Africa Watch
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Fratricidal Conflict in the Horn
In May 1991, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) constituted the spearhead of the alliance that seized Asmara and Addis Ababa and thus overthrew Mengistu Haile Miriam’s Dergue regime. For the EPLF, this was a culmination of twenty years of struggle, thirty if one counts the sacrifices of their antecedents in the war of liberation that began when Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962. The TPLF, principal component of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), had benefited initially from the protection, support and encouragement of its elder partner. As is the case in most resistance struggles, relations between the two movements had not always run smoothly. Both sought their ideological inspiration in Marxism, and engaged in the usual polemical disputes about doctrinal niceties and disagreements about tactical and strategic alliances. The exigencies of guerrilla and later conventional warfare had also seen disputes about supply routes and areas of operation and, between 1986 and 1988, there was a break in the compact that worked to the advantage of their mutual foe. The personal relations between their respective leaders, however, had always been sound; indeed, Meles Zenawi and Issayas Afeworki are cousins on the side of the former’s Eritrean mother.
The longstanding Eritrean demand for independence was received sympathetically by the new EPRDF government in Addis, which conceded a local referendum on Eritrea’s future despite the objections of many Ethiopians. Some 99,8 per cent of registered voters in Eritrea elected to take independence, which was granted in May 1993. The parting appeared, at least at government level, to be amicable and it seemed that these two extremely poor countries would concentrate mutually upon fostering economic recovery in the wake of a punishing and protracted war. Many Ethiopians were bitter about the surrender of Eritrea and the Red Sea coastline, however, which they saw as the result of over-friendly relations between the two leaders. Certainly, the decision did little to recommend the new rulers in Addis to the supplanted Amhara élite.
Reality suggested that the economies of the two countries were so interwoven that they would benefit from continued co-operation. Thus, when armed conflict broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in mid-May this year, shortly to be followed by the launching of bombing raids on each others’ territory and the mobilisation of forces in apparent preparation for all-out war, even the most seasoned observers of the region were taken aback.
Admittedly, there had been a growing measure of tension between the two states, primarily over economic and fiscal policies which were increasingly proving difficult to harmonise. For their part many Ethiopians claimed that Addis was being far too generous to its former province. Ethiopian traders were also upset at the advantages enjoyed by their eastern neighbours, who until recently continued to use the Ethiopian birr as currency. The problem with this was that Eritrea had relaxed all exchange controls, whereas Ethiopia declined to follow the path of complete liberalisation of the currency markets. As a consequence, the birr traded at a discount in Eritrea, effectively leaving Ethiopia with a completely legal ‘black market’ on its doorstep. Eritrean traders were able to amass vast profits simply by round-tripping, a system which also resulted in the steady flow of dollars from Ethiopia to Eritrea. Ethiopian manufacturers also complained of their inability to compete with their Eritrean counterparts because of the latter’s ability to corner the market in dollars and import raw materials comparatively cheaply.
In 1997, Eritrea introduced its own currency, the nakfa, which it wanted to trade at parity with the Ethiopian birr. Eritrea also insisted that, internationally, the nakfa would be allowed to float. After long deliberation, the Ethiopian government rejected the proposed linkage of the two units and, from October 1997, required that all trade transactions in excess of US $250 between the two countries are to be conducted in hard currency. Certain common items were excluded even from this concession. Many rural households in the Tigray area derive much of their income from the proceeds of migrant labour and livestock sales, for which Eritrea is the largest local market. The new policy effectively bans cross-border livestock exports by farmers and small traders, leading to depressed livestock prices. The nakfa consistently trades at lower rates than the birr, which implies falling wage rates for migrants from Tigre. All of this erodes household incomes, causing considerable stress. On both sides, the animosity generated by the hardships caused by this series of policy changes was considerable and created a reservoir of public anger to be directed at whichever of the two governments was identified as the responsible party.
One essential consequence of the new Ethiopian trade policy was that the control of borders suddenly became a matter of importance, and this certainly gave a new edge to the sporadic squabbles about remote areas where the exact position of the frontier had previously been of little significance to the local population.
Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, a boundary commission had been established to cover the Yirga Triangle and other disputed areas, including Badda at the northern end of the Danakil Depression, where there was an incident in 1996, and Biru, north-west of Assab, where there was a clash on 27 April this year. In both areas, the two governments had established administrative posts after 1991. When Ethiopia asserted its claims in Badda last October and in Biru this February, after operations against the opposition Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, Eritrea pulled back. In 1997, the Ethiopian authorities issued a map of the Tigrayan Administrative Region which appeared to confirm Eritrean suspicions about Tigrayan expansionism. On the basis of this map, Eritrea says Ethiopia has also made claims to areas west of the Yirga Triangle, including all the land between the Gash/Mareb and Takazze as far as the Sudan border. Tigrayans occupy the key positions in the Ethiopian government, and some of them appear eager to press the claims of their region for special status. This places Meles in a difficult position, for if he attempts a soft line on the conflict with Eritrea, he may become vulnerable to threats from more hardline Tigrayans.
