International Humanitarian Law and the Restoration and Maintanance of Peace

By Michel Veuthey Head of Delegation, International Committe of the Red Cross

Published in African Security Review Vol 7 No 5, 1998

INTRODUCTION

In today’s unstable situation, the first purpose of international co-operation is, and should remain the prevention of armed conflicts and the maintenance of international peace and security.1 The second is to preserve humanity in all circumstances, even during conflicts, which is the primary intention of international humanitarian law.

International humanitarian law is an important component in maintaining peace. It is a permanent reminder that armed conflict and enmity between civilians on opposite sides of a conflict are temporary, exceptional situations: no enemy is an enemy for ever.2 Civilised life — both within and between communities — is founded on peaceful relations in which peace is not the absence of conflict, but the harmonious management of conflicts. Furthermore, the very nature of humanitarian law shatters the dangerous illusion of unlimited force3 or total war, creates areas of peace in the midst of conflict, imposes the principle of a common humanity, and calls for dialogue. International humanitarian law is increasingly part of global thinking on security issues at the national, regional and international levels. The inclusion of humanitarian law complements the current concept of human security, which Paul Kennedy identifies as a broadening of national security to "anything on the globe which challenges a people’s health, economic well-being, social stability and political peace."4 In this thinking, the implementation of humanitarian law should form part of a culture of conflict prevention for the 21st century.5

THE NATURE OF HUMAITARIAN LAW

The simplest and most universal definition of humanitarian law is found in the Golden Rule, "Love thy neighbour as thyself." The great Rabbi Hillel’s response to a question on the Torah was, "Do not do unto others what you would not want to be done unto you. This is the essence and the rest is commentary."6 Practically all traditions know this fundamental principle.7 Throughout the history of humankind, all civilisations have developed rules to ensure its survival — in Asia (Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, and Bushido); in the Middle East (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam); in Africa (a multitude of customs valid only within a given tribe); and in Europe, where the mutual restrictions imposed by chivalry, before the condottieri and lace-clad war generals were supplanted by the humanists (Grotius, Hobbes, Kant, Pufendorf, Rousseau and Vattel, among others)8 — all aimed at avoiding excesses that would turn clashes into anarchy and make peace more difficult to achieve.
Thus, in Article 6 of Perpetual Peace, Kant wrote: "No State at war with another must allow itself hostilities of a kind which would make reciprocal confidence impossible during future peace."9

Humanitarian law may be expressed through the provision of bilateral agreements which can be concluded before hostilities begin (cartels), during hostilities (truces and instruments of surrender), or at the end of a conflict (ceasefires and peace treaties), setting out the treatment to be given to civilians, prisoners, the sick and wounded, and neutral intermediaries. Or it may be formed through multilateral agreements, frequently concluded in reaction to a bloody conflict. Each of the stages of humanitarian law codified in Geneva from 1864 to 1977 resulted from a war that created a shock wave in public opinion: the battle of Solferino (1859) between Austrian and French armies was the impetus for the First Convention, in 1864; the naval battle of Tsushima (1905) between Japanese and Russian fleets prompted adjustment of the Convention on War at Sea in 1907; World War I brought about the two 1929 Conventions, including a much broader protection for prisoners of war; World War II led to the four 1949 Conventions10 and an extensive regulation of the treatment of civilians in occupied territories and internment; and decolonisation and the Vietnam War preceded the two 1977 Additional Protocols,11 which introduced written rules for the protection of civilian persons and objects against hostilities.

Similarly, most of The Hague Law stems from the peace conferences of 1899 and 1907. World War II and regional conflicts prompted the drafting of the United Nations instruments on human rights, disarmament, the prohibition of terrorism and mercenaries, protection of the environment and protection of the rights of children.

The terminology used to refer to these international treaties may vary between humanitarian law, international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, laws of war, law of Geneva, Red Cross Conventions, law of The Hague, or human rights in armed conflicts. All seek the same objective: to limit the use of violence. Some of these instruments, such as human rights treaties, are based on a peacetime approach, while others, such as humanitarian law, are normally applicable during armed conflicts. Yet, their scope often overlaps, especially with regard to the fundamental guarantees that they embody.

