Records of weapons collection and destruction in Southern Africa:
The Mozambican experience
Martinho Chachiua
Institute for Security Studies

In the course of more than two decades of war, Mozambique has witnessed the deep militarisation of its entire society, including the remote rural areas. The nature of the wars and the weakness of the warring parties’ logistical structures led to the dispersal of arms straight down to the level of the individual citizen. Hence, one of the most challenging legacies of the wars is weapons redundancy. Given the prevailing deprivation of the majority of the population and the failure of state institutions to perform their security tasks, the availability of these weapons has since fuelled crime and violence internally, as well as regionally. They have ultimately made the discourse of human rights a dead letter and its essence a distant ideal. As a result, the end of the war has not been necessarily translated into positive peace or the end of the fear of depredation.

Above all, weapons proliferation jeopardises social and political stability and hence hinders socio-economic development. Therefore, retrieving1 these weapons from society becomes a prerequisite for stability and development. As a result of this need, government and civil society initiatives for arms collection emerged.

This article looks at these arms collection efforts as a component of the peace process and the way in which political and economic dynamics have influenced the collection. It is noted that improved proactive policing2 efforts did not necessarily reinforce arms collection and destruction initiatives such as that of the Christian Council of Mozambique’s buy-back project and the police’s joint Operation Rachel. Conversely, the political motives behind the establishment of arms caches and the economic situation seem to determine the outcomes of weapons recovery programmes.

The more tense the political relations between the former warring parties, the lower the confidence in the sustainability of the peace process and the more difficult it becomes to collect weapons. However, given the fact that arms have not been used (at least overtly) for political ends since 1992, their attached political value has eroded. The economic consideration, which seems to compel people to use anything at their disposal for their livelihood, is increasingly replacing political constraints for weapons collection and destruction. Thus, the challenge is to collect the weapons before they reach smugglers/criminals who, most of the time, pay more than both buy-back projects or the police.

Since the early 1960s, Mozambique has not witnessed any meaningful period of peace and stability until the 1994 general elections. Throughout this period of war and its related scarcities, as well as deprivation and despair, violence has been the rule as opposed to the exception.

The war had been all about people’s lives. The preferred target was individuals and their social basis. By the late 1980s, the war had disrupted fifty per cent of the countryside, nearly one million people had been killed and 4,5 million became refugees or were displaced.3 As a result, 250 000 children had been either orphaned or separated from their parents.4 Máusse, quoting United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates, indicates that between 1985 and 1990 fifty to sixty per cent of the Mozambican population lived in extreme poverty.5 Despite the fact that the relationship between GDP and human development is not at all linear, these figures are in line with the data released in the UNDP’s Mozambique National Human Development Report 1998, according to which the country’s GDP per capita dropped to its lowest point of US $28 in 1985.6 As far as the economic effects of the war are concerned, these figures speak for themselves.

From the social point of view, about 27 per cent (25 498) of the soldiers being demobilised in 1994 were under the age of eighteen.7 These "[k]idnapped boys and men were trained through a brutal process of deprivation, spanking, threats and subject to breaking all taboos, such as, to eat human flesh, to kill family member."8 The public security system had deteriorated. The state and society remained apart, creating conditions for lawlessness. Violence against defenceless civilians was perpetuated. Any resistance was neutralised by torture, humiliation, or threat of death.

It is widely held that the numbers of weapons brought into the country are unknown. What is known, though, is that by the end of the civil war, the country was not only awash with small arms but, most importantly, these had been diffused throughout all levels of society. A study conducted by the Arms Management Programme (AMP)9 attempted to categorise the illegal weapons possession continuum in Mozambique. It concluded that weapons unaccounted for could be found in three different forms:

• caches deliberately held by the previously warring parties;

• caches belonging to individual soldiers — both demobilised and currently in the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM); and

• arms held by individual civilians.

Firstly, during the implementation of the peace agreement, the two dominant parties (as a result of the distrust that existed between them) deliberately held arms caches. Mazula, quoting Matteo Zuppi, states that:

"... very often things [negotiations] were not going due to several reasons, mainly due to distrust. This distrust was enormous and reciprocal, but it was stronger in the Renamo’s side which did not want to succumb to the integration trap ... a strategy with which Frelimo, during a long period of time, tried to assimilate Renamo ..."10

Thus, while Renamo tried at the negotiating table to get as many concessions from Frelimo as possible, it did not lose sight of the fact that those concessions could be withdrawn once the military strength of Renamo had been minimised. Therefore, Renamo had to ensure that it held sufficient political space for survival within the new political dispensation by maintaining, what Cock termed the "... material base for political bargaining",11 in other words, arms.

