In times of relative peace and in the absence of direct military threats, the major debate that faces any defence force is that of its appropriate size and shape. This is indeed the current situation in the South African Army where budget constraints impede on meeting the requirements for its landward defence capability.

South African security and defence policies are rooted in assessments of its national interests, and how these interests can be promoted within the domestic, regional and international setting, now and in the future. This is undertaken in conjunction with other Chiefs of divisions in the Ministry of Defence and, where it is sensible to do so, with allies and partners.

The South African White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review represent the defence policy of the South African government. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 106 of 1996, established a framework for democratic civil-military relations. The SA Army derives its mandate from these policy documents, as well as from the strategic direction provided by the Department of Defence (DoD).

The SA Army mandate centres around the provision of combat-ready forces and its primary role is the development of a landward defence capability. The mandate, including the imposed tasks, comprises the following:

the management of its landward defence capability;



the provision of the army component of the landward defence capability;



the administration of allocated general support bases;



the administration of the career management of all personnel in army uniform up to and including the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, but excluding personnel functionaries; and



the administration of forces employed in the field (this includes the scheduling of forces, mobilisation and demobilisation, and support to the second line).

The primary and enduring purpose of the DoD is to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Africa, and to help in sustaining the nation’s wider security interests. In this, the SA Army has a particular role to play. Since April 1994, the operational commitments of the SA Army have included support to the South African Police Service (SAPS) in the maintenance of law and order and border control, as well as humanitarian aid, both internally and externally. This has been done through the use of its collateral capability.

In future, military commitments will include increasing involvement in United Nations (UN), Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) peace missions and the provision of humanitarian aid. Recent operations in Central Africa and Lesotho bear witness to this task, while active involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might soon be added.

This means that the SA Army has to be prepared to meet, at short notice and possibly in conjunction with the UN or the OAU, a range of possible security challenges and operational commitments that could arise in Southern Africa and perhaps, in the longer term, elsewhere in the world.

Faced with today’s often unpredictable challenges, everyone involved in South Africa’s defence efforts need to have a clear understanding of the reasons why the country has armed forces, how these forces fit into the overall pattern of national security, and what principles are applicable. In short, the military strategic environment, the military strategy of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the role that the SA Army is required to fulfil in executing military strategy have to be understood.

Notwithstanding the series of joint warfare manuals in revision, a military strategy and specifically a joint concept of operations for defence are yet to be produced that would indicate what the force design should be in order to meet the rapidly changing environment of the SANDF’s defence responsibilities. These concepts, however, will be addressed during the military strategic planning cycle that has been initiated by the Chief of Joint Operations in which the SA Army will actively participate. Principles of war, manoeuvre theory and mission command will serve as primary drivers for the development of the SA Army’s strategy. This will be developed as a matter of high priority to serve as a common vehicle for expression and a common plane of thought. Its purpose will be to guide, elaborate on, and provide the basis for further study and informed debate.

The SA Army provides the landward defence capability of the SANDF and must be maintained as a strategic asset of the state. However, expenditure on the SA Army must be commensurate with the SANDF’s and other national priorities. This has led to the demand that defence should be adequate, appropriate, affordable and accountable in relation to the realities that pertain to the SANDF in particular, and South Africa in general.

The problem is therefore to provide an army that meets these criteria and that is capable of performing its assigned functions and tasks effectively at the same time. These conflicting requirements have led to the SANDF adopting a ‘core force’ approach to determine force design and force structure. The core force approach is based on the critical assumption that sufficient warning will be given of the development of medium and long-term contingencies to allow for the effective expansion of the force to take place in order to counter these. It is thus necessary to develop a methodology that will determine the minimum force levels required to meet short-term contingencies and that, at the same time, will provide for sustainability, expansion and deterrence to meet longer term contingencies.

The approach to the ‘core growth capability’ of the SA Army must be included in the ‘holistic strategic issue’ that addresses the matter of a sustainable force design and structure.

A new logic is developing in the SA Army — an approach that will shape it for decades to come. This new approach draws on employee involvement, mission command, transformational leadership, total quality management, re-engineering and the creation of a new culture and spirit through shared values. Involvement is used as a source of control. Work is structured so that people are empowered and able to add significant value. Systems thinking and lateral processes are emphasised. The organisational structure is designed around core business, sound client-supplier relationships and the delivery of quality products and services. Effective leadership is practiced throughout the SA Army. A learning and a teaching culture is being established.

