INTRODUCTION

As a practitioner, normally constrained by one's office, the opportunity to exercise `academic freedom' and explore new frontiers, to move beyond established policy, and to explore the issues that underpin the limitations, options and challenges of South Africa's engagement in peace support operations, is valued. However, this must be prefaced by the following personal concerns:

As Defence Secretary, a way must be found to cut the Gordian knot in international relations theory and global policy, that makes it almost impossible today for many democratic governments to accept the risk of deploying international forces in response to crises in Africa.



I have to recommend to the Minister of Defence, and he, in turn, to the Government, that South Africa should pay sums it cannot afford if it is to meet its obligation to provide housing, clean water, electricity, health services and education at home to bring humanitarian aid to suffering populations on the African continent, and provide proper support in peacemaking and peacekeeping.



I have to do this in the midst of a domestic debate between neo-realists who believe that the sole criterion of action abroad ought to be the national interest; and post-modernists, among others, who decry so narrow an approach and call for structural reform and global co-operation.

Meanwhile, African states, uncomfortably close to South Africa's borders, are caught up in domestic and cross-border conflict, fuelled and sustained by ancient feuds, foreign interests, arms smugglers and mercenaries. The fundamental question thus facing South Africa, is how to keep the cost of intervention in support of peace below that of failing to engage.
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It is against this reality that the subject of this article is addressed in the following four parts:

a brief exploration of the dominant trends that are shaping the global future, and thus that of Africa;



an examination of the uncertain margins of coercion and consent in peace support operations authorised by the United Nations;



a revisitation of the debate about crisis response and peacekeeping in Africa, and the tendency to represent these as distinct species of a wider genus; and



against this background, an explanation of the core dilemmas South Africa faces in deciding how to play its proper role in support of peace, and offering a tentative suggestion about a possible way forward.

TRENDS IN GLOBAL SECURITY

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world order and the paradigm that sustained it, have passed from centre stage. Academics of many persuasions have sought to define new paradigms, but none of these has yet gained wide support. The world presents a complex and often confusing picture to those who inhabit it. Nevertheless, a number of key trends have become evident.

Exponential advances are converging in a phenomenon that is termed `globalisation' in both the media and in policy discourse. These are evident in:

information technology and systems, as well as the biological sciences and the potential convergence of both;



the scale and volatility of global capital movements;



the size and power of non-state actors, especially global corporations, whose turnover dwarfs the Gross Domestic Products of smaller states; and



the acceleration of global acculturation due to the near-universal character of advertising, entertainment and news coverage.

This trend is being reinforced by a `neo-liberal paradigm' of global free trade, embodied in the World Trade Organisation, and by democratically accountable governance and domestic economic liberalism; even though the role of the state in facilitating national development is again recognised.

Moreover, in a global economy characterised by intense competition for resources and markets, states have found it useful to band together in economic alliances, common markets, free trade areas, development communities and the like to achieve economies of scale and scope, and to benefit from their various comparative advantages. This trend, often described as `regionalisation', seems certain to continue, as transcontinental and transoceanic alliances already under discussion become realities in the next decade.

Although these trends are transforming the structure and dynamics of the interstate system, weakening absolute sovereignty and altering the powers and functions of governments, they derive from the existence of states and the ability of governments to exercise control over the people in the territories they govern. This is not the case, however, in all territories. In as much as a new global system may be emerging, a third trend poses a serious challenge. This is often viewed as the collapse of `weak states'.

There are many examples of the latter trend. The former Yugoslavia was torn apart; the Czech Republic and Slovakia parted peacefully; the USSR fragmented; and governments in Belarus and Tadjikistan, to cite but two of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) republics on the line between the Islamic south and the Christian Orthodox north, exercise only nominal control over their territories. In Africa apart from the excision of Eritrea from Ethiopia, and the festering instability in Somalia and Sierra Leone what the International Institute of Strategic Studies has called a `swath of instability' extends from the Horn in the east, all along the equator to the Atlantic coast on the west. It is, of course, this area that is of most immediate concern to South Africa, in the context of what are termed `peace support operations'.