It was in the Yirga Triangle that the latest and most serious clash occurred. A minor, and probably unplanned clash on 6 May near Badme was followed six days later by a full-scale engagement. The disputed Triangle is a remote and rugged area occupied by Tigrinya speakers, who have never given much attention to borders. Some 20 000 of these people are said to be from highland Eritrea, attracted by the fertility of the malaria-infested Baduma plains. Alluvial gold is recovered on the Tigrayan side. Other inhabitants include Kunama and Baria peoples from western Eritrea — Nilotic peoples who, during the liberation war, opposed both the ELF and the EPLF. A Kunama-Baria organisation, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Setit and Gash, has fought sporadically against the EPLF since 1993.
Prior to 1981 Yirga was largely in the hands of the Eritrean Liberation Front, though the TPLF also had a presence there after its founding in 1975. The TPLF took over the Triangle after it had helped the EPLF oust the ELF. In the mid-1980s, Sheraro was a major TPLF base and the EPLF kept a presence at Sheraro, near Badme.
It has to be said that the treaties ordering the boundary between the Italian colony of Eritrea and its neighbours, are not among the clearest or most unambiguous arrangements of territorial affairs. Nor does it appear that they were ever followed up by the erection of permanent beacons in a process of demarcation. The process is further complicated by the boundary’s reliance on perennial watercourses for much of its definition, and even the whereabouts of certain ethnic groups. Matters are not simplified by the existence of neighbouring settlements with identical names, and others rendered differently according to one’s choice of language. Thus Badme, which lies at the heart of the current dispute, is referred to also as Badem and Badime, but identified more usually on maps as Yirga.
The relevant annex to the treaty of 10 July 1900, redefining the border between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, signed in Addis Ababa on 15 May 1902, reads as follows:
"The frontier Treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea, previously determined by the line Tomat-Todluc, is mutually modified in the following manner: -
Commencing from the junction of the Khor Um Haga with the Setit, the new frontier follows this river to its junction with the Maieteb, following the latter’s course so as to leave Mount ala Tacura to Eritrea, and joins the Mareb at its junction with the Mai Ambessa.
The line from the junction of the Setit and Maieteb to the junction of the Mareb and the Mai Ambessa shall be delimited by Italian and Ethiopian delegates, so that the Canama tribe belong to Eritrea."
Africa Confidential drew the appropriate conclusion that, though the border is fairly easily defined along the Takazze and Mareb/Gash Rivers, it is vague in between. The boundary in the Danakil through Afarland is also not defined on the ground, but was drawn on the map following Menelik’s defeat of the Italians in 1896. The Danakil boundary was described in a convention signed between Italy and Ethiopia as follows:
"From the most easterly point of the frontier established between the Colony of Eritrea and the Tigré by the convention of 10th July, 1900 the boundary proceeds in a south-easterly direction, parallel to and at a distance of 60 kilometres from the coast, until it joins the frontier of the French possessions of Somalia.
The two Governments undertake to fix the above-mentioned frontier-line on the spot by common accord and as soon as possible, adapting it to the nature and variation of the ground.
The two Governments undertake to establish by common accord and as soon as possible the respective dependency of the limitrophe tribes on the frontiers on the basis of their traditional and usual residence."
It appears that the Italian colonial map issued in 1934, may have exaggerated the extent of Eritrean territory with a view to providing Mussolini with the excuse for an assault on Ethiopia. It has therefore been rejected by some advocates of Ethiopia’s case, who also point out the difficulty of using the imprecise treaties signed at the turn of the century.
No attempt was made to alter the boundaries during British military or mandated rule, or when Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia between 1952 and 1962. When Eritrea became an Ethiopian province in 1962, the fact that the boundary was ill-defined ceased to matter much. Subsequent changes to the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Ethiopia may have added to the confusion, for a substantial revision was undertaken under Mengistu in 1987, one that actually separated the Eritrean and Assab Autonomous Regions from each other. Another point being raised by some Ethiopians is that the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 nullified all treaties between Eritrea and Ethiopia prior to that date. An additional and more extreme argument runs that, if Eritrea wishes to redraw the boundaries it was allocated while being an integral part of Ethiopia, it can do so only with the consent of the authorities in Addis. By extension, any claim by Eritrea that only the colonial boundaries are legitimate, would be countered by the argument that the last colonial power to exercise control over Eritrea was Ethiopia.
