INTRODUCTION

One of the characteristics of the post-Cold War era is that of an unprecedented ethnic revival, causing the disintegration or dismemberment of multi-ethnic states. This process started in 1989 with the breaking away of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the former Soviet Union, and is often associated with high levels of instability, confrontation and even conflict. Playing an instrumental role in this, is the re-emergence of the concept 'ethnicity', which has previously been declared dead by most of the academic world. As a phenomenon of the 1990s, it has demonstrated the ability to reincarnate and take its place in world politics. It constitutes an important factor in modern political mobilisation and in global conflict. It also stokes many of the fires which are currently burning in numerous corners of the global village. These conflicts often feed on the heterogeneity of states and the formation of nations, with the spark for violence provided by the ignorance and intolerance displayed by governments in the management of ethnic confrontation.

THE NATURE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

Ethnic groups, mostly seeking to assert themselves geo-politically, are often associated with high levels of violence and lasting bitterness. These are not comparable to the ideologically motivated inter-state wars, the class struggle of the Cold War era or the world wars.¹ Though it can include a number of similar characteristics, particularly in cases where the boundaries of the state coincide with the ethnic composition of the population, i.e. homogeneous states, ethnic conflict is essentially a conflict between vertically parallel and self-defined ethno-cultural units, competing for resources and reasserting their own ethno-cultural position vis-à-vis other groups within the state. Only about ten per cent of all states are homogeneous and enjoy the stability promoting benefits where ethnic interests equal state interests, because geography and demography coincide. In the majority of other cases, ethno-cultural units are expected to accommodate one another within a single heterogeneous geo-political entity, often perceiving their interests threatened or inadequately addressed as a result. It is also essentially the struggle for improved communal or socio-cultural survival, mostly triggered by environmental and acute scarcity, which will rage on at sub-national level and beyond the capability of the state to protect the individual from its consequences.²

Conflict within heterogeneous ethno-cultural settings can take place within or across state boundaries, the contest for territory being determined by the psychological geography of the participants, i.e. their perception of an historical right to the territorial claim. An example would be the Kurdish claim for a future 'Kurdistan' which extends into three states, namely Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

This also has a profound impact on conflict resolution. Ethno-cultural conflict is a subjective and emotional form of conflict which seems more dependent on changes in mass perceptions in order to improve the relationship between distinct communities, and aimed at the way in which they behave and understand each other. As a result, it has in the past been associated with negative irrationality, supposedly the driving force behind race theories and 'ethnic cleansing'. This demonisation of ethno-nationalism is as factually flawed as it is in itself emotional and prejudicial. Nationalism's 'dark side', experienced in its most infamous form during the Second World War in Nazi Germany, reveals upon closer examination a non-ethnic side in its self-defining criteria which could perhaps be more adequately described as 'race-based internationalism'. Racial criteria replaced the ethno-cultural aspect of group-defining criteria, and became an ideology in much the same way as class-based internationalism provided one of the ideological poles in the post-Second World War bi-polar, Cold War system.

AIMS OF NATIONALISM

The other, and often ignored 'face' of nationalism is that which generates the will to sacrifice and resist imperialism and expansionism. The most notable example caused comparatively weak and already defeated nations to continue resisting Nazi Germany, albeit only with underground forces, such as the French maquis. It was a sense of nationalism which provided the impetus for Boers to challenge British colonialism in the final years of the 19th Century, despite shared racial characteristics, and the British to later challenge Germany even when the latter appealed to racial solidarity. It is the same kind of ethno-nationalism which prevented assimilation in 'white' South Africa. The ethno-cultural divides between the English and Afrikaans speaking segments of the white population remain more or less firmly in place. The failure of racial 'nation-building' in South Africa during the second half of this century was probably most notable in the political divisions, with the political parties being divided largely along Afrikaans and English lines, while Black (ethnic) aspirations played little role in white political formation.

The political objectives in ethnic conflict differ in important aspects from conventional structural conflict found in inter-state conflict and geo-political competition for resources. These are usually:

control of the state – usually in the case of a minority wanting to dominate the majority;



control of a state – secessionist sentiments being prevalent among ethnic minorities;



exemption from control by others³ – usually entailing demands for measures of limited or internal self-determination to secure cultural 'breathing space'. If such measures are denied, the demands tend to evolve into secessionist ones.