Much of the contemporary debate on the conduct of peace operations has assumed that `sensible governments' are largely in agreement about the question of engaging in `peace support operations', or third-party interventions designed to end conflicts and support peace processes. But if this were true, there would be far less difficulty in mounting effective operations. The primary difficulty in this regard is the uncertain margins between coercion and consent in interventions authorised by the United Nations in support of peace. This uncertainty poses both doctrinal and practical dilemmas for states interested in helping to keep the global peace.

CONSENT VERSUS COERCION

Underlying the issue of consent versus coercion is the pseudo-conflict within international relations theory, between the neo-realists and the post-modernist idealists. This debate seems to many practitioners to be full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. This is not because the questions in the debate are unimportant the relevance and capacity of the state; anarchy or regime co-operation as the dominant feature of the global order; positive evolution or essential stasis as its prime characteristic, and the tension between traditional conceptions of `national interest' and international morality. Far from it! They are, in fact, vital questions, some of which have engaged the minds of scholars throughout the ages.

What bothers those who look to theoretical writings for insight into the dilemmas confronted in practice, is the over-simplification of opposing arguments that is inherent to much of the debate a debate that increasingly reflects the confusion and perceived conflict of interest between various state and non-state actors in the contemporary global system. And it is the latter which often frustrates effective action in the prevention, containment, management and resolution of conflict, both between states, and between factions inside the borders of (often weak) states.

Moreover, because the interstate system still celebrates the supposed sovereignty of states, interference in their domestic affairs is expressly discouraged by the UN Charter and that of the OAU. The only exception to this is Chapter VII of the UN Charter, dealing with threats to international peace and security, which provides for intervention in cases of "... threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and Acts of Aggression..."; and permits the Security Council to order political, economic and military action against offending states.

Although the United Nations, in principle, may not intervene in "... matters essentially within the jurisdiction of any state...", Article 2(7) provides that the principle of non-intervention "...shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll." Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter empower the Security Council to recommend any means necessary, including armed force, to preserve or restore international peace and security. Article 43, however, requires unanimity within the Council before action is taken. As we are all aware, this has greatly weakened effective UN efforts to keep the peace in areas within the sphere of interest of the major powers. Collective security of a coercive nature was largely ineffective during the Cold War years, because of disagreements between the five permanent members of the Council, (notably the superpowers) about the circumstances in which it was to be applied.

Chapter VIII also makes provision for action by "... regional arrangements or agencies ... relating to the maintenance of international peace and security ... [in a manner] ... consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Such action, however, likewise requires the express and unanimous authorisation of the Security Council. Traditionally, therefore, peacekeeping operations have been mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Chapter VI, however, deals with the "pacific settlement of disputes", and does not envisage UN intervention, even in the form of mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, without the consent of the parties to a conflict. If the requirement of consent is to be set aside, the line between Chapter VI and Chapter VII must be crossed, and a determination made by the Security Council that the conflict or situation actually constitutes a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.

Between 1948 and 1988, in the absence of unity of purpose in the Security Council and a mandate for coercion, UN peacekeepers were deployed chiefly under Chapter VI of the Charter, and operated on the basis of three core principles:

the consent of the parties;


the impartiality of the peace-keepers; and


a prohibition on the use of force except in self-defence.

Although such operations were conducted almost exclusively by multinational military forces, these principles have been deemed immutable. Mediation, conciliation and arbitration have been seen as the primary instruments of conflict management, and peacekeepers have been deployed, either unarmed, or at most, with light weapons of a defensive character.

If the parties to a conflict, usually between states, are determined to achieve peace and require UN peacekeepers simply to help them honour their undertakings and reduce the risk of misunderstandings triggering a return to war, traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI is appropriate. Where these conditions do not apply, the principles expose such operations and personnel to serious risk. Indeed, the weakness of an absolute reliance on consent was cruelly exposed on several occasions and in several operations during the era of `classical' peacekeeping. Consent collapsed and force was used by belligerents despite a UN presence in the Middle East (UNEF I during 1967), in Cyprus (UNFICYP during 1964 and 1974), in the Congo (ONUC during 1961), and in Lebanon (UNIFIL during 1982).