Ethiopia has also complained that the conduct of this dispute reflects an aggressive technique of conflict resolution that has become ingrained in the foreign policy stance of the new Eritrean state. This technique may be summed up as resorting to military force first, then negotiating once territory has been seized. In support of this thesis, Addis refers to the violent dispute with Yemen in 1995 over the Hanish islands, now before the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
On 14 May, Eritrea suggested international mediation, even though its forces continued to make inroads into the disputed Triangle. Susan Rice, the US Deputy Under-Secretary of State, arrived in the region on 16 May, eager to stop the conflict with Rwandan assistance between two key members of the ad hoc anti-Sudan alliance that the US had so carefully been constructing.
The US/Rwandan peace plan made the following points:
"1) The Ethiopian and Eritrean parties should commit themselves to the following principles: resolving this and any other dispute between them by peaceful means; renouncing force as a means of imposing solutions; agreeing to undertake measures to reduce current tensions; and seeking the final disposition of their common border on the basis of established colonial treaties and international law applicable to such treaties.
2) To reduce current tensions, and without prejudice to the territorial claims of either party: a small observer mission should be deployed to Badme; Eritrean forces should redeploy from Badme to positions held before May 6, 1998; the previous civilian administration should return; and there should be an investigation into the events of May 6, 1998.
3) To achieve lasting resolution of the underlying border dispute, both parties should agree to the swift and binding delimitation and demarcation of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. Border delimitation should be determined on the basis of established colonial treaties and international law applicable to such treaties, and the delimitation and demarcation process should be completed by a qualified technical team as soon as possible. The demarcated border should be accepted and adhered to by both parties, and, upon completion of demarcation, the legitimate authorities assume jurisdiction over their respective sovereign territories.
4) The Ethiopian and Eritrean parties should demilitarize the entire common border as soon as possible."
Ethiopia was willing to accept this proposal, but Eritrea argued that it was being asked to withdraw unilaterally from its own territory, and refused, though it was willing to accede to a complete demilitarisation of the contested areas. Ethiopia refused any negotiation with Eritrea until the troops were withdrawn and there matters stood, with both sides apparently preparing for a major conflict.
By early June, the centre of operations had shifted to the area around the border town of Zela Ambessa, where severe fighting took place. On 5 June, there was a further escalation as both sides launched air raids: Ethiopia against the airport at Asmara, and Eritrea against the Tigrayan capital Mekele, where some fifty people, including several children were killed.
On 11 June, Ethiopia opened a new front opposite the southern port of Assab, provoking speculation that an attempt would be made to establish a renewed permanent presence on the Red Sea.
Fortunately, on 14 June, the US government managed to persuade the two protagonists to institute a moratorium on air-strikes, and this in itself led to a temporary halt in the fighting, though there were soon renewed artillery exchanges near Zalembessa.
On 17 June, a high-level Organisation of African Unity (OAU) mediation team arrived in the region, and though their efforts initially appeared fruitless, there was a noticeable softening of the diplomatic position adopted by the two leaders as the month wore on.
Though it is possible that the lull in fighting could be converted into a truce paving the way for a more permanent settlement, the intervening period has also seen both sides augmenting their armed forces and equipment, Torrential rains in Tigray have prevented any large-scale clashes for the last two months, but the weather has now changed, and the warlike rhetoric of the politicians may yet be matched by feats of arms.
In conclusion, other implications of this micro-war should be considered.
Firstly, it indicates that, although conflict in Africa is usually intrastate, the possibility of violent conflict between states, even between states whose governments have been closely associated in the recent past cannot be ruled out.
A related point is that the emergence of this conflict demonstrates just how difficult the business of early warning is.
It is also clear how quickly a dispute about conflicting economic and fiscal policy can be transformed into a war over territory.
The conflict also illustrates the difficulty that leaders may experience when they are committed to hardline stances against their better judgment. Domestic power plays may be of major significance in this regard. Neither Prime Minister Meles nor President Issayas Afeworki were in a position to back-track in public without damaging their standing within their own political systems.
This situation was aggravated by some of the most inflammatory press and Internet exchanges in which both camps did their best to create and maintain a war psychosis — "with malice clothed in reason’s garb" — despite the obvious fact that both countries were doing immeasurable damage to their already struggling economies. Much of the Internet traffic originated from the Ethiopian and Eritrean diasporas, who were doubtless influenced by the dementia so common among exiles, but many of the diplomatic exchanges emanating from Asmara and Addis were also couched in language that may be described as irresponsible.
Finally, the US and other powers external to the region have been handed a salutary lesson in the volatility of interstate relations in this area. Simplistic ideas about a new generation of African leaders simply will not stand up against the pressures generated by conflicting state interests. Similarly, the anti-Khartoum coalition will come under increasing pressure, though few would have anticipated that its most vulnerable fault-line would be between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the near future, the coalition will show signs of increasing strain over the waters of the Nile, and a serious dispute is already building between Egypt and Ethiopia. The countries of the Horn will also find it difficult to remain aloof from the turbulence of the Arabian peninsula which will be exacerbated by the evident failure of the Oslo peace accords.
These are times for exceptional vigilance in Africa.
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