To achieve the above, the SA Army has adopted a two-tier strategy that will deploy as follows:

a long-term strategy where the focus is on the creation of a ‘new’ army; and



a short-term strategy with the focus on the establishment of a firm base for the creation of a new army.

The long-term strategy is developed through three stages:

the creation of a sustainable, affordable force;



the creation of a core growth capability that will contain the growth potential for the development of an envisaged war force; and



the creation of a war force should the need ever arise.

The above strategy is to be based on a thirty-year plan. Appropriate medium and long-term contingency strategies still have to be developed. These will be based on envisaged demands beyond 2015 and the requirements of the future battlefield.

It is interesting to note that the first stage of the strategy focuses on development and creation, while the second stage will be committed to continuity, durability and sustainability of force design, force structure and performance. Stage three will be based on contingency planning.

The short-term strategy is developed with the following three objective in mind. The first is to structure and manage for sustainability. This implies the establishment of an optimal force design and structure that is aligned to current and emerging military strategy and policy and the vision of the DoD and the SA Army. Furthermore, it also implies the closing down of certain structures and the creation of new ones. This includes the following:

the implementation of the command and control system of the transforming SA Army;



the implementation of general support bases;



the implementation/adaptation of fourth level structures; and



the closure of formations and command headquarters, support units, operational units, group headquarters and the SA Army headquarter unit.

The second objective is to develop capacity. The outcome of this will be an output-based approach and continuous improvement. The approach is one of integration where lateral processes are emphasised. The business of directing, structuring, preparing and supporting the force is thus to be constituted as a whole.

Thirdly, a growth environment must be created. This dynamic focus area results in commitment and esprit de corps — the spirit of the new army. It addresses a particular approach to leadership and the creation of a new culture based on seven identified core values. The outcomes of sound culture and norms are high productivity, satisfaction and individual growth. These imply action in two vital areas:

the institutionalisation of transformational leadership, mission command, total quality management, civic education, the DoD culture, a learning/teaching culture, generally accepted accounting principles, and performance management; and



the implementation of the SA Army’s integrated change management and communication programme.

The IPAF system is a subsystem of the DoD system. It provides a landward combat-ready defence capability, supported to the second line. Combat-ready forces implies combat-ready user systems (units and their subsystems), and higher order user systems (higher order combat groupings such as combat groups and formations).

The Army Office directs, orchestrates and controls units through type and support formations. Service agreements will be concluded with other DoD divisions to ensure the full support and interoperability of army forces.

Several ‘mission success factors’, governing the SA Army strategy, were identified.

The SA Army structure should provide for sustainability and affordability. The maintenance of a core growth capability was accepted as a priority task for the SA Army as a prudent and viable option in the light of a constrained budget. The expansion capability of the SANDF will be vested in the Reserve Forces. Cognisance is to be taken of the fact that the SANDF will reflect ‘jointness’ and promote combined capabilities. A core growth capability includes a balanced and sustainable nucleus with the ability to:

deal with contingencies of a short-term nature;



deal with a range of contingencies; and



expand the size of the defence force to appropriate force levels within a realistic warning period should the threat situation deteriorate significantly.

This nucleus must also be able to do the maintenance and, where necessary, the adequate and appropriate upgrading or replacement of equipment and weaponry, and possess an effective intelligence capability to ensure early warning of potential conflicts and crises. The SA Army considers mobility, and effective command and control and information systems as essential force capabilities.

The development of a viable and credible defence capability depends upon the availability of human resources and the competence to develop cohesive combat units, formations and larger combat forces. Appropriate recruitment, selection and staffing of the ‘one force’ will be imperative. The educational, scientific and technological development of society will have to be taken into consideration. This factor also highlights the importance of a quality education, training and development system.

The sustainability of a force, from its home base and in the theatre of operations, influences the tempo, duration and intensity of operations. It concerns the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objective in peace and in wartime.

The issue of sustainable force support requires additional comment. It concerns the:

sustenance and moral well-being of people;

maintenance of material;

provision of expendable material; and

replacement of casualties.

