INTRODUCTION

The South African defence industry has recently been the subject of much criticism and debate. There are of course many perceptions of the SA defence industry. The Department of Defence would view it from a strategic point of view, while the Department of Foreign Affairs might consider its impact on South Africa's foreign relations. Pacifist lobbies – and there are many of them – would argue the matter from the point of view of human relations and ethics.

The Cameron Commission investigated on allegations of misconduct in the business of arms trade and reported its findings. Government adopted a new policy on conventional arms control and reiterated that "our morality as a democratic Government dictates that we have to act in accordance with internationally accepted norms and standards." The Government also stated that it is obliged to promote world peace and security, and that the country's approach to the sale of arms is based on a resolution to act responsibly. The question arises whether a responsible arms transfer policy is one in which the humanitarian, ethical, political, legal and strategic reasons take precedence over the economic and commercial motivation to export arms. If so, how is the policy administered and what are the implications for the various stakeholders?

More specifically, who advises the Government on defence industrial policy and who accepts responsibility for the implementation of the policy?

The role of the Defence Secretariat in the business of acquisition, local production and the export of defence-related products and services, is participatory. To illustrate its role, the following issues will be dealt with in this article:

acquisition policy of the Department of Defence;


industrial development policy;


arms trade policy;


national policy perspectives;


foreign policy regarding arms trade;


defence policy; and


the role of the Defence Secretariat.

The above scope suggests a logical relationship between the defence needs of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the South African defence industry. The new Constitution instructs the SANDF to "... provide a balanced, modern, and technologically advanced force, capable of executing its functions under the Constitution ...", and to maintain an appropriate state of preparedness for this purpose. It implies that the SANDF must have access to a local, specialised defence industry, capable to develop, supply and maintain the systems and products necessary for the SANDF to perform its tasks.

ACQUISITION POLICY

The existence of a sophisticated domestic defence industry is an important factor in enabling the SANDF to maintain the necessary state of preparedness in the most cost-effective manner. Not all defence equipment ought to be manufactured locally, but the domestic design, development and manufacture of certain systems and products are essential to enable the SANDF to execute its constitutional mandate cost-effectively.

The Department of Defence has revised its acquisition policy recently. In terms of the new policy, South Africa shall not strive for complete self-sufficiency in arms development, but only limited self-sufficiency in key areas. Defence industry studies will be executed from time to time to indicate the preferred mode of acquisition for particular defence systems. These studies shall provide guidelines for:

independent local development;


foreign procurement;


competitive procurement (local and foreign competitors); or


partnerships between local and foreign suppliers.

Preference shall be given to the procurement of defence products and services from local suppliers, providing that such procurement represents good value for money. Naturally, this implies that the local industry should compete internationally and should do so cost-effectively.

Funds allocated to the defence budget have declined by fifty per cent in real terms since 1990, in response to lower levels of threat assessments, and a shift in the Government's spending priorities.

To compensate for a much lower domestic demand from the SANDF, the South African defence industry has sought export markets to maintain turnover at levels high enough to preserve its manufacturing capacity in products and systems required by the SANDF.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

The defence industry's policy is to be an integral part of the national industrial policy. The defence industry is the leader and catalyst for the growth of the high-technology manufacturing industry in South Africa, and leads the industry in technology development, local systems and product design and development, quality standards, and export promotion.

The structure of the defence industry shall primarily be determined by market forces. In principle, no new defence industry establishment shall be undertaken with state funding where capabilities already exist, either in the public or private sector. The commercial industrial base shall be used for defence production to the maximum possible extent.

The management of long term strategic interests, such as national defence technology development programmes, requires the establishment of 'preferred supplier' and 'centres of expertise', to achieve the necessary long term commitment from both the State and industry to develop and maintain certain levels of technological expertise. This commitment shall also be evident in the minimum level of funding that is made available for R and D to maintain the required levels of competence.

The obligations of the Department of Defence towards the industry is evident. The Department shall support, direct and contract the defence industry to run a limited number of long term core programmes, to enable it to maintain the necessary width and depth of engineering and production skills to provide support and to produce products for local use and export.

