994 the Cameron Commission in the wake of the public outcry that followed this discovery, and early in 1995, a Cabinet Committee to recommend a responsible arms trade policy.

The Cameron Commission recommended that the arms trade should be guided by new social values, specifically "to promote democracy, human rights and international peace and security." The Commission pointed out that ARMSCOR was a product of the apartheid era and "has not been subject to a transparent process of transformation in keeping with our new democracy."100 It recommended that Government should play a more active role at ministerial level, in considering and approving applications to market or sell South African arms abroad.

The restructuring of ARMSCOR, and the creation of a new arms control body are largely the results of the Cameron Commission report. The new weapons control body created in August 1995, the National Conventional Arms Control Commission (NCACC), includes several members of the Cabinet Committee appointed early in 1995. It is a four-tier organisation headed by Minister Kader Asmal and accountable to Cabinet.

The NCACC will be responsible for decisions on arms sales that will be made on a case-by-case basis and not on country classifications. However, "transfers and trade will be avoided which would be likely to be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms, contravene South Africa's international commitments ... endanger peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into a region ... have a negative impact on South Africa's diplomatic and trade relations with other countries, support or encourage terrorism, be used for purposes other than the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient countries and contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts."101 Each weapons sale will be made subject to an export permit issued by the NCACC and an independent inspectorate will be established. It has been suggested that a research capacity should be attached to this inspectorate to conduct social impact assessments on weapon sales. The NCACC will report to Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Defence. One informant claimed that this is "one of the tightest and most comprehensive frameworks anywhere in the world."

The production and export of light weapons are challenged at present, not just from within the State, as in the case of the Cameron Commission. This process points to the social solution to the problem of the proliferation of weapons in the region.

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF LIGHT WEAPON PROLIFERATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION

The proliferation of light weapons in the region is challenged by an embryonic demilitarisation movement, though this is at present extremely small, fragmented, and in South Africa, mainly white and middle-class in its social composition. This movement is demanding a shift of power and resources away from the military and is challenging militarist values and social practices. The leadership of this movement involves significant numbers of women; in other countries in the region women's groups, such as the `Roots of Peace' organisation in Angola, have been established.

One source of this challenge is a focus on micro-disarmament by `Gun Free South Africa'. Their campaign was launched in September 1994 and focused on encouraging people to hand in their guns on 16 December 1994 in return for food vouchers, lottery tickets and a certificate of thanks from President Mandela. Only 270 firearms mainly white-owned and licensed were handed in, but according to the co-ordinator of Gun Free South Africa, the campaign "raised public awareness about the proliferation of firearms in our society and made it an issue for public debate. It also placed the issue on the political agenda; the ANC December national conference adopted a resolution supporting Gun Free."

The second significant group in the South African embryonic de-militarisation movement is the Ceasefire Campaign. The group is involved in a national campaign against landmines, the objectives of which have been endorsed at a meeting of NGOs in Johannesburg in June 1995. They include:
  • promotion of the international ban on landmines;
  • stopping the production and distribution of landmines in South and Southern Africa;
  • the destruction of all existing landmine stockpiles in South Africa;
  • demining, particularly in affected Southern African countries;
  • contributions from South Africa to an international fund for demining;
  • financial compensation; and
  • provision of rehabilitation services to landmine victims in South and Southern Africa.
These two social movements are focused on the two most lethal and plentiful categories of light weapons dispersed throughout the region at present anti-personnel landmines and firearms. The two have opposing social meanings: landmines are increasingly stigmatised but firearms, particularly the ubiquitous AK-47, are still legendary weapons linked to romantic images of revolutionary struggle and national liberation.

It is increasingly clear that the proliferation of light weapons is a destabilising force throughout the world. However, establishing control mechanisms will be difficult, since both the legal and illegal arms trade are embedded in intricate social relations, institutions and material interests. On the supply side, governments, manufacturers and individual dealers will want to continue making the enormous profits involved. On the demand side, this article has shown that there are strong economic interests, cultural meanings and social practices attached to the possession of light weapons. Thus, meaningful arms control must be part of a broad process that emphasises demilitarisation and a shift in social values towards peace and human rights, as well as economic development and political legitimacy. In short, arms control has to be understood as part of the transformation of social relations in post-apartheid South Africa. The culture of violence and secrecy created by apartheid has to be replaced by a respect for human rights and the transformation of key institutions Parliament, as well as ARMSCOR into accountable, transparent structures.

It is also crucial to establish the legitimacy of these structures. As has been stressed, "[p]olitically, the critical issue in dealing with the use of small arms in intra-state conflicts is to bring small arms back under the authority of the State functioning through a democratic government which enjoys broad public support."102 This has particular pertinence, given that one of the strategies of resistance to apartheid has been a level of lawlessness to make the country `ungovernable'. Consequently, one of the legacies of the apartheid regime is a distrust of authority and minimal public respect for the law.

