The definition of defence requirements is one of the fundamental and often crucial questions facing governments in peacetime. It is nothing other than the age old question of ‘guns or butter’. Today, it is generally accepted that the answer to this question is not a matter of guns or butter, but rather of finding a balance between national expenditure on guns and butter. The question is thus not an argument between social and defence spending, but rather one of determining the most appropriate balance between these two necessities. Obviously, in peacetime the scale will lean heavily towards the social and welfare needs, especially in the underdeveloped and developing world. This must however not be done in such a way that the security of the nation is jeopardised.

All governments have two fundamental responsibilities towards their people. These are to ensure their well-being and their security. (In fact, the primary reason for the existence of the state up to the recent past was the requirement to ensure the security of its citizens.) It can also be stated that governments are in the business of creating the preconditions for the generation of wealth and prosperity and for ensuring the protection of such prosperity.

The well-being of people and their security cannot be subdivided. Lack of security, the inability to protect one’s values and valuables, the feeling of vulnerability, the exposure to the whims of others, are fundamentally counter to the concept of well-being. From another perspective and when viewed more liberally, security cannot be restricted only to safety from physical attack, but includes the concept of security of the individual.

It is for this reason that the South African White Paper on Defence recognises security as "... an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessitiesof life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being."

The White Paper further states that, "[a]t national level the objectives of security policy therefore encompass the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability. Stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.

At international level the objectives of security policy include the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African state, and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa."

It is in the light of these considerations that the government and defence planners in South Africa must find answers to real and realistic defence requirements. This article is an attempt to contribute to this debate.

In the first place, the theoretical framework for defining defence capabilities will be discussed. The basic theory of ends, ways and means underlying the force design process will be explained. In terms of defence ends, the evolving security environment is examined by means of a brief analysis of external and internal security trends and South African defence policy. In terms of ways, employment concepts are discussed, focusing on defence strategy, defence tasks and operational concepts. The examination of means argues the implications of the above factors on the force design of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). A broad view of the capability areas or force element that should be included in the force design is presented, as well as an indication of its financial implications. The article concludes with remarks on the dilemma presented by the discrepancy between defence policy and funding.

The determination of defence requirements is an integrated process between the government as the representative of the people, and defence experts who serve as advisors to the government in their professional capacity. In technical terms, the determination of defence requirements is the resolution of the triangle of ends, ways and means. The ends of defence address the question of what outcomes and outputs are required from defence in pursuit of national interests and goals. The ways are determined by the alternative postures, concepts of operations and doctrines open to defence, and the means are the required military capabilities deduced from these ends and ways.

In resolving these matters, the government prescribes the ends of defence. It is ultimately the responsibility of the government to define the functions that it wishes its defence force to fulfil. The definition of the ways or methods of defence is an interactive process between the government and defence experts. The government lays down the national defence posture and the rules and principles to which defence planners must adhere, while defence experts advise government on strategies and doctrines. Once these decisions have been taken, it is largely the responsibility of defence experts to determine the capabilities required to give effect to these prescripts. This combination of capabilities (or force design) will determine the required defence budget. This makes it essential for the force design process to be iterative, as the cost implications might compel the government to reconsider some of its previous decisions. Although force design is thus inherently needs driven, it will also be constrained by cost. This interactive process was followed during the South African Defence Review process. 

Figure 1 demonstrates this process in the form of a scale. It shows that the scale can be brought in balance by either reducing the ends, changing the defence posture and the concepts of operations, or by increasing the resources. If not in balance, as shown, this will imply a certain strategic risk.

As stated above, it is the government that prescribes the ends of defence as it is ultimately the responsibility of the government to define the functions that it wishes its Defence Force to fulfil. However, it is obvious that the security environment in which a country finds itself will strongly influence this appreciation. It is also apparent that, in times of interstate tension and conflict, conventional defence thinking will be dominant. In times of peace, where conventional threats are absent, governments tend to seek more ‘peacetime utility’ from their defence establishment. This is often referred to as the ‘peace dividend’.

The modern world is characterised by rapid change. This has led to the management dictum that pre-warning of change is the only competitive advantage. It is therefore important to be constantly aware of possible change by carefully monitoring the strategic environment.

On the international scene, the end of the Cold War has brought about new uncertainties in a volatile and unpredictable international environment. Old alignments have disappeared and potential conflicts, previously suppressed by superpower rivalry, have reappeared. Developments in Yugoslavia and the tension between the newest nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, among others, demonstrate the fragility of world peace.

