INTRODUCTION

The African security environment of the 1990s has produced two prominent and interrelated trends: the withdrawal of international involvement in the continent; and increasing conflict within African states. No longer constrained (or supported) by the ideological parameters of Cold War conflict, and suffering from the `marginalisation' by the international system, African states are now attempting to create indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms at the regional level in order to address the ravages of intrastate conflict, in the absence of effective external intervention. These `African solutions to African problems' have evolved in both a structured and an ad hoc manner, and have met with varying degrees of success.

The most dramatic example of `indigenous' peacekeeping is the seven-year intervention in Liberia by a coalition of West African states. The Economic Community of West African States Observer Group (ECOMOG) military intervention peaked at a strength of nearly 15 000 troops, and has been widely criticised for injudicious use of force, and Nigerian dominance, which impacted on the partiality of the peacekeepers. Nevertheless, the Liberian elections of July 1997 prompted some in the international community to declare the mission successful, in much the same way as a singular electoral occurrence has been the benchmark of success or failure of United Nations peacekeeping missions in recent years.

The size, shape and posture of the ECOMOG mission, as well as the violent nature of the Liberian civil war, has tended to overshadow a more recent attempt at indigenous multinational peacekeeping. The two year old conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) also led to an all-African response, in the form of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords (MISAB). However, little attention has been paid to this tiny force, at its peak numbering 1 100. The aim of this article, therefore, is to outline the causes and course of the conflict in CAR, to examine the nature of the rather unusual international response, and to comment on the implications of the MISAB experience.

EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS

CAR is of little strategic importance to the outside world. Located in the geographic centre of Africa, it is a tiny, landlocked country of approximately 3,5 million inhabitants. Having gained independence from France in 1960, CAR has had a limited experience of democratic institutions, frequently punctuated by coups and mutinies. It has also experienced frequent, and sometimes unwelcome, interventions in its internal affairs by external powers, specifically France.

David Dacko, the country's Prime Minister prior to independence, enjoyed strong support from the French government as the country's first president. Supported by the military, Dacko introduced a one-party system in 1962 and, with the assistance of France, suspended the post-independence constitution. Blamed for a failing economy, and rife with corruption, the regime was threatened by a general strike in early 1966. Persuaded by the knowledge of a French-backed coup plot, Dacko decided to resign in favour of his cousin, Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Bokassa's infamous rule was marked by chronic economic problems, continued dependence on France and erratic, brutal, and arrogant behaviour including crowning himself emperor in 1976.

Bokassa was ousted in 1979 by a coup which saw Dacko returned to power, supported by French troops flown into the country from Gabon and Chad. Dacko introduced a short-lived multiparty system in early 1981 but, by September, this had been replaced once more by a military government, headed by André Kolingba. Faced with growing opposition to his regime, Kolingba introduced a one-party political system and legislative elections in 1987. He argued against the introduction of a multiparty system in 1990, but pressure from the international donor community forced the legalisation of political parties in July 1991. Kolingba managed to stall elections until August 1993, when he, and his party, were defeated by Ange-Felix Patasse, a civilian from northern CAR, in both rounds of the legislative and presidential elections.

Patasse had the unenviable task of initiating unpopular economic reforms and of navigating CAR through the CFA currency devaluation of 1994.¹ The disastrous effects of the latter led to the implementation of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) stand-by programme, but this assistance was withdrawn in late 1995 because of mismanagement and corruption. Total external debt increased by over $120 million in the 1995-1996 period,² and by early 1996 the economic situation had deteriorated to the point where the poorly managed national oil company, Petroca, was unable to pay its taxes to the state. This deprived the already over-burdened government of a significant revenue source, and the deepening financial crisis resulted in frequent government defaults on public sector wage payments.

Against this background, conflict in CAR became inevitable. Since 1996, the country has been racked by general civil unrest and three army mutinies. The initial mutiny of April 1996 was closely followed by a second uprising in May. The third, and longest, mutiny occurred in November of the same year and the conflict continued to simmer until the deployment of a multinational buffer force in February 1997. This force has subsequently remained in CAR, with the approval of the UN, to help maintain the peace.

Pay Strikes

In early 1996, the deepening economic crisis in CAR, and the failure to pay public sector wages for several months, produced widespread dissatisfaction.³ Violent protest against the government began on 18 April 1996 when the Mixed Intervention Regiment (RMI), a Yakoma (southern) tribe dominated regiment of the CAR army, initiated a four day mutiny over unpaid wages. The capital city of Bangui was effectively shut down as the Presidential Guard, comprised predominantly of northerners, with the support of resident French troops, attempted to restore calm.

