|
Africa Watch
A Large Peace of Africa?
When Laurent Kabila came to power in May 1997 — in what he chose to call the Democratic Republic of Congo — he did so not as the leader of a genuine Congolese rebellion, but as the local frontman for what was essentially a foreign legion.
In September 1996, Banyamulenge (Zairian Tutsi) rebels, many of whom had served with their kinsmen in the Rwandan army, were prompted by Zairian persecution (and their foreign backers’ anticipation of an increase in Hutu militia and former Rwandan army attacks from their bases in the refugee camps of Eastern Zaire) to launch a counter-strike, partly retaliatory but in the main pre-emptive. The essential aim of this military operation, carried out with the support and direct participation of Rwanda, Burundi and later Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, was to dislodge the massive refugee settlements and thus dislocate the military preparations of the exiled Hutus. In Uganda’s case, the motive was to disrupt the logistical co-operation offered to Sudan in its support for insurgent groups such as the West Bank Nile Front, Lord’s Resistance Army and Tabliq militia, which continued to torment north-east Uganda.
This originally limited operation extended itself by default as the rebel forces discovered that Mobutu’s state was so rotten that few could be found to defend it with their lives. Indeed, much of the defence of Zaire was undertaken by forces loaned by UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi, who had a direct interest in succouring his old ally. By the same token, Angolan government forces intervened in the west of the country to ensure the rebel’s victorious advance on Kinshasa.
Once in power, Kabila found himself in a quandary. The Banyamulenge-dominated People’s Democratic Alliance, which formed the bulk of his fighting forces, was generally unpopular outside of Kivu. Yet its importance within Kabila’s overarching Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces (AFDL) made it essential for its leaders to be appointed to prominent positions in the new government, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paul Karaha) and of Presidential Affairs (Deogratias Bugera). From these positions of strength, and with the tacit support of the Rwandan officers brought in to train and command a reformed army, the Tutsi faction was able to obstruct any tendency to broaden the political support base of the new regime. This was widely resented, particularly in Katanga, which had also made a significant contribution to Kabila’s success.
Perhaps even more threatening to Kabila than his failure to secure wider support from established political figures elsewhere in the country, was his gradual alienation of key sponsors. Uganda was upset by his apparently cordial relations with Sudan and, together with Rwanda, became increasingly critical of his inability to carry out his part of the pact by preventing rebel incursions through the Kivu and Haut-Zaire regions. From a greater distance, the the United States, which had welcomed the fall of Mobutu as the cementing of the alliance between the ‘Renaissance states’ arrayed against Khartoum, expressed grave reservations about Kabila’s commitment to a democratic transition and, more particularly, to his obstruction of United Nations’ investigations into the fate of the thousands of Hutu refugees who had disappeared in the course of his advance across the country. This was rather disingenuous, since the removal of these refugees, by whatever means, had been key to the overall plan, and had been executed in large part by the Rwandans and the Banyamulenge. This should have been obvious to Washington, which had observed the campaign at close quarters.
The deterioration of Kabila’s relations with Rwanda and Uganda, and pressures from other elements within the AFDL, persuaded him that his excessive reliance on the Tutsi, whether of Congolese or Rwandan origin, was unwise. Indeed, he appears to have realised that a plot may have been afoot to replace him at the head of affairs. Kabila ordered Rwandan troops to leave the country and began a purge of the army command, to reduce Banyamulenge influence. At this point, Karaha and Bugera left the country, the former soon to join a rebellion initiated by Banyamulenge-dominated regiments in Kivu on 2 August.
Initially, it appeared that the rebellion might repeat the pattern established by the 1996-97 insurgency, with rebel forces advancing across the country from their bases in the east. In a bold move, however, the rebel alliance flew troops across the country to the western seaboard, where they recruited the assistance of a number of soldiers of Mobutu’s old army, encamped at Kitona and awaiting integration in the new Congolese army. Thus reinforced, they quickly seized Muanda and the port of Banana before moving on Matadi, the river port supplying Kinshasa. In the east, rebel forces quickly established a hold on Goma and Bukavu before advancing on Kisangani, the country’s third largest city.
Faced with a rapidly deteriorating military situation, Laurent Kabila denounced the rebellion as an invasion by Uganda and Rwanda, and sought to mobilise the Congolese around an anti-Tutsi banner. Having failed to establish a broad national following, this tactic was his only means to secure his short-term survival, even though its consequences have still to be reckoned in terms of lives and its impact on recreating the country as an entity. He also appealed to other members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to come to the assistance of a fellow SADC state under external threat.