Similarly, Frelimo had to make many concessions as the political price to ensure a cease-fire. Frelimo was also uncertain about the exact outcome of these concessions. It was not familiar with competitive politics, and was sure that it had made mistakes that the constituency would scrutinise. Hiding arms was a safety measure in case the peace process failed or had an undesirable outcome. the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) estimated that forty per cent12 of Renamo’s arms depots were not verified. As a result, reports indicate that many caches are still lying in remote localities throughout Mozambique.

Secondly, many demobilised soldiers kept arms that were in good condition, while handing in those of poor quality. Vines, who has spoken to a large number of demobilised soldiers, has written extensively on this issue.13 In addition, press releases and police reports show the high incidence of demobilised soldiers and other active state security personnel found with illegal weapons.14

Apart from the weapons that may have been kept back from the ONUMOZ disarmament exercise, some of the demobilised soldiers may know the whereabouts of the caches referred to above. The Association of War Demobilised Soldiers (AMODEG) believed that "... most of the weapons in illegal supply are in the hands of demobilised soldiers, as they know where the weapons were cached."15 In addition, Renamo’s leadership, as well as some anonymous Frelimo officers claimed that some rashly demobilised soldiers knew the locations of arms caches and were able to draw on these as a source of arms whenever needed.

The fact is that weapons have ‘leaked’ from both Renamo and Frelimo armouries during the war. And they continue to leak from the present army armouries and police arsenals, as well as being taken from the abandoned caches. The motivations are generally criminal or for personal gain. Finally, individual citizens were issued with arms for self-defence years ago and continue to have access to arms from abandoned caches or illegal trade.16

With the picture above, it is quite safe to argue that human rights were a lost cause during the war.

Though the success of the elections in 1994 suggested that the country would not witness any more war, signs were that positive peace was still far from attained. The gap between the number of weapons thought to be in the country and that of collected weapons at the end of the peace process represented a potential for instability in the post-election period.17 Increases in violent crime figures, in general and armed crime in particular, were to shape the security environment (table 1).

	Table 1: Arms-related crimes, 1994-1996
		Year		Total reported crimes (TRC)		Arms-related crimes (ARC)		% of ARC
		1994		26 063		1 122		4,3
		1995		35 160		1 445		4,1
		1996		37 725		1 679		4,4

Source: PIC-1, Polícia de Investigaçao Criminal.

Indeed, despite the lack of systematised crime statistics and their unreliability when available, reports indicate that, in the 1994-1996 period, there was a considerable increase in reported criminal activities in general. While there were 26 063 total reported crimes in 1994, there were 37 725 criminal cases in 1996. However, as far as arms-related crimes are concerned, which tend to be generally violent, there were 1 122 arms-related crimes in 1994 against 1 679 in 1996. This shows that, while general reported crime increased by 44 per cent during the period of three years, arms-related crimes showed an increase of 49,6 per cent.

Given the inherent inaccuracy of the statistics, one needs to add additional sources of information to broaden the picture. Estimates given by a hospital caregiver to the AMP survey team, for example, indicated that two bullet-related casualties were reported per day to the hospital in Maputo alone in 1996.18 This means a total of 720 annually. This is nearly half of the number given by official statistics for 1996 for the entire country.

While these figures may not be that horrifying, the institutional security response is disappointing. Between 1990 and 1998, the police have only managed to submit an average of 37,2 per cent of all reported crimes in the country to the courts. In turn, the Attorney General19 reported that the courts tried 58 per cent of the 13 993 criminal cases brought to their attention in 1997. In other words, less than half of all reported crimes reach the courts of which about half are tried, meaning that only about one quarter of reported crimes are brought to court. This state of affairs is a direct reflection of a weak criminal justice system.

The weakness of the criminal system is also illustrated by the fact that, at the correctional end of the spectrum, prisons are overcrowded and many of their inmates have not been tried. For instance, reports indicated that over 110 prisoners in Xai-xai, Gaza province rioted in protest against the long delays in cases coming to court in 1995. Of the 164 prisoners in jail at the time, only 25 were serving sentences. In reaction to these reports, the Justice Minister admitted that 1 451 of the 2 572 prison population were awaiting trial in 1995. This situation can only be classified as generalised impunity in the country.