After several days of confusion and fighting, an initial promise of wage payment was made, and then broken, by the government. As a consequence, the mutineers hardened their demands to include back wages for 1992 and 1994. Relative calm returned to the city after a second promise of wage payment was made and the mutineers began returning to their barracks.

The mutiny was, in many respects, the first real challenge to the President's political authority, and on 23 April, Patasse conceded to the demands of the mutineers. However, he reacted to the continued strife by banning public demonstrations by political parties and trade unions. Initially, the restriction on public demonstrations was not stringently enforced. However, an attempt by the police to enforce the ban during a demonstration of pensioners sparked a broader surge of opposition to the President and his government. Shortly afterwards, 5 000 civilian opposition supporters marched through the capital accusing the government of inaction on the country's financial crisis.

Pay and Politics

Similarly disillusioned with the government's inability to meet their demands, some 500 soldiers mutinied in the centre of Bangui on 18 May 1996. The mutineers cited the movement of the armoury from the army's Camp Kassai base to the Presidential Guard's Camp de Roux base, and the denial of amnesty to the soldiers involved in the April mutiny as grievances. The mutineers wreaked havoc in the city centre before seizing a police station in a populous district of the city suburbs. Several senior military and government officials were detained by the mutineers and at the request of President Patasse, the French increased their presence in CAR (approximately 1 400 troops) by 250 marines, flown in from Chad, and a 130-strong Gabonese-based Foreign Legion company. The French intervention placed sufficient pressure on the mutineers for them to agree to a ceasefire with the Presidential Guard, on 20 May 1996.

The ceasefire was short-lived, however. Within days, the radio station became a focal point for the fighting between loyalists and mutineers and the city descended into anarchy. Mutineers and civilians indulged in a looting spree which affected over ninety per cent of the city's businesses and further damaged the crippled economy. Although the French attempted to facilitate discussions, the issue of President Patasse's resignation collapsed the talks. The continuing violence prompted the French again to increase their presence by a hundred special force commandos. Subsequently, the French presence became more overt with the addition of armoured personnel carriers, Mirage fighters and combat helicopters. Not all Central Africans welcomed the French intervention, however, and it sparked additional protests. The mutineers were soon overwhelmed, and government forces regained control of the city centre, as well as several residential areas and the Camp Kassai base, on the outskirts of Bangui.

Unhappiness with the degree of force used by the French, in order to bring the mutiny to an end, prompted greater and more widespread anti-French sentiment. Public unrest in Bangui resumed, former emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa condemned the intervention and the opposition coalition, known as CODEPO, demanded that the government act on the disarmament of civilians. An impasse between the rebels and the government was overcome on 27 May when a second ceasefire was negotiated, leading to more serious consultations between the mutineers, the opposition parties and Patasse's government.

Recognising how close CAR had come to civil war, President Patasse moved quickly on the concessions made to the mutineers. Within days, he introduced an amnesty law and established a meeting of the armed forces chiefs of staff to discuss army restructuring. A peace accord was signed on 2 June, which provided for French supervised disarmament, amnesty, the dismissal of the deputy chief of army staff (a key demand based on the mutineers `dissatisfaction with the ethnic divisions and favouritism in the army), and a defence restructuring meeting. A new Prime Minister was also appointed.

Shortly thereafter, Patasse and Prime Minister Jean-Paul Ngoupande (former CAR ambassador to France), jointly announced an intention to open talks with the IMF on the issue of emergency financial aid and longer term assistance. In an attempt to consolidate the peace, the new government of national unity was announced on 18 June. It incorporated four members of former ruler Kolingba's political party in the Cabinet, as well as several non-party figures. However, the new Cabinet was not embraced by the existing party politicians in Parliament.

In August 1996, the General Meeting on National Defence was convened, bringing together some 1 000 soldiers, members of political groups, and a variety of religious organisations. Although tasked with the restructuring of the army, the conference also discussed disarmament especially the issue of the illegal distribution of weapons during the two mutinies. Prior to the conference, in recognition of the destabilising potential of private militias and armed bands, the government had ordered citizens to hand over to the police and gendarmes any illegally acquired weapons. When the meeting adjourned a month later, over 200 recommendations had been made, the majority of which were not implemented until the deployment of MISAB.