Of equal concern is the development of the so-called ‘new threat patterns’, such as:

organised transnational crime;

the re-emergence of piracy on the high seas;

new terrorism by non-state actors (including nuclear, biological and chemical threats);

information warfare;

threats to embassies, ships, aircraft and other offshore assets;

mass migrations due to internal conflicts or economic collapse; and

environmental degradation.

On the African continent, there are disturbing developments in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. The conflict in Angola continues and is disruptive to stability and development in the Southern African region.

Africa is furthermore characterised by:

The dire economic and socio-economic position of many countries on the continent may lead to the total collapse of some states and to general anarchy.



The prevalence of intrastate conflict as opposed to interstate conflict has dangerous spillover effects that can threaten neighbouring states.



The emergence of opposing interventions by other African states in the intrastate conflicts of others may lead to direct interstate conflict. This is exemplified by the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.



The marginalisation of Africa by the so-called developed world means that the latter is increasingly less inclined to get involved in the resolution of African conflicts and problems.



The proliferation of small arms, as well as the easy access to ‘leftover’ weapons systems as a result of the end of the Cold War pose real threats to Africa’s stability.

For South Africa, its internal levels of crime and violence are still unacceptably high and are likely to remain so for the near future. This situation can only be contained in the short to medium term through the employment of the security forces, but the long-term solution lies in economic growth, job creation and education. The country’s borders remain vulnerable to illegal immigration and transborder crime, necessitating the deployment of the security forces. Furthermore, the capacity for disaster relief, search and rescue missions and large-scale humanitarian missions does not exist in civil society, compelling the security services to provide for such services.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, makes it clear that the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the country, its territorial integrity and its people.

The White Paper on Defence clearly spells out South Africa’s strategy for the protection of the state and its people through the hierarchy of:

political, economic and military co-operation with other states;

the prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means; and

the use or threat of force as a measure of last resort.

The White Paper on Defence argues that the government’s preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will therefore only turn to military means when deterrence and non-violent strategies have failed. Deterrence requires defence capabilities that are sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors. The White Paper thus states the need to maintain a core conventional defence capability.

The South African Defence Review argued that the SANDF should be designed around the demands of its primary function — the defence of South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people against external military aggression. It allowed for certain additions to this design for priority tasks such as border control, peace support operations and police tasks, but argued that these and all other secondary tasks should ideally be executed by means of the collateral utility inherent in the design for the primary task.

The Defence Review developed the concept of a peacetime core force as a force that can execute contingencies of a short-term nature at short notice, but that will need warning and a period of growth for larger scale contingencies for which warning can realistically be expected. This is an important concept in that it reduces defence expenditure during peacetime. The risks involved in such a concept, of course, are numerous and include wrong assumptions of warning times, the non-acceptance of such indicators by decision makers and the inability to expand capabilities in time. Despite this and given the constraint of available finances, there is great merit in this approach and it is submitted that it will become a basic premise in defence planning in many developing countries. Where it is not possible to maintain large standing forces, the concept of the retention of core growth capabilities and expertise, is probably the only alternative.

However, defence policy is not static, but changes to adapt to changes in the environment. De facto defence policy calls for the SANDF to play a meaningful and supportive role in the national strategy to advance the African Renaissance. This strategy is outward-looking and seeks to promote security through engagement with Africa to foster conditions of stability, growth and development on the continent. Defence roles that emanate from this strategy, such as support in peacebuilding, stability projection, participation in peace missions, pacts and alliances will inevitably have force design implications. The Chief of the SANDF, addressing members on occasion of the fifth anniversary of the force on 27 April, said that:

"It is clear that our priority is the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, with particular reference to Southern Africa. The instability in our region has already led to a number of conflicts within states, between rival political forces, and aided by other national defence forces. All carry the danger of spreading beyond the borders of the countries concerned. This leads to the conclusion that there will be increasing demands for the SANDF to become committed to peacekeeping, peace support or even peace enforcement operations."

De facto policy, for the internal role of the SANDF, shows an increased responsibility for border control (land, sea and air) and a long-term commitment to the support of the South African Police Service (SAPS) in the maintenance of law and order. It is envisaged that the SANDF will increasingly be called upon to assist in the field of human security as set out in the White Paper on Defence.