Since the end of the Cold War, an unprecedented level of agreement between the permanent members of the Security Council has led to more than twenty new UN missions being created, involving more than seventy troop contributing countries. Some were `second generation' multifunctional operations, designed to assist former domestic combatants in Cold War proxy conflicts (for example, in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Namibia) in the implementation of political settle-ments. While these operations have largely been lauded as more or less successful, the issue of consent versus coercion returned with a vengeance where UN and multinational forces conducted `third generation' or `middle ground' operations. This was particularly the case in Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, where there was no peace to keep and humanitarian concern for human tragedy lay at the heart of the task. In all three instances, consent collapsed and there was a perceived need for peacekeepers to use force to defend themselves and their mandate. The UN peacekeepers (with few exceptions), however, were not adequately equipped for the judicious use of force, resulting either in undue exposure to threat, or ineffectiveness, or both.

While a robust NATO force took over from the large force of beleaguered UN peacekeepers in Yugoslavia, there was no similar coalition willing to halt the Rwandan genocide, or to stay with the peace process in Somalia. This brings us to the whole question of peace support in Africa, where Africans have started to wonder if this issue is seen by the West simply as part of a generic problem with UN peacekeeping, occurring on a particular continent, or as a distinct species, with its own characteristics.

PEACEKEEPING AND CRISIS RESPONSE IN AFRICA

If one notes that there were two interstate wars and fourteen serious intrastate conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa between 1946 and 1988, but only one UN peacekeeping intervention in the then Congo in 1960-62 the extent to which the international system has failed to use the classical instrument of conflict management optimally in Africa is evident. Much of this had to do with Africa's marginal status. What Africans did to each other apartheid South Africa excepted was not generally seen in New York to be a threat to international peace and security. Threats to security in the Middle East, however an arena of big-power competition for oil throughout this period, and as recently as 1991, when Operation Desert Storm was undertaken with the authority of the Security Council, were regarded as directly affecting international peace and security.

Although there has been an initial post-Cold War surge in new `peace support' operations on African soil, there is now an obvious lack of enthusiasm to launch any further UN missions on the continent. Perhaps it is Africa's physical remoteness from the core of Western interests that has sapped the international will to stay the distance in Africa, and to focus properly on the challenges and the means to address ruinous conflicts on the `dark continent'. Aside from the hasty withdrawals from the terrible circumstances of Somalia and Rwanda, the UN has shied away from any meaningful engagement in crises in countries such as Libya, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the former Zaire, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Sudan. And in Angola, the UNAVEM III force, which has operated under a Chapter VI mandate, has remained in the country at half strength while the Security Council imposes sanctions on UNITA thus positing one of the parties as the `enemy' and leaving the peacekeepers and observers to rely on consent for survival.

African states thus view efforts to create special regimes for African peacekeeping or crisis response with concern. Whatever the merits of devolving authority for crisis management to actors in close proximity, Africans are fearful of initiatives that treat them differently to other states.

The Dayton Accord through US diplomacy buttressed by US-led NATO firepower brought the destructive war between ethno-religious and nationalist factions in the former Yugoslavia to an end. At the signing ceremony, US President Bill Clinton recorded the horror of that war by noting that 250 000 people had died there in four years as a result of the conflict. This was indeed a tragedy of immense proportions. But we should not forget that in the two years between 1992 and 1994, at least 500 000 people died in Angola twice the number, in half the time. And in Rwanda, no less than half a million people were massacred in two months during 1994. These facts are not presented as a criticism of Mr Clinton, or Washington, or the West. They are used merely to point to the uncomfortable tension between the narrowly perceived, national, or collective institutional interests of the larger powers, and the moral imperative to act promptly and effectively to prevent, contain and relieve catastrophe, wherever it may emerge.

The most effective action, by whatever group of state (and interstate) actors, will always be determined by the unique circumstances of each new crisis. However, the humanitarian principle must be universal. Africa cannot be an exception to the rule, and it may also be argued that a wider perception of national interest in a rapidly shrinking world, should lead to the convergence of humanitarian concern and national interest.

The need to act in support of peace bears no less on African states than it does on European, American or Asian states. We must be prepared to shoulder our share of that burden, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where South African policy focus lies. However, we are also entitled to expect that those with greater resources will contribute what is necessary to make our efforts successful. This is, of course, the nub of the problem in Africa.

The financial restraints under which the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has had to operate in recent years, both because of the great increase in the number and variety of conflicts in which its deployment has been required, and the failure of a number of states to make the necessary payments, have inhibited effective action. Progress has been made towards resolution of the latter problem and one can only hope that a satisfactory outcome will soon emerge.