Human rights violations of detainees in police custody have been frequently reported. According to Human Rights Watch 1998, human rights records were improving, but police behaviour and prison conditions remained a serious concern. What is more worrying, the report goes on, is that no serious prosecution of those police members who are involved, has taken place to date. Police brutality mostly went unpunished.

In short, Mozambique is in a situation where the state is unable to monopolise the instruments of violence and the use of force to protect the people. While appreciating that the underlying causes of the violence lie beyond the simple possession of a weapon, it has become clear that the widespread availability of weapons has exacerbated social violence. As long as violence remains widespread in social relations, and the availability and use of weapons continue to hamper the state’s ability to protect its citizens or compel it to use excessive force to protect them, human rights will remain a hostage.

This seems to be the background against which arms collection initiatives emerged at two different levels: at social level and at state level. The former includes all the activities of a civil society aimed at retrieving the means of violence from that society, in order to contribute to the enhancement of a culture of peace. The latter is an exercise undertaken by the state in its struggle to recover the means of violence dispersed by the war.

There is no information available regarding the rules governing the official issue of arms to individual citizens before independence. All that is known, is that between 1964 and 1974, weapons were issued to individual white settlers according to the security imperative imposed by the war. The weaker the state became, the greater the number of weapons issued to settlers to fill the security gap.20

During this period, Frelimo had no motive to take measures for the control of arms. On the one hand, weapons dispersal could help to weaken the colonial state by jeopardising its monopoly over the means of violence, in general, and the proliferation of weapons could constitute a source of arms supply to the guerrilla fighters, in particular. On the other hand, Frelimo, as a guerrilla movement, had to rely on popular mobilisation for its success in the war.

The Lusaka Accord, which provided the framework for the cease-fire and the power transfer at independence, ignored the question of disarmament. It was implicitly left to the Frelimo government to take action in this respect. Naively, or due to the regional and domestic context that emerged with Mozambican independence, the Frelimo government failed to put disarmament on its political agenda. It should be stated quite clearly that the government had no time to take arms control measures, as Rhodesia’s Ian Smith attacked the country shortly after independence, and the war with Renamo broke out. This train of events postponed arms control arrangements indefinitely. Instead, a process of intense militarisation and the arming of the whole society characterised the entire war period

Arms control arrangements in Mozambique arose as a corollary to the recent peace process. It is a reaction to the legacy of both domestic and external conflicts that jeopardised the state’s monopoly over the instruments of violence. Arms control in Mozambique means, to use Rana’s words, "... bring[ing] small arms back under control of the authority of the state functioning through a democratic government which enjoys broad public support."21

The internationally managed disarmament initiative conducted by ONUMOZ as part of the political settlement of the conflict in the country was the first serious attempt to retrieve arms. The failure of the ONUMOZ disarmament component has been extensively analysed. Reading these analyses, the conclusion can be made that, while ONUMOZ was politically successful, it left most of the disarmament to be undertaken by Mozambicans themselves.

Since 1994, the police have been improving strategies to combat crime, and has undergone an extensive reorganisation process. In 1995, the post of General Command of the Police (the equivalent of South Africa’s National Police Commissioner) was introduced. In 1996, Minister Manuel Antonio and his deputy minister who were popularly held as corrupt and incompetent, were dismissed. A Master Plan to curb the numbers of illegal weapons circulating in the country was announced in April 1995. The plan included deploying permanent police units to patrol the main roads, re-establishing district police commands and creating a special unit for arms cache destruction. Given the regional character of the arms problem, the Master Plan also included improved co-operation with the security forces of the neighbouring countries, especially South Africa. Security agreements were immediately signed that allowed cross-border operations.

Although the Master Plan was meant to contemplate crime prevention and combat in general, arms proliferation was its de facto centrepiece. In this regard, two components were envisaged:

• Improved traditional proactive policing aimed at arms confiscation and armed crime combating: This component allowed the deployment of special task forces along the main roads and crime-torn areas.22 Although weapons would be retrieved from society — not only by confiscating them, but also by serving as a stick to compel illegal owners to hand them in — it has been seen as much more of a control measure than a collection initiative, hence it is beyond the scope of this article.

