INTRODUCTION

There has been a vast increase in peacekeeping activity since the end of the Cold War. From its inception in 1945 until 1988, the United Nations was active in only thirteen peacekeeping and observer missions. During 1988, there were five United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed; by 1992 the number increased to eleven. In 1994, the UN was engaged in seventeen peacekeeping operations.2 During the same period, the number of military personnel deployed had risen from 9 570 to 62 000; the number of countries contributing contingents increased from 26 to 74; and the UN annual budget for peacekeeping had risen from $230 million to $3,6 billion.3 The general understanding of increases in UN activities to maintain international peace and security, is that it is the result of the Security Council having been `freed from the shackles' that have trapped it during the Cold War. Since its establishment, there have been numerous attempts, notably by the US and the Soviet Union, to use the UN as a platform for ideological struggles. Vetoes exercised by these two super powers reduced the effectiveness of the Security Council, and concealed the potential role that the organisation might have played, in the absence of Cold War constraints. Therefore, there may well be some truth in the explanation that the end of the Cold War opened opportunities for the UN to carry out its primary objective effectively, namely the maintenance of international peace and security.

The UN is a body comprised of sovereign states, aimed at enhancing international security through the prevention of war and other events that threaten international peace. The ravages of World War I and, more particularly, World War II, inspired the international community to attempt to prevent the occurrence of similar events. Since its inception, however, the UN has encountered many problems in its attempts to accomplish this arduous objective. The frustrations plaguing the UN are not only restricted to the rivalry of the `former' super powers within the Security Council. Nerfin states that, "the UN is primarily an instrument of governments, and this may be seen not only as its original sin, but also as its major shortcoming."4 In a configuration of more than 180 independent states, the unselfish promotion of `international community' goals seems utopian. Some member states will use the UN as a tool to pursue their own national interests to the limit.

This article will review the practice of peacekeeping which, due to the failure of the ideal of `collective security', has become a key instrument utilised by the UN to attain its primary goal. Much of the literature on peacekeeping is premised on the virtuous nature of this activity and, as a result, focuses on ways to improve peacekeeping without questioning the concept per se. Why, for example, do countries participate in peacekeeping? Is it out of a commitment to bring about international peace, or are there other motivations? Why do some countries participate more than others? Is it because they are more concerned about international peace, or are there perhaps other less altruistic reasons?

THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Most peacekeeping operations are directed and controlled by the UN. Even those operations that are not directly under the control of the UN, will have obtained approval and support from the world body. Peacekeeping as it is known, evolved in an ad hoc manner. There is no specific reference to peacekeeping in the UN Charter, but Article 43 states that all members of the UN, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call, armed forces and facilities, including rights of passage, which are necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Some scholars trace the roots of peacekeeping as far back as the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. At these respective gatherings, the notion of the `settlement of disputes' was raised.5 The former Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester B Pearson, is credited with the development of the modern concept of peacekeeping. He played an instrumental role in the formation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that helped to defuse the international crisis in the Middle East in 1956. This peacekeeping force was able to supervise a peaceful disengagement of warring parties under the UN flag. The term peacekeeping was formalised in 1965 "... when the UN General Assembly established a special committee to deal with peacekeeping matters, and named it the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations."6

Peacekeeping has developed extensively since that era, and currently encompasses much more complex activities. Contemporary peacekeeping, generally referred to as `second generation peacekeeping', transgresses the disengagement of warring parties and includes the monitoring of elections, humanitarian relief assistance, disarming belligerents, supervising the demobilisation of former combatants, monitoring and providing security for peace support operations, escorting relief convoys, establishing exclusion zones in combat areas, and providing medical services to refugees and war victims.7 Peacekeeping has now reached the `third generation' phase. Operations at this level are generally referred to as peace enforcement, because of the lack of consent by one or more of the parties to some or all of the UN mandate. These missions include low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to the enforcement of cease-fires and, when necessary, assistance in the rebuilding of so-called failed states. However, some of the fundamental features that guided the first peacekeeping operation, remained prevalent. For example, neutrality occupies the same importance in contemporary UN peacekeeping operations as it has in 1956. It has become commonly accepted practice that states participating in UN peacekeeping operations should not pursue individual interests concerning any of the combatants. This principle has been difficult to uphold and, on several occasions, UN peace keepers have been accused of taking sides or sympathising with one of the groups in a conflict.