On 7-8 August, President Mugabe convened a regional summit at the Victoria Falls to discuss the Congo crisis. The presidents of Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, Zambia and the DRC attended. South Africa was not invited, though the South African Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister had a brief meeting with Kabila before he left Lubumbashi for the meeting. Little emerged from the summit, however, beyond the airing of mutual recriminations.
On 12-13 August, the SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) held its monthly meeting in Lusaka. Angola, Zimbabwe, the DRC, Lesotho, Seychelles and Mauritius failed to send delegates. The absence of the first three made it virtually impossible seriously to address the Congo crisis, which had taken a further turn as rebels seized the port of Matadi and the Inga hydroelectric scheme, whence they could control the supply of power to much of the country, including the capital. From here they continued their advance towards Kinshasa, gaining the support of a number of government troops on the way. After a brief delay in taking the heavily fortified base at Mbanza Ngungu, they proceeded with their advance along the road to Kinshasa.
On 17-18 August, the defence ministers of Angola, Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe met in Harare, agreeing that the government of Laurent Kabila would require the full support of SADC to guarantee its survival. Mugabe, speaking in his capacity as head of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security announced that the meeting had agreed that military aid should be sent to secure Kabila’s position. The distance between Pretoria and Harare over the crisis now started to widen, with Mugabe arguing that his meeting had mandated an intervention under SADC auspices. The South African government denied that he had the authority to do this, more particularly since President Mandela was the chairperson of SADC and the SADC Organ was in limbo until its mandate had been discussed and approved by the leaders of the region — which was expected to occur at the forthcoming summit in Mauritius.
A bitter war of words broke out between South Africa and Zimbabwe, as the latter dispatched troops to help with Kabila’s defence, assisted by Angola, which also inserted forces from the Cabinda enclave. The Angolans reoccupied Muanda and Banana with little effort, but bumped into some unexpected resistance from the ‘rebel’ forces at Kitona, and suffered substantial losses before the defenders broke off contact and made their way unmolested to Matadi to join the rebel rearguard. As the threat to Kinshasa became increasingly evident, foreign governments made arrangements to evacuate their nationals. In the east, the towns of Bunia and Kisangani fell to the rebel alliance.
On 22-23 August, President Mandela called two emergency summits in Pretoria to seek an end to the fighting. The first of these was attended by representatives of Kabila’s government and by the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda. The second meeting was attended by representatives of twelve of the fourteen SADC states and by the presidents of Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya. Neither Kabila nor Mugabe attended, the latter dismissing the summit as superfluous since, by his account, the organisation had already made its decision. The Pretoria summit mandated President Mandela to seek an immediate cease-fire and the halting of military movements, to be followed by political negotiations.
On 26 August, the rebel forces made their first attempt to probe Kinshasa’s defences from the south-west. Defensive artillery fire caused a substantial number of casualties among the civilian population in the sprawling informal settlements around the city, setting a pattern that was to be repeated throughout the battle for the capital. The following day, the axis of the rebel penetration into Kinshasa shifted to the north-east, with more Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian forces committed to the defence of the city and its airport. This deployment proved crucial in warding off the rebel offensive in the west, causing the rebel forces to withdraw, some across the river to Congo-Brazzaville, others to the area south-west of the capital, where they continued to interdict military traffic. Angolan forces now advanced to secure the port of Matadi and the Inga dam, unhindered by the withdrawing rebels. At Matadi, they crossed the bridge to the south, establishing a route to the Angolan mainland.
Under these circumstances, the Durban summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was awaited with keen anticipation. Prior to the summit in Durban, there were many who speculated that President Mandela’s peace efforts were doomed to failure. Nevertheless, there were clear indications that Mugabe was eager to find a way of extricating himself from the conflict as soon as possible, despite his very public disagreement with South Africa. If he could declare victory in Kinshasa, it might provide him with the opportunity to withdraw and save face while there was a lull in the fighting as the rebels regrouped and re-equipped in Congo-Brazzaville.
While there could be no guarantee of diplomatic success, it seemed that the long-term military situation in which Kabila found himself, propped up by foreign allies whose commitment to his personal cause could not be assumed, might persuade him to negotiate a settlement while the opportunity offered itself. As was to prove so often the case throughout the conflict, however, Kabila was quite capable of making decisions which, in a cooler light, appear irrational. What happened at this juncture was that Kabila announced on 30 August that he was launching a counter-offensive to dislodge the rebels from their gains in the east.