• The establishment of a special task force for the destruction of arms caches: It was initially meant to be an internal response to arms proliferation. However, it has worked from the beginning as the counterpart of the South African Police Service (SAPS) Task Force team that was established, among others, to curb arms smuggling from Mozambique into South Africa as part of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). Mozambican and South African converging interests in arms cache destruction in Mozambique resulted in a joint operation which turned out to be the most important arms collection initiative in the country.

The 1994 general elections in both South Africa and Mozambique presented turning points in the long process of political, social and economic changes. As far as arms, violence, crime and social stability are concerned, the change was characterised by a transformation from predominantly political violence to criminal violence. Violent crime rates threatened to undermine social stability, democracy and human development in both countries.23

Although the countries had individually devised unilateral strategies to curb arms proliferation, the porousness of their borders, the existence of supply networks and routes, the interconnection between illicit arms and other cross-border crimes, namely vehicle theft and drug trafficking, the unilateral successes in both countries became clearly insufficient. For example, SAPS estimates for 1993 to 1995 show that the South African police recover only ten per cent of illegal arms entering the county.24

Co-operation became not a matter of choice, but an imperative. The presidents of the two countries, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and Nelson Mandela of South Africa, met in March 1995 to sign an agreement of co-operation and mutual assistance in the field of crime combating.25

The agreement provided for access to detainees for interrogation purposes, and an exchange of information on arms smuggling. It also allowed the police forces of the two countries to undertake joint operations in response to common safety and security problems (Article 6).

Under the umbrella of this agreement, the SAPS and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) designed Operation Rachel, a joint initiative to destroy arms caches. The philosophical basis underpinning the operations was:

• The recognition of a common problem: For South Africa, it was extremely important that the caches were identified and weapons destroyed to avoid these being smuggled into its territory where they fuelled violent crime.26 For Mozambique, rural safety, the curbing of violence and the general disarmament of its bush were the aims.

• The awareness of each country’s constraints: Mozambique had neither the financial resources nor the expertise to destroy these caches. The SAPS, on the other hand, lacked the necessary knowledge of the Mozambican terrain and the legal right to operate inside the country.

The formula was that South Africa would supply the bulk of the financial resources, landmine resistant vehicles and other specialised equipment, as well as highly trained senior police officials. Mozambique would gather the necessary information and, with its knowledge of the local conditions, facilitate contact with local communities.

Apart from these basic understandings, and perhaps aware of the political complexities around the arms caches, it was necessary to define an appropriate collection strategy for the prevailing situation in the country. It was decided that:

• The operation to destroy arms caches would be intelligence-driven. Both Mozambican and South African police forces would gather intelligence about the location of these caches and would jointly plot them on a global position system (GPS) map. Thereafter, a team of Mozambican and South African police experts would be deployed to the field to destroy the weapons on site.

• The operations would adopt an unorthodox policing approach. While in traditional proactive police operations it could be expected that individuals holding arms caches would be prosecuted, individuals in this case were co-opted, worked with and generally rewarded for disclosing the location of arms caches. The rationale behind this approach is twofold. It is believed that most of the cache caretakers know of more than one cache. Hence, argued a South African police officer "... if you prosecute at the outset you lose his/her co-operation in disclosing other caches."27 In the Mozambican post-conflict situation, in the second place, a proactive police operation ran the risk of being easily politicised as most of the caches were kept for political reasons.28 In other words, the operation should be subordinated to the general goal of political reconciliation in the country. An undeclared amnesty would therefore apply. Given the poverty prevailing in the rural areas of the country, it was decided to reward people who disclosed the whereabouts of arms caches as an incentive. A modest buy-back component was thus included in the operation.

• An equal partnership between the two police forces would be fostered as a confidence-building measure, especially in the light of the past hostile relationship between the security agencies of the two countries.

• A joint command structure would be put in place.

With this structure in mind, the first Operation Rachel was launched on 11 August 1995. Based on the information gathered, appointments were arranged with informants. Local authorities and the population were made aware of the nature of the operation. The briefing sessions were used for public awareness campaigning. The informants subsequently guided the police teams to arms caches. Most of the weapons were buried under the ground. Depending on the assessment of experts on the scene, the weapons were either destroyed on site or moved to an appropriate location where they could safely be disposed of. Sometimes, a public destruction session was arranged with the media invited to attend.

