Managing inteligence in an age of knowledge

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The contemporary era, in which states, individuals and other entities practice their existence, is fundamentally different to that of historical precedent. In effect, it can be characterised as an age of knowledge which has superseded the former information age. Sophisticated knowledge-based technologies — informational and distributional — are the catalysts which have facilitated the transformation to the age of knowledge, bringing about a ‘new world information order’. Information and intelligence are the metaphorical passengers and products of the use of these technologies and associated communication processes. They represent the raison d’être of such technologies, in effect spurring on their development.

The impact of intelligence on decision and policy-making makes it a primary determinant of state power in an age of knowledge. Intelligence, being a user-specific type of information designed to provide the recipient with both the context and opportunity with regard to a specific problem or situation, is a fundamental resource for the making of both decisions and policy in and for government. The efficient management of information and intelligence does and can therefore impact upon the relative power of the state at both inter- and intranational levels. Consequently, it is argued that the power of states in the post-modern age of knowledge is in effect commensurate with their intelligence capabilities.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the management of intelligence in an age of knowledge. Generic trends, concepts and principles have been developed, which are universally applicable — to a greater or lesser degree — to all governments and states which are part of the ‘global village’ and which are ipso facto participants in the global political economy and the contemporary environment. Additionally, various recommendations — perhaps somewhat radical — are made for government actions in the field of intelligence and information management.

The contemporary post-modern world is indeed different from the world of historical precedent. Many of the differences between ‘then’ and ‘now’ can be attributed to an evolutionary growth of human society. Within the spectrum of growth, there has been gradual evolutionary development accompanied by development in ‘leaps and bounds’, such as the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution.

At the present stage of human development, it is apparent that an age of knowledge has dawned with ramifications in scale for contemporary society, comparable to those of the Industrial Revolution for our forebears. Naturally, the consequences and impact of the age of knowledge on contemporary society will be different in type than similar human development leaps of the past. What will be less different, however, is the scale of transformation.

Technological innovation was largely responsible for the Industrial Revolution. In a similar vein, technology brought about the contemporary age of knowledge in the post-modern world. The technologies which have acted as catalysts in bringing about the age of knowledge are information and distribution technologies² based on the ubiquitous electronic microchip and associated electronic technologies that have culminated in ‘infostructures’ such as the Internet and the ‘World Wide Web’.

From humble beginnings, knowledge-based technologies have transformed the contemporary world with regard to the impact that they are capable of having on all fields of human endeavour, from politics to warfare to entertainment and commerce. Even societies and states which do not fully use such technologies are not exempt from their global influence. No state can isolate itself from the age of knowledge. To do so would result in economic and political stagnation (or regression) with no potential for development. Like any living organism which has to grow to survive, a state has to interact with its surrounding environment in order to survive, develop and prosper. The international phenomenon of the so-called global village, together with globalisation, have in effect brought about a forced participation of all states on a global scale, irrespective of their governments’ desires to be part of the system or not.

It could well be argued that the age of knowledge is a misnomer that merely depicts the use of fashionable language, and that it has been in existence throughout human history. It is true that knowledge and its growth have been part of human existence for the past millennia, ranging from the sophisticated civilisations of antiquity to contemporary world societies. What is different, however, is the magnitude of acquisition and distribution of information for knowledge purposes, primarily brought about by the development and application of sophisticated (electronic) communication technologies.

The development and utilisation of these technologies has resulted in the worldwide electronic acquisition, processing and distribution of information on a scale unprecedented in human history. However, the so-called information age where large volumes of information are acquired, processed and distributed has given way to the next stage of evolutionary development: the age of knowledge. This stage of development is one where it is realised that information itself is worthless unless it has utility value and is internalised by information recipients, effectively becoming knowledge.

This is why the term the ‘age of knowledge’ is used. It makes a clear distinction between this age and the so-called information age. Although semantic arguments could be made in favour of saying that all ages of human history are ages of knowledge, this would not be correct as historical precedent regarding information and knowledge bears no relation to its status in the contemporary post-modern world.