It is not a discrete function, but covers the means whereby combat power is maintained so that operations can be conducted successfully. It is therefore an integral part of preparation, planning and implementation. The SA Army is to provide specifically for sustaining the following processes as part of an integrated DoD support system in a cost-effective and efficient manner:

education, training and development;

personnel;

logistics;

intelligence;

command and management information;

the acquiring of material, systems and services;

legal support;

combat crime support;

financial management support;

corporate communication support; and

chaplaincy services.

The force preparation process is designed to cater for change to be introduced as a complete package encompassing doctrine, force structure, equipment, personnel and training. For the process to be successful, an active and committed contribution of all members of the Army is required. Training is viewed as a force multiplier.

Training provides the means to practice, develop and validate, within certain constraints, the practical application of common doctrine. Equally important, it provides the basis for schooling commanders and staffs in exercising command and control.

The essential characteristics of a good combat force are that it must be well-trained and disciplined. Training should add value and be based on the competencies required at different levels to build individual and organisational capacities. Appropriate training and operational doctrine give cohesion to a force and bring it to a state of preparedness.

Discipline derives and flows from training and plays a fundamental role that is essential to the philosophy of training. The essential characteristics of excellent training and good discipline are apparent in every military achievement, whether in times of peace or war. Excellent training also impacts upon the development of strong leadership, clear command and management concepts, military professionalism, the development of a military culture, esprit de corps and the respect for the Law on Armed Conflict.

Knowledge is power: the synthesis of military power in an organisation is the product of the synthesis of knowledge. Unity, self-confidence and high morale are its outcomes. Mutual trust, understanding, faith and teamwork are the binding factors. The result is combat cohesion that is the bulwark against alienation, chaos and fear on the battlefield. It is thus essential that the future Army must be well-trained, well-led and highly disciplined.

The requirements of mobile warfare (manoeuvre theory) emphasise morale, the development of character and the belief in a doctrine. Many of the demands are psychological, stemming from uncertainty, lack of routine and lack of a sense of security. The physical demands result from constant movement, lack of protection from the climate and lack of food and medical supplies. Even when not engaged in battle, the rigours of mobile warfare sap the energy and courage of soldiers who are not conditioned for it. The root of the problem therefore lies in how to prepare the individual for the physical and psychological demands of warfare in Africa.

Conditioning for mental circumstances is based on morale and mental training. Morale is not a transitory emotion like happiness or depression, and it should not be confused with contentment or a feeling of well-being. It is a spontaneous tendency, an inclination resulting from a condition of small persistent circumstances or broken by some major catastrophe. Morale is the instinct that enables people to face the fear of death and injury undaunted and to endure hardship. It is the will of the individual and of a unit to fight and suffer heroically.

Strong leadership provides the decisive edge and is the most essential dynamic of operational effectiveness. It ensures astounding success, even in daily work and life. The choice of leaders and of methods for educating, training and developing leaders for the Army will probably set the tone and direction for this country and Africa’s future. It would appear as if few defence forces in Africa possess an institutionalised leadership, command and management philosophy, strategy or design.

The challenge to the SA Army is quite clear. The choice of leaders and of methods for developing future leaders should be addressed as a strategic issue. Appropriate leadership, command and management concepts that will satisfy the needs and requirements of the country’s combat forces, should be developed. Concepts should make provision for forces acting in unison as part of a coalition force in Africa. Such concepts could be launched as a combined project so that countries can learn from one another. These evolving leadership concepts should incorporate the ‘African way’.

There is no simple formula for leadership. Leadership is about influence and action — and Africa is begging for leadership. To be truly comprehensive, African leadership theory must pass the test of local applicability in diverse cultural, geographic, political, economic, social and military settings, not only now, but also in future.

Technology is to be selectively developed and/or acquired, locally or internationally. Advanced technology is to ensure a winning advantage in new and existing weapon systems to satisfy the needs and requirements of the SA Army, taking due cognisance of financial guidelines.

The SA Army component of the landward defence capability will be recognised by a number of characteristics.

It must possess a core-growth capability for long-term contingencies. The force will possess the minimum force level that can be maintained as a growth core, in accordance with the core force concept, without the permanent loss of capabilities. This growth core will enable limited force employment where this is necessary, but will maintain the expertise and technological base for growth when warranted by the strategic and/or economic situation in the long term. The reserve forces required for such expansion are treated as ‘one force’ with the permanent force.