All R and D efforts, but especially technology development programmes, are aimed at the longer term. To meet the needs of a technologically advanced military force, as required by the Constitution, funds need to be allocated to defence research and development programmes. These programmes shall be selected and managed so that a technology base is sustained within the armaments industry in areas that are of strategic and/or economic importance to South Africa.

The Government shall also enter into agreements with other governments to enable the defence industry to co-operate with foreign companies. Each government will support and maintain its own industry financially to enable it to participate in the partnership. The governments shall be committed to acquire the successful products produced by the partnerships. These aspects should be negotiated and included in memoranda of understanding between South Africa and other countries.

ARMS TRADE: NONPROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Since its inauguration in May 1994, the South African Government has committed itself to a policy of non-proliferation and arms control that covers all weapons of mass destruction and extends to concerns relating to the proliferation of conventional weapons. This policy forms an integral part of its commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection.

The stated primary goal of this policy is to reinforce and promote South Africa as a responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced technologies in the nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional fields.

In order to implement a clear policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the South African Cabinet decided on 31 August 1994 that South Africa should:

be an active participant in all non-proliferation regimes and suppliers' groups;



adopt positions publicly that support the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with the aim to promote international peace and security; and



use its position as a member of the suppliers' regimes, as well as the South African Development Community (SADC), the Africa Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, to promote the importance of non-proliferation and to ensure that these controls do not become the means whereby developing countries are denied access to advanced technologies.

This policy pre-supposes that the implementation of such policies could guarantee perpetual peace. However, if there is a golden rule in world politics it is that bad times return. It is not fashionable to make that point, but its political incorrectness renders it important. It is the author's civic duty, as a scholar of strategy, to mind the store of ideas that bear upon national and international security. But, there are many people who believe, some with passionate sincerity, that the store of military security does not need minding.

Armaments, their manufacture and their trade, do not comprise as it were a free-floating subject to be addressed ethically, or in isolation. To debate whether or not one likes or approves of arms, makes about as much sense as to debate whether or not one likes or approves of the payment of taxes. Arms are neutral. It is a view that is not shared by the Cameron Commission. The issue is not weapons or armed forces, still less is it war, and it probably should not be the arms industry or the arms trade either. The real issue here, is the implicit posing of false alternatives.

At least, questions of arms manufacture and sale or transfer must be subordinated in principle to attitudes towards armed forces in general and the armed forces of South Africa in particular. If a prudent national security policy for South Africa requires the national provision of armed forces – as permitted, indeed encouraged, by the UN Charter and international law, and practised by virtually all UN member states – then naturally those forces need weapons and other items of equipment essential for military purposes.

There is no doubt that the South African defence industry will need to participate aggressively in the global arms market. The following strategic assumptions may apply to the industry:

Firstly, local industry cannot supply many products effectively at the present low levels of demand, and export earnings by manufacturers are essential to reduce the unit cost of products sold to the SANDF.



Secondly, exports earn foreign exchange, thereby having a positive impact on the balance of payments, and export profits bring tax revenue to the exchequer, to fund spending on essential infrastructure projects and social programmes.



Thirdly, Government insists that military exports should not pose any foreseeable threat to the safety of South Africa's population, nor to the forces charged to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.



Finally, South Africa should be seen as a responsible member of the international community, and conduct its trade in defence products in accordance with international law and normative standards.

NATIONAL POLICY PERSPECTIVES

The Government finally placed its macro-economic strategy on the table on Friday, 14 June 1996. Entitled Growth, Employment and Redistribution, the long-awaited policy framework envisages low inflation and a huge injection of foreign capital.

Trevor Manuel, the Minister of Finances, outlined a seven-point plan to reform the economy. It includes reduced government spending on wages and increased expenditure on infrastructure. This includes:

electricity;


domestic, industrial and agricultural water supplies;


sanitation;


roads, railways, airports, harbours and pipelines;


telecommunications and postal services;


urban housing and rural development; and


hospitals, clinics and educational facilities.

In terms of this plan, the Government will decrease consumption expenditure. The plan does not augur well for defence spending, as defence planners will already have to put forward with very convincing arguments for sustained defence spending, let alone ask for increased defence spending.