In the case of South Africa's two most ethnically conscious groups, namely Afrikaner and Zulu nationalists, there is no apparent desire for control of the South African state. To them, South Africa constitutes a colonial entity with artificial and arbitrary boundaries, incorporating the former Boer republics and the Zulu kingdom into one geo-political entity with the former British territories. Instead, rallied around the concept 'self-determination', they aspire to the latter two of the abovementioned political options. Although the Government admits the existence of different tribes, recognises eleven official languages and a wide spectrum of differing religions, there is a general reluctance to accommodate these groups territorially in a strong federal system or a separate territory. This seems to be partly based on the fear of further fragmentation, as other groups may make similar claims. This fear is evident among international interest groups who tend to overemphasise 'globalisation' and see ethnic mobilisation as a threat to economic performance, as well as the infrastructural cohesion of countries. To these interest groups the proliferation of states constitutes a nuisance which they hope will dissipate as borders supposedly fall victim to the 'info-age'. This thinking does not take into account the paradoxical nature of the post-Cold War era where increasing economic co-operation goes hand in hand with the proliferation of states.⁴

THE PROLIFERATION OF STATES

In 1945, the United Nations (UN) was founded with 51 countries as members. By 1960 there were 100 UN countries, while by 1984 there were 159. Today the UN is fast approaching 200 members, indicating a continuous proliferation of states, with more states applying for membership as they come about at an ever-increasing rate. Just as preventive measures to curb arms proliferation have failed, so too have measures to restrict state proliferation proven to be futile. Former United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher made the point when he testified before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "If we don't find some way that the different ethnic groups can live together in a country ... we'll have 5 000 countries rather than the hundred plus we now have."⁵

Others are inclined to place the probable number of countries at 1 000,⁶ while Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld⁷ limits his contribution to merely verifying the probability that the future will see a world with much greater fragmentation and a higher number of states. However, these will not be states in the same form as they are defined today, as the nation-state concept also continues to change. Whatever the full extent of state proliferation may eventually be, much of it seems destined to take place in Africa. Of the 233 politically active ethnic groups identified by 1990, 209 were situated in developing countries, with Africa taking the lead with 74, even before Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zaire hit the headlines or Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia.⁸

The reality seems to be that there is a natural proliferation of states based on re-emerging ethnic consciousness throughout the world, and accelerated through the collapse of the bi-polar international Cold War system. While the rigidity and resistance to the redrawing of boundaries and secessionist attempts in Africa are notorious in their persistence, African writers like Mazrui are already asking how many existing African states will remain intact over the next 100 years. It is contended that the outline of most African states (normally designated by a colonial power), will change in two ways:

more, but smaller states, based on ethnic self-determination and comparable to the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia; coupled with



regional integration towards larger political and economic co-operation forums.⁹

TRUISMS AND FALLACIES ABOUT ETHNIC CONFLICT

In the wake of the December 1996 series of bombings, South Africa's policy-makers may need to ask the question whether these were isolated incidents on the part of a small group of reactionaries, or a sign of things to come. The subsequent arrests of the suspects indicated that they were exclusively Afrikaners from the ultra-right spectrum. Some observers dismiss the phenomenon as sporadic and isolated, pointing at the amateurish modus operandi which has characterised much of the pre-election and the more recent bombing sprees. Similar approaches, taken by governments throughout the world, usually result in a worsening of the security situation as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya demonstrate. Statists in both instances confused symptoms and causes, blaming nationalism as the cause for the problem, although it later proved to be the symptom of an underlying frustration among numerically inferior, ethno-cultural sub-units who were asserting their right to determine their own future.

Ethnic conflict is the most lasting kind of confrontation and armed conflict, possibly clumsy and impulsive at first because of its emotional nature, ultimately becomes more sophisticated and frequent. In South Africa, the intervals between acts of terrorism and/or sabotage have become shorter since the assassination of Professor Johan Heyns, which seemed to signal the start of a post-apartheid continuation of political violence.