The age of knowledge can therefore be regarded as a phase in human development where knowledge derived from the use of knowledge-based (communication) technologies, both informational and distributional, has become one of the primary instruments in directing and impacting upon all human activity ranging from governance, politics and commerce to the more mundane aspects of human existence.

Underpinning this paradigm shift in human existence is information — the primary building block of intelligence and the age of knowledge. In effect, information and its acquisition, processing and distribution represent the raison d’être of knowledge-based technologies.

Information, whether in digital or other formats, is the metaphorical passenger on the vehicle of modern (communication) knowledge-based technologies. The building blocks of information are data which are raw, unsummarised and unanalysed facts such as statistics which, viewed on their own, are meaningless, yet they become information when placed together in an ordered and understandable fashion.

Information itself can therefore be regarded as an assortment of data put together in a way that contributes to meaning and utility. The progression from information to knowledge is based on whether the recipient who receives information internalises it in such a way that it results in understanding. Although the two concepts can be clearly distinguished, the terms ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ are often incorrectly used as synonyms.

Intelligence, in turn, is a user-specific form of information and knowledge that is tailor-made for the needs of a specific customer or information-user recipient. It presents the recipient or consumer with context, problem identification and the identification of opportunity, thereby acting as an instrument in the making of defensible decisions and policy. The importance of intelligence for government and all its functions is incontestible as policy and the antecedent decision-making processes determine the quality and efficacy of government actions, including those actions designed to acquire, maintain or project state power.

Figure 1 places the concepts ‘data’, ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’ into perspective vis-à-vis ‘knowledge’.

Without intelligence based on sufficient, reliable and timely information, decision and/or policy-makers will not be able to function in the present-day world in a way th10 at would be to their competitive advantage. It is the receipt of high quality intelligence, resulting from a complex communication process, that is required by states, institutions (public and private) and individuals in order to enable them to make decisions and policy that enhance their chances for survival and prosperity in the contemporary environment.

However, in order to facilitate the efficient use of intelligence for governance, corporate or individual purposes, it is imperative that an efficient information management strategy is in place. For a state, this would entail a national information strategy of which the success would depend upon the priority given to such a strategy, together with its competent management and implementation. Sufficient, reliable, useful and timely intelligence is the product, as well as an integral part of such a strategy. It is this type of strategy, in conjunction with its primary product — intelligence — which enhances the user’s competitive edge with regard to, inter alia, power-related goals.

Intelligence can thus be regarded as the key to survival in the present environment for all players in national and international political arenas, whether these are governments, corporations or individuals. It is a product that can be used by governments to protect their citizens and enhance their global economic competitiveness and level of development, and is thus an instrument through which a state can acquire, maintain and project power. By adapting to the changed environment, a state will be able to ensure that it survives and prospers in the next century. Equally applicable is the use of intelligence for commercial purposes. By neglecting to recognise the demands of the changed environment, states, corporations and individuals alike can place themselves at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis competitive entities both within and outside their borders.

With regard to intelligence and its management, the most important consequence of the age of knowledge is that the traditional approach towards intelligence is often inefficient, being both resource-hungry and sometimes ineffective. The time-consuming length of the traditional intelligence cycle is also not suitable to the present-day dynamic environment where reliable, useful intelligence is required almost immediately in order to aid effective decision and policy-making. In addition, the traditional intelligence communities of many states tend to rely on outdated methods to process information and to convert it into useful intelligence for end-users. Although the means (knowledge-based technologies) exist to acquire large volumes of data, it is the processing of this data into a useful product (i.e. intelligence) that poses the greatest challenges for contemporary intelligence practitioners.

The acquisition of information and its subsequent processing into intelligence for distribution to consumers, are no longer (if these ever were) the exclusive preserve of traditional intelligence agencies. However, this does not mean the demise of the traditional intelligence service(s) within a state. Aspects such as covert military or law enforcement intelligence are still as important as ever, but even these have become diminished by the ability of private intelligence practitioners to access and process data and information efficiently by using open sources through means provided by sophisticated knowledge-based technologies and associated methodologies.