The support of local communities was deemed critical, as they are valuable sources of information. Director Naude, appreciating the role of the local population, stated that if Operation Rachel has been successful, its success should be attributed to the people of Mozambique who, tired of war and violence, did not want any more weapons available in their communities. He goes on to argue that one needs to build schools, hospitals and roads, and provide clean water to reward these communities who suffered so greatly from the ravages of the war and are now willing to get rid of these weapons.29

As conceived, the operation had to tackle the security concerns of both South Africa and Mozambique simultaneously. Each of the task force teams had to be able to see the results in terms of solving the security problems of its own country. The only way that this could be immediately accomplished, was to concentrate on the areas immediately surrounding the countries’ shared border. This would allow both the South African and Mozambican authorities to attach every weapon that was retrieved meaningfully to criminal exploits in their respective countries. South Africa, for instance, could easily convey the message that arms were found and destroyed literally on the border, showing that if these were not destroyed, the potential existed that they could easily cross the border and could be used in criminal activities inside the country. As the head of the National Crime Investigation Service, Wouter Grove stated, "... the operation was a major success for President Nelson Mandela’s community safety plan announced in May [1995]."30 This ensured the unconditional commitment of both countries.

The operation has also managed to attract civil society’s attention. Companies in South Africa were now willing to provide incentives — for instance, sweets — for children and women who handed weapons or ammunition to the team.

By 1998, four such operations had taken place and statistics show that 11 891 firearms, 106 pistols, 6 351 anti-personnel mines and 3 192 337 rounds of ammunition were destroyed. (table 2). These figures represent a success that cannot be underestimated, mainly if considered from a security point of view. Despite the lack of evidence, the perception is that arms smuggling into South Africa has been reduced as a consequence of the Rachel Operations. However, it also remains true that these successes are drops in the ocean of the estimated numbers of weapons that are still in circulation.

As indicated, the prevailing philosophy is that these operations should not be judged in terms of the quantities of recovered weapons vis-à-vis the cost, but in terms of the lives and property that could have been lost if these arms were used by criminals. In this respect, any result is good enough to justify the continuation of the Operation.

Though the results may not be as successful in absolute terms as it has been claimed, both South Africa and Mozambique have indicated that the Operations will continue. The SAPS has indicated that about R1,5 million have been earmarked for 1999. Similarly, the Mozambican Interior Minister, Almerino Manhenje has confirmed that the location and destruction of arms caches remain a top priority for his ministry in 1999.31

Although such an environment is conducive for the Operation to continue, the cost associated with it points to a different direction. Rachel IV cost R1 120 144, twice as much as Rachel III (R649 321). Two factors seem to have contributed to the cost increase: the expansion of the Operation towards the north of the country, and greater awareness of the Operation among informants and cache caretakers. The longer the Operation takes, the more expensive intelligence gathering becomes. Both informants and cache caretakers are well aware that they can get material and financial benefits from the fact that they know where weapons are located. This is especially true in a context of rampant poverty. There is no doubt in Director Naude’s mind that many people sell weapons in the first place or try to get as much out of the Rachel Operations as they can in order to meet their basic needs. A greater focus on development therefore seems necessary to reach a solution for the weapons problem in the country.

These facts challenge the continuation of the Rachel Operations in the near future. Firstly, the Operation is becoming extremely expensive when the common ground is arguably narrowed by decreasing arms smuggling from Mozambique into South Africa. In other words, the prospects that South Africa will remain committed to pay for the Operation beyond the Zambezi River, when cross-border security concerns are diminishing, are unlikely. This means that it is time for Mozambique to mobilise the necessary resources to disarm its bush further north of the Zambezi River. The Mozambican police seem to be ready to continue the work, provided that the financial resources and technical means are made available. But the chances of the Mozambican government taking up such costs are virtually nil, unless a generous aid hand is extended in time as part of the socalled ‘security first’32 approach.

Secondly, while security calculations had initially determined the political will, police officers’ commitment, as well as people’s willingness to support the initiative, these are no longer enough to keep the momentum going. People’s immediate needs and socio-economic development imperatives have been added to the agenda. The debate around the security versus development dichotomy shows that, at some point, security problems cannot be effectively addressed without looking at general socio-economic development issues. Operation Rachel needs to be moved from the traditional security concerns to include wider socio-economic development planning.

Finally, what makes Operation Rachel exceptional is not the fact that it solved the problem for which it was undertaken in the first place, but managed to devise a strategy that combined the different stakeholders in a common cause. It has been able to address both security and political problems. It has also demonstrated that operations of this kind have to be supported by socio-economic development initiatives.