Ethnic conflicts tend to penetrate state structures, challenging the loyalties of 'ethnic kin' who are employed as agents of the state.¹⁰ Already in December 1990, Xhosa policemen, sympathetic to their ethnic kin in Phola Park, attacked the Mshayazafe Hostel alongside Xhosa 'blanket men', killing twelve Zulu-speaking residents.¹¹ Widespread allegations of a similar collusion between Inkatha/IFP Zulus and the former KwaZulu Police, suggested that the situation was no different the other way around. While loyalties toward the state are undoubtedly strongly influenced by how ethnic groups are treated by it, ethnic conflict scenarios have witnessed defections on the part of the members of ethnic groups. Where loyalties were put to the test, as in the case of the defection of a battalion of ethnic Cossacks from the Russian army to join the Moldovian rebels in the early 1990s, ethnic loyalties generally prevailed. This raises the question whether the apparently increasing difficulties faced by the South African Police Service (SAPS) to track down and arrest right-wing insurgents is a consequence of improving capabilities on the part of the perpetrators or an indication of diminishing enthusiasm on the part of Afrikaner policemen.

Ethnic communities show an extraordinary durability, surviving migration, occupation and oppression, as vividly demonstrated by the Irish Republican Army, and the Israeli/Palestinian and Kurdish conflicts.

Yet another characteristic of ethnic conflict is that economics take second place, with a basic disregard for persuasive arguments of 'interdependence' or for economic interests superseding group interests. Again, there appears to be confusion regarding symptoms and causes, between hopes or dreams, on the one side, and uncompromising realities on the other. When dealing with the former, many ethnic conflicts were subjected to peace campaigns, emphasising their 'unity' and 'interdependence', including Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia. In the latter case, the interdependence argument was arguably more relevant, but remained ultimately ignored. There were peace marches in Belgrade with Serbs and Croats forming themselves into a 'civic forum' to fight against ethnic and religious hatred. Similar marches preceded the conflict which engulfed Sarajevo, with the city witnessing all threeof its ethnic role players strongly represented in marches propagating multi-ethnic co-existence. Within the city, there was a 25 per cent rate of ethnic intermarriage which made observers hopeful that peace would prevail. To their surprise and dismay, these efforts had little impact on the momentum acquired by ethno-nationalism. Emphasising the 'interdependence' of a country's people therefore does not mean that ethnic groups will refrain from confronting one another. Even in inter-state conflict this assumption was made with regard to Germany and Britain who, being each other's biggest trading partners, were believed to be too 'interdependent' to risk war. This assessment was made in 1912, just two years before the outbreak of the First World War. It is often, and wrongly, assumed that the potential opponents will be guided by economic logic and will realise that such an interdependence actually exists. It is rarely considered possible that one or all might simply not care. The fallacy that economic interests supersede ethnic ones, is inclined to downplay the extent to which modern people are still 'herd animals', responding to the same 'instincts' which frustrated the business interests of the 'merchants' of human societies. While it does seem true that the higher the socio-economic status of the average individual, the weaker the intensity of group identity, it creates the implicit or explicit tendency to assume that ethnic groups can be placated by materialism alone, thereby underestimating the emotional power and value of ethno-nationalism.¹² It is increasingly undisputed among scholars of ethnic conflict, that economics take second place on the ethno-nationalist scale of priorities. States come into being regardless of economic considerations, and not by achieving any specific financial or economic status, as seen in one of the UN's newcomers, Palau, an island state in the Pacific with only 20 000 inhabitants.¹³

NATION-BUILDING

Another obstacle in understanding and resolving ethnic conflict, seems to be that many politicians, academics and business people remain ideologically trapped in the systemic era of the Cold War. They remain committed to the rejection of ethnicity and define the concept 'nation', not according to ethnic criteria, but instead strictly within the outdated conceptual parameters of ideology. Socialists usually associate ethnic pluralism with sectarianism, parochialism, narrow-mindedness and chauvinist bigotry. They, along with a number of liberals, maintain that those opposed to integration either deliberately want or irresponsibly risk social disintegration.¹⁴ This seems supported by the response of the ANC's intelligentsia to the emergence of ethnic tensions, despite the extensive propagation of the 'one nation' concept by the South African Government and supportive sectors of civil society.¹⁵ Ideally, they think that ethnically conscious groups should be persuaded to abandon their political objectives and rather aspire to individual rights and equality under one government. he need to focus on greater contact between the various groups and to combat 'prejudice', is also identified as being one answer to 'ethnic mobilisation'.¹⁶ This school of thought argues that the classical Marxist approach of simply denying the existence of nations and attempts at coercive assimilation, is no longer the appropriate solution to what is referred to as the 'national question'. Despite an apparent shift in emphasis, they still seem committed to the traditional Marxist paradigm where the handling of the national question seeks the eventual emergence of, for example, a new South African nation based largely on the culture, values and interests of the working class in the long term.¹⁷ There are efforts to erode the nationalist sentiments among the Afrikaner blue-collar workers, through co-operation between ANC-aligned trade unions and Afrikaner nationalist trade unions like the Mineworkers Union (MWU). The rationale is that class interests can replace ethnic interests, and nationalist energies can be channelled in such a way that these act in support of a broader, though nostalgic 'workers of South Africa unite' sentiment. This approach runs contrary to the dynamics of ethno-nationalism and is unlikely to provide a satisfying answer to the aspirations of separatists.