On 31 August, the UN Security Council issued a statement calling for a cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the opening of political dialogue towards national reconciliation. It supported the territorial integrity of the Congo and all regional diplomatic efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement. It also repeated an earlier call for an international conference on peace, security and development in the region, to be held under the auspices of the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
According to the statement, "[t]he problems of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must be solved on the basis of a process of all-inclusive national reconciliation which fully respects the equality and harmony of all ethnic groups, and which leads to the holding of democratic, free and fair elections as soon as possible."
This resolution seemed to echo President Mandela’s position, as endorsed by the majority of SADC states at the Pretoria meeting. The rebel alliance had also played itself on-side by supporting the call for a cease-fire and the need for a negotiated political solution to the Congo’s problems.
The question now became the sustainability of Angola and Zimbabwe’s military support for Kabila. Angolan losses at Kitona had been substantial, and the government’s forces were expected to be fully occupied soon with UNITA, which had been expelled from the government of national unity. By handing over the town of Matadi and the Inga complex without a fight, the rebels also signalled that they sought no argument with Luanda, and may have expected a measure of reciprocity.
Uganda and Rwanda, on the other hand, were able to some extent to count on the indirect backing, military and financial, of the US, especially now that the latter’s campaign against Sudan had taken a new turn following the embassy bombings in East Africa.
Contrary to expectations, the presidents of Angola and Zimbabwe arrived at the NAM summit in Durban. President Nujoma of Namibia was also present. Although the DRC delegation rejected any idea of a cease-fire prior to the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces from its territory, and condemned South Africa as being a secondary protagonist in the conflict, Kabila indicated that he might be willing to attend the summit to discuss specific points.
At this stage, Angola appeared far more eager to see some sort of cease-fire, claiming that the objective of preventing the overthrow of a recognised government by rebel forces had now been achieved. Angolan officials said that they were confident that a cease-fire could be put in place quickly, a view that seemed directly to contradict Kabila’s statement that his planned counter-offensive in the east enjoyed the support of his allies. An Angolan spokesman said that the talks should be based "on a certain number of accepted principles, such as recognition of the authority in place in Kinshasa, which should commit itself to representivity for the Banyamulenge people and settle the question of their citizenship." This implied a rejection of the depiction of the Banyamulenge as foreigners, a keystone of Kabila’s hate campaign.
The Zimbabwean government also had domestic problems that complicated its commitment to Kabila’s defence. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) indicated that it would proceed with its long standing threat of a five-day national strike unless the government agreed to withdraw a number of new taxes. The Secretary-General of the ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai, had emerged over the previous eighteen months as the most powerful of Mugabe’s domestic critics, though he had yet to declare any personal political ambitions. Tsvangirai also headed a forum of civil society organisations opposed to the Congo adventure, which was seen as worsening the country’s economic position and further driving down living standards in Zimbabwe.
In a development that appeared to reflect another grave miscalculation on the part of Laurent Kabila, the Sudanese pro-government newspaper Al Rai al-Aam claimed that he had secretly visited Khartoum following his visit to Harare. Kabila evidently held several hours of talks on the regional situation with his Sudanese counterpart.
Even as meetings were being held on the sidelines of the NAM summit, a military meeting in Luanda was discussing the modalities of further support for Kabila. Recommendations were to be forwarded to the respective political leaders of the countries involved. There were indications that the military chiefs of Angola and Zimbabwe were both seeking permission to withdraw from the DRC in the light of the strains placed upon their countries by continued operations. Their feeling was that, with Kinshasa reasonably secure, they could make a dignified exit, leaving the politicians to negotiate an end to hostilities.
But Thursday 3 September was to provide one of the great surprises in the diplomacy surrounding the Congo crisis. President Mandela suddenly announced at a press conference that SADC unanimously supported the military intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. "It is quite reasonable when the legitimate head of a government of a country says: ‘I have been invaded by a foreign force. Come and help me defend my country ...’ for the neighbouring country to respond positively." Mandela’s explanation for this potentially embarrassing volte face was less than convincing: "There was some confusion before. But once Sam Nujoma gave me this explanation and he repeated it in the summit, we unanimously supported that initiative and expressly acknowledged President Kabila as the legitimate head of that government. There is no difference whatsoever on this point now that explanations have been given." Since any serious observer of the Central African scene had been aware from the beginning of August that Rwandan and Ugandan troops were on Congolese soil, it seems astonishing that Mandela had to await this enlightenment from President Nujoma. A more charitable interpretation would see Mandela’s statement as a selfless effort to launch the peace process more broadly, albeit in uncertain hands. So surprising was Mandela’s intervention that there was some speculation that South Africa was genuinely concerned that Mugabe’s continued commitment in the Congo could destabilise Zimbabwe.