The fundamental rules of humanitarian law12 are closely linked to the survival of human beings, not only individuals but entire populations, by:
  • the safeguarding of cultural objects and places of worship,13 and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population;14
  • the protection of medical establishments and units (both civilian and military), public works, and installations containing dangerous forces (like dams, dikes, and nuclear power plants);15 and

  • the preservation of the natural environment.16
Even beyond these objectives, the need to maintain a minimum of confidence between adversaries (in other words, the prohibition of perfidy) is one of the pillars of both customary and written humanitarian law.

By its very nature, humanitarian law aims, through acts of humanity, to preserve the survival of humankind,17 ensure that ‘civilised’ life is still possible and maintain the necessary conditions for a return of peace even during a conflict. As Denise Bindschedler-Robert, writes, "[t]he law of armed conflicts is certainly not a substitute for peace. Nevertheless, in the last analysis it preserves a certain sense of proportion and human solidarity as well as a sense of human values amid the outburst of unchained violence and passions which threaten these values."18 As a psychologist expresses it, "[i]t can save us from dehumanising ourselves by dehumanising our enemy."19
 

THE UNIVERSAL APPLICABILITY OF HUMANITARIAN RULES

It is important for the sake of peace that humanitarian rules and principles are respected under all circumstances. In modern situations, when faced with so-called "collapsed states",20 "post-modern wars"21 and anarchic conflicts,22 the states’ party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions should reaffirm their collective responsibility "to respect and to ensure respect for this Convention in all circumstances."23 However, the question arises whether these measures should be limited to diplomatic démarches and the adoption of resolutions, or extended to the use of sanctions and peace enforcement operations in order to stop genocide and arrest war criminals. In part, this may be answered by looking at when humanitarian law is brought into a conflict or potential conflict situation.

Sometimes, the introduction of humanitarian rules in a conflict is deferred when individual countries, or the international community at large, choose to perpetuate the illusion of peace by refusing to recognise the state of conflict, and ignoring or concealing victims. Actions such as these may jeopardise the application of the law and, indeed, the restoration of peace, as delays of this nature allow conflicts to progress beyond the stage at which international law can help to resolve the conflict. As the number of victims grows — individuals are taken prisoner, are tortured and executed, or disappear — and methods and means of warfare degenerate on both sides, it becomes extremely difficult to revert to the legal path. When large-scale military operations are characterised for too long as ‘operations for the maintenance of order’ or even ‘fraternal assistance’, hatred accumulates, and sincere but belated efforts to set reciprocal limits sometimes run into insurmountable problems, with an adverse impact on civilians and prisoners. The pacifying value of humanitarian restrictions thus emerges late in the day, accompanied by the bitterness caused by too many violations. The revolting policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a confirmation of grave breaches of humanitarian law, the very embodiment of hatred and rejection. As for genocide, it should be considered as a threat to international peace and security24 — another century of megadeath is totally unnecessary.25

The period of applicability of humanitarian rules is also subject to change. Often, the actual hostilities are brief, and a lightning war gives way to a long period that no longer belongs to war, but is not yet peace. During this period, which may last for several years, victims remain: prisoners remain in detention years after the cessation of hostilities (as was the case in the Western Sahara, in the Iraq-Iran conflict, and the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait), and civilian populations come under attack or remain under military occupation.

At the end of hostilities, the accumulation of unsolved humanitarian questions often constitutes an additional obstacle to successful peace negotiations. Humanitarian questions are mentioned more and more frequently in Security Council resolutions. Such was the case in the Arab-Israeli conflicts, in Lebanon, in Yugoslavia, and in Somalia. The question of the repatriation of prisoners of war between Iran and Iraq was referred to on two occasions in Security Council resolutions:
  • Paragraph 4 of Resolution 582 (1986), after an appeal for an immediate ceasefire, reads: "Urges that a comprehensive exchange of prisoners of war be completed within a short period after the cessation of hostilities in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross."

  • Paragraph 3 of Resolution 598 (1987), after paragraphs demanding that a ceasefire is observed and requesting the Secretary-General of the UN to dispatch a team of observers, reads: "Urges that prisoners of war be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949."
Many of those prisoners had not been registered, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was unable to visit them under the arrangements provided for by the Third Convention. A persistent obstacle to their repatriation was the insistence by certain parties on prior settlement of other (military and political) points in the negotiations. The ICRC nevertheless considered that the conditions for complete repatriation of all these prisoners were fulfilled, pursuant to Article 118 of the Third Convention, which clearly stipulates that, "[p]risoners of war shall be repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities."