		Table 2: Operation Rachel statistics
		Category		Rachel I		Rachel II		RacheI IIl		Rachel IV								Total
		Firearms		1 120		475		5 584		4 712
														11 891
		Pistols		8		13		78		7				106
		Anti-personnel mines		96		577		518		5 160
													6 351
															88
		Landmines		3		4		4		77
														1 260
		Hand grenades		407		66		336		451
		Hand grenade detonators		-		54		153		217			424
														890
		Detonators		-		230		602		58
																7 015
		Mortars		-		292		3 726		2 997
																			263
		Launchers		43		59		79		82
		Projectiles		202		51		2 340		5 545						8 138
														1 242
		Boosters		219		17		83		923
		Cannons		6		5		13		9
												33
		Round of ammunition		23 182		136 631		3 000 000		155 494				3 315 307
																	5 912
		Magazines		344		577		3 674		1 317
		Other accessories		1 008		694		301		876
															2 879

In response to foreseeable armed violence in the aftermath of the peace process, the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) conceived a project in 1992 called Swords into Ploughshares (known by its Portuguese acronym TAE). The TAE project leaders believed that the prevailing violence in Mozambique was partly caused by the large numbers of available instruments of violence. Therefore, the goal was to help the UN as well as the government in retrieving weapons as part of a much broader effort at enhancing the culture of peace. The TAE project officially started in 1995.

Given the nature of the project, the first step was to create an atmosphere of confidence. Political actors and the police were convinced to step out of the project’s way so that the anonymity and security of the people handing in weapons were guaranteed. The TAE was widely accepted by government institutions, Renamo, national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Resources were mobilised: Germany, Sweden and Japan provided 300 bicycles, fifty sewing machines and other implements valued at about US $1,2 million. The media was widely used to raise public awareness.

The TAE expected that individuals would hand in their weapons in exchange for agricultural implements. This meant that the initial goal was to collect weapons held by individuals. The project expected to collect one weapon for each item exchanged. Collected weapons were to be destroyed and their physical constituents transformed into productive tools such as hospital scissors, small tables, mugs, ploughs, cutlery, and others. However, most of the weapons collected by the project came from caches. In other words, the TAE project failed to tap the initial target market.

In August 1998, the small arms that were collected, numbered approximately 1 750. In a situation where the exact numbers of arms in circulation were unknown, the numbers of arms that were collected, provided little indication of the impact of the programme. According to the TAE project leader, "... we are not thinking about what 1743 small weapons mean out of the existing arms in Mozambique, but we think in terms of the lives that would have been lost with the use of what we have collected."33

The relative success of the arms buy-back programme has been questioned, due to its counterproductive as part of a disarmament undertaking.34 It is argued that such a buy-back programme can be dangerous as it may have a negative effect on the overall objectives of the programme by fuelling illegal arms trade. But in the case of Mozambique, it seems that the demand for arms both within and without the country (especially in South Africa) did not influence the number of weapons being handed in.35 What then are the factors influencing arms collection programme?

There is evidence to suggest that the TAE and the Rachel Operations did not tap the criminal weapons market. Armed crime increased throughout the execution of both the TAE and Operation Rachel. While the overall lack of success can arguably be explained by the lack of resources, different explanations also come into play. In fact, the numbers of collected weapons have no correlation with violent crime rates in the country. While arms-related crimes increased since 1993 and peaked in 1997,36 arms collected by both the police and the TAE show a different picture.

The total arms collected by the TAE and Operation Rachel decreased from 1 400 in 1995 to 1 018 in 1996. The numbers increased to 6 094 in 1997 to decrease again to 5 130 in 1998.

This suggests that the modest success of arms collection depends greatly on the political momentum in the country and, consequently, on the people’s confidence in the twin processes of peace and democratisation.

Sources: SAPS Rachel statistics; CCM, TAE Statistics.

Indeed, if the statistics of collected arms represented in Figure 1 and the political context throughout the period under consideration are related, the following correlation seems to be fairly acceptable. The general elections in October 1994 have been a success. The political environment in 1995 was marked by an overall consensus on the need for joint efforts to reconstruct the country. The highest manifestation of this mood was demonstrated, among others, by the Chissano/Dlakama37 meeting to discuss the arms proliferation problem and the Parliament’s consensus over the government’s five-year programme.