The SA Army will be predominantly conventionally oriented. The force design will revolve mainly around the SANDF’s primary function of defence against military aggression. The force design, including its area defence capability, will be mainly conventionally oriented and is determined largely by decisions regarding three parameters: the level of defence required, the approved defence posture, and the defence budget. Defence is conducted jointly, with each combat service providing specialised capabilities to landward, air and maritime defence. The contribution of the SA Medical Service is common to all the dimensions. The land assets reside in the Army.

The SA Army will also have to be able to project force and deterrent ability for strategic contingencies that are foreseen in the short and medium term. South Africa has turned away from an isolationist approach and offensive posture to one of common security in Southern Africa, defence co-operation with other states, respect for international peace and security, and adherence to international law. The government’s preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will only turn to military means when non-violent strategies and deterrence have failed. Deterrence and a force projection capability require a credible defence capability to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore essential that the SA Army maintains a core growth capability with the potential for expansion should this ever be necessary.

The SA Army will have to possess a flexible and rapid-response capability based on its landward defence capability. These forces will maintain immediate readiness for all shorter term contingencies. The potential for expansion of this conventional capability is contained in the Army Conventional Reserve. Flexible and rapid response is conceptualised in terms of conventional mobile defence and area defence. The SA Army must use its collateral capability for certain secondary functions, such as peace support operations, humanitarian aid and internal deployment, in co-operation with the SAPS. (As the SA Army is presently structured to meet the requirements of the primary function, in the light of present financial constraints, this is not the preferred option.) High readiness will include the practiced ability to mobilise, conduct operations and demobilise quickly and efficiently. This includes the ability to expand, grow and contract according to the contingency and warning time.

The force must be affordable and sustainable. The SA Army will represent the minimum force level that can be maintained as an affordable growth core, in accordance with the core force approach. This force is to be sustainable, and an appropriate balance is to be maintained between operating expenditure and spending on capital renewal or upgrading.

The SA Army will have to have an excellent training capacity. The SA Army will maintain the capability to prepare its forces on a continuous basis in accordance with its mandate. It will make provision for appropriate mission and combat training; military and professional education, training and development; and support training. The exercising of the force for joint as well as combined operations will enjoy high precedence. A professional corps of trainers will serve as the nucleus and centre of excellence for an excellent training capacity. Training will be the core focus of the SA Army.

The possession of excellent leadership, command and management capabilities is another essential characteristic. The institutionalisation of appropriate leadership, command and management practices results in continuity and durability of optimal performance. It is a performance and output-based institution, is mission oriented and has a learning and teaching culture. The SA Army culture entrenches productivity and quality as values. Authority is commensurate with responsibility and accountability with the necessary resources allocated. Dynamic communication with internal and external stakeholders and the general public is excellent and line-driven. All leadership, management and command activities facilitate ‘jointness’ and sharing. Mission command and transformational leadership are the predominant styles, while total quality management principles will guide the conduct of the SA Army.

Finally, the SA Army will have to operate effectively as a single force. The SA Army’s core growth capability includes both the Full-time Component (FTC) and the Reserve Forces as integral and essential parts of the institution. The ‘one force’ concept provides for the flexible utilisation of human resources and reduces the necessity to maintain a large and unaffordable FTC. Fair and equitable treatment is applied, and all components render the same high standard of service, notwithstanding differences in dynamics, functioning and requirements of the two components.

The forging of the vision and mission of the SA Army was a remarkably consultative exercise. The vision is the driving force in creating a landward defence capability. The vision reads as follows:

"The SA Army, our people one in spirit, has the commanding presence and power of a pride of lions. We are an excellent military force, forever professional and ready, making a difference wherever serving South Africa."

The mission describes the Army’s tasks and reads as follows:

"The SA Army provides combat-ready forces to Chief of the South African National Defence Force, whilst playing the leading role in sustaining a credible, cohesive, joint landward defence capability."

The SA Army is faced with an immense challenge. It must downsize its current force strength of the Full Time Component from the current strength of 45 536 to 32 000, as approved by the Minister of Defence. This implies a personnel reduction of 13 536 members. However, further budget cuts in the medium term requires a further reduction of 7 500 members to a strength of 24 500. The total personnel reduction required is therefore 21 036. The military, as well as socio-economic risks and implications of meeting this demand have clearly been spelled out to the Minister of Defence and the DoD top management.