Military Cleavages

After less than two months of relative calm, the encouraging signs of peace seemed to fade when, taking advantage of President Patasse's absence from the country, a third mutiny was triggered on 16 November 1996. During the first days of this mutiny, weapons were forcibly removed from the armoury and approximately 200 mutinous soldiers from the Camp Kassai barracks fanned out across the city in an attempt to disarm pro-Patasse supporters. In reaction, the French rapidly deployed patrols throughout the city to protect key points and provide support to the Presidential Guard. Additional French Foreign Legion troops were flown into CAR from Chad to supplement the 1 750 soldiers already stationed in the country.

Mediation by the Archbishop of Bangui began on 22 November, in an attempt to address the growing tribal cleavages within the military. The failure to address tribal inequalities and favouritism earlier in the conflict prompted demands for President Patasse's resignation. Attacks on Yakoma tribe members exacerbated the crisis and prompted the President to suggest the use of additional force to quell the violence.

Unwilling to leave the country during the unrest, President Patasse was forced to miss a Franco-African Summit in Burkina Faso during early December, where the conflict situation in CAR was a significant topic on the agenda.⁴ Addressing the summit on 5 December 1996, French President Jacques Chirac reiterated the need for good governance and democracy in the region and restated his country's reluctance to become embroiled in the latest mutiny in CAR. Instead, the presidents of Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali and Chad were dispatched to Bangui to assess the conflict situation. During this period, the spiralling level of violence prompted the UN to evacuate its staff from Bangui, while 300 refugees were forced to flee to neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville

Mediation continued in early December with President Patasse negotiating with eleven opposition parties, who attacked his ability to maintain national unity. A fifteen-day ceasefire agreement was reached on 8 December, in which the mutineers relinquished control of the oil depot and the state radio transmitter, but remained in control in other parts of the capital. An additional ceasefire on 22 December extended the deadline until 23 January 1997 and created a ten-member joint security commission.

Reactions to the signing of the truce varied. While the French welcomed the truce, the mutineers, who had wanted only a further fifteen-day extension, arrested their chief negotiator for ostensibly betraying the military. Civilians also demonstrated against the agreement, demanding a quick and more permanent end to the conflict.

However, by the end of the second ceasefire deadline, a new peace accord had been agreed to, which provided for a 500-strong African peacekeeping intervention. The peace blueprint (known as the Bangui Accords) was mediated largely by General Toumani Toure of Mali, and provided for amnesty, the restoration of constitutional legality, and the revival of the political protocol of the Government of National Unity. Intended to replace French troops deployed around Bangui, peacekeepers from Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo were deployed in support of the peace accord, with a mandate to quell further violence. In terms of the Bangui Accords, Patasse was obliged to appoint a civilian career administrator, Michel Gbezzera-Bria, to the position of Prime Minister. With this appointment, the Government of Action for the Defence of Democracy was established on 30 January 1997, with the overarching goal of ending the military and political conflict of the previous year.

THE INTER-AFRICAN MISSION TO MONITOR THE BANGUI ACCORDS

The Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords (MISAB) formally became the buffer between the combatants on 12 February 1997. Comprising 450 soldiers from six African countries, the force was commanded by a Senegalese colonel and supported by French logistics. However, political wrangling soon stalled MISAB's work. After appealing to citizens "to make a patriotic leap forward to retrieve the situation in the Central African Republic in serenity and fraternity",⁵ Patasse procrastinated on the naming of a new cabinet, while acrimonious debate over the inclusion of CODEPO meant further delays. When the new 28-member government was finally announced on 18 February 1997, its first major issue was the disarmament of the rebels.

In early March, mediators proposed a ten-day disarmament period in which mutineers would be reintegrated into civilian life. Rejecting the proposal, the mutineers declared their unwillingness to go "like cattle to the slaughterhouse."⁶ On 23 March, a spokesperson for the mutineers claimed that the peace accords were not being respected and declared that forced disarmament would be considered an act of war. Relative calm was restored when the disarmament deadline was extended to 31 March 1997, and political concessions were made to the mutineers. The latter included Cabinet appointments for several former mutineers as minister delegates (junior Cabinet positions), specifically to the portfolios of security, civilian disarmament and military reorganisation. However, tensions mounted once more when an attempt by the Defence Minister (a presidential supporter) to visit a mutineer-held position in the city provoked an exchange of gunfire.