It is equally flawed to argue in favour of, and apply artificial measures to further assimilation. Frequently this is done through initiating increased contacts and managed integration on all levels of society. Although this is considered to be conducive to nation-building, i.e. successful assimilation, it has led to reactions which were far removed from the intended, and mostly theoretical outcome. When dealing with diverse and distinct cultures of highly developed self-awareness and collective identity, it is probable that increased artificial and designed contacts are apt to perpetuate and exacerbate nationalistic proclivities, for example, the problems and conflict potential between Croats and Serbs in Yugoslavia, the Walloons and Flemish of Belgium, the Quebecois and English-speaking in Canada, having increased in direct relation with increased contacts.¹⁸ It seems inconceivable to the promoters of artificial and frequent 'interaction', that during these occasions the participants not only become aware of the things they have in common, but also of the things which make them different. The persistence with which such programmes are advanced, would also suggest that illusions of homogeneity, often couched in terms like 'one nation' or 'one people', are deliberately propagated despite evidence to the contrary, and can serve as accelerators of nationalism and the security implications this entails. Assimilation is entirely subject to consent and the voluntary acceptance of a new identity, as has been the case in the successful nation-building models of which Americans, Australians and Afrikaners themselves are products. Ethnic groups, sharing one geo-political unit, generally defy attempts aimed at artificially manufacturing a new all-encompassing 'nationhood'.

In times of pressure and crisis, ethnicity commands the loyalty of people in a primordial and irrational fashion over which states or governments representing a different value-system, have little control. When ethnic groups engage in conflict, it is largely based on perceptions, emotions and passionate impulses, rather than objective facts and long term geo-political planning.

STIMULANTS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

In South Africa, the threat of ethnic conflict/civil war was defused by skilled political manoeuvring. The subsequent victory of the ANC saw the birth of the so-called new 'rainbow nation', comprised of twelve different ethno-cultural units sharing a geographic entity whose borders were arbitrarily determined by colonial interests with little regard for the territorial interests of the indigenous population. For many ethno-nationalists the term 'rainbow nation' is an accurate description of South African 'nationhood', as the rainbow is by definition an optical illusion, intangible, temporary and widely accepted as having no pot of gold at the end of it. Statists and assimilationists, on the other hand, are inclined to interpret the absence of ethnic strife as evidence of the presence of a single nation, and therefore any tranquil period in the relations among two or more ethno-national groups causes scholars to:

assume that the society is ethnically homogeneous; and


to perceive a multi-ethnic national liberation movement as mono-ethnic.¹⁹

Such assumptions constitute an impediment in understanding ethnicity, ethno-nationalism and the desire for self-rule. They also cause frustration among those whose world view is built around a collective consciousness, the survival of group identity, and who experience an intense sense of belonging to that defined group. It has also been described as a form of 'extended family' or even 'tribalism'. Whatever one prefers to call it, ethno-nationalism, as it is felt by a nationalist, occupies the moral and emotional high ground, otherwise held by political ideology. As one scholar summarises it: "It is unreasonable, considered as a general phenomenon, while natural as a specific one. It is contradictory as well as preposterous as a general proposition that the values and interests of every country are superior ones, yet it is evident that all nations are the same as objects of the loyalty of their citizens. Only a Serb can appreciate why Serbia is worth dying for since Serbia otherwise represents nothing of more value or moment to the detached observer than does Croatia, Guatemala, or Tibet."²⁰