From an analysis of the evolving security environment and South African defence policy, it is clear that the strategy for the defence of South Africa and its people should be three pronged. The three elements of this strategy are:

the promotion of peace and stability in support of the African Renaissance (promoting regional security), i.e. defence through prevention and containment of conflict; this includes peacebuilding;



maintaining the ability to defend and protect the country (core defence capabilities); this includes the element of deterrence; and



the promotion of a safe and secure environment in South Africa in support of the growth and development objectives of the government; this focuses on human security.

It can also be stated that the SANDF’s strategy is "[t]o ensure effective defence for South Africa through the professional execution of its peace-time functions and duties whilst maintaining a conventional growth core capable of expanding within appreciated warning periods to meet larger defence contingencies."

The above strategy must further be expressed in the form of those tasks that the SANDF must execute or must be able to execute to form a basis for the force design of the SANDF. With regard to the three elements of the strategy, these tasks are:

participation in conflict prevention, resolution and management;



participation in confidence and security-building measures;



participation in the establishment of a common security regime (the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and others);



the execution of international obligations;



the management of effective early warning of conflict;



the maintenance of core capabilities;



the provision of the required level of deterrence;



upholding of law and order in the country in co-operation with the SAPS;



border control;



the protection of marine resources;



the preservation of life, health and property;



the provision and maintenance of essential services; and



support to civil authority.

The force design implications of these tasks are discussed in the last section of this article.

In terms of the concepts of operations, certain new developments need to be acknowledged in defence planning in the African environment. These include:

The increasing role of the OAU through the interstate Central Organ for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts that is empowered to intervene in an attempt to resolve conflicts on the continent has to be noted. This will impact upon the freedom of action of individual states and also increase the demand for collective action in times of crises.



The intrastate nature of conflict will require more emphasis on the use of minimum force and the development of appropriate forces, doctrines and tactics.



The very nature of the requirement to prevent and contain conflict presupposes rapid response capabilities to be able to act before situations get out of hand.



The emphasis on human security will demand the expansion of expertise in defence forces to become more involved in non-traditional military tasks.



The new threat patterns will require the development of appropriate concepts of operation to be able to counter them successfully. Most important will be the development of doctrines and tactics against non-state initiated information warfare and terrorism using biological and chemical agents.

The greatest impact on force design or means deduced from the above will be the realisation that the premise that a defence force designed for its primary function only will be able to execute its other functions through its collateral utility, is not valid.

Defence against external conventional military aggression implies certain characteristics in equipment, operations around one’s borders, internal lines of communication and the relative proximity of support structures. Peace missions and other operations in compliance with international obligations, on the other hand, have different demands. These include:

The emphasis therefore shifts from heavy ground mobile forces to light air and sea mobile forces. Other important emerging functions will similarly place specific demands on force design. Border control and policing functions require large numbers of light and/or motorised infantry, continuous air and maritime patrols and territorial forces. Search and rescue and other humanitarian and disaster relief missions require specialised equipment not always provided for in conventional military forces.

There will thus be a quantitative and qualitative difference between a force design based on a primary function orientation only, and that which is required for the broader spectrum of modern defence functions.

It is not the intention of this article to go into a detailed discussion of exact types and quantities of all the capability areas or force elements required to be able to give effect to the described strategy and tasks, but rather to give a broad interpretation of the implications of defence policy, the described strategy and tasks expressed in practical terms. This is contained in table 1.

Table 1

Driver: Strategy element	Capability Area and Force Elements
1 Maintenance of the ability to defend and protect the country	Air Fighter squadrons Air defence systems IFR and EW aircraft Airborne reconnaissance systems
Tasks: Maintenance of core defence capabilities Provision of deterrence	Maritime Submarines Surface combatants Combat support ships Mine hunters and mine sweepers
	Land Infantry formations (Mechanised and Motorised) Armour formations Artillery formations Anti-aircraft formations Engineering formations Paratroop formations Special forces
	Medical Medical battalions
2 Promotion of peace and stability in support of the African Renaissance Tasks: "Participation in conflict prevention, "resolution and management Participation in confidence and security-building measures Participation in the establishment of a common security regime Execution of international obligations Management of effective early warning of conflict Peace support operations	Military attachés Defence intelligence structures Defence foreign relations structures Defence liaison structures Light air and sea mobile land forces Strategic air transport Strategic sea lift and transport Air transport for diplomatic initiatives Air and sea mobile medical services Air and sea mobile engineers Search and rescue capabilities
3 Promotion of a safe and secure environment in South Africa Tasks: Upholding law and order in the country in co-operation with the SAPS Border control Protection of marine resources "Preservation of life, health and property" Provision and maintenance of essential services Support to civil authority	Territorial land forces Light and motorised infantry Engineers Light air reconnaissance Light air transport Transport helicopters Inshore patrol vessels Disaster relief capabilities Search and rescue capabilities Hydrographic capabilities Naval divers VIP aircraft