Humanitarian law lies at the heart of peace, focusing as much on maintaining peace as on restoring it. Breaches of humanitarian law aggravate and prolong conflicts while application of the law mitigates and shortens conflicts.

The role of humanitarian law in maintaining peace is clear from the fact that many conflicts, both internal and international, have been sparked by serious violations of humanitarian law. Massacres of civilian populations in the Middle East, Latin America, Indochina, and Europe inflamed hatred and passion rather than imposing fear and submission.26 Furthermore, breaches of humanitarian law have accounted for the spreading of conflicts. For example, refugees — victims of persecution in their homeland — may bring to neighbouring or more distant countries the violence to which they were subjected.

International humanitarian law prohibits population displacement during conflict, although this is frequently ignored. Article 3, common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol II of 1977, contains rules which, if respected, would significantly reduce the number of refugees, internally displaced persons, and victims in general.27 Respect for international humanitarian law would also imply the separation of combatants from civilians, disarming camps, careful placement of refugees, preventing combatants from using refugees for cover or aid supplies.28 Violations of these laws were at the root of Security Council resolutions asking for international armed interventions in Somalia in 1992 and, in Bosnia, the attacks against ‘safe areas’ and the shelling of Sarajevo led to NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force in 1995.29
 

BREACHES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW LEADING TO CONFLICTS

‘Pacification’ as an euphemism for genocide is the most extreme example of a breach of humanitarian law that leads to conflict, and is not only a question of terminology. History has demonstrated the illusory nature of the idea that a conflict may be shortened by resorting to torture or massacres, bombardments of civilian populations, or terrorist attacks against civilians. From World War II to this day, violations of humanitarian law have served merely to strengthen the adversary’s determination to resist. They also have severely undermined the legitimacy of that party to a conflict which condones inhumane practices. As Albert Camus wrote during the Algerian War, one should be watchful "to fight for a truth without destroying it by the very means used to defend it."30

Using the fate of prisoners of war as a pawn in peace negotiations, as was done at the end of the October 1973 war between Israel and Syria (the October/Yom Kippur War), is a serious abuse that has proved to be counterproductive in both the short and the long term. As the ICRC stated in December 1973: "The commitments arising out of the Geneva Conventions are of a binding and absolute nature. Under those commitments, each State unilaterally undertakes, vis-à-vis all other States, without any reciprocal return, to respect in all circumstances the rules and principles they have recognised as vital. These do not involve an interchange of benefits but constitute a fundamental charter that proclaims to the world the essential guarantees to which every human being is entitled."31

Breaches of humanitarian law leave lasting and often serious after-effects, which hinder the return to civil and international peace, as has been witnessed during the American Civil War, on the Eastern Front in World War II, between Japanese and Chinese, and in the Middle East.

Humanitarian issues that are not resolved during the conflict often handicap the restoration of peace between former adversaries: only when these are settled, can normal political and economic relations be resumed, sometimes many years after the cessation of hostilities. The issues of mistreatment of prisoners of war (POWs), persons missing in action (MIAs), and several thousand Eurasian children, and the case of former ‘re-education camp detainees’, paralysed the relations between the United States and Vietnam for some twenty years after the end of the war.

The role of humanitarian law in restoring peace is twofold. It opens the possibility of dialogue, thus averting degradation by excessive violence both between international adversaries and among one’s own population. It also aims to solve humanitarian problems: refugees, prisoners, disappeared and those missing in action that can become serious political issues, and can hamper the establishment of long term peace.

USING HUMANITARIAN LAW TO SHORTEN CONFLICTS

Well before the first signs of political negotiation, humanitarian gestures help to informally institute a minimum of dialogue between adversaries. Such dialogue may result in ceasefires, often tacit, between enemy positions to evacuate the dead and wounded; truces to let civilians out or supply them with food and medicines; or contacts to exchange news of the latest captures or even to exchange prisoners. A humanitarian truce may lead to a complete halt in the fighting. In Santo Domingo in 1965, for instance, the joint efforts of the ICRC delegate, the president of the local Red Cross, and representatives of the UN and of the Organization of American States (OAS) succeeded in halting the fighting for twenty-four hours in order to collect the wounded; during that time negotiations were held that put a final end to the armed clashes.