In the same way, it could be argued in the South African context, that only a Zulu would know why aspiring after a Zulu state may in the future become worth dying for. So far actions on the part of Afrikaner extremists have shown more of a willingness to kill rather than die for their ideal, as exemplified by events in Bophuthatswana during March 1994. Increasing pressures exerted by the new political and socio-economic environment, however, are likely to have a profound impact on changing that willingness and enhancing their capabilities as a larger group, other than the traditional radical fringe, to become estranged from the "emerging regime."²¹

Having earlier mentioned the attempts aimed at switching the allegiance from ethnic to class interests, it is important to note that such efforts are also undermined by additional determinants. So-called 'affirmative action', or selected empowerment or disempowerment, together with symptoms of social disintegration, increases the perception of being threatened and can result in emigration and/or ethnic mobilisation. As the economic incentives on a macro-level, which contribute to restraint in a number of ways, diminish and are replaced by conditions wherein the aspirations of the masses exceed the resources of the country, group identity lends itself to become the vehicle through which one can compete more effectively for scarce resources. It also provides security in an emerging environment of social disintegration and instability. In short, while economic prosperity can slow down the emergence of ethnic confrontation, the development of increasing socio-economic hardship serves as the ultimate accelerator. This was certainly a factor in the rise of Afrikaner nationalism during and after the depression of the 1930s, which saw the formation of Afrikaner business interests such as Volkskas (banking), SANLAM (insurance), AVBOB (funeral services) and many others specifically serving the Afrikaner sector.

CREATING A WIN-WIN SOLUTION

The pressures exerted on the governments of heterogeneous states by ethno-cultural sub-units seeking 'breathing space', have been seen to threaten their existence when they are faced with a government policy of escalation rather than accommodation.²² The way governments can win in an ethnic confrontation scenario is to avoid entering an escalation phase. Addressing the issue prior to ethnic mobilisation achieving momentum has been seen to limit the demands made by groups seeking self-rule, while attempts at suppression have had the opposite affect. The longer a state waits to accommodate ethnic groups and their aspirations, the more likely it is to lose. A good example of a clean 'divorce' is that of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia respectively, at first received internationally with great scepticism, because it made little 'economic' sense. With the aid of hindsight, and when compared to the prolonged conflict in neighbouring former Yugoslavia, the decision made a lot more sense than the alternative. On either side of this example lies:

the peaceful accommodation of ethnic sub-groups through permissive and tolerant measures allowing for so-called self-determination without fragmentation, for example Belgium, i.e. a loose federation or even confederation; and



on the other extreme, bloody wars of secession as a result of coercive efforts aimed at maintaining the status quo. In security terms, these are also referred to as one example of 'limited war scenarios'. This description can be misleading as it is not an indication of the level of intensity, but rather of the means employed, the objectives pursued, and the scope of operations.²³ By this definition, Chechnya is, despite its high intensity, clearly a limited war because of the limitation of objectives on the part of the warring sides. In the case of the Chechen rebels, as for almost all ethnic conflicts, the objectives are limited primarily to the achievement of independence rather than, for example, the surrender of Russia. There is also a clear limitation of means by the relatively small number of Chechens. The Russian response is also one of deliberate limitation, restricting both the means employed and scope of operations to the utilisation of conventional weapons, rather than deploying nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. This raises the question of what security options are really available to governments faced with ethnic tensions of 'limited war' potential.

COMBATING ETHNIC NATIONALISM – CONSTITUTIONAL AND MILITARY APPROACHES

Once a state needs to spend its national energy to convince its inhabitants that 'we are one', the writing is usually on the wall. Governments faced with diverse populations have an inherent policy disadvantage in so far as national interests are determined by national values, and the various components of the population do not share a common value system. Being in possession of their own collective norms, standards, goals and aspirations, the actions of government are therefore evaluated by conflicting, diverse and culture-specific normative standards, with the chances for frustration and dissatisfaction among the various population segments being above average. In the African scenario, there appears to be an even greater cleavage as a result of additional civilisational factors wherein the population segment of Asian or European descent subscribes to a number of differing core values which seem fundamentally incompatible with the process of 'Africanisation'.²⁴