FOREIGN POLICY ON ARMS TRADE

International arms transfers have not only become a fact of life and an accepted international phenomenon, but also a powerful instrument of foreign policy. It requires South Africa to reconcile its humanitarian objectives and the internal agreements and conventions to which it is party, with the role and interests of the SANDF and the armaments industry.

The Department of Foreign Affairs plays a major role in shaping the country's defence policy. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Department applies the following guidelines in its counsel on defence and arms trade:

Arms transfers of a lethal nature are unlikely to be approved

* to international flash points and destinations of prevailing conflicts;

* nor to destinations under UN arms embargo;

* nor transfers to destinations where there are regional conflicts;

* nor to states that oppress their local communities and/or commit serious human rights abuses.

* nor to terrorist movements or states that have a proven history of illegal arms trade.



Arms transfers that are likely to be used against the SANDF or within the context of security co-operation arrangements, will not be approved.



Transfers of dual-use items that are subject to control in terms of South African non-proliferation, will be evaluated in terms of current control lists and destination.

South Africa's foreign policy priorities in bilateral and regional context are primarily focused on the needs of the Southern African subregion, as well as Africa as a whole. The Government believes that it has a special responsibility to promote socio-economic progress in the region in order to ensure that peaceful co-existence and security prevails. In this context, the Government is committed to improve its demining and mine-counter measures technology and capability. Effective assistance in mine clearance has been initiated in Southern Africa.

DEFENCE POLICY

Intelligent, informed and certainly well-intentioned people are capable of serious errors in judgement. It is extraordinarily difficult to plan efficiently for future security. The obvious, albeit frequently ignored, point that the future cannot be foretold in detail, poses the most fundamental challenge to defence policy formulation and planning.

How could we survive a future that we cannot predict? The answer lies both in applying what is known about the future with some confidence in order to offset the unknown, and in planning against at least some of the unpleasant possibilities that the future may hold.

International scholars of security have uncovered some sobering facts, but little really useful understanding, to offer on the subject of defence reviews. Alas, the discipline of comparative defence policy analysis is still in its infancy. Part of the problem is that for security and defence nothing appears to fail like success. In war and in peace, armed forces are intended to help shape the decisions of actual or possible foes. This means that the proof of policy success often lurks undetectable in the events that have not occured.

Defence reviews in all countries, rather like historical writings, reflect the beliefs and aspirations of the authors, whether they are individuals or institutions, often more than the periods that they seek to shape or explain themselves. If it is any consolation, neither British nor American experience with defence reviews have been very distinguished. In 1981 the British, for example, in a defence white paper, rationally titled The Way Forward, elected to cut the surface fleet of the Royal Navy, just prior to the Falklands war! In the early phases of the so-called Options for Change exercise in 1990/91, the British Government chose to rationalise the army considerably, just as Britain secured command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's post-Cold War Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps and faced large demands for light infantry to undertake United Nations' peacekeeping tasks.

The British performance of recent years, however, possibly shines in comparison with the Americans. President Clinton's 'bottom-up' defence review was truly accurately titled. The Clinton Administration conducted a defence review in the absence of a settled foreign policy. It can be done, but it does not make any sense. If the US gets it right, it will be based more on luck than on sound judgement.

It is useful to summarise the main reasons why the undertaking of a defence review can be either advisable or not.

Firstly, it is probably important from time to time to go back to basics in order to reconsider the purposes, idealistic and instrumental, of defence activities.



Secondly, it is valuable to conduct an occasional 'compass check' to ascertain whether defence behaviour is broadly on the correct, that is to say, the intended road.



Thirdly, it is useful to see periodically if bad habits have crept into policy implementation.



Fourthly and rarely, but all the more significant, a non-routine focus is needed for defence thinking and planning with deadlines provided for decisions.



In the fifth place, the policy-making system should occasionally be challenged to reconsider the continuing validity of linear thinking and behaviour, or a 'business as usual' attitude. Routine, linear, incremental procedures proceed in a manner to produce routine, linear, incremental outcomes.