Military solutions are obviously problematic. For example, the incidence of illegal weapon smuggling across the border with Mozambique is one reason cited in the recent appeal by the SANDF that the electric fence along the Mozambique border should be switched on to lethal mode. The alarm was switched from lethal to alarm mode in 1990, after public protest about the fact that at least 94 people were electrocuted by it, between 1986 and 1989.103

Clearly, as Goldring has argued, South Africa needs, "an integrated policy of transparency, oversight and control."104 But the country also needs sustainable development. As Naylor points out, "probably the single most important factor stoking the demand for arms is the prevailing gross disparity in income, wealth, and natural resource capital."105 With an unemployment rate of 34 per cent and one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world, South Africa illustrates this factor, even though there are high levels of poverty and unemployment throughout the region.

None of these measures will be achieved without an indigenous demilitarisation movement that involves the kind of mass mobilisation that marked the anti-apartheid struggle. It is in this sense that the most important solution to the current problem of light weapon proliferation in the region is social. It involves creating values and social organisations to work for a national consensus on the need for a comprehensive programme of demilitarisation that involves a number of initiatives.

Demilitarisation involves a shifting of power and resources away from the military élite. It is anchored in a broadened concept of `national security' that encompasses economic, social and ecological factors. In this broadened concept of national security, high defence expenditure has been compared to dismantling a house in order to erect a fence around it. Demilitarisation should involve not only decreased defence spending, but also reductions in force levels and restrictions on arms exports, as well as the conversion of the arms industry to civilian production. It should involve the conversion of the 600 000 hectares of land presently controlled by the SANDF to suit development purposes. It should also involve uncoupling militarism from masculinity, a question posed most sharply by Virginia Woolf sixty years ago when she asked, "how can we alter the crest and spur of the fighting cock?"

However, the social mobilisation necessary to create a demilitarisation movement is particularly difficult in South Africa. During the process of `élite-pacting' which marked South Africa's transition from authoritarian rule, an alliance of militarists from the various armed formations, particularly from the SADF and MK, was firmly established. No strong grassroots anti-militarist movement emerged during the 1990-1994 period to challenge this alliance. South Africa has inherited a militaristic nationalism that links prestige in international relations to military power. Subverting it will require the erosion of current antagonistic ethnic identities and the creation of a common society bound by shared values of peace and justice, democratic participation, equality of economic opportunity and respect for cultural diversity.

CONCLUSION

The processes of peace and democratisation in Southern Africa are extremely fragile. There are many threats to the region's future security, apart from the proliferation of light weapons. One such threat is environmental deterioration: the degradation of the natural resource base on which all economic activity depends. There is a danger that "... natural resources will mark future sites of conflict rather than sources of co-operation."106 Access to environmental resources could become sources of tension and conflict in Southern African. The region could become caught up in what has been termed the `green war factor' a vicious cycle in which environmental degradation leads to tensions and local disputes and violence, that lead to civil and inter-state wars, in turn causing yet more environmental degradation.107 At the same time, environmental issues provide opportunities for enhanced regional co-operation.

Now that we have secured a pluralist political system and universal franchise has been secured in all the states of the region, the consolidation of peace and democracy depends on the transformation of economic and social relations. The proliferation of light weapons in the region is a key issue that threatens the establishment of regional security on which such transformation depends.