Humanitarian clauses are the first ones which adversaries wish to negotiate. For example, the provisional government of Algeria sought first of all to negotiate a ‘special agreement’ with the French government, under Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and then, after Paris refused, initiated the procedure for accession to the Four 1949 Geneva Conventions.32 In 1984, in La Palma, El Salvador, the first item in the negotiations between the government and the guerrillas was to humanise the war. The first contacts between Soviet representatives and mujahideens in Afghanistan dealt with the plight of prisoners of war. The first talks between various warring factions in the former Yugoslavia, held in Geneva in 1991 under the auspices of the ICRC, focused on humanitarian issues (exchanges of prisoners and relief supplies to civilians).

The treatment of prisoners plays an important role in the return to peace, as does the treatment of civilian populations. Repatriation of refugees is an essential component in the restoration of peace, but is exceedingly difficult if villages have been razed, and roads and fields strewn with mines. The issue remains relevant today for hundreds of thousands of Afghan, Angolan, Burundian, Cambodian, Mozambican and Rwandan civilians. Anti-personnel mines continue to kill and maim thousands of innocent civilians every year, and especially refugees and internally displaced persons. Mines are not only a cause of displacement, they also constitute one of the chief obstacles to the return of populations once the fighting is over.

In non-international conflicts, amnesty corresponds to an essential feature of POW status, namely, impunity for participation in the hostilities. It may also be a powerful means of relieving antagonism; a measure of national reconciliation following a crisis; or a political solution to a crisis, to encourage partisans of armed struggle to turn (or return) to democratic forms of political struggle.33 It is, indeed, with this in mind that Article 6, paragraph 5, of Additional Protocol II of 1977 invites governments "to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict." The object of this provision, according to the ICRC commentary on Protocol II, "is to encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to re-establishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided."34

The same question also arises at the international level: should one prolong hatred and punish criminals (on the losing side), or wipe the slate clean and decree, as in the Treaty of Nimeguen of 1678, an official "act of forgetting?"35 Today, the question of whether priority should be given to pardon or to criminal prosecution is still a subject of negotiations. When Bangladesh was created after a war between India and Pakistan, criminal proceedings against 195 Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian detainees held for violations of humanitarian law (accusations of genocide) were curtailed: Pakistan made the full repatriation of all prisoners a condition for peace negotiations. The matter was brought before the International Court of Justice by Pakistan, and later, with the agreement of the parties involved, was struck from the register.36 The provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions — reaffirmed in 1977 — would no doubt be sufficient to punish the violations that still occur in many conflicts. Actual prosecutions have been rare and unilateral events. Nevertheless, governments party to the 1949 Conventions (practically all members of the UN) should not too easily escape their responsibility to prosecute violators of humanitarian law: the preventive role of the effective use of the universal jurisdiction provided for in the 1949 Geneva Conventions for all states party could contribute not only to justice but also to peace. The experiences of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda have proved constructive in many respects, despite the difficulties encountered,37 and will undoubtedly be of valuable assistance in setting up the newly created international criminal court.38

HUMANITARIAN LAW: A SUM OF EXPERIENCES

Humanitarian law is a sum of real-life experiences. It is based on warnings against the destructions of war, and advice on how to overcome difficult choices and avoid tragedies that have become increasingly deadly as modern means of destruction have become more powerful and the number of protagonists has grown. One should use the dynamic role of humanitarian action to disarm the adversary, or, in the words of Sun Tzu, "build a golden bridge to the retreating enemy."39 The military, political, and economic effectiveness of humanitarian behaviour should be constantly emphasised, in the hope that we may finally move on from chaos to peace, from internecine strife to dialogue. Octavio Paz writes: "Hölderlin sees history as a dialogue. Yet that dialogue has always been interrupted by the sound of violence or the monologue of chiefs. Violence exacerbates differences and prevents us from talking and listening. Monologue is the negation of others; dialogue does of course maintain differences, but it provides an area within which alternatives coexist and become interleaved. To establish such a dialogue, we have to affirm what we are while at the same time recognising others and their inherent differences. Dialogue prevents us from denying ourselves and from denying the humanity of our adversaries."40

The letter of humanitarian law is essential. It must, however, be applied in the proper spirit: for the benefit of victims, rather than to serve transient interests. It is not only legal experts who can understand humanitarian law; every human being is capable of grasping its fundamental principles. Pierre Boissier, founder of the Henry-Dunant Institute, used the following method in training new ICRC delegates in the Geneva Conventions: he gave his students a blank page and asked them to re-write in their own words the essence of the four conventions, placing themselves, in turn, in the position of the wounded (First Convention), the shipwrecked (Second Convention), prisoners of war (Third Convention), civilians in an occupied territory (Fourth Convention), and enemy forces. This powerful ploy brought out the essential provisions of instruments that seem at first sight extremely complex and difficult, but then, as individuals respond to vital requirements, are easily understood.