Abrahamsson and Nilsson described this positive political mood among the politicians as the "spirit of reconciliation policy."38 This political environment seems to have determined a fairly high level of confidence in the peace and democratisation process. That is especially true for those who might have kept arms for political reasons. In addition, the reintegration support scheme still provided something for demobilised soldiers to sustain themselves. In such circumstances, the political value of weapons decreased and, ideally, anyone who might have kept a weapon for political reasons was tempted to hand it in at the first opportunity. Some are reported to have abandoned their weapons to be found by the police and the general population throughout 1995 and early 1996.39

However, this popular confidence in the peace and democratisation process diminished in 1996 as the political environment was disturbed. The last expectations of Renamo playing a considerable political role in the country were jeopardised by the discussion around the local elections. The Frelimo government was quite tough in forcing Renamo to vote against the whole local elections bill package. Renamo threatened to block the elections. The tension increased up to the point where both parties’ language suggested a resort to armed actions.40 The confusion around the electoral process led to a high rate of abstention (85,4 per cent).41 At the same time, the reintegration subsidies came to an end in 1996. These had all increased the political value of arms caches. Hence, political control over these caches seemed to have tightened throughout 1996 and cache caretakers became reluctant to disclose their whereabouts to either the TAE or to the police task team. Following the postponement of the local elections, the political atmosphere cooled down during most of 1997, just to heat up again in 1998 with the final discussion on local elections.

Conversely, given the fact that Mozambique has not registered serious political violence since 1994,42 the political value of these caches declined. Thus, economic considerations will certainly determine the decision to hand arms to the TAE, the police or to smugglers.

Recent reports both from TAE field teams and the police task team indicate that the weapons are no longer as politically important as they were in the past. The reason for this appears lodged in the realisation that the political and strategic environment will not allow armed conflict to erupt in the country. For cache caretakers, the reasoning behind this realisation may be the mere fact that, although they witnessed heated political debate over the local election package, for example, the weapons under their control guarded were not being used as a last resort. As matter of fact, the number of caches reported both to the TAE and the police task team had actually increased.43

This means that the political control over these caches has been loosened and that cache caretakers no longer have political reasons to keep them. Recent TAE field reports indicate that, although informants claimed that they were afraid of their political masters when having to disclose the location of weapons caches, this was an excuse to pressure the TAE to provide substantive incentives in exchange for weapons.44 This is in line with the fact that Operation Rachel is becoming increasingly expensive.

It seems that people will tend to disclose the whereabouts of caches to whomever pays the best price. This means that, if arms traffickers pay more than the TAE or the police, weapons from these caches will rather be given to arms dealers to sell wherever have a market.

As discussed above, this is in contrast with shrinking resources to pay for operations of this kind. Thus, it is strongly recommended that more resources are provided to initiatives such as the TAE and Operation Rachel to ensure that the different roleplayers can act as fast as possible to reduce the numbers of arms cache. This will prevent criminals from having access to sources of weapons and hence reduce violent crime, one of the most challenging security concerns in the country. Unless weapons are removed from society — as an important component of the broader process of uprooting the culture of violence — the discourse on human rights will ultimately remain a theoretical exercise.

1 Although there are reports that new weapons are currently entering Mozambique from Bulgaria, Albania and Russia, the most challenging security concern is arms caches. These caches have become not only a source of weapons used in violence throughout the region, thus jeopardising safety and security, but also a thermometer of political transition in the country.

2 It is generally held that arms buy-back programmes are more likely to work when efficient policing is in place to be the ‘stick’. See S Meek, Buy or barter: The history and prospects of voluntary weapons collections programmes, ISS Monograph, 22, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1988.

3 See, among others, I Msabah, Negotiating an end to Mozambique’s murderous rebellion, in I W Zartman (ed), Elusive peace: Negotiating an end to civil wars, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1995, pp. 204-230.

4 United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995, The United Nations Blue Books Series, V, UN, New York, 1996, pp. 11-12.

5 M A Máusse, The social reintegration of the child involved in the armed conflict in Mozambique, in E Bennett (ed), Child soldiers in Southern Africa, ISS Monograph, 37, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, April 1999.

6 UNDP, Mozambique, peace and economic growth: Opportunities for human development, National Human Development Report, UNDP, Maputo, 1998, p. 49.