President Mugabe should have been delighted to seize the generous opportunity afforded him to extricate himself from the military morass of the Congo and to seek relief from the domestic political pressures that had been mounting throughout the crisis. Declaring that the military aims of the intervention had been achieved, Mugabe said that the time had come for the region to work together for peace: "We will advise President Kabila to put forward a political programme which will enable all shades of opinion to be accommodated." He also announced that he would host a meeting at the Victoria Falls on 6-7 September between the rebels and their backers, and Kabila and his allies. The meeting would focus on ways of "bringing about a peace that provides for how prisoners will be handled, the withdrawal and the return of displaced people." This would then provide the basis for all inclusive elections.
Though Wamba dia Wamba expressed the rebels’ surprise at Mandela’s radical change of position, he claimed that this had not weakened their resolve to see Kabila removed from power. Yet there could be no denying that Mugabe emerged reinvigorated from a potential diplomatic disaster in a way that even he could not have expected. Conversely, it was difficult to see what South Africa could salvage of its regional diplomatic credibility after President Mandela’s remarkable performance in Durban. As far as a leadership role in Southern Africa is concerned, it was as if Pretoria has signalled its willingness to leave this to the region’s ‘life presidents’.
In terms of the DRC’s future, a great deal now hinged upon the course and outcome of negotiations. There was little to suggest that Kabila had the flexibility or subtlety to make the most of a fundamentally weak position, in that he still had no positive domestic support base. What he had managed to do, is whip up anti-Tutsi xenophobia to a dangerous degree, but that was another matter altogether. He was still dependent on the support of external forces to maintain him in power.
Logic suggested that Angola and Zimbabwe would seek a ‘settlement’ at the talks, sufficient to allow them to depart and that Rwanda might well agree to permit this development. Once this had occurred, the rebellion could enter a second phase, with every chance of success.
President Mugabe said that the Victoria Falls meeting would aim at creating the conditions for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country. It would not attempt to resolve the political difficulties underlying the rebellion. A Zimbabwean government official said that people should not be under the illusion that the meeting would discuss the politics of the DRC, which was a matter for the Congolese people themselves.
The early news emanating from the Victoria Falls talks was very upbeat. President Chiluba emerged with the announcement that a cease-fire was about to be signed, yet the following day the talks ended disastrously. No agreement was signed and at the conclusion of the summit a vague communiqué was issued. It mentioned a commitment to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the DRC; the need for any settlement to take account of the legitimate security concerns of the DRC’s neighbours; and the decision to convene a meeting of the participants’ defence ministers in Addis Ababa on Thursday, 10 September to work out the modalities of a cease-fire and troop withdrawal. An obvious point to make was that there was, as yet, little prospect of a cease-fire being agreed to by all parties.
Disaster was virtually guaranteed by the way in which the rebel delegation was handled. This group was headed by Arthur Z’Ahidi Ngoma, the movement’s deputy-president, and also included Emile Ilunga, a former ally of Kabila whose Katangese supporters had played a major role in overthrowing Mobutu. Arriving late as a result of engine problems, the rebel delegation was held up for three hours before being escorted under guard to a small room in the hotel where the talks were taking place. The only contact they had with the delegates was when they were visited by the Secretary General of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim and President Chiluba, who said they would convey the rebel viewpoint to the summit.
The rebel delegation was not even invited to sign the final communiqué. The rebels, while reiterating their commitment to a peaceful solution to the crisis, insisted that any cease-fire would be predicated upon the withdrawal of the foreign forces opposing them and the recognition that a new inclusive political dispensation had to be negotiated.
Even after the end of the talks, the DRC Foreign Minister, Jean-Charles Okoto, claimed that Rwanda and Uganda had committed additional forces to the conflict, a statement hardly calculated to build trust between the delegates in Addis. Rwandan spokesman, Joseph Bideri also said that "the rhetoric at the talks was characterized by old-fashioned, blatant lies." He added that the region’s leaders were "chasing a mirage because they had a golden opportunity" to hear the rebels’ case, and missed it. President Chiluba went as far as saying that the atmosphere at the talks had been charged and that the discussions were candid. His argument that the rebels had agreed to the principle of a cease-fire should have been read against the qualifications and conditions listed by the rebels’ spokesman, and appeared to be an attempt to salvage something of value from the wreckage.