Another important principle of UN peacekeeping has been the voluntary contribution of material or human resources towards missions. Involvement or non-involvement theoretically does not signify anything about a country's political intentions, but is instead the apolitical decision by the participant to support the global community and its ideals,8 or so it would seem.

`MAJOR' POWER DOMINATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The pursuit of world-wide peace by the UN's predecessor organisation, the League of Nations, is generally regarded as a failure. "The inability of the League to deal with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, its failure to end the 1933 war between Bolivia and Paraguay, its inability to halt the fascist ambitions of Mussolini in 1935 and his subsequent attack on Ethiopia, its failure to stop Hitler's invasion of Austria in 1938"9 are some of the examples cited to demonstrate the inadequacy of the League in curbing wars. Many other reasons have been promulgated to explain why the League of Nations failed.10 However, the general structure of the UN shares many features with that of the League, even though there are differences in procedure between the two organisations. For example, both organisations share a Council, comprised of a few powerful states, an Assembly, made up of a wider congregation of states, and a Secretariat.

The UN Charter, signed in October 1945, initially provided for a Security Council of eleven members, five of whom were designated permanent membership with the right to veto decisions. The five permanent members were stipulated by name: China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Six other non-permanent members were to be elected by the General Assembly, for two-year terms. In comparison to the League of Nations, the UN Security Council's structure displayed rigidity. In the former organisation, the number of permanent seats to the League's Council fluctuated, and the number of non-permanent seats increased as the organisation progressed. The flexibility of the League's Council structure resulted in the preponderance of small states over the bigger powers within the Council. This is illustrated by the presence of only France, the United Kingdom, and the USSR as major powers in the League Council in 1936, while eleven non-permanent seats were occupied by smaller states.11 In contrast, the UN Security Council assured a select few states `indefinite' major power status.

The differences between the League Council and the UN Security Council were not only restricted to composition. In the League of Nations, both the League Council and League Assembly were given identical mandates, i.e. to "deal with matters affecting the peace of the world".12 It was originally anticipated that the League's Council would assume a more important role, due to the practical ramifications of its small size, and because of its major power character. But this was not to be. In practice, the League Assembly progressively began to play a far more important role and actually supplanted the Council in terms of decision-making.13

The founders of the UN saw the lack of authority in the League's Council as one of the reasons that led to its downfall. This, they felt, had to be rectified in the new organisation. In order to assure the UN's sustainable competence, it was decided that membership of the Security Council would be specified, so that each major power would have a permanent seat. Additionally, the Security Council would be bestowed with greater powers than those at the disposal of the General Assembly. The Security Council has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Article 24 of the UN Charter stipulates that, in fulfilling this function, the Security Council will act on behalf of other member states. Article 25 further emphasises that member states must agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. The more restricted operational structure of the UN meant that only five countries had exclusive claim to meaningful decisions related to world peace.

Morgenthau's dictum that international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power, then renders it reasonable to conclude that many states, especially those classified as middle powers, have found themselves in a dilemma brought about by the creation of the UN. Many states endeavour to have a permanent seat in the Security Council, which has considerable implications for any country. It does not only result in an elevated status, but gives the country concerned more political clout in the international arena. For example, there has been ongoing debate concerning the (quantitative, as well as qualitative) expansion of the Security Council to make it more representative, so that it reflects the diversity of the global community. Those lobbying for expansion want to see, among others, equitable geographic representation.

Among the advanced countries, both Germany and Japan are hoping to get a permanent seat in the restructured Security Council. There is no doubt that both these states are regarded as major powers in their own right, despite the fact that they do not possess nuclear weapons, nor occupy a permanent seat in the Security Council. Germany's economy dominates the European Union, while Japan is among the leading economic powers in the world. However, their absence from the Security Council has rendered them quiescent in global political and security affairs, relative to other less economically powerful states that occupy permanent seats in the Security Council. In the case of Japan, its stature as a major trader and the world's largest creditor-nation, has not translated into any confidence over handling a higher political profile in international affairs.14

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

What does all this have to do with peacekeeping, one may ask? The post-Second World War settlement was not ardently welcomed by the middle powers, especially those that fought as allies of the victorious powers during the war. The subsequent division of labour within the UN had more far-reaching implications than a simple separation of the `lions from the lambs'. Effectively, it meant that the `exclusive major power club' had a monopoly over international security affairs. The middle power states feared the implications of marginalisation in the new world body. If, for example, the maintenance of peace was not in the interests of any of the major powers, the rest of the international community would have to suffer the consequences of inactivity by the Security Council.

