The Human Development Report 1999, Oxford University Press, New York, for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1999.

There can be little doubt that the Human Development Report of 1999 is, once again, a remarkable compilation of information in an accessible manner — placing the state of global human development within an understandable, ready to use and readable format. This is the tenth report published by the UNDP and reflects most cogently upon the impact and importance of globalisation as a force to bring economic and social benefits to societies, arguing that "... the free flow of money and trade is matched by the liberating power of the flow of ideas and information driven by new technologies." In fact, much of the report deals with the impact of globalisation upon development and is premised on the recognition that markets serve "... as the central organising principle of global economic life."

The UNDP has long used the human development index (HDI) as an alternative measure of development, supplementing that of gross national product (GNP) alone. As a result, the HDI has become something of a flagship and central theme that runs through the report — yet, by their own admission, the HDI remains a crude instrument and merely an introductory move in getting people interested in the rich collection of information that is presented in the report. Similar to its predecessors, the report contains a wealth of information and sets out a visionary and bold programme of action to underpin global governance into the next century.

The first chapter is entitled Human development in this age of globalisation: information is provided, for example, about the impact of the US $1,5 trillion that is now exchanged in the world’s currency markets each day, and how globalisation is driven by market expansion. While competitive markets may be the best guarantee of efficiency, they do not necessarily guarantee equity. Inequality between and within countries continues to increase with the assets of the top three billionaires now worth more than the combined GNP of all the least developed countries and their 600 million inhabitants.

The second chapter deals with New technologies and the global race for knowledge as the costs of communication technology plummets and the Internet is expected to have more than 700 million users by 2001. The Internet, in particular, poses severe problems for development, creating parallel worlds within which "... the advantage of being connected will overpower the marginal and the impoverished, cutting off their voices and concerns from the global conversation." Liberalisation, privatisation and tighter intellectual property rights are pushing poor people and poor countries to the margin as part of a proprietary regime controlling the world’s knowledge.

The chapter on The invisible heart — care and the global economy is possibly the weakest of the five chapters that make up the heart of the report. Although welcome, its treatment of neglected areas — those tasks of providing for dependents, children, the sick, the elderly and others — is thin and not entirely convincing.

Chapter four is entitled National responses to make globalisation work for human development and presents the argument that, without strong national governance, neither the opportunities nor the threats of globalisation can be effectively managed for human development. Making globalisation work, means capturing global opportunities in trade, capital flows and migration, protecting people against the vulnerabilities created by globalisation and overcoming the resource squeeze from the shrinking fiscal autonomy of the state.

The final chapter, Reinventing global governance — for humanity and equity presents seven key challenges as an agenda for action to secure human development in an era of globalisation. These challenges include an effort to reduce the threat of financial volatility and to remedy the imbalances in the structures of global governance that lie at the root of the speed with which global disparity is rising. These are rich pickings, indeed, for those interested in issues of equity, development and global governance.

Much of the value of Human Development Report has traditionally been in the extensive comparative statistics that are included. The 1999 edition does not disappoint in this regard. Some 25 comprehensive tables present comparative data on gender-related developments, health profiles, education imbalances, aid flows, demographic trends, job security, crime, and much more, among the 174 countries included in the report. Canada, Norway and the United States are at the top of the HDI ranking and Sierra Leone, Niger and Ethiopia at the bottom. Sub-Saharan Africa has more than twice as far to go as Latin America in making up shortfalls in human development. In ten African countries, the impact of Aids has seen life expectancy fall — with up to seventeen per cent in the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The Human Development Report 1999 was released in July and is an invaluable tool for those interested in development, global governance and the challenges that confront the people’s of the world.

Jakkie Cilliers

Institute for Security Studies

J Cilliers and G Mills (eds), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies — Peace Support Missions in Africa, SAIIA/ISS, Johannesburg/Pretoria, 176 pp.

Angola fell apart after the Portuguese colonisers left in haste in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution in the middle of the 1970s. The erstwhile liberation movements were fighting one other for control over Angola. The MPLA, supported by Cuba and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, was opposed by the FNLA led by Holden Roberto, and UNITA, a Chinese-supported guerrilla movement led by Jonas Savimbi. At the time, the FNLA had the support of the CIA and the logistic assistance of the Western-backed kleptocracy of Mobuto Sese Seko in Zaire. UNITA and Savimbi, having bid farewell to communist China in favour of a closer ally, had the fortune of being supported by the then South African Defence Force (SADF) — a relationship that was to last for many years to come. Unfortunately, a Cold War (read: hegemonic struggle between the West and the Warschau Pact led by the Soviet Union) was being waged at the time, and no one considered any peacekeeping or peace support missions. Perhaps the reason was that the apartheid regime had its silent (covert?) admirers in the Congress and Senate of the United States, the United Nations and even within NATO.