As if the situation were not confused and complicated enough, there were well-sourced but unconfirmed reports that Sudan had deployed two battalions of troops into the DRC.
President Museveni now convened his parliamentary caucus to explain his actions with regard to the DRC. He told those present that he was not willing to leave the Congo until Kabila assured him that neither Ugandan rebels nor the Sudanese military would use DRC facilities against Uganda. For this reason, Ugandan troops had occupied the airfields in the border region.
Attention shifted to Addis Ababa and the meeting of defence ministers to discuss the modalities of a cease-fire, a monitoring mechanism and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. Following their departure from the Victoria Falls talks, the rebel delegation flew to Kigali for discussions with the Rwandan government and possibly with other elements currently in the city. The rebels’ disposition could hardly have been improved by revelations that Kabila tried to persuade President Mugabe to arrest them while they were in Zimbabwe.
On his return from Zimbabwe, Rwanda’s President Bizimungu expressed disappointment that those countries supporting Kabila had failed to understand the real issues, choosing instead to defend Kabila at all costs: "In the meantime, obstacles have emerged, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and even Zambia later affirmed that the conflict in Congo was not Congolese, that Congo was invaded, and therefore there should be no talks with the rebels." According to Bizimungu, this condition was imposed by the SADC states present as a condition for Rwanda’s participation.
On Thursday, 10 September, representatives of the six countries involved in the DRC conflict met in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the OAU to discuss three issues as mandated by the Victoria Falls talks:
- the modalities for an immediate cease-fire;
- the organisation of a cease-fire on the ground and its monitoring; and
- the withdrawal of foreign forces.
The meeting was chaired by Zambian Defence Minister, Chitalu Sampa. It was attended by the defence ministers of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, but only by junior ministers from Uganda and Rwanda, an ominous signal. The DRC government was represented by General Joseph Kabila, the Army Chief of Staff and Laurent’s son, and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Charles Okoto. The rebel alliance was not invited, a direct implication that Kabila’s allies still insisted on treating the root of the conflict as a foreign invasion.
Despite the obvious limitations built into this diplomatic enterprise, OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim, expressed optimism: "It is the expectation of the leaders that this meeting will agree on the conditions for a cease-fire among the parties in conflict through verifiable processes and modalities. In doing so it is also important to bear in mind that all the parties involved should agree to and observe the cease-fire."
Joseph Kabila’s statement to the press was a little more cautious: "I am optimistic there can be a positive outcome. If we don’t reach any agreement it is still positive that we have had the meeting."
Moven Mahachi, the Zimbabwean Defence Minister raised other issues, saying that Rwandan and Ugandan troops would have to leave before the Zimbabweans did. "Who came first must go first", he said. He explained the absence of a rebel delegation in terms of their absolute reliance on Uganda and Rwanda: "The rebels cannot operate without their backing. They have no logistics and no equipment." He also hinted that other African countries might send troops to aid Kabila, even though he did not name them.
The exclusion of the rebels obviously impaired the process, implying that Uganda and Rwanda would be required to admit that the war was essentially an invasion if any settlement or cease-fire was to be agreed. Rwanda remained adamant in its refusal to admit it had forces in the DRC. There were some indications at the Victoria Falls meeting of a slight rift opening between Kampala and Kigali, with the former most concerned to prevent Sudan and the rebel forces it supports from turning Uganda’s flank in the north-west. By drawing Sudan more clearly into the picture, however, Kabila complicated his chances of splitting the rebels’ allies.
According to reports in the Weekly Mail & Guardian, Uganda proposed a deal with Angola that if the latter withdrew its support for Kabila, Uganda would guarantee that UNITA would not be allowed to operate from Congolese territory. The offer was double-edged containing, as it did, the implied threat that if Angola continued to defend Kabila, UNITA would be permitted to use the DRC as a staging area — as, in fact it was already doing.
The three-day meeting of defence ministers and other representatives of the seven countries involved in the DRC conflict ended at 2:30 a.m. on 12 September with no agreement reached on the implementation of a cease-fire or the withdrawal of foreign troops.
Negotiations had continued in Addis Ababa on 11 September, but showed only a few signs of progress as the discussions centred on arguments about Rwanda’s presence in the DRC and the issue of whether the rebels should be allowed to attend the talks. Rwanda still refused to acknowledge the presence of its forces on Congolese soil, and Kabila’s allies declined demands by Rwanda and Uganda that the rebels should participate directly in the negotiations.