Finally, a formal defence review can be preferable to the real alternative, which is often not the absence of a review, but rather the conduct of a protracted 'rolling' view that makes major decisions cumulatively and in such a way that the larger questions pass unasked and therefore unanswered.

Two points are worth highlighting, in particular. Firstly, the request for and conduct of the country's formal defence review, risk generating expectations of policy change that the evidence, honestly and competently assessed, may not support. Secondly, with reference to the national defence policy, there is a general and prudent rule that holds that when in significant doubt, do not change it. The caveat is clear: the defence community can become captives of a process of policy review, while the virtues of policy stability should be recognised in a world obscured by perils that the years ahead may bring. The scale of recent political change in South Africa would appear to negate much of the generic argument in favour of steadiness of policy course, just as the radical change in the outside world's view of South Africa carries potentially massive implications for the country's prospects as an arms trader.

What South Africa, or indeed any country, aims to achieve with a defence review is an integrated, end-to-end analysis that connects its forces logically, coherently, and purposefully with the next state. The SANDF's chosen acquisition policy for the future should be demonstrably – in the sense of plausibly – relevant in terms of providing support for South Africa's interests in a changing world. The defence policy that is selected should also meet domestic imperatives, and it has to have, what can be termed, both external and internal integrity. External integrity refers to the coherence between defence and foreign policy. Internal integrity refers to the necessity for the SANDF to function effectively as a military machine.

Thus, it can be argued that South Africa's defence policy, strategy and posture must be based on:

a careful appreciation of the realities of the external environment in which South Africa finds itself;



an accurate understanding of the challenges faced locally in building a limited, just and increasingly prosperous society; and



a serious effort to find an optimum balance between the many, occasionally conflicting, demands with which both these complex realities are confronting the country.

THE ROLE OF THE DEFENCE SECRETARIAT

The Defence Secretariat is a sub-component of the Department of Defence. In general it plays a leading role in defining defence policy. It determines the Department's budget and related programmes, and the Secretary for Defence will soon be able to fulfil the responsibility as the Department's accounting officer.

The Defence Secretariat also plays a significant part in the business of defence acquisition, local production and export of defence-related products and services:

As the custodian of defence policy, the Defence Secretariat should ensure that defence acquisition enables the SANDF to have access to cost-effective equipment.



In collaboration with ARMSCOR, the Defence Secretariat should provide effective guidance and direct support for the local defence industry to develop as a viable and competitive entity.



The Defence Secretariat would facilitate bilateral agreements between governments to enable the defence industry to co-operate with foreign companies (indirect support).



The Defence Secretariat is an active participant in the Government's management of South Africa's arms trade. The Directorate of Conventional Arms Control administers applications for the marketing, contracting and exporting of defence equipment and services. The Secretary for Defence is the chairman of the 'Scrutiny Committee', and is also a counselling member of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee.



Whereas the Defence Secretariat is responsible to advise the Minister of Defence on defence policy, it also influences the architecture of national policy. It should be evident that many of the determinants of national policy are in direct conflict with the exigencies of defence.

CONCLUSION

If South Africa should be able to protect itself and contribute to regional and possible global peacemaking, then it has to be sufficiently armed. As a good neighbour, South Africa must sustain a SANDF able to project power and, if necessary, to fight over long distances.

Consistent with broad ethical principles, not to mention detailed specific guidance from the world of high policy, South Africa's arms industry has to function in a highly competitive market that often consists of unscrupulous foreign enterprises. To avoid any misunderstanding, the world is amply populated with greedy, albeit efficient, arms merchants, South Africa can probably play a role in specific niches within the global arms market, but it cannot dominate that market in any significant sense.

A well-armed SANDF, prepared to serve national, regional, and global security needs, would reveal much about the character and maturity of the society from which it has sprouted. Neither the SANDF, nor the domestic defence industry should apologise or make excuses for their core activities. Both entities will continue to exist, because the cause of a just order requires armed protection. Both require the services of an able and committed advocate for the cause of defence. The Defence Secretariat aims to fulfil that role.

ENDNOTES

Edited version of an address to the South African Armour Association, 26 June 1996.