Nevertheless, the majority of mutineers (now under a new commander) began returning to the Camp Kassai barracks on 18 April 1997, under the watchful eye of the MISAB peacekeepers. By late April, it was estimated that only a hundred of the approximately 700 mutineers remained at large. The reported number of mutineers may have been inaccurate, as clashes between peacekeepers and mutineers continued throughout May and June. One of the worst incidents occurred when the mutineers shelled the French embassy, causing approximately a hundred casualties, including at least sixty dead. The increasing severity of the clashes led to renewed French military involvement when they helped to defend Senegalese and Chadian peacekeepers against a rebel attack. Soon afterwards, a four-day truce was brokered between the peacekeepers and the remaining mutineers. A key provision of the truce was the return of mortars and other heavy weapons to the French embassy.⁷ On 2 July 1997, the four-day truce was extended for an additional ten days.

The formal ceasefire of 2 July allowed for talks to resume specifically on the issues of disarmament and the return of rebel soldiers to barracks. The mediation efforts of Toumani Toure and the French ambassador prompted a symbolic reconciliation ceremony between the rival army factions on 9 July 1997. Significant to the ongoing peace process, France announced a redefinition of its African policy, including its disengagement from CAR, during this period. Emphasising security on the European continent, rather than the defence of sometimes mismanaged former colonial regimes, the recently elected Socialist administration was seeking to cut its defence expenditures both nationally and internationally. One of the most significant cuts to be announced was the closure of the two French bases in CAR.

UN involvement in the seventeen-month conflict was eventually elicited by a formal request from President Patasse. On 6 August 1997, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1125, which retroactively approved the MISAB force. Provided with a Chapter VII mandate,⁸ MISAB was to continue as a UN-authorised coalition of the willing with "the expenses and logistic support for the force ... borne on a voluntary basis."⁹ The Security Council approved the continued deployment of MISAB for an initial period of three months, and requested that bi-weekly reports be submitted. The first of these reports, submitted on 18 August 1997,¹⁰ discussed the role of the International Monitoring Committee in overseeing the implementation of the Peace Accords and confirmed the following aims of the peace process entrusted to MISAB:

the creation of a government of national unity;



ratification of a law granting amnesty to those who committed crimes in the context of the third rebellion;



disarmament of former rebels in honour and dignity, as well as the return of all weapons by the civilian population;



realisation of recommendations made during the General Meeting on National Defence (AugustSeptember 1996);



the accommodation of former heads of state;



suspension of a parliamentary audit into mismanagement; and



the development of a final phase of national reconciliation aimed at consolidating peace and security.

The role played by the International Monitoring Committee vis-à-vis MISAB is akin to that played by the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in relation to a UN peacekeeping force deployed in a conventional wider UN peace operation. The force commander of MISAB receives direction from, and reports to the International Monitoring Committee, which in turn reports to the Security Council. In the case of the CAR operation, the co-ordinating linkage between the civilian head of mission and the UN Secretariat (especially the Department of Peacekeeping Operations), as well as important UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Development Programme, etc., does not exist. The latter are essential to the process of linking any peacekeeping attempt to the indispensable objectives of peacebuilding.

According to the 18 August report to the Security Council, the adoption of Resolution 1125 had the effect of re-activating the stalled political negotiations. For example, on 9 August 1997, several opposition groups signalled their intention to return as full participants to the Government of Action in Defence of Democracy. The first report concluded by remarking on the significance of MISAB as a model for future responses to African conflict.

Over the ensuing three-month period, MISAB continued to submit bi-weekly reports to the UN on its various activities. In the area of disarmament, the major undertaking of the mission, MISAB helped to implement a two-phase process of arms collection. The initial (voluntary) phase was conducted throughout September 1997, and provided a small monetary reward to citizens who turned in weapons of their own accord. The second phase involved the physical collection of weapons from civilians and militias who had not responded to the incentive. Ten resource people, including deputies, neighbourhood leaders, former rebels and opinion leaders, were recruited to assist in the implementation-of-law phase of disarmament, which included neighbourhood meetings and rallies, the use of informants, and searches conducted by MISAB soldiers. The involvement of civil society in the disarmament process also sought to promote the broader aim of national reconciliation.