The powers granted to the Security Council were more extensive than those given to its equivalent predecessor organ, the Council of the League of Nations. Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter empowered the Security Council to recommend any means necessary, including the use of armed force, in the pursuit of international peace and security. However, a significant provision, embodied in Article 43, sought unanimity within the Security Council before any action could be undertaken. This provision was the one that enabled other states to `stake a claim' in international affairs. As previously mentioned, the Security Council encountered problems with its modus operandi, which was predicated upon the principle of unanimity. This shifted the balance of power within the UN, and subsequently paved the way for a more dynamic General Assembly.

The composition of the Security Council was its major limitation. The major powers were unable to transcend ideological interests in order to act collectively in the interests of the global community. Because of the vetoes that dominated proceedings in the Security Council, a resolution was adopted which allowed the General Assembly to make recommendations related to the maintenance of international peace and security in cases where the Security Council became deadlocked. The Security Council's other major weakness was exposed in 1950, when it recommended armed action to quell North Korea's aggression, without the capability to field such a force.15 A UN peacekeeping force was subsequently deployed through ad hoc improvisation without any major power contribution. It became evident that the Security Council was not only an inappropriate platform for reaching decisions concerning international security, but also lacked the capability to effect some of the recommendations that had been agreed upon.

MIDDLE POWER DOMINATION OF UN PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping is a costly exercise, and any operation can cost millions of dollars, depending on its magnitude and duration. Additionally, peacekeeping requires well-trained soldiers with appropriate equipment. It is therefore safe to argue that many countries are unable to participate in peacekeeping operations, even though they might have the desire to do so. Peacekeeping, therefore, has become an expression of middle power status. After the campaign for special middle power status within the UN was rejected, peacekeeping became an instrument to demonstrate countries' importance in the new global dispensation. Similar to the manner in which the UN Charter delegated certain roles to states, peacekeeping fortuitously became the preserve of middle powers. But what is wrong with middle powers being the instruments of international peace and security? The answer to this question depends in no small measure on the motives and intentions of such states.

It is often taken for granted that participation in UN peacekeeping is motivated by a state's benevolent commitment to the global community and international peace. However, the explanation for a state's involvement in peacekeeping is not necessarily dominated by altruism. A probing analysis of state participation in peacekeeping reveals that a realist explanation could also account for participation. Neack is one of the proponents of such a theory, and believes that states act more out of self/national interest than from a commitment to the international community. She suggests that "those states whose interests were better served by the continuation of the international status quo - that is, the states of the advanced industrialised West and non-Western states who have enjoyed some prestige in the international status quo - have dominated UN peacekeeping."16

When tracing the history of UN peacekeeping, one is struck by the centrality of Canada's role in this area. Was this because Canada was more righteous than other UN member states, and more concerned about the fate of humanity `which seemed to be on the verge of immense self-annihilation', therefore requiring the vision of Lester B Pearson and company to formalise Article 43 of the UN Charter? Some scholars have argued to the contrary, proposing that UN peacekeeping has developed out of the thwarted global political aspirations of a single state: Canada.17 Neack explains as follows: "At the close of World War II, Canadian statepersons undertook an aggressive campaign to establish a special status for Canada and other middle-power states in the new United Nations. The Canadians wanted this special status in recognition of Canada's military and financial contributions to the allied victory in the war and to solidify the rank of the middle powers directly below the `Big Five' and above everyone else."18 Other middle powers,19 such as Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Sweden, showed a similar desire to that of Canada.

When the middle powers were lobbying for special status, their argument centred on the sentiment that, unlike the major powers, they could be trusted not to challenge the international order, while they possessed sufficient resources collectively to protect the order against aggressive states.20 Idealists would probably accept the argument that the so-called middle powers are the most likely group of states to protect the international system. Realism, however, casts suspicion over state participation in peacekeeping. The realist theory of international relations purports that states' actions are motivated by the maximisation of national interest. The conventional foreign policy instruments of military force, trade and diplomacy, are not the only ones available to the state for enhancing influence at international level. Peacekeeping is another avenue open to states to improve their stature and become influential in international affairs.