Humanitarian law has evolved from a law protecting only certain categories of individuals (from medieval knights to today’s prisoners of war), to a set of provisions ensuring fundamental human rights guaranteeing the survival of civilian populations in wartime.

Humanitarian instruments in force form part of international law and are interlinked with the system of international security, whether for arms control or for peaceful settlement of conflicts. They still have to be replaced in the general context of the development of co-operative relations at the political and economic levels.

Humanitarian action cannot be confined to exceptional or emergency situations. Different actors (individuals, organisations, and governments) will be involved in different situations, each most effective in one particular sphere of activity. According to international humanitarian law, the ICRC plays the unique role of neutral intermediary between parties to the conflict: "through humanity to peace" could be the motto of the ICRC in many operations today.

Nevertheless, no-one should lose sight of the problem as a whole and, in particular, of how their actions are interrelated with those of others.41 At the same time, implementing humanitarian law facilitates a return to peace and the reconstruction of a country, and emergency relief organisations (like the ICRC) will give way to development organisations (such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and others, including the other components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement42 and the increasing role of non-governmental organisations, on the national and international level).

The fundamentals of humanitarian law may be thought of as forming part of a wheel of co-operation,43 responsibility44 and accountability:45
  • the initial stage is the emergency situation, in which survival is paramount;

  • reconstruction and development follow;

  • then, the building and maintaining of a balanced, sustainable economy;

  • the next stage is the pursuit of peace, with efforts such as those of the UN and regional and subregional organisations;

  • legal mechanisms follow for the settlement of conflicts, in the form of international treaties and national constitutions; and

  • the final stage is the attainment of the ideals of humankind.46
The fundamental principles of the Red Cross, namely, humanity, universality, neutrality, independence, service, unity and impartiality could provide useful guidelines for other organisations engaged in humanitarian action.

Humanitarian law and its principles thus form part of a chain of solidarity: at the height of a conflict, with the necessary support of other political and economic measures (military peacekeeping and peacemaking measures should normally be kept separate from humanitarian activities — at least humanitarian activities by non-UN organisations, especially the ICRC) and efforts to mobilise public awareness, they often constitute a vital link that contributes to the restoration of peace. As President Abraham Lincoln asked, "Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?"47

ENDNOTES

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
  1. The normal state of human relations between communities and within a single community, is peace. Humanitarian law does not contradict this rule, but confirms it; this is borne out by the Preamble to Additional Protocol I of 1977.

  2. W Broyles Jr, Brothers in Arms: A Journey from War to Peace, Knopf, New York, 1986. Broyles writes: "To transform ordinary men into warriors requires that they give up a piece of their civilised selves, that they develop the ability to see other men and women as abstractions, as enemies to be killed. That powerful idea is easy to learn and hard to forget. But the idea of the enemy, so fundamental in the heat of war, is always temporary. Wars end. No enemy is an enemy forever. We have made our peace with the British, the Germans, the Japanese; we have brought the North and the South of our own Civil War together. We will be reconciled with the Vietnamese. As my former enemies said, the past is the past. We all did our duty, most of us honourably. Life goes on. The war is over."

  3. The principle of the limitation of armed violence is reflected in contemporary written law, in the Saint-Petersburg Declaration of 1868, as well as in Article 22 of The Hague Regulations of 1907, which stipulates that, "[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." This text is taken up again, slightly reworded, in paragraph 1 of Article 35 (Basic rules) of Additional Protocol I of 1977: "In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited."
  4. See P Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, Random House, New York, 1993, p. 130

  5. Z Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, Scribners, New York, 1993, p. xv; also: Carnegie Commission, Preventing Deadly Conflict: The Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, December 1997, p. 257; and B Lown, Clearing the Debris: The Atomic Age at 50, Technology Review, 18 August 1995.

  6. E Fromm, You Shall Be As Gods, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966.

  7. See the excellent collection of essays, UNESCO, International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, UNESCO, the ICRC and the Henry-Dunant Institute, Paris, 1986 (French and English).