The 18 August report stated that MISAB (at the time 796 soldiers) could account for 81 per cent of heavy weapons missing from the armoury, but only 34 per cent of light weapons.¹¹ By the end of October 1997, 87 per cent of known government heavy weapons and 54 per cent of known government light weapons had been recovered and deposited at the French embassy. According to the MISAB reports, the low rate of recovery of the light weapons was attributed to the ease with which small weapons can be concealed, transported outside of the country, buried, or otherwise concealed or disposed of. A further matter of serious concern to the long term reconciliation efforts and regional stability is the number of weapons assumed to have been transported outside the country by a group of 130 mutineers who never returned to the barracks. This may contribute to the growing black market for weapons in Africa, where rebel groups are able to purchase unrecovered light weapons relatively cheaply for the purpose of prosecuting conflict and/or violent crime.¹²

Equally important to the disarmament process is the demobilisation of extraneous soldiers and their reintegration into civil society. Experience elsewhere in Africa demonstrates that this should be an integral part of any comprehensive arms management programme. Frequently, malintegrated former combatants provoke ongoing internal instability, as they resort to banditry to survive, rather than face unemployment and abject poverty. Moreover, without psychological assistance when re-entering civil society, combatants become increasing disillusioned, frustrated, and alienated and often return to rebel groups, thus fuelling the cycle of violence. In CAR, demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) was not an explicit part of the MISAB mandate.

However, the UNDP allocated approximately US $2 million for the restructuring of the armed forces, including the demobilisation of more than 1 000 soldiers. If the total amount were to find its way to the demobilised, this represents approximately US $1 500 per person with which to start a new life. Unless such grants are linked to a comprehensive D&R programme which provides for skills acquisition and sustainable employment, experience further teaches that it may be squandered without real benefit to former soldiers.

With regard to finances, Resolution 1125 provided an inadequate financial basis for MISAB. Despite its approval of the MISAB mission, the UN provided no direct funding of the peacekeeping operation. During the debate in the Security Council, several countries, specifically the United States, expressed the opinion that the MISAB mission must be supported purely on a voluntary basis.¹³ Consequently, a compromise was reached whereby mission costs would be borne by each of the participating countries, the government of the Central African Republic, the French government, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The African countries were required to provide limited vehicle support and personnel equipment, while the provision of tactical and support vehicles, including fuel and maintenance, and the supply of office equipment was left to the French government. France also provided for the payment of rents for buildings used during the mission, over and above previous monies provided earlier in the conflict for the payment of salary arrears.

The fourth MISAB report warned that, without financial support, African nations will continue to lack the capability to resolve conflict on the continent. It argues that "owing to the insufficiency of the African countries' own resources, logistic support from the international community, along the lines of the support which France has provided to MISAB and which remains open to contributions for all other States, is still needed."¹⁴ Except for support from France and the participating African countries, little international financial support was forthcoming, save for the UNDP's financial support to the demobilisation project (as mentioned) and initial funding for the ten resource persons of the International Monitoring Committee. In contrast to its strident political support for the ECOMOG regional initiative, the OAU only granted small sums of money in support of MISAB and the International Monitoring Committee.

The sixth and final MISAB report,¹⁵ pursuant to Resolution 1125, concluded that the nine-month old mission had started the country on the road to reconstruction. Although daily social and economic activities had resumed, the report cautioned that the situation remained tense and that strikes for back wages and government study grants continued. The report added that, while achievements in the military, political and security areas were significant, peace cannot be solidified without attention to the economic origins of the initial mutiny of April 1996. It also called for an extension of the UN mandate in order to continue the process of post-conflict confidence-building.

The sixth report also pressed the UN to provide additional resources for the MISAB troops, in order to combat growing troop demoralisation. Consequently, knowledge of pay and amenity discrepancies between traditional UN peacekeeping operations and the MISAB troops undermined, and continues to undermine the efforts in CAR at regional peacekeeping. On 6 November 1997, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1136¹⁶ and extended MISAB's mandate until 6 February 1998. Addressing the financial concerns, it requested that a trust fund be established in support of the MISAB troops. Furthermore, it encouraged all UN member states to contribute to the support of MISAB and called for the greater involvement of international organisations and financial institutions in the post-conflict development of CAR.

MINI ECOMOG OR A DIFFERENT ANIMAL?

