INTRODUCTION

During the first five years after the 1994 election that instituted democracy in South Africa and allowed its readmittance into the international community, the South African government (re)established relations of one form or another with many countries. Many new foreign missions were established, and binational committees were formed, among others, with the United States and Germany.

Yet, after five years of intense international and diplomatic activity, a clear indication still has to emerge of the direction South Africa will go in terms of its international alignment. For example, even though South Africa and the US have forged closer relations through a binational commission (BNC), encompassing all spheres of international relations, including defence, it is well-known that the two countries have regularly been at odds over certain fundamental issues, relating primarily to South Africa’s relations with countries with poor human rights records.

This dichotomy in the relations with the US, the world’s only superpower and leader of the Western power bloc, raises important questions about South Africa’s future international relations and alignment, because in terms of modern security concepts, these will probably be the most important factors influencing the country’s national security and national security policy. The following are perhaps uppermost in the minds of those who are involved in shaping South Africa’s national security policy:

What should the definition or concept of national security be for South Africa?



What vital national interests will drive South Africa’s international relations, and who are the most appropriate international partners to share and promote these interests in order to ensure national security?



Who should be the stakeholders and participants in the national security process?



What types of international security arrangements or systems are appropriate for South Africa to ensure its national security?

These questions can no longer be answered with old, or even current definitions and paradigms as yardsticks, and without taking a futuristic point of view. The world is changing rapidly, and the national security strategies and policies which South Africa puts in place now, will have a make-or-break effect in terms of its well-being five to ten years hence.

This article therefore aims to propose a macro-framework for a South African national security policy, derived from an international relations perspective.

National security is an interactive and integrative system consisting of the individual as the irreducible basic unit, who is connected both to the state and the international political system by way of civil society. There is a hierarchy between these levels, but the international political system is anarchic and is therefore not yet fully established as the higher order system. The state is still the strongest entity for the enhancement of national security issues, but is increasingly being challenged by civil society which demands a larger role.

Before South Africa attempts to construct a framework for a national security policy, it needs to consider the possible security strategies that are available. The choice of an appropriate national security strategy could make a positive, fundamental difference to South Africa’s national security policy orientation. Making this choice, however, is not simple.

Assuming that threats exist, and that insecurity is a problem because of vulnerability to those threats, the choice is between taking action to reduce the vulnerability, or trying to eliminate or reduce the threats by addressing their causes at the source. The first of these options is called national security strategy by Buzan,¹ because this action is taken largely within the threatened state. The second option is called international security strategy, because it depends on the adjustment of relations between states either directly, or by making changes in the systemic conditions that influence the way in which states make each other feel more, or less secure.

If a national security strategy is adopted, security policy will focus on reducing the vulnerabilities of the state. This can be done by increasing self-reliance, or by building up counters to deal with specific threats. If the threats are military, they can be met by strengthening a state’s own military forces, by seeking alliances or by hardening the country against attack. Economic threats can be countered by increasing self-reliance, diversifying sources of supply, or conditioning the population to accept a lower standard of living. A national security strategy is not without its merits but, almost by definition, it makes less sense for lesser powers. Normally, only great powers have sufficient resources to make this strategy work. The very term ‘national security’ implies a self-help approach. The main advantages of a national security strategy are that threats can be met specifically as they arise, and that the measures which provide security are largely under the control of the state concerned. A national security strategy provides certainty, because it deals with the firm realities of capabilities rather than with the uncertainties of other states’ intentions.

The problems with a national security strategy are therefore that few countries have the resources to make it work, that its logic operates only on the state level and that it tends to produce a ruinously expensive and psychologically counterproductive obsession with security. The logic of a single-minded national security strategy can easily lead to militarised and security-obsessed societies, such as those that can be found in much of the Middle East, and South Africa prior to 1994.

South Africa, being a lesser power in the global context with limited resources, should therefore avoid a national security strategy as defined by Buzan, as a basis for its national security policy.

