The reign of the late President of Niger, General Ibrahim Bare Mainassara was always under threat. Ever since he assumed power on 27 January 1996, possibilities of a coup remained a reality. The events over the last few months thus bear testimony to the fact that his rule was to be short-lived.

Mainassara was not considered as a legitimate head of state because he assumed office through a military coup that toppled former President Ousmane. The latter was democratically elected during the country’s first multiparty elections in 1993. President Ousmane steadfastly undermined the fundamental principles of democracy during his reign. Notwithstanding the activities of the Ousmane government, the 1996 coup shattered all hopes for a stable country, since Mainassara has further transgressed proper forms of popular participation.

It has become a trend that the military justifies its use of force on the grounds that it is saving the country from a corrupt civilian leadership. General Mainassara employed similar tactics when he assumed power during a political crisis in Niger. Due to the pressure exerted by foreign countries over the staged coup, Mainassara was forced to outline a transitional programme which culminated in a general election.¹

Thus, six months after he overthrew the democratic government, General Mainassara organised an election in July 1996, in which he also campaigned for the presidency.² He emerged victorious amidst reports that the process was chaotic. He had disbanded the Electoral Commission and appointed his own which, not surprisingly, declared the election to have been ‘free and fair’.

The same election was viewed as a mockery of democracy when Mainassara placed most of the opposition leadership under house arrest. Even though he had hoped that he would transform himself into a civilian leader through the election, his failure to address issues affecting the general population made him an unpopular figure.³

In February 1999, local elections were held and voting was again disrupted, with vandalism and theft of election material reported at most polling stations.⁴ Under these confusing conditions, the opposition coalition, consisting of the Front for Restoration and Defence of Democracy (FRDD) and the Alliance for Democratic and Social Forces (AFDS), announced an election victory. The result of the polls showed that the opposition had obtained 596 seats against 468 for parties supporting Mainassara.⁵ To the coalition’s dissatisfaction, however, the Supreme Court annulled the election and ordered a new one. On the eve of Mainassara’s assassination, the opposition parties had already called for his resignation from office.⁶

During Mainassara’s reign, the state security apparatus was employed to suppress opposition parties, although there were reported cases of some sections in the army showing support to the opposition.

Niger is clearly a country that has never enjoyed a stable democratic system of government, but has rather experienced the progressive disintegration of good governance. The background provided above shows that the death of General Mainassara occurred when there was a political stalemate in the country between the regime and the opposition parties.

In the space of less than three years, history repeated itself when Niger experienced another coup. The only interpretation that could be offered, is that the democratic value system has scarcely had any opportunity to entrench itself in a country where the polity itself is fragile.

At the time when the Nigeriens were still pondering the assassination of Mainassara, described by the military spokesman as an "unfortunate accident",⁷ the military announced that it is taking over the control of the government and the country. A new military junta, under the leadership of Daouda Malan Wanke, took over the reins.

Wanke, like the man he replaced, is a career soldier who has spent most of his life in the military where he held several senior positions.⁸ Furthermore, Wanke was the head of the élite presidential guard and therefore responsible for Mainassara’s security. Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, who was the Prime Minister under Mainassara’s regime, was re-appointed to the same position by Wanke.

Immediately after his appointment, Wanke announced a series of institutional changes in the country. He dissolved the National Assembly and opted for a transitional National Reconciliation Council (NRC) to be in charge of Niger for the next nine months.

There should be cause for concern about the National Reconciliation Council (NRC) given that it is an all-military Council. This affords the military an opportunity to dictate the pace of this crucial period. The dissolution of the Assembly is also a strategic move in the sense that it was mostly constituted of pro-Mainassara members. Wanke also suspended the Supreme Court, as well as the 12 May 1996 Constitution.

The proposed transitional programme announced by Wanke is to commence with a constitutional referendum in September 1999, with a general election following in December. A civilian government will subsequently assume office on the last day of 1999.⁹

The new military ruler opened up the political arena when he lifted the suspension of political parties imposed after the assassination of Mainassara. The eleven opposition parties welcomed the announcement that the National Reconciliation Council (NRC) is only a temporary measure and called on their supporters to accept the proposed nine-month transitional programme. This move needs to be appreciated by opposition leaders, since the gravity of the situation demands that decision-makers in the country collaborate in order to ensure that peace prevails during this time.