  8. See G Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1980, p. 400

  9. Another translation reads: "No State shall, during War, permit such Acts of Hostility which would make mutual Confidence in the subsequent Peace impossible: such are the employment of assassins (‘percussores’), poisoners (‘venefici’), breach of Capitulation, and Incitement to Treason (‘perduellio’) in the opposing State", <www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>

  10. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949.

  11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).

  12. Humanitarian law may be defined as the principles and rules restricting the use of violence in armed conflicts in order to spare the persons who are not (or are no longer) directly engaged in the hostilities (civilians, wounded and sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war), and to limit the use of methods and means of warfare of such a nature that would cause superfluous injury (or excessive suffering, as in the case of ‘dumdum bullets’, or with gas warfare), or which could cause severe damage to the natural environment or betray an adversary’s confidence in agreed-upon obligations (‘perfidy’).

  13. The protection of cultural objects, essentially set out in the Convention of The Hague of 14 May 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, is reaffirmed in Article 53 (Protection of cultural objects and places of worship) of Protocol 1 of 1977 and Article 16 of Protocol II. See S E Nahlik, Protection of Cultural Property, International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, pp. 203-215.

  14. An article in each of the two Additional Protocols of 1977 is devoted to the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (Protocol I, Article 43; Protocol II, Article 14). The protection afforded to medical units, in particular civilian ones, was substantially extended by Protocol I (the main points being reaffirmed in Article 11 of Protocol II): Article 8 (Terminology), subparagraph e), defines ‘medical units’; — Articles 12, 13 and 14 describe the protection afforded, and its limits.

  15. The prohibition of attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces (dykes, dams, nuclear electrical generating stations) is also set out in the two protocols of 1977 (Protocol I, Article 56; Protocol II, Article 15).

  16. The causing of widespread, long term and severe damage to the natural environment, thereby prejudicing the health or survival of the population, is outlawed in Article 55 of Protocol I and in the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 10 December 1976. In this regard, see G Herczegh, La protection de l’environnement naturel et le droit humanitaire, and A Kiss, Les Protocoles additionels aux Conventions de Genève de 1977 et la protection des biens de l’environnement, in C Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles, Marthinus Nijhoff and the International Committee of the Red Cross, The Hague/ Geneva, 1984.

  17. See H Meyrowitz, Réflexions sur le fondement du droit de la guerre, in Swinarski, ibid., pp. 419-431; M Veuthey, Le droit à la survie, fondement du droit international humanitaire, in Essais sur le concept de ‘Droit de Vivre’ en mémoire de Yougindra Khushalani, Bruylant, Brussels, 1988, pp. 233-249.

  18. D Bindschedler-Robert, A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflicts, Report to the Conference on the Law of Armed Conflict, Carnegie Endowment, Geneva, 15-20 September 1969, p. 61.

  19. S Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections on the Hostile Imagination — The Psychology of Enmity, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1986, p. 181.

  20. See I W Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, p. 301.

  21. See R Fox, On the Age of Postmodern War: Beyond Clausewitz — The Long and Ragged Conflicts of the Coming Millennium, The Times Literary Supplement, 15 May 1998.

  22. As Martin van Crefeld puts it: "Once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the State, is wrestled out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will break down"; M van Crefeld, The Transformation of War, Free Press, New York, 1991.

  23. 1949 Geneva Convention, Article 1.

  24. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Thirty-eighth session, Item 7 of the provisional agenda, Gross Violations of Human Rights and International Peace, E/CN. 4 /Sub. 2 /1985 /11, 25 June 1985, paragraph 18: "Genocide, the most extreme form of discrimination and massive disregard of the right to life, recognised as a crime against humanity, was considered as a major threat to international peace and security."
  25. Brzezinski, op. cit., Chapter One: The Century of Megadeath.

  26. During the Spanish Civil War, the bombings of Madrid, aimed at the civilian population from October to December 1936, were abandoned because they failed to have the expected effect of terror, thereby confirming what had already been observed during the Sino-Japanese war: far from weakening a people’s morale, such operations, which are condemned by international law, inspire fierce hatred, bringing the will to resist to a climax; see E Wanty, L’Art de la guerre, Volume 2, Verviers, 1967, p .279; Article 17, Protocol II of 1977 (Prohibition of forced movement of civilians).

  27. Protocol II, ibid.

  28. B Barber, Feeding Refugees, or War? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid, Foreign Affairs, 76(4), July/August 1997.