Diplomatic pressure was being exerted to have Rwanda follow Uganda’s lead and admit that its forces were in the DRC to protect Rwanda’s vital national interests. Without this admission, there could be no thought of a cease-fire. The head of the Rwandan delegation, however, remained obdurate, saying that the issue was a digression from the real problem: the internal political situation in the country.
By now it had become apparent that the ever widening circle of military involvement from other states in the region had created enough alarm for the participants to take the negotiations seriously and seize upon any chance of progress. Diplomatic sources claimed that all sides were moving towards the position that the rebels should be excluded from the negotiations at present, and that immediate attention should be given to the need for all the regional players to reduce their military intervention, before more direct clashes occurred between non-Congolese forces. The threat of the resumption of major offensives and counter-offensives would make this very likely and would undoubtedly complicate the business of extricating the principal forces. With the achievement of a reduction in foreign military presence, efforts could be made to pressurise Kabila and the rebels into dialogue. The entry of Sudan into the military frame complicated matters gravely as far as Uganda was concerned, for this constituted a direct threat to the country’s national security.
A press statement from the OAU on Saturday morning said, "The ministers worked out draft modalities for a cease-fire agreement in the DRC. The outcome of their deliberations will be submitted to their respective governments. Considering that this is a continuing and intense process more consultations need to be undertaken."
Following the break-up of the talks, Moven Mahachi, Zimbabwe’s Defence Minister, said that, if the SADC heads of state saw no prospect for peace, they might consider sending more manpower. It seemed unlikely, however, that Kabila could count on the support of SADC forces other than those already helping him.
Other statements by Mahachi indicated a hardening of attitudes. Referring to Rwanda and Uganda, he said, "They want to delay the talks to give themselves time to prepare for war. They don’t want peace in that region." He said that inviting the rebels to the talks would have been tantamount to "legitimizing armed rebellion as a way of resolving political problems", apparently forgetting the history of his own country as well as that of Kabila’s rise to power. "There is more chance for democracy under Kabila than under the rebels. If the rebels want a voice they must put themselves forward as a political party."
President Mandela, chairing the SADC summit for the last time in Mauritius on 14 September, again emphasised the need for a political settlement to ensure peace in the longer term. "The challenge now is to develop and implement the agreement so that the people of the DRC can determine their own destiny and embark on reconstruction as a united, stable and prosperous nation." As Mandela returned to his seat following his opening statement, he was greeted warmly by President Mugabe, in an uncommon demonstration of respect.
Kabila was evidently disappointed in his efforts to secure a SADC motion, condemning the external aggression of Uganda and Rwanda. He may have been misled into a false sense of the nature of his regional support by developments in Durban, at the Victoria Falls and in Addis Ababa, forgetting that he essentially enjoyed the ‘unqualified’ support of only three other SADC states. Even they were less than enthusiastic in private about his leadership, and about his unsubtle and uncompromising approach to negotiations with the rebels.
At the Mauritius summit, it was apparent that there was general consensus that Kabila must agree to meet the rebels, and that he must abandon the convenient fiction that the war was simply a foreign invasion. South African Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo said at the summit that, "What is clear to us is that the conflict will be decided in the long run by those who are at loggerheads, that is the government of the country together with the rebels. There can be no other way."
The conclusion of the summit was delayed for seven hours by wrangling over the wording of the communiqué on the DRC. It was apparent that an unequivocal stance was still being avoided, for the final statement was to the effect that the outbreak of war in the DRC was regretted, and that all parties were asked to lay down their arms and negotiate a settlement. This must have represented something of a setback for Kabila.
Indirectly related to the SADC stance on the DRC was the organisation’s declaration of unqualified support for the government of President dos Santos, and its condemnation of Jonas Savimbi as a war criminal. SADC also called for the recognition of the ‘renovated UNITA’ as sole genuine participants of the opposition in the negotiation process. It is unclear what impact this was expected to have on Savimbi, though it would seem to the dispassionate observer rather more likely to confirm his dependence upon the opinions of his hard-line advisors.
So intense and time consuming was the discussion on the DRC and other crises that the summit had no opportunity to discuss the pressing issue of the role of the SADC Organ on Security. This was not the time that delegates wanted to open a potentially divisive issue, since consensus on Congo remained imperative.