By 1988, UNITA and the South African military machine (at the time considered to be one of the largest and most effective forces on the continent together with the Egyptian Army, the Libyan Peoples’ Army and that of Nigeria) succeeded in destroying much of Angola’s economic potential. Famine already threatened about 500 000 Angolan citizens, and more than 20 000 people were maimed by landmines. Foreign debt stood at US $4 billion. Today, the war still continues and the losses are even greater. Private security companies, on request of ailing governments, entered the war on behalf of multinational (read: global) corporations alongside government and anti-government forces. But remember, the Cold War is over. The world’s excuse for not intervening at this moment is that ‘resources are lacking’ and that the North ‘has no strategic interest in Africa’. "Africa will have to sort out its own problems. There is nothing for us to gain," is the discernable subtext. And in the meantime, the Great Lakes region exploded, the kleptocracy in Zaire fell and a fairly undemocratic and unstable Kabila-regime persists precariously in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Eritrea, uneasy peace is shattered regularly as a result of differences between neighbours. Liberia and Sierra Leone stumble from one crisis to another and Nigeria uneasily settles into a civilian regime that has to oversee peace between unequal regions and clashing language groups amidst glaring poverty and foreign exploitation. These are the harsh realities of Africa, to name but a few. Even in a relatively stable Southern Africa (let us not refer to the Southern African Development Community), the government of Dr Robert Mugabe — hero of the Chimurenga — in Zimbabwe seems to run into problems with stability and legitimacy. In northern Namibia, old feuds between SWAPO and CANU-supporters cause tension and occasional violence in the Caprivi Strip, interspersed with brief stability.

With the progressive ‘disengagement’ of Western powers from Africa, except where profit looms, the responsibility (or rather need?) for peacekeeping is falling squarely on Africa’s shoulders. South Africa, as one of the younger and relatively more stable democracies, may find itself picking up (part of) the tab for future peacekeeping. Due to nearly a decade of progressive budget cuts in military spending, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)is less than combat-ready. It is even less ready for its potential new role as peacekeeper, due to a lack of exposure and (re)training. The integration process is far from over and its success is still to be registered. In monetary terms, neither South Africa, nor any other SADC country is capable of venturing into such a peacemaking role without rather stressful economic consequences and a loss of human resources. South Africa’s two own attempts at peacekeeping in the ‘backyard’ were met with suboptimum success, to put it mildly — the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) during the year of the country’s founding elections (1994) and the hasty attempt in 1998 to intervene in a perceived unstable Lesotho on behalf of SADC. The latter took place on short notice after insufficient consultation and lacked the protocols of proper consultation. It left many South Africans with a dented pride, someone may remark. It is against this background that any dialogue or discussion on peacekeeping or peace support missions in Africa will have to be viewed.

This may be a rather long — yet necessary — introduction. Under review is From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies, edited by Cilliers and Mills. The book flowed from an earlier conference held in 1999 in Johannesburg, though chapters were added to the original contributions in retrospect. A white paper has been tabled on peace operations since then in South Africa. This document, however, does not translate into the readiness and capability of such a role by South Africa.

Fools rush in where angels fear to tread. And foresight (and preparation) is better than the sorrows of hindsight. For this reason, the book is an important contribution that is not nearly timely enough, but may at least assist in the process (and possible practice) that is to come. It is to the credit of the editors and contributors that this most necessary discussion is pioneered.

The introduction deals with peacekeeping on the problematic continuum of ‘keeping the peace’ to ‘more complex emergencies’. African experience has shown that the latter is more likely than the former. This chapter by Cilliers and Mills provides a necessary and useful background to peacekeeping in Africa. That the challenges are immense, is known, but Cilliers and Mills point out that they are likely to present themselves, that little support is likely to be forthcoming and that the tab (even with suboptimum capacity) is likely to be presented for payment to Africans themselves.

Malan debunks some myths on peacekeeping in Africa. Peacekeeping is likely to become necessary at any moment and sometimes without sufficient early warning. Structures to enable/enact this are weak. Subregional arrangements have a major role to play — provided that compatibility, common ground, competence, communication and credibility can be achieved. More so, there is a need for a crisp organisational focus and ‘a phased approach’ to regional (and continental?) peacekeeping. A competently and challenging chapter.