The use of knowledge-based technologies as tools to access, correlate, interpret and find patterns for events finds unique expression in private sector intelligence specialists whose profit orientation in a competitive world enhances both efficiency and the provision of necessary intelligence to consumers. Additionally, the outsourcing of intelligence will become increasingly relevant for governments because of the professional expertise available in the private sector combined with the increased relevance of open sources of information. Furthermore, many private sector institutions are able to provide reliable up-to-date intelligence to public decision and policy-makers in a far shorter time frame than that which government departments (and traditional intelligence services) themselves can provide.

As a result, the need to decentralise, prioritise and privatise (outsource) the intelligence function has become a reality for contemporary government. Conditions demand that it becomes part and parcel of every government department and not only of those departments of which the traditional line function has been to produce intelligence.

The outsourcing of a function previously regarded as the sole preserve of government agencies can be interpreted as the transferring of power on the part of the state towards the market-oriented private sector. To some extent, this argument is valid. However, it should be borne in mind that governments themselves are metaphorically often held hostage by their own intelligence agencies in their attempts to increase their own bureaucratic power and influence, while at the same time protecting their own vested interests.

The competitive ethos of the private sector and its theoretically neutral political approach may be the great equaliser, as government can cross-reference intelligence that it deems unreliable and simply hire a competitor in the intelligence business if necessary.

It should be stressed that intelligence is in no way the preserve of any specific government agency. If one accepts that intelligence is a specific type of information, tailor-made to meet the requirements of an end-user or consumer, it is clear that it is applicable across the spectrum of all human activity and ipso facto across the entire spectrum of government activities. Therefore, these findings are applicable across the entire intelligence spectrum, ranging from strategic intelligence through operational, tactical and technical intelligence (in all government departments).

Figure 2 is presented as a possible national information management system based on intelligence. This system can be followed by the contemporary state (naturally adapted to the specific requirements and circumstances of the particular state) in order to meet the challenges of the age of knowledge.

The model is an attempt to address the new realities vis-à-vis the management of information with specific reference to the role of information and intelligence for decision and policy-making purposes. It represents a generic approach which, with adaptations, could be used in any state in the world, and shows the structure and process with regard to the normative manner in which information and intelligence should be managed in order to meet the contemporary challenges characterising this era.

The model is especially applicable to those states that, like South Africa, lack a focused encompassing information strategy to provide intelligence for government policy and decision-makers.

At the core of the model are departmental intelligence units (DIUs) which are proposed as ‘knowledge brokers/facilitators’. These act as interfaces between the multiplicity of private sector information or intelligence providers and clients in government who are involved in decision and policy-making. These clients would be situated on all levels of government, ranging from national to local levels, and would encompass all government departments.

It is envisaged that every government department would be provided with a DIU whose size would be commensurate with the size and functions of the respective department. As such, it can comprise as few as one or two persons or it can be considerably greater in size.

The functions of a DIU would include, inter alia, the following:

maintenance and development of a ‘meta-database’³ of service providers, both public and private, that specialise in intelligence or information relevant to specific departmental functions and needs;



determining suitable service providers for each user-specific request for intelligence; and



prioritisation, processing and financing of requests from government clients.

The DIU would be staffed by qualified information practitioners, financial specialists and technical or logistical support personnel. It should be noted that DIUs would not provide intelligence themselves, but would outsource a request to the most suitable service provider, who would subsequently produce the intelligence and provide it directly to the client. The finished product would therefore not be transferred to the client via the DIU, as this would be too time consuming. The service provider, however, would invoice the DIU for services rendered.

In many instances, intelligence of a covert nature can and should still be acquired for decision and policy-makers through the traditional route of covert intelligence structures and agencies. Such agencies, however, can and should utilise the open source private sector intelligence service providers to provide intelligence that will be complementary to that obtained by covert means. Private sector information or intelligence service providers are legion and include, inter alia, commercial intelligence enterprises, the media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), universities, libraries, specialists, research organisations and think tanks, journalists and private corporations.