7 Máusse, op. cit.

8 Richman quoted by Máusse, ibid.

9 See M Chachiua, The status of arms flows in Mozambique, in T Nkiwane, M Chachiua & S Meek, The status of arms flows in Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, ISS Monograph, 35, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, January 1999.

10 See B Mazula, As Eleições Moçambicanas: Uma Trajectoria da Paz e da Democracia, in B Mazula (ed), Moçambique: Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento, Inter-Africa Group, Maputo, 1995, p. 27.

11 J Cock, A sociological account of light weapons proliferation in Southern Africa, P Singh (ed), Light weapons and international security, Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs & British American Security Information Council, Delhi, 1995, p. 101.

12 See C Smith, Light weapons and the international trade, in UNIDIR, Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa, UNIDIR, New York, 1996, p. 35.

13 A Vines, The struggle continues: Light weapons destruction in Mozambique, Basic Papers, 25, 18 April 1998, p. 2.

14 Noticias, 16 July 1995.

15 G Oosthuysen, Small arms proliferation and control in Southern Africa, SAIIA Southern African Series, South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein, 1996, p. 49.

16 Some individuals own weapons by accident. They were either given these during the war or they found them abandoned and are naively afraid to hand them to the authorities.

17 Estimates range between one and six million weapons circulating in the country against 213 951 weapons collected by ONUMOZ. See E Berman, Managing arms in peace processes: Mozambique, UNIDIR, New York, 1996, p. 88.

18 Towards Collaborative Peace, TCP Survey Type one, 96-Moz-10, unpublished document, Institute for Security Studies, undated.

19 Procuradoria Geral da República, Informação Anual à Assembleia da República, Abril de 1998, p. 3.

20 See Chachiua, op. cit.

21 Cock, op. cit., p. 115.

23 See M Shaw, South Africa: Crime in transition, ISS Papers, 17, March 1997.

24 Oosthuysen, op. cit., p. 65.

25 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa in Respect of Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating, signed March 1995.

26 SAPS officials consistently argued that Operation Rachel was a preventive measure of tracking down and destroying weapons in Mozambique before they were smuggled into South Africa. Certainly, this justifies why the operations were consistently concentrated in the southern part of Mozambique and most particularly around the border districts.

27 M Naude, Interview, Pretoria, October 1998.

28 For a discussion on motives behind arms caches, see Chachiua, op. cit.

29 Naude, op. cit.

30 National Crime Investigation Service Chief Wouter Grove quoted by Reuters News Service, 29 June 1995.

31 Almerino Manhenje cited by Mozambique News Agency, Telinforma, 1761, 7 January 1999.

32 This is obvious, given that the financial contribution for the whole operation has been reduced to R15 000 a month allocated to the arms investigation unit that is not only meant for arms collection, but also for combating any arms-related crime.

33 J Muthe, Interview, Maputo, April 1997.

34 See Meek, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

35 This conclusion attempts to take into account that the market price at the time of increasing violence in the country and in KwaZulu-Natal could be above what the project was prepared to give in return for handing in a weapon. See section on the correlation between collected weapons and crime, and political and economic dynamics.

36 Vines, op. cit., p. 6.

37 President Chissano met Dlakama to discuss arms proliferation in the country. Their joint initiative was aborted as Dlakama wanted a joint team to investigate and Chissano found this unacceptable. See Vines, op. cit., p. 8.

38 H Abrahamsson & A Nilsson, The Washington Consensus e Moçambique, Padrigu Papers, Gothenburg University, 1995, p. 11.

39 Vines report that mine clearance companies found that unknown individuals removed uncovered weapons before destruction. See Vines, op. cit.

40 Media Fax editorials question declarations made by Frelimo senior member that suggested there was a force ready to be used if necessary. Media Fax, 2 and 3 June 1998. See also AWEPA, Boletim sobre o processo de paz em Moçambique, 18, Junho de 1997, <www.mozambique.mz/awepa/ awepa18/oprocess.htm>.

41 See I B Lundin, Algumas Reflexões Sobre a alta taxa de abstenção nas Primeiras Eleições Autarquicas em Moçambique um Breve estudo qualitativo, MENSAL, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, 8(4), Novembro 1998, pp. 10-20.

42 In Mozambique, arms have not been used for political violence since 1994, but as a political stick.

43 Interviews with TAE co-ordinator and police officer, Maputo, September 1998.

44 M Chachiua, unpublished field trip report, Institute for Security Studies, August 1998.