But beyond the obvious financial constraints, the emphasis placed on the legal doctrine of state sovereignty and the closely associated requirement for consent by the parties involved, unless the situation is determined unanimously by the Security Council to be a threat to international peace continues to pose doctrinal dilemmas which inhibit deployment in situations where intervention is required. Likewise, the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed troops in peace support operations in circumstances where no true peace exists, and the risk to life that this entails, discourages states that perceive no vital interest in the outcome from making units available to the UN.

The Organisation of African Unity has taken a still more restrictive approach than the UN. The core principles of the OAU, which member states are pledged to `observe scrupulously', are:

the sovereign equality of all states;



non-interference in the internal affairs of states; and



respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent existence.

With respect to the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, it is evident that the provisions imposed by the OAU Charter with regard to the legal sovereignty of states, and the requirement that there is no intervention in the domestic affairs of member states without their specific consent, are honoured only by the OAU itself, and such members of the international community that deem it expedient to do so in any particular case. This poses particular difficulties in conflict management and resolution in African states wracked by civil war or other forms of violent internal dissent.

Unless the government of the state in question decides to ask for international (or OAU) support for conciliation in interstate or intrastate conflicts (and few do unless the balance of power is such that they have no choice ), or the UN Security Council decides that intervention under Chapter VIl is required, there are no effective instruments under international law to address incipient crises, despite the dramatic effects they may have on the economic, social and political security of neighbouring countries.

This legal and institutional gap leaves the field open for intervention (or support of dissident nationals of the afflicted state) by states bordering on it, if they perceive their interests to be threatened by events there, or if historical bonds or antipathies persuade them to do so. It has also increasingly created space for unco-ordinated and sometimes illicit intervention by various non-state actors, including non-government organisations, national intelligence agencies, transnational corporations, and mercenaries.

For example, the effort to dispose of the late Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire was actively supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola, while France (briefly), Morocco, UNITA and a rag tag collection of foreign mercenaries were drawn in for a variety of reasons on Mobutu's side. South Africa's efforts to negotiate a peaceful transition were rendered far more difficult by these divergent agendas and levels of clandestine military engagement in the former Zaire. And in Sierra Leone, it was a foreign private military force that turned the tide of conflict against rebel forces and facilitated elections there under UN supervision (albeit to the displeasure of the South African Government, which has introduced new legislation to curtail mercenary activity from South Africa).

The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone were also sustained for years by the competing interests of larger states in their vicinity. The fact that UNAVEM II and III were engaged in Angola, and ECOMOG in West Africa, no doubt helped contain even greater tragedies, but restrictive mandates and, in the case of ECOMOG, inexperience and perceived partiality, hampered their utility. Moreover, despite the active intervention of the armed forces of both the Government of Angola and UNITA in the conflict in Zaire, UNAVEM was unable even to take note of this fact, which has proved very significant in the subsequent unfolding of the Angolan peace process. More recently, the UN has maintained a stony silence about Angolan air raids against the previous government's forces in Congo-Brazzaville.

Whether particular interventions by missions with international authority would have been crowned with greater success or have used less force in any of the cases mentioned above, is a moot point. Operational and tactical considerations, however, are only relevant once the broader philosophical and strategic issues have been decided. The underlying issue is what form of intervention is appropriate, by whom, under what conditions and authority, when gross violations of human rights are being committed, or when the balance of power in a region is being significantly altered. The answers to these questions, as recent events in Africa have shown, will affect the survival of hundreds of thousands of people, and will have profound effects on the economies of the states afflicted by conflict and those nearby. It is perhaps for this reason that neither the international nor the African community have come up with a viable solution to the issue, and it lies at the heart of the limitations, options and challenges confronted by South Africa when considering how best to engage in peace support operations.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DILEMMA

South Africa's conundrum is exacerbated by the fact that it must sail between the Scylla of national interest and humanitarian concern, and the Charybdis of financial and military prudence. However, the problems that arise from our domestic circumstances have been over-emphasised, in my opinion. There is no doubt that the practical difficulties of integrating seven formerly adversarial forces, and training them for peace support operations, have urged caution in committing those forces for peacekeeping tasks. South Africa's reputation for power projection into Southern Africa before the country's transition to democracy in 1994, also undoubtedly created suspicion about capacity and motives, and the government must still take account of this today. But these are manageable concerns, which are already being addressed in the proper quarters.