A mechanism is also envisaged to co-ordinate the intelligence facilitation process between DIUs and ipso facto different departments. Such a mechanism should comprise standing and select committees, as well as electronic co-ordination and integration, requiring the sophisticated utilisation of knowledge-based technologies.

The intelligence capabilities and capacity of a state in the contemporary environment can have a considerable impact upon its ability to attain, maintain and project power at both international and intranational levels. The relationship between intelligence and state power is likely to become increasingly important in the 21st century and the failure to recognise this importance on the part of the custodians (government and associated institutions) of the state can have negative consequences for the state and those entities which fall under its jurisdiction. It should be noted, however, that this would be qualified by the ideological foundations of the state and its structure. For example, the enhancement of the power of a totalitarian state, facilitated by intelligence, would most likely not have any positive consequences for the inhabitants of that particular state or for their ‘global neighbours’, so to speak. In contrast, the enhancement of the power of a ‘liberal-democratic’ state would most likely benefit its inhabitants and institutions. Naturally, the enhancement of the power of any state will impact either positively or negatively upon other states, thus making the role of intelligence significantly important in the contemporary world.

By enhancing its own information management and ipso facto intelligence capacities, a state will in effect be protecting itself against the aggressive intentions of others. Thus, even states who are neutral and non-aggressive (whether politically, militarily or economically), have to make provision to increase their levels of power according to the dictates of the environment. Such increases in power would in effect represent the maintenance of the status quo in this changed environment. To do nothing to ameliorate the influence of knowledge or adapt to the impact of the age of knowledge (i.e. by failing to recognise the role of intelligence, knowledge-based technologies and a national information management system), a state will in fact begin to lose power, a trend which would be difficult to reverse.

The traditional view and approach to intelligence followed by most contemporary states is largely outdated, both methodologically and philosophically, as well as inefficient, thus being a drain on the limited resources of the state. Although the importance and relevance of traditional intelligence structures and methods have been considerably reduced in the age of knowledge, the converse is true in terms of intelligence as a product. The importance of intelligence as an ubiquitous product for government has increased immeasurably in the current context.

The contemporary post-modern environment lends itself to intelligence obtained from open sources by both private and public sector entities for the purposes of making sound, defensible decisions and policy across the spectrum of government activities irrespective of the level at which such activities take place (which can range from the local to the international levels). It is thus strongly recommended that intelligence for government-related purposes (whether power-related or otherwise) should be the product of co-operation and partnership between the public and private sectors in a state. This could facilitate a sorely needed efficiency and flexibility with regard to the management of information resources for the purposes of decision and policy-making.

However, one of the main prerequisites for the facilitation of efficient management of the intelligence function of a state is that a broad ‘national information management strategy’ should be developed and implemented. This is sadly lacking in many states. States such as the United States and those of the European Union are at the forefront of these developments, with a corresponding increase in both their influence and power. In so far as great empires were created by the trade in spices and other related commodities centuries ago, so too will both political and economic ‘empires’ be created as a result of the trade in information and ipso facto knowledge.

At this stage, South Africa lacks a clear-minded vision of the use of intelligence for all government-related activities. The mindset in the country places intelligence within the scope of existing intelligence agencies, such as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), as well as the military and law enforcement establishment. Intelligence is also viewed as an esoteric product where visions of state security and national interest are used to promote institutional biases and vested interests, as well as to act as an instrument of obfuscation for the public. No efficient integrated approach to information management exists in the state, a fact that contributes to institutional inefficiency and countless lost opportunities.

What is important in South Africa and elsewhere is a change of mindset about the role that intelligence can play with regard to the broad spectrum of governance functions found within a state. Intelligence is a resource that should play an integral part in the day-to-day decision and policy-making process taking place in government at all hierarchical levels, irrespective whether the policy or decision is strategic, operational, tactical or technical.

Without an integrated information management strategy, a state and its government run the risk of never reaching their potential, while at the same time letting events overtake them, making them reactive entities with limited influence on and within the contemporary dynamic environment.