The table lists the three main elements of the strategy with their associated tasks as force design drivers and then gives an indication of the requirements in terms of capability areas or force elements. This is not intended to be a complete list of all requirements, but rather serves to clarify the arguments in the article. Quantities are not indicated, but for costing purposes are based on the view of the author of the minimum numbers associated with the concept of a growth core force or the quantities required to be able to provide services at present levels. Anything less than these quantities falls below the critical mass that makes such a capability viable.

The capabilities indicated in the table must be supported by structures such as headquarters, training establishments, general support bases, maintenance depots and administrative service centres. All these operational and support structures must be fully functional and sustainable. If not, they should rather be excluded from the SANDF structure. The full costing of such structure elements consists of their annual cost regarding personnel, operating and capital equipment maintenance and replacement. In successive design exercises conducted by the Department of Defence during the last two years, the full cost of a force of this nature, together with the employment costs at present levels of operation, amounts to an annual defence budget requirement of around two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).

By contrast, the defence budget, as indicated in the government’s medium term expenditure framework (MTEF), is presently set at 1,5 per cent of GDP. This produces the dilemma of a substantial discrepancy between the requirements emanating from national defence policy and the funding of the defence function by the government.

This situation cannot be allowed to continue as it will inevitably lead to all capability areas declining to below critical mass and therefore becoming ineffective. It needs to be addressed by means of a policy review as a matter of priority.

The force design of a defence force is the final expression of the appreciation of the roles and functions and the posture, doctrine and operational concepts that are determined by the political leaders and principals of that defence force. It will of necessity be driven by needs, but will also be constrained by resources.

In the African scenario, at the threshold of the 21st century, the design of continental defence forces will be influenced by the economic problems facing most of the continent, the great need for socio-economic upliftment, the relative absence of interstate military conflict,but the prevalence of intrastate conflict, the need for collective security actions and the role of non-state actors in security matters.

For these reasons, it is submitted that military planners concerned with the subject of force design in democratic countries on the African continent will have to take cognisance of the following considerations:

The concept of a core force maintaining growth potential and expertise for future expansion if and when required, will ensure that defence expenditure can be limited to allow for the real and crucial socio-economic developments needed as the foundation of the African Renaissance without permanently losing capabilities. This is an area that needs specific study and conceptualisation.



The design of the force will have to be extended to include a vast array of non-traditional defence contingencies. The priority tasks of peace missions, border control, the combating of organised transnational crime, the maintenance of essential services, disaster relief and others, will have to be accommodated in force designs.



More use will have to be made of part-time or reserve forces as these support the core force concept and provide an essential basis for growth and expansion when required.



Specific investment into sound intelligence and early warning mechanisms is a prerequisite for the core force concept. If this is not created, the competitive advantage of fore-warning and time to grow and prepare the force will be lost.



Force designs will have to take specific cognisance of emerging new threat patterns. Information warfare, mass migrations, piracy and ‘new’ terrorism need special attention.



The development of efficient and effective concepts of operations to combat many of these new threats and to execute new functions will need specific attention.



Force designs will increasingly have to take note of requirements for common security, allowing for interoperability between national forces.



More emphasis will have to be placed on light, highly mobile and flexible forces. Air and sea transportability will be a basic requirement.



An effective balance between ground, air and naval forces remains a requirement. When planning with uncertainty, balance ensures flexibility.

The above list is not exhaustive and studies by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can greatly contribute to the definition of these important considerations.

In the final analysis, it is not possible either to list or even to try and prescribe all the considerations for force design. As already stated, the current world is extremely fluid and unpredictable and even to contemplate that any list of considerations can be exhaustive, would be folly. This article has attempted no more than to present some ideas to add to the debate. However, it is submitted that the ends, ways and means model, as described, presents an enduring framework for force design in any environment and epoch. This process must be iterative and inclusive to ensure that the final force design supports policy and is both affordable and sustainable.