Even as diplomatic efforts continued in the background, the scope of the war was gradually expanding. Kabila flew to Tripoli to seek financial assistance from Muammar Gaddhafi, and at the end of September, Chad confirmed that it had sent troops to the DRC.
The focus of the campaign now shifted to the key town of Kindu, which had to be held by Kabila’s forces if they were to make good their promise that a counter-offensive in the east of the country was imminent. But on 12 October, Kindu fell to the rebels and their allies, after protracted fighting. The military balance clearly had begun to favour Kabila’s enemies, but instead of responding positively to South Africa’s urgent promptings that a negotiated solution should be sought, Mugabe convened a strategy summit with the presidents of Angola and Namibia to discuss ways of reversing the rebels’ gains on the battlefield. Zimbabwe also announced that it was reinforcing its expeditionary force.
Kindu having fallen, there was now a considerable distance between the principal forces of the rival armies, and it would obviously be some time before either side could regroup and resupply for another major engagement. The weather had deteriorated, impeding the large-scale movement of mechanised troops. This created an obvious breathing space in which the region’s statesmen might make another bid to achieve a cease-fire and avert the outbreak of declared hostilities involving a growing number of African states.
Accordingly, on 26 and 27 October, a meeting of African defence and foreign ministers was held in Lusaka under the auspices of SADC. This meeting and a subsequent heads of state summit were to attempt to formulate a broad framework for the implementation of a cease-fire, for negotiations and for addressing the security concerns of the DRC’s neighbours. Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU Secretary General, urged the delegates to adopt a pragmatic approach in their efforts to work out a way of securing the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC and the establishment of a follow-up mechanism to assist the DRC government in promoting national dialogue leading to a new political dispensation. Though the summit formulated a draft proposal for a cease-fire, the rebels were denied direct access to the meeting, and refused to negotiate through third parties. As a possible way forward the meeting established a committee to conduct proxy talks with the rebel leadership, which continued to press its demand for direct talks with Kabila. However, he continued to maintain his position that what he was facing, was not a rebellion but an armed invasion from Rwanda and Uganda.
Towards the end of October, President Mandela received a rebel delegation led by Wamba dia Wamba, to the great annoyance of Kabila, who interpreted this as evidence of South Africa’s partiality in the matter. At about this time, Chadian forces advancing towards rebel-held Buta suffered a severe defeat, possibly at the hands of a new rebel group, the Congolese Liberation Movement, which appeared to be operating in Equateur province with Ugandan support. This development raised questions about possible differences between Uganda and Rwanda about their strategic approach to the DRC conflict. There were also clear indications that the emergence of a new movement with clear Mobutuist links was unwelcome to Wamba dia Wamba’s Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). It served as a warning that the political aims of the rebellion needed clearer articulation and direction.
Despite mounting problems at home — some of them related to the expensive and unpopular Congo adventure — Mugabe showed no signs of abandoning Kabila. Indeed, the expanding network of financial transactions involving senior figures in the Zimbabwean political and military establishment suggested a deepening commitment to a cause whose prospects seemed increasingly problematic. At the beginning of November, a high-level US diplomatic intervention was dismissed with disdain by Kabila’s backers.
On 6 November, Mandela met Paul Kagame in Pretoria, and managed to extract the public admission that Rwanda had committed forces to the DRC in the interests of its own security. This was a major breakthrough, for it opened the way to a more sensible discussion of a cease-fire, standstill and eventual withdrawal of foreign forces. Kabila’s reaction was again disappointing: there could be no talk of a cease-fire until the aggressors had departed from Congolese soil.
By the middle of the month, South Africa had engaged directly with the DRC government in an attempt to move matters on. The visiting Congolese foreign minister again criticised the Pretoria administration for its alleged support of the invaders, and was taken to task publicly by Alfred Nzo, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nzo said the Congolese government needed to come to terms with the fact that the rebels are a "real factor in the political dynamics of the Congo ... While we accept that there is an external dimension to the problem, we nevertheless firmly believe that the rebels are a real factor in the political dynamics of the Congo and unless this fact is accepted there will be no progress in resolving the current crisis. It was South Africa’s contention that all political persuasions in the country had to be accommodated if a sustainable solution was to be found."
By this time, there were also indications that Kabila’s principal allies might have other more pressing problems to address than the defence of his regime. In Angola, the civil war had resumed with an intensity that was not reflected in the scant attention it received in the media. Indications were that the Angolan armed forces were experiencing difficulties in containing UNITA, and notwithstanding the promise of vast oil wealth in the near future, the government’s credit lines were almost exhausted.