ENDNOTES

  1. J Cock & L Nathan (eds.), Society at War: The Militarisation of South Africa, St Martins Press, New York, 1989.
  2. M Klare, Light Weapons Arms Trafficking and the World Security Environment of the 1990's, paper read at the conference on The Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem, UNIDIR, Berlin, May 1995.
  3. J Cock, Women and War in South Africa, Pilgrims Press, Ohio, 1991.
  4. Weekly Mail, 30 May 1991.
  5. M Mann, The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism, New Left Review, 162, 1987, p. 71.
  6. J Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1975.
  7. Ezell, Foreword to Ellis, ibid.
  8. The Citizen, 25 April 1990.
  9. The Star, 17 June 1995.
  10. Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Report: June 1995, Human Rights Committee, Johannesburg, 1995, p. 2.
  11. Weekend Star, 6 August 1994.
  12. The Star, 20 July 1995.
  13. Ibid.
  14. South African Police, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the South African Police, RP 58/1994, SAP, Pretoria, 1994, p. 104.
  15. Ibid.
  16. The Star, 31 May 1995.
  17. The Star, 20 July 1995.
  18. The Star, 21 June 1995.
  19. T Cochrane, A Hole in our Heads, Weekend Star, 6 August 1994, p. 11.
  20. Personal communication, Captain Botha, SAP, September 1995.
  21. Cochrane, op. cit.
  22. The Star, 21 August 1991.
  23. SAP, op. cit., p. 111.
  24. The Star, 31 May 1995.
  25. Ibid.
  26. Cited in The Star, 1 August 1995.
  27. Quoted in The Star, 26 June 1995.
  28. B Xeketwane, The Relation between Hostels and the Political Violence on the Reef from 1990-1993: A Case Study of Merafe and Meadowlands Hostels in Soweto, unpublished MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1995; J Rosenthal, Self-Defence Units and their Relations to the Communities in which they are found, Sociology 111 Research Project, University of the Witwatersrand, 1994.
  29. ANC, Internal Discussion Document, 1992, p. 11.
  30. Rosenthal, op. cit.
  31. Personal communication, Mike Murphy, August 1995.
  32. Cited in South African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC), State of the Environment in Southern Africa, SARDC, Harare, 1994, p. 260.
  33. Ibid., p. 258.
  34. Ibid.
  35. Sunday Times, 28 July 1991.
  36. M Cameron, cited in The Star, 21 May 1988.
  37. Sunday Times, 23 July 1995.
  38. G Mills, Small Arms Control Some Early Thoughts, African Defence Review, 15, 1994, p. 44.
  39. SAP, op. cit., p. 119.
  40. Cochrane, op. cit.
  41. Cited by R Lessick, Day of the Gun: An Investigation into Gun Ownership in Contemporary White South African Society, unpublished Sociology Honnours dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, p. 41.
  42. ANC, op. cit.
  43. Saturday Star, 12 May 1990.
  44. Lessick, op. cit.
  45. SAP, op. cit., p. 119.
  46. Lessick, op. cit.
  47. The Star, 30 September 1993.
  48. Sunday Times, 20 August 1995.
  49. Mills, op. cit., p. 45.
  50. R Williams, Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Problems and Prospects, paper read at the conference on The Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem, UNIDIR, Berlin, May 1995, p. 2.
  51. L Mathiak, Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola, in J Boutwell, M Klare & L Reed (eds.), Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Mass., 1994, pp. 71-72.
  52. The Citizen, 1 September 1993.
  53. M Klare, The Thriving Black Market for Weapons, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1988, p. 23.
  54. Klare, 1995, op. cit., p. 15.
  55. Cock & Nathan, op. cit.
  56. P Johnson & D Martin, Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report, James Currey, London, 1989, p. 11.
  57. Cameron Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Arms Transactions between ARMSCOR and one Eli Wazan and other related matters, first report, Johannesburg, 15 June 1995.
  58. Personal communication, Hunter, 1995.
  59. Ibid.
  60. SARDC, op. cit.
  61. Weekly Mail, 7(15), 1991.
  62. Xeketewane, op. cit.
  63. Ibid.
  64. Williams, op. cit., p. 2.
  65. Ibid.
  66. Ibid., p. 3.
  67. South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1993/4, SAIRR, Johannesburg, 1994, p. 301.
  68. The Citizen, 17 June 1993.
  69. SAIRR, op. cit., p. 300.
  70. The Citizen, 16 July 1993.
  71. Williams, op. cit., p. 5.
  72. J Cock, Towards a Common Society: The Integration of Soldiers and Armies in a Future South Africa, unpublished Report, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1993; C Alao, The Defence and Security Implications of the Liberation War on Zimbabwe 1980-1987, unpublished PhD thesis, Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, 1991.
  73. Republic of Mozambique, A Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme for Mozambican Military Personnel: First Phase 1991-1992, Government of Mozambique, Maputo, 25 May 1992, p. 4.
  74. S Rana, Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts, paper read at the conference on The Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem, UNIDIR, Berlin, May 1995, p. 14.
  75. Mathiak, op. cit., pp. 81-97.
  76. The Citizen, 21 April 1993.
  77. The Argus, 22 August 1995.
  78. New York Times, 29 May 1994.
  79. General Mellet, cited in The Citizen, 16 July 1993.
  80. The Citizen, 21 April 1993.
  81. TAS, 9 November 1993 (information supplied by Karen Hansen).
  82. Sunday Mail, Zambia, 20 August 1995.
  83. The Argus, 22 August 1995.
  84. Weekly Mail, 18 September 1992.
  85. The Star, 15 June 1995.
  86. Sunday Times, 27 August 1995.
  87. The Star, 30 September 1993.
  88. The Star, 20 July 1995.
  89. Business Day, 13 October 1993.
  90. Sunday Times, 10 September 1995.
  91. P Batchelor, South Africa's Armaments Industry, paper prepared for Economic Trends Research Group meeting, University of Cape Town, November 1992, p. 22.
  92. According to S Willett & P Batchelor, To Trade or Not to Trade? The Costs and Benefits of South Africa's Arms Trade, Military Research Group, Johannesburg, 1994.
  93. P Batchelor, Dirty Secrets: South Africa's Arms Trade Legacy, Budget Watch, 1(2), 26 June 1995, pp. 1-3.
  94. Ibid., p. 3.
  95. Engineering News, 20 September 1991.
  96. The Star, 17 February 1995.
  97. Cameron Commission, op. cit., p. 76.
  98. Ibid., p. 79.
  99. Ibid.
  100. Ibid., p. 3.
  101. Press release, 4 September 1995.
  102. Rana, op. cit., p. 18.
  103. The Star, 29 June 1995.
  104. N Goldring, Towards Restraint: Controlling the International Arms Trade, Harvard International Review, 17(1) Winter 1994/5, p. 34.
  105. Naylor, cited by Goldring, ibid., p. 56.
  106. L Swatuk, Environmental Crises and Prospects for Southern African Regional Co-operation, paper read at the African Studies Association meeting, Toronto, Canada, 1994, p. 1.
  107. O Bennett (ed.), Greenwar: Environment and Conflict, Panos Institute, London, 1991.