By the end of 1997, the term `coalition of the willing' had become common UN parlance, and MISAB was increasingly being touted as another example of subregional peacekeeping in Africa. MISAB, like ECOMOG, follows the trend of regional conflict resolution. However, differences between the two missions underline the problems associated with the lack of UN and international engagement in African conflict. The ECOWAS initiative in Liberia represents the first time that a regional body intervened to stop a conflict in its own region. The operation was one of the largest in the world, and from 1990 to the end of 1995 (when the NATO-led IFOR took over from UNPROFOR in Bosnia), the only major peacekeeping effort not run by the UN.

While the size and shape of the MISAB intervention pales in comparison with ECOMOG, there are some additional differences between the course and conduct of the CAR mission, and that in Liberia. For example, MISAB was initiated during a biennial Franco-African Summit, that had governance and development on its agenda. ECOMOG, on the other hand, was born in 1990 under the auspices of an existing subregional organisation. Although ECOWAS had hitherto been primarily an economic regional grouping, it did have provisions for a Standing Mediation Committee with a mandate to intervene in conflict situations in the region which the Franco-African Summit did not provide for.

Another significant difference between the two missions, but nevertheless an important indicator of the future, is the role of key states in the initiation and continuation of the missions. Regional hegemon Nigeria was the driving force behind the initial deployment of ECOMOG, and its dominance continued throughout the mission in Liberia. In the case of CAR, it was France, the former colonial power, that played the role of lead nation, albeit more in a traditional gendarme guise. In both interventions, the mission could not function without the logistic support and leadership provided by Nigeria¹⁷ and France respectively.

While Nigeria participated militarily in ECOMOG until the end, France's withdrawal from Africa (specifically the elimination of the garrisons in CAR) may undermine the fragile peace sustained thus far by MISAB. For example, the financial support that France provided in respect of unpaid government wages, including those of the disaffected soldiers, was an essential condition for reaching a peace agreement in CAR. And there is little doubt that the MISAB force cannot sustain a further three-month deployment without significant French leadership and logistic support.

The disparities between MISAB and ECOMOG also extend beyond the question of lead nation, to include differences in both international and regional involvement. ECOMOG's attempt at gaining greater international legitimacy received far greater support from the OAU than has been the case with MISAB. The OAU provided MISAB with limited financial support, but its reaction to the Liberian crisis was far more significant. It has been argued that the Liberian crisis was a significant factor in the OAU's decision to establish a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993.¹⁸ The earnestness with which the OAU supported ECOMOG politically lent more salience to the regional security repercussions of the Liberian conflict, and no doubt contributed to the more animated UN response. The establishment of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), authorised by Security Council Resolution 866 of 22 September 1993, further legitimised the ECOMOG force and contributed to the provision of significant non-African support for the remainder of the mission. In the case of MISAB, UN approval was less through OAU concerns than French pressure and a direct request from the beleaguered president of CAR. As a consequence, the `marginalisation' of CAR within Africa meant no involvement by UN mediators or co-ordination with other UN agencies, in contrast to UN engagement in the follow-on to the ECOMOG mission.

CONCLUSION

While MISAB has reduced the tensions and security problems associated with military disintegration and the proliferation of weapons, it cannot tackle the problem of poor governance which lies at the heart of CAR's problems. Although Security Council Resolution 1136 addresses the need for the assistance of financial institutions and international organisations in the development of the country, little appears to have been achieved in this area. The belated request for assistance by the Security Council is a weak concession to the importance of post-conflict peacebuilding in contemporary peacekeeping missions, and underlines the cardinal importance of involving the entire UN system in a lasting peace process. Without the full engagement of the UN and the international system, the economic and political instability that caused the conflict will not be addressed.

Unlike ECOMOG, MISAB has not benefited from the deployment of impartial extra-continental personnel, or wider involvement by the international community. It is far-fetched to expect an African coalition of the willing to provide assistance with peacebuilding, when its members are themselves impoverished. While MISAB has provided an interesting example of changing responses to African crises, it is far from an appropriate blueprint for future interventions.

While regional responses may be an emerging trend in post-Cold War Europe, they do not offer a solution for Africa. Unlike the Franco-African Summit and ECOWAS, the NATO alliance has as its only purpose the security of states within its sphere of influence. NATO's history and structures make it far more suitable to regional peacekeeping than the current initiatives in Africa. Moreover, NATO involvement in the conflict in Bosnia emerged as a follow-on to a full-scale UN peacekeeping force of unprecedented magnitude.