Neethling of the Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS) deals with the use of UN observer missions in Africa, inclusive of the pros and cons of such missions. While the UN remains the principal organ with the prerogative to intervene in peacemaking, many structural elements are lacking and capabilities restricted. Neethling sums it up appropriately in his statement that "all relevant role-players could (should — author’s insertion) have a set of broad principles or modalities for responsibilities to ensure regional security" (p. 44). While UN operations are becoming smaller and presumably more sophisticated, their success levels are not very impressive. Therefore, Neethling stresses the need for "a firm and widened coalition to respond to the challenge in Africa" (p 44).

Landsberg writes on being "willing but unable", a metaphor fit for the current situation, where Renaissance discourses and the resultant over-optimism are likely to eschew analysis and action. There is also the deceptive overestimation of own capacities to be dealt with through planning and reflective debate. The need for a continental contract zone on security co-operation and development is mooted. Some optimism is to be found in this chapter, but implicit causation is rendered for the observant reader. As every observer knows, contract zones do not establish themselves...

Ero uses ECOMOG as a relevant case study in a potentially useful chapter on lessons (to be) learned. Likewise, Aning deals with ECOMOG as a subregional approach to peacekeeping and its problems and outcomes, providing more data for lessons learned and to be learned. These chapters are informative reading for practitioners and state officials. When read in tandem with Neethling’s chapter this limited comparative approach is useful and informative.

Hutchful takes a critical look at the Ghanaian attempt to restore peace in strife-torn Liberia. His evaluative comments pose good food for thought and even more for those that are of the opinion that the South Africa of today is ready to become the heraut of peace on the continent. In conjunction with the chapters by Ero and Aning, his chapter provides an initial and tentative framework for further comparative — and may I add, applied — research. Much more research is needed in the comparative field, though.

Sibanda a deals with lessons from UN peacekeeping missions from UNAVEM to MONUA in Angola. While he agrees with the principle of concurrent activity he points out that bypassing planned and systematic benchmarks can derail peacekeeping, more so if much are to be done with little resources. This is a valuable chapter on lessons learned, apart from the heart-warming experience of reading a practical and reasonable analysis by a foot soldier.

Cilliers reflects on regional peacekeeping in Africa. He ponders whether the concept is a mythical construct or an essential tool. He points out that self-fending have to develop colaterally with growing consensus and state ordering. A need for serious applied policy work is pointed out. Unless the former prerequisites are met, ‘dreambuilding’ may become disastrous — even if with good intentions.

Williams looks at challenges for non-consensual peace missions. Consensual peacekeeping and the link with peacebuilding are crisply pointed out in a well-written chapter. What is perhaps missing, is the problematique of UN missions losing their ‘flavour’ because of undercommitment, resulting in less efficiency in achieving their goals (Angola being an example). A further problem is also understated: the UN is becoming tarnished in the eyes of some because of the Security Council’s domination by Big Brother (US) and its loyal twin (Britain). At the recent OAU conference, Thabo Mbeki pointed to this evolving problem, and the uncertain (even antagonistic) reception of UN forces in Timor seems to support this reservation.

A useful glossary is included at the end of the publication.

The book is as timely as it can humanly be. It provides valuable case studies, a useful warehouse (though restricted) of data for lessons learned and some good speculative and evaluative insights. A good start is made with comparative research, though this element can be further developed. The book is indeed an important contribution to the field of (applied) research on peacekeeping and peace support operations.

What is missing, however, is some detailed work/contributions on the role of early warning, diplomacy and consensual peace missions. More could be said on protocols and procedures and steps in preparation of a regional peacekeeping role. A more bold chapter on continental peacebuilding/peacekeeping and the development of a continental protocol would have been most welcome. The work is well balanced in terms of realistic analysis, crystal ball-gazing and outright Renaissance lingua. The latter is a worthy optimism, but devoid of sober analysis, realistic stocktaking, action preparedness and proper preparation within prebargained contract zones.

An index would have been useful for cross-referencing and quick searches on concepts, names and topics.

The book is good reading for practitioners, theorists (even politicians), staff of departments of Foreign Affairs, security agencies, diplomats, and those employed by those employed by non-governmental organisations in the field. Even those within civil society who want to know more about a debate growing in prominence. Theory builders may find it less useful, but those in search of applied research will benefit substantially from it.

Ian Liebenberg

Group: Democracy and Governance

Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)