The response by governments to ethnic challenges, other than blatant non-recognition and suppression, are usually concerned with channelling the attention away from the territorial aspects of ethno-nationalist demands, seeking alternative arrangements through measures, such as a 'cultural commission'.²⁵ These arrangements rarely satisfy, and governments generally remain under pressure to grant recognition, territorial autonomy or even independence in order to resolve the issue. This they resist as it implies – and is viewed as equally drastic – the amputation of a part of the territory of the state. This raises the question whether any alternatives offer themselves to governments. The answer seems to be 'no'. Territory has in almost every instance proven to be the key to ethnic conflict resolution, and could be described as being the 'currency' of ethnic conflict and conflict resolution. For the government of the rump state it might be the price for peace, while for ethno-nationalists it is the ultimate goal they strive for, and for which they themselves show a fanatical willingness to pay a high price. The division of Pakistan/India, Eire/Northern Ireland, Israel/Jordan are all examples of territorial adjustment.

Both Western and East-bloc military establishments have experienced the durability of nationalist insurgency during their military involvement in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively. Former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara conceded that during the Vietnam war the US overestimated the ideological – Communist – threat while having "totally underestimated the nationalist aspect of Ho Chi Minh's movement. We were wrong, terribly wrong."²⁶ The old wisdom of guerrilla warfare, namely that the insurgents need to avoid losing in order to win, while governments need to win in order to avoid losing, also retains its relevance in the ethnic conflict scenario. Ethnically motivated insurgents seldom have any desire to take over the entire state, and it generally remains their objective to gain control of a familiar region or a territory to which they feel historically attached, wherein they seek to establish a state of their own. The military pressure is merely a method of reaching a settlement which would make state-formation, with international recognition and formal, as well as normal relations with the rump state, possible. Heterogeneous military formations and states are almost always at a disadvantage when engaging in counter-insurgency operations against nationalist sub-groups.²⁷ Cohesion becomes a problem as loyalties and communication are put to the test. The durable nature of ethnic conflict suggests that almost nothing, short of genocide, can overcome the will to resist. Sri Lanka's drawn out ethnic war shows that to defeat ethnic insurgents today is to face their sons tomorrow. In Africa's case, additional factors may also play a role in such a scenario, namely:

the natural proclivity to combat, which follows many years of liberation wars and concomitant oversupply of illegal weapons, along with a considerable familiarity with military weapons and tactics which is quite prevalent among ethnically conscious groups, i.e. Zulus and Boers. Many African ethnic groups or tribes pride themselves on relatively deep-seated military tradition;



the fragility of some countries' infrastructures, which have difficulty sustaining their populations; and



the limited resources of developing countries to combat insurgencies, as demonstrated in Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi,i etc.

There are, however, some case-specific advantages held by the Government in the South African scenario. The chances for Afrikaner insurgency are hampered by the cultural predisposition of the modern Afrikaner. In contrast to the relative motivational clarity at the beginning of the Anglo-Boer wars, the current situation is influenced both by the 'generation gap' which has evolved over almost a century of varying degrees of Afrikaner hegemony, as well as the suppression of initiative and individualism under the Christian National Education system of the past. In addition, the Calvinist religious value system may serve as an impediment to the formulation of strategies which are conducive to successful nationalist political programmes or eventual insurgency. Through its nature, the nationalist activist and, in an advanced stage, the insurgent will almost inevitably experience Calvinism as restrictive and even inherently reactionary to the point of political paralysis, because to the activist, the 'nation' (volk) holds the highest position in the order of loyalty. It is a characteristic of successful ethno-nationalist struggles, that the nationalist intelligentsia is usually more secular than the people they represent, having long discarded religion as the key political organisational principle.²⁸ Some of the current Afrikaner nationalist movements, like the Freedom Front, have contended that the reverse seems to be the case. Hence, it is likely that secular nationalist activists will eventually take control, if not of the political vehicle (in this case the party), then at least the mass mobilisation and the 'struggle', rendering the official political vehicle irrelevant. It is an acknowledged characteristic of 'liberation struggles' that they become increasingly radicalised as subsequent generations take the place of the 'old guard'. As a notable example of combining secular nationalist doctrine with religion, the National Party, in conjunction with the Dutch Reformed (NG) Church and Christian National Education, was able to combine nationalist policies with creation stories, although the more recent motive was a need for moral justification for control over others and not defence against being controlled by others.²⁹