Having said this, the SA Army has progressed a long way in establishing its new organisational structure. The Army Office has been established and staffed, while the process to establish eight formation headquarters, three brigades and twenty group headquarters is well under way. Very soon, the staffing of the thirteen general support bases for which the SA Army is responsible, will commence. The SA Army has succeeded until now in implementing the required design principles to create a new institution.

However, implementing all these new structures creates numerous challenges that are not easily resolved. In the meantime, the SA Army is required to provide combat-ready forces and user systems for operational deployment.

In order to achieve this goal, measures have been taken to assist the Chief of the SA Army in managing the landward capability. This is being done by the Landward Defence Forum and the SA Army Armament Committee. To give further strength to these bodies, it is intended to establish a Landward Institute to provide the DoD and Armscor with solicited landward advice. Similar institutes already function with great effectiveness in the other services.

The SA Army’s core business is the preparation of forces to a state of combat-readiness with the necessary command and control elements, supported to the first and/or second line, as requested by the Chief of Joint Operations for deployment, to operate under operational command of a task force commander.

The components that will have an influence on the combat-readiness of forces are as follows:

Force preparation provides for the education, training and development of the individual, and the force training of user systems and higher order user systems from team to unit level. Force preparation guidelines are issued on a quarterly basis in line with the strategic management process of the SA Army. These guidelines prescribe the landward operations for which force structure elements are to prepare. A resume includes mobile operations (conventional by nature); area defence operations in rural and urban areas; peace support operations in, and/or the protection or evacuation of South African nationals from neighbouring states; participation in special operations; provision of assistance during emergency situations; border control and the provision of support to the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order; international military obligations; and airborne operations.



Preparedness refers to the management of landward defence resources and includes manpower, equipment infrastructure and support resources. Although main equipment systems are included here, these are dealt with as a separate component.



Operational readiness of main equipment systems has to be maintained.



Standard of battle discipline displayed by leaders and troops during force training exercises needs to comply with specific norms and values.



The mental fitness and morale of individuals and groups should be geared towards conducting successful operations.



A scope of leadership command and management practices, processes and philosophies should be available to effect higher productivity, satisfaction and individual growth. It impacts heavily on the morale component.



The conceptual understanding of functional doctrine, joint doctrine, the principles of war and operational concepts is essential.



The physical fitness of individuals needs to be measured.



Medical examinations determining the medical fitness of individuals to conduct operations have to be in place. 

The above components are grouped in dimensions to establish a composite system against which the combat-readiness of a force can be measured.

The dimensions and components are used as a basis against which combat-readiness is measured. Should the highest standard prescribed be achieved in all the respective components, it would mean that the force that is measured, is 100 per cent combat-ready. In reality, this would be impossible due to dysfunctions, shortfalls and shortcomings over which the force that is measured, has little or no control.

The status reports contain the information required to determine combat-readiness. Status reports are forwarded to Directorate Force Preparation by the responsible authorities. The main elements of the status report are:

dysfunction;



shortfalls;



shortcomings; and



the judgement of the commander whether he or she is able to carry out his or her core functions or not.

Determining Combat-Readiness

The first step is to determine to what degree systems are combat-ready by comparing the data received via the status reports against the standards of the components of combat-readiness. This will indicate variances.

Step two consists of determining whether the variance, in actual fact, represents the combat potential and/or advantage of a user or higher order user system. This variance is now compared with the criteria set for a force to be employed in a specific operation. If the criteria cannot be met, the force is then classified as not being combat-ready.

The components described above have to be managed to such an extent that they will ensure a credible result in respect of the combat-readiness of user and higher order user systems. The overall responsibility for managing combat-readiness lies with the Directorate Force Preparation, but there are also other roleplayers and factors that influence the process.

There are numerous challenges that are still to be resolved in the SA Army. Many of these challenges relate directly to ageing equipment and personnel inflation and are compounded by the continuous reduction of the SA Army budget allocation. These challenges can only be resolved through the development of an encompassing military strategy for the Department of Defence and through the intervention of Parliament.