  29. A Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a Policy Vacuum, Adelphi Paper 305, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 96. As for Somalia, see Security Council Resolution S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992, especially paragraphs 4 and 5 and this preambular paragraph: "Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security."

  30. Se battre pour une vérité en veillant à ne pas la tuer des armes mêmes dont on la défend, Actuelles, III, Chroniques algériennes 1939-1958, Paris, 1958, p. 24.

  31. See The International Committee’s Action in the Middle East, International Review of the Red Cross, December 1973, p. 641.

  32. See M Bedjaoui, La Révolution algérienne et le droit, Editions de l’Association des juristes démocrates, Brussels, 1961.

  33. L Joinet, Study on Amnesty Laws and Their Role in the Safeguard and Promotion of Human Rights, Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Commission, E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1984/15, paragraph 30.

  34. S Junod, Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), ICRC, Geneva, 1987, p. 1402, paragraph 4618.

  35. A M de Zayas, gives this example in his article Amnesty Clause, in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 3, 1982, p. 15; he also quotes Article 2 of the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, Article 2 of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748, Article 2 of the Treaty of Paris of 1763, Article 2 of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, Article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814, and the mutual amnesties concluded between France and Algeria in the Evian Agreement of 19 March 1962.

  36. Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War, Order of 15 December 1973, ICJ Reports, 1973, p. 347.

  37. See P Tavernier, The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, International Review of the Red Cross, 1 November 1997; also G Erasmus & N Fourie, The International Criminal Tribune for Rwanda: Are all Issues addressed? How does it compare to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission?, International Review of the Red Cross, 321, pp. 705-715.

  38. See the website of the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court, <www.igc.apc. org/tribunal/>

  39. See S Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, II.19. "Treat the captives well, and care for them" (III.1); "Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this" (III.2); "To capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them."

  40. O Paz, Tiempo Nublado, One Earth, Four or Five Worlds: Reflections on Contemporary History, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, 1985.

  41. For instance, decisions by the International Monetary Fund, a typical ‘peace’ organisation, may have caused riots or even civil war in some developing countries.

  42. See Resolution 8 (Peace, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights) of the Council of Delegates, Seville, 25-27 November 1997.

  43. F Grünewald, From Prevention to Rehabilitation: Action Before, During and After the Crisis — The Experience of the ICRC in Retrospect, article based on a study presented to the Colloquium: Emergency — Rehabilitation — Development, Arche de la Fraternité, Paris, 17 November 1994; published in International Review of the Red Cross, 306, pp. 263-281.

  44. P Fuchs, Conflict and the Global Economy: Towards a New Sharing of Responsibility, Director General, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Hôtel Baur en Ville, Zurich, 29 February 1996.

  45. See Article 1, Common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions: "the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for this Convention in all circumstances."

  46. These ideals could be social, political and/or spiritual and should not divide but unite. See B Griffiths, Return to the Center, Tempelgate, Springfield, Illinois, 1977, p. 71: "I have to be a Hindu, a Buddhist, a Jain, a Parsee, a Sikh, a Muslim, and a Jew, as well as a Christian, if I am to know the Truth and to find the point of reconciliation in all religion." Hans Küng also considers that international peace presupposes peace between religions. See H Küng, Projekt Weltethos, Piper, München, 1990, p. 191 and H Küng (ed.), Ja zum Weltethos: Perspektiven für den Such nach Orientierung (Global Responsibility. In Search of a New World Ethic), Piper, München, 1995, and his statement on the Declaration Towards a Global Ethic on <kvc.kit.nl/kvc/ukverslag_kung.html> as "a minimal basis consensus relating to binding values, irrevocable standards and moral attitudes, which can be affirmed by all religions despite their ‘dogmatic’ differences and can also be supported by non-believers ... A better world order will ultimately only be created on the basis of — common visions, ideals, values, aims and criteria; — heightened global responsibility on the part of peoples and their leaders; — a new binding and uniting ethic for all humankind, including states and those in power, which embraces cultures and religions. No new world order without a new world ethic, a global ethic."

  47. Quoted in M L King Jr, Strength to Love, North Light Books, Cleveland, 1963, p. 53. See also this quote by Martin Luther King: "The chain reaction of evil — hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars — must be broken, or we shall be plunged into the dark abyss of annihilation. Far from being the pious injunction of an utopian dreamer, the command to love one’s enemy is an absolute necessity for our survival..." (p. 27).