The above argument is strengthened by recent reflections by the Canadian Foreign Minister, who was responding to a self-posed question about Canada's national interests in the new era of peacekeeping. He said: "My view is that peacekeeping is fundamental to Canadian foreign policy. It is not simply a question of continuing a tradition for which Canadians have a deserved international reputation. It is a question of making the UN work, in directions which are in Canadian interests ..."21 These words are enlightening - they confirm misgivings that the evolution of peacekeeping and contemporary participation is masked by contradiction. Participation in UN peacekeeping is supposedly an act that transcends narrow national interests, while peacekeeping, in no small way, has developed as a way for middle powers to demonstrate their power in and importance to world politics.22

A cursory examination of UN peacekeeping will reveal a high incidence of participation by middle powers. A study of the eighteen UN peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1990 conducted by Neack, identifies Canada, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Norway, Denmark, India, Italy, Australia and the US as the top ten peacekeeping nations during that period. These findings give credence to the notion that, with the notable exception of the US, UN peacekeeping is dominated by countries classified as middle powers. Those that question India's inclusion in the ranks of the middle powers may be reminded that India has a reputation as a regional power, as a leader among non-aligned states, as a newly industrialising country, and that much of its international status comes from its activities within the UN.23 A look beyond the top ten countries discloses the participation in UN peacekeeping operations of Brazil, Argentina, Ghana and Nigeria. The presence of these countries, which are not typically classified as middle power states in the top twenty peacekeeping list, reinforces the realist perception that these states have attempted at various times to establish themselves as regional and/or non-aligned or rising global powers. Thus, state participation in UN peacekeeping supports the view that the most likely participants are states that benefit from the status quo, and aspiring `powers' that seek to achieve some relative prestige within the status quo.24

GEOGRAPHICAL BASES OF SELF-INTEREST

The geographical distribution of peacekeeping operations until the end of the Cold War also suggests that states are motivated by self-interest, rather than by a commitment to the international community. Before the upsurge in peacekeeping activity, which was revitalised by the `victory' of the West over the `communist East', most peacekeeping operations were fielded in the Middle East, while conflict in other regions was largely ignored. There is limited support for the explanation that the Middle East has been afflicted by more conflict than other regions. From 1945 to 1988, there were seven interstate wars in North Africa/Middle East, four interstate wars in Southeast Asia, three in South Asia, two in sub-Saharan Africa, and one in each of the remaining regions - Eastern Europe, Central America, North Asia, Mediterranean and South Atlantic.25 In the same period, there were fourteen intrastate wars in sub-Saharan Africa, twelve in North Africa/Middle East, eight each in Central America and Southeast Asia, seven in South America, six in South Asia, two each in North Asia and East Asia, and one in the Mediterranean region.26 These statistics show that the Middle East has not been the only area afflicted by conflict. Africa, though it has accounted for less interstate conflicts during that period, has also warranted the attention given to the Middle East, especially when it is considered that the UN Charter does not preclude the organisation from resolving intrastate conflicts if they are likely to endanger international peace and security.

The moderate application of peacekeeping operations in other regions was not necessarily motivated by respect for the sovereignty of member states. Nor was the concentration of peacekeeping operations in the Middle East driven by a commitment to resolve interstate conflicts that threaten international peace and security. Western middle powers that dominated UN peacekeeping had their interests inextricably linked with the US-led Western bloc. Therefore, decisions lobbied for in the Security Council by the US, France and Great Britain were not disparate with the interests of Western middle powers. The same principles motivated the `communist' states of Russia and China. Each bloc made attempts to influence the UN not to interfere in regions that each respective bloc controlled.