Even the Convergence for the Republic (CPR), a coalition of about ten political parties and former allies of the President, have expressed their support for the new regime’s intentions to facilitate the route to democracy in the country.

True to its word, the NRC announced the transitional government of national unity. Out of nineteen ministries that were created, thirteen were occupied by the main opposition parties, the FRDD and the AFDS, and two by military staff.¹⁰

The April coup has a variety of implications for Niger. One scenario is that the assassination of Mainassara, although bad on its own, offers Niger another opportunity to implement democratic changes, especially when bearing in mind that Mainassara halted all forms of democratic activity. This depends of course on the participation of the opposition in ensuring that the process reaches its ultimate goal.

The second scenario is that Wanke, the new ruler, with the army behind him, would want to cling to power and not honour his promises. This is, however, an unlikely scenario when one considers the external environment both at regional and international levels and its effects on Niger.

The country’s powerful southern neighbour, Nigeria, has recently been witness to a democratically elected President assuming power. The military leader mostly responsible for this achievement in Nigeria is General Abubakar who currently epitomises Africa’s new versions of the ‘strong man’. With these changes right next door, Niger’s new regime would be inclined to follow suit. General Obasanjo of Nigeria has already voiced his opinion about the current situation in Niger and has urged General Wanke to persist with his transitional programme.

Pressure is also mounting with other countries in the region, such as Chad, Mali and Sudan, expressing similar opinions. Interestingly, the new military leader was denied an opportunity to attend the summit of the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (COMESSA) of which Niger is a member.¹¹

Maintaining such pressure might be one of the ways that will ensure that peace and democracy prevail in Niger. At a regional level, forces against the current military leadership therefore hold sway. That the new military leader is aware of this was reflected in his decision to meet with representatives of other countries in Niger, including the ambassadors of the United States and France.¹²

The transitional programme, as outlined by the military leadership is not a window-dressing exercise. That is, there is a realisation from within the army that the pendulum has shifted and that it is no longer feasible for a military regime to hold the reins of power. Wider consultations with opposition parties and other influential groups, for instance trade unions, thus originate from this realisation.¹³

In the light of the changes that are likely to occur as a result of the coup and the transitional arrangements, there are two issues that the regime has to deal with that would have an impact on the ultimate outcome of the process. Firstly, there is the issue of the former Tuareg and Toubou ethnic groups who had already entered into agreements with Mainassara.¹⁴ The leadership of the Tamoust Liberation Front (FLT) stated that the fragile peace agreements signed with the former government could be affected by the change of guard; more at stake is the delay of the implementation phase.¹⁵ There are about fifteen rebel groups in Niger that concluded peace deals with the former government. Although some of the stipulations of these agreements have been implemented, the decentralisation and development of Tuareg regions are still to come into effect.¹⁶

The regime has maintained its commitment to bring about national reconciliation and extra measures would therefore be necessary to ensure that the Tuareg rebels are not left out of these processes, as this could let the country drift into civil strife. France is of significance in this regard as it is the largest contributor to initiatives aimed at reintegrating former rebels into national life.¹⁷ The challenge for the regime is to ensure that France does not withdraw its aid to Niger as a result of the coup.

The second issue concerns Niger’s economic recovery. Since Niger is regarded as one of the world’s poorest countries, the regime would have to meet the challenge of rebuilding a weak economy.¹⁸ To achieve this, it will need the necessary support from its neighbours and the international community. This support is most likely to be extended if the regime does not backtrack from the process of change that it has embarked upon.

The above discussion reflects one of the important points about transitions to democracy: it is a fragile process marked by difficulties. Hope is therefore mingled with fear about the likely outcome of democratisation in Niger. Fundamentally, the process rests on the next step that the regime takes. What is clear from the population’s point of view is that their acceptance of the current scenario is solely dependent upon General Wanke’s regime adhering to its promises of taking the country to a democratic dispensation.