On the positive side, MISAB (like ECOMOG) proves that there is a strong indigenous political will towards contributing to peaceful conflict resolution in Africa but this cannot mature without the enthusiastic involvement of the international community and the UN system. If, despite their shortcomings and disparities, MISAB and ECOMOG are considered worthy precedents for the application of Chapter VIII, Regional Arrangements,¹⁹ as the panacea for conflict resolution in Africa, the international community may see the development of two versions of peacekeeping the developed world's engagement in conflict in the northern hemisphere and the poor man's involvement in neighbouring countries in the southern hemisphere.

ENDNOTES

This article was written while Fiona McFarlane was a research intern at the Institute for Security Studies. The assistance of the Government of Canada and Project Ploughshares are gratefully acknowledged in making this visit possible.

The CFA Franc zone encompasses two economic and monetary unions and consists of fourteen African countries plus France. France guarantees the convertibility of the CFA franc into French francs and thus facilitates foreign exchange transactions. Automatic convertibility resulted in increasing current account deficits during the 1980s and pressure in the early 1990s on profitability and competitiveness of the main exports of the CFA franc zone countries. The devaluation in 1994 sought to reduce the trade and current account deficits of the CFA franc countries, improve the external asset position of the central banks associated with each of the monetary unions and restore macroeconomic viability; See M Del Buono, Devaluation of the CFA Franc: Two Years Later, Africa Forum, <www.einaudi.cornell.edu/Africa/notes/ dec96/dec3.html>



According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report for the year 1997 total external debt for 1994 was US $824 million and increased to US $944 million in 1996. During the same period, real growth in GDP rose by less than one per cent.



The summary of events is based primarily on Reuters news articles from the Reuters Business Briefing service.



The 19th Franco-African Summit started on 3 December 1996 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and was attended by 46 nations including thirteen anglophone countries. The summit is held every two years, alternatively in France and Africa. The 19th Summit focused on the theme of Good Governance and Development, but security concerns in Africa were also raised, as well as concerns about France's EU commitments and its effect on the CFA Franc. At the request of President Patasse, a `fraternal' mission was mandated by the Summit to look into the situation in CAR in order to avoid a collapse into civil war.



President Patasse as quoted by Reuters, President Says No to Bangui Unity Government for Now, Reuters Limited, 13 February 1997.



Army mutineers as quoted by Reuters, Army Rebels Reject Bangui Disarmament Plan, Reuters Limited, 1 March 1997.



No official policy appears to exist that explains why the French embassy has been designated as the depository. However, it can be assumed that the embassy was viewed as a secure, neutral location to which both parties can return weapons stolen from the armoury during the second mutiny, as well as other illegally procured armaments.



Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for the use of armed force "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."



Resolution 1125 adopted by the Security Council at its 3 808th meeting on 6 August 1997; <www/un/org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl?234+unix+_free_user_+www.un.org..80+un+un+scres+>



First Report to the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1125 (1997) Concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic (18 August 1997), <www.un.org/Doc/sc/ letter/1997/s1997652.htm>



The percentage of weapons recovered subsequently changed due to accounting errors; see Second Report to the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1125 (1997) Concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic (1 September 1997), <www.un.org/Doc/sc/letter/1997/s1997684.htm>



For additional information on the significance of disarmament in peace operations and the means of proliferation of light weapons and their contribution to conflict, see UNIDIR, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues, UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1995-1997; and Society Under Siege: Crime, Violence and Illegal Weapons, Towards Collaborative Peace Series, 1, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1997.



For a summary of the Security Council debate and the draft resolution see <www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl/4150+ unix+_free_user_+www.un.org..80+un+pr+pr++>



Fourth Report to the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1125 (1997) Concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic (29 September 1997), <www.un. org/Doc/sc/letter/1997/s1997759.htm>



Sixth Report to the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1125 (1997) Concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic (27 October 1997), <www.un.org/Doc/sc/letter/ 1997/s1997828.htm>



For the text of the resolution, see <www/un/org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl?245+unix+_free_user_+www.un.org..80+un+un+scres+>



Nigeria's importance to ECOMOG is discussed by R A Mortimer, ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security in West Africa, in E J Keller & D Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order, Lynne Riener, Boulder, 1996, p. 161.



Mortimer argues that the involvement of Sengalese President Andou Diouf in the ECOMOG Committee of Five planning group, combined with OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed-Salim's desire to expand the OAU's authority in civil conflicts, accelerated the creation of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; ibid., p. 157.



Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter outlines, in minimal detail, the concept of Regional Arrangements as they deal with "matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."