The absence of an Afrikaner dominated geographic area to provide mass bases for insurgents and allow for the creation of 'liberated zones' is another advantage. Afrikaners are dispersed and are only dominant in certain urban patches that do not constitute anything like power clusters. In this regard, the strategic position of Zulu nationalists appears to be considerably better, with large areas of KwaZulu-Natal, particularly areas north of the Tugela, providing a geographic zone of almost undisputed ethno-political dominance. In such areas of potential insurgent dominance, the Government's ability to project power is often challenged, as the example of Chechnya seems to confirm. Nonetheless, the absence of a base area does not, as has already been indicated, preclude possible security implications stemming from Afrikaner nationalism and the pursuit of self-determination. It places additional strategic limitations on insurgents in such a scenario, and also provides uncertainty with regard to the formulation of political objectives.

Yet, these initial disadvantages are unlikely to be of a permanent nature, and in this sense merely provide some time for the formulation of political solutions.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Ethno-nationalism is likely to be a permanent part of the new global reality, and it is difficult to dispute the contention that it may ultimately outlive concepts, such as the 'rainbow nation'. The international experience certainly seems to support this contention. Finding ways to prevent ethno-nationalism from eventually providing the coup de grace for this romantic political idea of a homogeneous nation proclaiming 'we are one', will require prudence and foresight. It may require a more significant and honest paradigm shift, in order to succeed in developing a comprehensive policy of pre-emptive management of ethnic conflict and confrontation lasting into the 21st Century. It is generally regarded easier to placate ethno-nationalists when they feel they still have something to lose, than when they have already sacrificed.

Policies of non-accommodation and marginalisation, provide the very 'push' factors which ethno-nationalism thrives on. There is an abundance of examples which prove that limitations placed on cultural freedom, such as language, religion, education, etc., stimulate and reinforce perceptions of cultural discrimination and subjugation to policies of ethnocide (cultural genocide) which, in turn, fuel the fires of ethnic conflict.

ENDNOTES

T Woodhouse, Commentary: Negotiating a New Millenium? Prospects for African Conflict Resolution, Review of African Political Economy, 68, 1996, p. 136.



R Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, p. 74.



D L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, California University Press, Berkeley, 1985.



J Naisbitt, Global Paradox, Nicholas Brealy, London, 1994.



A Toffler, War and Anti-War, Little, Brown and Company, New York, 1993.



Naisbitt, op. cit.



Newsweek, 17 April 1995, p. 54.



R Gurr and B Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Westview Press, Westview, Colorado, 1994.



The Economist, 11 September 1993, p. 34.



C J Maritz, Southern Africa, in W Kaltefleiter and U Schuhmacher (eds.), Five Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall, Christian Albrechts University, Kiel, 1995.



D Reed, Beloved Country, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1993.



H Giliomee, Adapting to Change, Frontiers of Freedom, First Quarter 1997.



D Geldenhuys, 'n Volkstaat is by Orania Moontlik, maar dis nie 'n Maklike Ideaal, Rapport, 23 June 1996.



J Mc Garry and B O'Leary (ed.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, TJ Press, Cornwall, UK, 1993.



Die Burger, 4 December 1994, p. 3.



Multiparty Democracy News, November 1996, p. 2.



African Communist, Third Quarter 1996, pp. 51-58.



W Connor, Ethnonationalism – The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. 118.



Ibid.



W Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations, Touchstone, New York, 1993.



T Somo, A Scenario for the New South Africa: Where are We Heading,? ISSUP Bulletin, April 1996.



C Maritz, Conflict Regions Around the World: South Africa, paper presented at the International Summer Course, Christian Albrechts University, Kiel, July 1995.



H Kozak, The New Question of Limited War after the End of the Systemic Conflict, paper presented at ibid.



See S Huntington, The West Unique, Not Universal, Foreign Affairs, November/ December 1996; also S Huntington, Clash of Civilisations, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.



Constitutional Assembly, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, Government Printers, Pretoria, 1997.



Newsweek, 17 April 1995.



P Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Fontana Press, Glasgow, UK, 1988.



A D Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Blackwell, Cambridge, UK, 1994.



J Kinghorn, Social Cosmology, Religion and Afrikaner Ethnicity, Journal of Southern African Studies, 20(3), September 1994.