The greater dilemma lies in the realm of international policy and doctrine pre-eminently, the proper role of the UN in dealing with threats to international peace and security especially if security is defined, as in the South African White Paper on Defence, as `broad and holistic' in scope, "... recognising the various non-military dimensions of security and the distinction between the security of the state and the security of people." The White Paper states that we shall seek national security "... primarily through efforts to address the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa's people and ... to promote and maintain regional security."

Our efforts to ensure this, and to protect the state and its people against external military threats, are to be based on "... political, economic and military co-operation with other states including regional defence co-operation, a common security regime and confidence and security-building measures in Southern Africa; the prevention, management and resolution of conflict by non-violent means; and the deployment of the SANDF as a last resort."

There should be no misunderstanding: conflicts in Southern and Central Africa, whether between or within states, have a disastrous effect, not only on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) of which South Africa is an integral part and on whose progress to prosperity our ability to grow and compete internationally, depends but also on South Africa itself. Such conflicts distract policy-makers from construc-tive tasks; invite rancour in SADC among those who should be our closest allies; destroy infrastructures vital to the health of the regional economy; discourage investment in what is seen as a volatile and conflict-ridden environment; and result in refugee flows which are socially and economically disruptive to the countries of settlement, and personally tragic for the people forcibly uprooted by violence.

Both from the perspective of a government committed to advance an African renaissance and an holistic perspective of security, and from the more traditional vantage point of a state concerned to protect its vital national interests, South Africa must act effectively to help prevent, manage and resolve conflict in Southern and Central Africa. The perimeters of our security co-operation environment, moreover, have been extended by the accession to SADC of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is now also a member of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security and the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).

We understand that the environment in which we live, is volatile and conflictual, and that we shall have to act more effectively than in the past, both through diplomacy, and the use of security instruments, to address that reality. South Africa has no aggressive intent towards any other state; its efforts will be directed solely towards preventing or containing conflict, and to facilitating its resolution. This will be done in concert with our partners in SADC wherever possible, and in close consultation with the UN and other concerned states. The conduct of the South African President and Deputy President in attempting to mediate a peaceful resolution of the crisis in former Zaire, and the President's subsequent efforts in the Sudanese conflict, are cases in point.

South Africa's dilemma therefore does not go to the principles of our engagement; it goes to the wider international context in which that engagement is to be effected. We understand that the earlier British and French proposals for a mechanism to respond to crises in Africa, and the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF later Initiative or ACRI) first suggested by the United States in 1996, are driven by a desire to have African states address the roots of and take responsibility for the crises that threaten human security and progress on this continent. We also understand that the determination of the OAU not to violate its Charter's prohibition on interference in the internal affairs of states, has inhibited that organisation's ability to act pre-emptively to avert crises, and has constrained effective responses once conflict has emerged.

We have watched, with interest, the efforts made to explore the possibility of dealing with conflict more effectively at the sub-regional level, with ECOMOG's emergence from ECOWAS being the most evident example; and we have joined in our own sub-regional efforts in creating the ISDSC and the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security.

But none of these fragmented efforts adequately address the challenge, although there is some merit in using the subregional approach to advance the wider debate. The words chosen by the US Administration to describe the purpose of its current peacekeeping support initiative African Crisis Response make it clear that the problem is not one of the classic principles and instances of peacekeeping. Where belligerents have given consent to the interpositioning of a force, the challenge is familiar and the doctrines governing the mission are well established.

The core dilemma lies in defining the circumstances that justify intervention whether diplomatic or military in a community of states that do not share identical perceptions of state and government legitimacy, and in circumstances where the outcomes of a conflict in one state, or between states, may have quite different results for neighbouring countries and peoples. The divergent reactions and roles of a number of neighbouring African states to the political crisis in Zaire in 1996 and early 1997, is a case in point. In what are today often known as `failed states', the conventional rules of peacekeeping provide little guidance for appropriate action.