Despite the reported conflicts in Africa, there was only one intervention in Africa prior to 1989, the United Nations Operation in Congo in 1960. This, it was argued, was because of the influence that European countries had in that region. Intervention in Africa would have jeopardised the Western bloc alliance and undermined European influence in that region. Similarly, the Soviet-led communist bloc discouraged UN interference in areas where they had influence. On the other hand, the Middle East was not easily controlled by either the Western or the Soviet bloc, even though competition for allies in that region prevailed throughout the Cold War era. It is due to this uneasy scenario that the `big-five' states encouraged and even required the involvement of the UN to help contain conflicts in the Middle East.27

PEACE KEEPERS AND ARMS SUPPLIERS

Another factor that raises scepticism about the true objectives of participation in UN peacekeeping, is the role of the primary peacekeeping states in fostering the proliferation of arms in areas of conflict. In the Middle East for example, the international community showed concern for conflict in that region by deploying peacekeeping operations in abundance, while time certain members of the international peacekeeping community were simultaneously the primary sources of militarisation there.28 While such action was consistent with the two rival super powers' behaviour of `going all out' to `win over' to their side as many states as possible, it is irreconcilable with the policy of the middle powers, who were supposedly meant to be the `impartial guardians' of the post-Second World War order.

Evidence suggests that, between the years 1948 and 1990, many of the most frequent peace keepers were also ranked among the largest arms exporters. For example, the middle power states of Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands are among the top thirteen major weapons exporters to the developing world where many wars were fought during the Cold War.29 This begs the question why the middle powers, if they are so committed to international peace, feature in the list of top arms exporting states? States engage in arms sales out of national interest, but seeing that these sales contribute to the escalation of conflicts, retrospective guilt may creep in and peacekeeping serves as a remedy to soothe the compunction. However, the likelihood of states acting out of guilt is not congruent with a world system where states' behaviour is generally motivated by self-interest. A more realistic explanation is that UN peacekeeping serves the same interests as arms sales do. That is, peacekeeping is self-interested action to establish, preserve, or increase a state's own position and power base in the world.30

NATIONAL INTEREST AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

National interest goals are also reflected in the execution of multinational peacekeeping operations. It is not unusual to learn of divisions within peacekeeping forces over various matters, including the implementation of mandates. Cases have been reported of commanders consulting with their respective national governments on what course of action to follow in particular circumstances, disregarding the peacekeeping operation leadership. Such actions undermine the operation and render it susceptible to failure. At worst, the absence of coherence between the multinational forces in peacekeeping operations can risk the lives of some of the contingents.

This scenario occurred during the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), where several Nigerian peacekeeping soldiers were killed in Mogadishu. It was reported that the Italian contingent watched the Nigerian element get into trouble, but refused to come to their assistance because of instructions from the Italian government. This is indicative of national contingents acting out of self-interest at the expense of international community goals.

Questions are being raised about peacekeeping as an instrument capable of bringing about longer term stability in conflict ravaged regions. National interest goals once more enter the equation. Fatigue occurs when a peacekeeping operation does not rapidly result in a cease-fire between warring factions. Where a cease-fire has been achieved, and some type of election staged, states are satisfied with the settlement, and are quick to declare the operation a success. There is no concerted effort to engage in post-conflict peacebuilding which will lay the foundation for longer term stability and eradicate the conditions that originally caused the conflict. An example is the withdrawal of Canada from the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. This mission is no closer to completion than when it began in March 1964, yet the Canadians no longer feel a need to support the effort. However, the Canadians were `quick to jump' to global `hot spots' with high international profiles, such as Bosnia.31

Equally disturbing is the rising trend of governments making financial gains from peacekeeping operations. This is more likely to occur with African and other poorer nations being pressured by the international community to shoulder the burden of peace in their respective regions. For some cash-strapped countries, motivation for participation in peacekeeping operations will extend beyond altruism and national prestige. Participation in UN peacekeeping is not supposed to generate financial benefits for member states. Recently, Zimbabwean peace keepers, serving with UNAVEM III in Angola, complained that the allowances they receive are much less than the amount allocated by the UN. Peace keepers are paid through their respective governments from the UN Peacekeeping Fund. Governments that contribute troops are paid $988 per soldier per month for all ranks. Specialists receive an extra $291 per month. However, Zimbabwean troops have been receiving $350 a month for their participation in Angola. Similar concerns were raised about payments for participation in Somalia.32 The increasing participation by poorer nations in the future is likely to reveal more contradictions of state participation in peacekeeping operations. Unlike the middle powers, which are motivated by a boost in international stature, the poorer nations may attempt to improve their financial positions by expropriating as much money from UN peacekeeping as possible.