In Zimbabwe, the economic and financial crisis was exacerbated by the government’s sudden abrogation of undertakings made to the farming and donor community about the land issue. Confiscation of property again seemed probable, prompting the suspension of significant financial aid.
Uganda, too, faced some public opposition to its commitment in the DRC, and financially had every interest in bringing an essentially wasteful conflict to an end.
On 19 November, SADC member states again tried to advance the process begun in Lusaka the previous month. Talks began in Gaborone involving the UN, the OAU, and the foreign ministers of Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa. For the first time, the rebel CRD attended a full ministerial meeting, though this implied the absence of the DRC government. The basic intention was to secure the rebels’ formal adherence to the draft proposal formulated in Lusaka. The document, which was initially accepted by the rebels, proposed a regional peace formula beginning with an immediate cease-fire, the standstill of all troops and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. It also asked that the leaders of SADC countries fix an agenda, date and venue for peace talks between the rebels and Kabila and to nominate a mediator. It was hoped that this would pave the way for broad-based political discussions. As the discussions continued, however, the more moderate approach espoused by the CRD delegation’s leader Wamba dia Wamba, was evidently overtaken by a more assertive stance on the part of some of his colleagues.
As a result, the meeting ended suddenly fifteen minutes after resuming on Saturday 21 November. The rebels had unexpectedly added to their previous conditions — that they should be included as full participants in all future negotiations on the crisis — the insistence that the SADC ministers present acknowledge that Kabila’s government was a perpetrator of genocide and other crimes against humanity. This latest demand evidently related to the systematic persecution of Banyamulenge Tutsis because of their alleged sympathies with the rebellion. SADC executive secretary Kaire Mbuende was unable to disguise his irritation at this turn of events: "I thought we were dealing with politicians and statesmen but these people are behaving like bandits." Some of the CRD delegates were also evidently unhappy that their military successes since the Lusaka meeting had not been adequately reflected in the balance of diplomatic power.
The next opportunity to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough presented itself at the 20th Franco-African summit in Paris, to which representatives of virtually all the African states were invited. President Chirac was able to talk with Mugabe, Museveni, Bizimungu and Kabila, though he failed to mask his contempt for the latter. Perhaps as a result of the public pressure to which they were subjected, none of these leaders felt comfortable with being branded the spoiler when Chirac announced that an agreement had been reached in principle. "There is already a document and the final signing should take place shortly, the protagonists having made the commitment of signing an agreement before the meeting slated for 17 and 18 December in Ougadougou." He said Kabila had also made commitments in terms of democratisation, openness and dialogue. Kofi Annan announced that a deal had been struck to end the war in the DRC, claiming that the leaders of the six countries involved had undertaken to stop fighting immediately. After meeting Chirac, he said that "[t]hey committed themselves to accepting an immediate end to hostilities," adding by way of an afterthought, "I hope they do not change their minds at once."
There was apparent confusion among the key participants about the substance of the agreement. Kabila was quoted as telling reporters, "What accord? I have not signed any accord." Museveni said that all parties had agreed to an immediate cessation of hostilities and expressed their determination to sign a cease-fire as soon as possible. "There are always arguments, but we ended with a unanimous agreement." Bizimungu’s understanding of what had transpired, appeared to contradict this optimistic view. He said there had been no progress, and that the exclusion of the rebels from the talks remained the sole obstacle to an end to hostilities. A senior Rwandan official described the Paris arrangement as a worthless wish-list. South Africa’s Deputy-president, Thabo Mbeki, said there were no new initiatives, no new ideas and no new processes.
At the time of writing, this is where the process has stalled. Whether it can be restarted at the meetings planned for Lusaka and Ougadougou remains to be seen. The issue of direct negotiations between Kabila and the rebels remains unresolved. The question of Rwandan and Ugandan security concerns remains unaddressed in any practical sense, yet this is a prerequisite for their withdrawal, without which Kabila refuses to accept the offer of a cease-fire.
Certainly, in the absence of a comprehensive spirit of compromise, the prospects for a lasting peace and the political and economic reconstruction of the DRC do not look promising. A hardening of the rebel position is also noticeable. Attention now shifts to the rebel advance towards Mbuji-Mayi, Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, and the question of whether the continent’s statesmen can move faster than the armed forces on the ground. Should they fail to do so, the results for the region will be catastrophic, not least because a military ‘solution’ is unlikely to provide the sort of basis required for a political dispensation that will include that part of the Congolese society which conducts its politics peaceably.
|
|
|