Given the complexity and duration of recent crises in Africa, and the human, financial and political costs of engagement, the sustainability of political support, both domestic and international, is almost impossible to calculate. The sustainability of political support must certainly be within the calculus of a prudent government committed to fiscal and monetary discipline and the reorientation of its economy, and the assurance of equitable domestic growth and global competitiveness. The South African government may therefore be forgiven for a certain amount of caution when it comes to committing forces for peace support operations abroad.

But, as already argued, this is not a sustainable posture. Crises and their consequences in Africa at least the southern and central part of it directly and negatively affect our ability to achieve what the Government has defined as its overarching goals. The brutal conflicts that have festered without effective international intervention, moreover, have produced human tragedies that demand a proper response. Such a response, however well intentioned, cannot be presented as a uniquely African response which is ready-made by Washington or any other foreign actor. Just as Africa must have the courage to admit that it lacks the resources and often the will to address the conflicts and crises on the continent adequately and appropriately, so must external powers recognise that Africa will no longer accept imposed solutions which treat it differently from other regions of the world. This is said in a spirit of great sincerity and friendship, as few of us have unblemished records in this regard.

The debate on appropriate modalities for keeping the peace in Africa will continue at the continental level, within the OAU, and South Africa will, of course, participate actively in this endeavour. However, ongoing efforts to enhance African capacity for peace support operations, which are greatly appreciated, should continue in parallel with (and be firmly linked to) broader initiatives at the level of the UN. Increasing participation by African states in UN peacekeeping missions will reinforce this linkage, while capacity-building continues through the kind of joint exercises undertaken in Zimbabwe this year by units from several Southern African defence forces. However, an even greater effort is required to address the key challenge of how best to support the maintenance or restoration of peace and security in Africa.

THE WAY FORWARD?

It seems that there is an urgent need, at the subregional level and through the ISDSC, to initiate a focused and constructive discussion with the UN Secretariat, the OAU Secretariat, and representatives of major non-African powers in the Security Council, as well as other states with extensive international peacekeeping expe-rience. The major purpose of such a discussion should be twofold:

to define an appropriate division of responsibility for the conduct of peace support operations in Southern and Central Africa; and



to address, openly and frankly, the doctrinal uncertainties at the level of the UN, that render anything other than classic peacekeeping in Africa a legal, political and financial minefield for those states that might wish to play a more constructive and effective role, in association with their regional and other international partners.

A dialogue of this nature, initiated by an African subregional organisation for the purpose of clarifying doctrine and potential responsibilities, would not be rejected by Africa as a diplomatic ploy by foreign powers. In the light of its narrow scope, such a discussion might enable us, more easily than a global conference, to focus on the ambiguities and policy dilemmas inhibiting clear sighted international action in addressing conflict in this region, and in developing appropriate and effective responses.

The agenda would be long and the discussions difficult, as they would be bound to include:

questions of legal and moral authority and the means to sustain both;



ways to guarantee financial, technical and logistical support and to identify sources of effective training to convey relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes;



definition of lines of command and control; and



decisions about the composition of forces for future employment.

However, nothing will be achieved by postponing the discussion.

As it has been made clear at the outset of this article, none of these ideas can be attributed to the Government of South Africa. And I shall conclude in a similar vein, with a personal vision that may serve to place much of what has been written in context. This vision was awakened by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, in the opening line of a speech he delivered on the adoption by Parliament of South Africa's new Constitution. He began by saying, "I am an African", and this simple, yet somehow poetic celebration of his African identity permitted everyone present to claim kinship with him, and with one another.

The vision inspired by Deputy President Mbeki goes beyond a personal rebirth. He has also championed the concept of an African renaissance, a rebirth of Africa after the long night of slavery, exploitation, war, corruption and economic collapse. All of us who are African have a commitment to achieve that rebirth. Containing and resolving conflict on the continent and preventing, as far as possible, those violent conflicts which may otherwise arise, is an essential part of this rebirth.

ENDNOTES

This is an edited version of a presentation by Mr Pierre Steyn to a conference on Contemporary Peace Operations, organised by the Institute for Security Studies at UNISA, Pretoria, 5 November 1997. It is published under the auspices of the Training for Peace project at ISS, which is sponsored by the Royal Norwegian Government and conducted in conjunction with the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI).

The author writes in his personal capacity. Although the sentiments expressed should cause no concern in the Ministry of Defence or the Government, these views are his own, and cannot be attributed to the South African Government.