South Africa, which has recently been admitted into several international organisations, does not have a peacekeeping record. However, like many other African countries, this is likely to change. South Africa has been asked by East African countries to be on standby for peacekeeping duties in Burundi. The affirmative response to this request marks a shift from the cautious position propagated by the Government only a year earlier.33 This may suggest that South Africa feels more confident to fulfil its international obligations, or maybe Burundi offers an opportunity for the country to play a more proactive role in regional affairs, especially with the country being touted for a permanent seat in the Security Council. It is too early to draw any definitive conclusions regarding South Africa's participation in peacekeeping operations, but international patterns suggest that Pretoria may be motivated by reasons other than altruism.

CONCLUSION

This article is not intended to discredit peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping, on many occasions, has brought some form of hope for a better life to war ravaged societies. However, peacekeeping is not necessarily motivated by a commitment to the international community and its goal of a more secure world. Since its inception, peacekeeping has been masked by the aspirations of certain states, notably the Western middle powers, who have tried to use peacekeeping as a ladder to a favourable position in the international hierarchy of states. The idealist conception of state participation in peacekeeping operations has many loopholes. It does not give a balanced account of state participation in peacekeeping operations.

A realist perspective of state participation in peacekeeping operations recognises that, if a state's interest is linked to the continuation of the international status quo, it will use whatever means at its disposal, including peacekeeping, to preserve that favourable status quo. Additionally, states will participate in peacekeeping to acquire a desired position in the international division of states. Peacekeeping is a high profile international activity and participation can result in the elevation of status. Status and influence in international affairs is what states strive for, and therefore, participation in peacekeeping may be motivated by national interest. If peacekeeping is motivated by such a rationality, but results in the desired outcome of maintaining international peace and security, then all is well. However, if national interests override international community goals, then peacekeeping will not realise the potential it has of building a more secure and peaceful world. Although the realist perspective is discredited and often labelled as being cynical, it offers a fresh introspection for the international community to reassess the motivations for state participation in UN peacekeeping operations at the turn of the 20th century.

ENDNOTES

This article is published as part of the Training for Peace Project, a joint venture between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), and the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP).



J Cilliers & G Mills, Peacekeeping in Africa, Vol 2, IDP/SAIIA, Halfway House, 1995, p. 1.



S Nambiar, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in Kumar (ed.), The United Nations at 50: An Indian View, UBS, New Delhi, 1995, p. 82.



M Nerfin, The Future of the United Nations System: Some Questions on the Occasion of an Anniversary, The United Nations in a Just World Order, New York, 1988, p. 524.



L Gumbi, Peacekeeping: An Historical Background, in Cilliers & Mills, op. cit., p. 27.



I Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, Hurst, London, 1984, p. 1.



Ibid., pp. 25-30.



L Neack, UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?, Journal of Peace Research, 32(2), 1995, p. 182.



Gumbi, op. cit., p. 31.



For a more detailed discussion, see, F Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, Macmillan, New York, 1973.



Ibid., p. 183.



Ibid., p. 185.



Ibid.



B Bridges, Japan: Hesitant Superpower, Conflict Studies, RISCT, London, September 1993, p. 1.



Hartmann, op. cit., p. 192.



Ibid., p. 181.



Ibid., p. 183.



Ibid.



The concept `middle powers' is a contested one. It is generally used to refer to states that do not command as much political influence as the so-called great-powers, but are relatively influential in international affairs because of their stable economic base and their industrialised status. Additionally, during the Cold War era, they were associated with `relative impartiality'. For a more detailed discussion of middle-powers, see Cooper et al., 1993.



Neack, op. cit., p. 183.



Notes from a speech by A Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressing the House of Commons on Canada's Role in Peacekeeping, Ottawa, 21 September 1994, Internet.



Neack, op. cit., p. 183.



Ibid., p. 184.



Ibid., p. 185.



J Rothgeb, Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System, St Martin's, New York, 1993, p. 75.



Ibid., p. 76.



Neack, op. cit., p. 189.



Ibid., p. 188.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid., p. 194.



International Peacekeeping News, 12, September-October 1995.



See A Pahad, South Africa and Preventive Diplomacy, in Cilliers & Mills, op. cit.