If the second option, an international security strategy is adopted, security policy focuses on the sources and causes of threats. The purpose then is not to block or offset them, but to reduce or eliminate them by political action. An international security strategy has a number of advantages. It addresses the security problem at the regional and system levels, and offers a prospect of a much more cost-efficient security policy than that available with a national security strategy. If threats are eliminated at the source, resources do not have to be wasted in meeting each of them on its own terms. An international security strategy provides an attractive, alternative option to the costly and dangerously competitive security-seeking national security strategy. In addition, an international security strategy offers options other than association with a large power, to most smaller states whose resources do not permit them to pursue a comprehensive national security strategy on their own.

An international security strategy is not without its problems, the most obvious being that, where a serious power struggle exists, the basic conditions for an international security strategy cannot be met. If states actually are in direct competition, there will be severe limitations to the scope for threat reduction through negotiation. Those feeling threatened will be forced to adopt a national security approach. Related to this is the disadvantage that states lose considerable control over those factors that provide their security. An international security strategy depends on the management of relations between states, which are historically unreliable. If security rests on the restraint of others, then it is at the mercy of their changes of mind. This contrasts unfavourably with the logic of self-reliance of the national security strategy.

Taken by themselves, therefore, neither strategies are free from serious logical problems. It would appear, however, that a posture aligned to an international security strategy would be the better of the two approaches for South Africa, as a basis for its national security policy.

Buzan² further contends that, in the real world, security policy must be and usually is a mixture. What kind of mixture between national and international security strategies would be the most appropriate? He proposes that, instead of alternating between the state and the international system in an endless cycle of frustration, a more appealing logic is to combine and expand the two approaches by seeking integrative security on all levels simultaneously, while paying maximum attention to the positive and negative linkages across the sectors of the power base. This is not easy, but also not impossible. However, it requires that the simplistic notions of security as deriving either from the power of the state, or from the creation of trust and order in the international system, should be replaced by more complex appreciations of how state behaviour and the international system interact. It also requires policies that are as sensitive to the vulnerabilities of other actors, and their own legitimate assessments of the threat, as they are to the vulnerabilities of and threats to the states generating those policies.

One policy conclusion that can be reached from this integrative view of national security is that security cannot be achieved by either individuals or states acting solely on their own.³ It cannot be created by individual actors, nor can it be created by concentrating all the power and responsibility at the upper levels of government. When such concentration takes place, the collective institution becomes a major source of threat to the smaller actors it was supposed to protect. The same analogy can be followed for the next higher level, where states will fear the submergence of their own powers and authorities in larger regional and global organisations. Buzan therefore argues that, instead of favouring hierarchical political structures, the logic of common security favours and confirms the utility of anarchy. This means that the more actors at every level retain some control over their security, the more stable the system will be, for a collapse at any level will not entail a collapse of the whole security system.

An integrative security approach, which would diffuse power throughout the security system from the individual, through civil society, the South African government and Southern African regional organisations and mechanisms, would therefore seem to be the most appropriate basis for a South African national security policy.

One idea that satisfies most of the criteria for an integrative security policy is that of non-provocative defence (NPD), as it incorporates elements of both national and international security strategies. NPD, according to Barnaby,⁴ relies on the principle that the size, structure, weapons, logistics, training, manoeuvres, war games, military textbooks and other military activities of the military forces of a country can be designed to demonstrate as a whole that they provide an effective defence, with virtually no offensive capability. Buzan says that, at the national level, NPD responds to the need for a robust and credible defence policy that can be achieved by the state using its own resources. It has the moral appeal of being strictly and obviously defensive, and if militia forces form its core, it also serves to decentralise organised military power within the state. On the international side, it shows sensitivity to the needs of other states without appearing weak or lacking commitment. It is not without risk, however, and is probably unwise when the likelihood of war is high. It is not riskier than other defence policies under normal circumstances, and has the merit of challenging other states to reconfigure their forces to less threatening ones. If they do not, they stand exposed for all to identify as the source of aggression. If they do, defence requirements can be mutually reduced.

The recent developments in the Southern African region show very clearly that other Southern African states feel threatened to a greater or lesser extent by South Africa’s leading position in the region, especially in the defence, economic and resource sectors. In the economic dimension, they are being threatened by trade imbalances. In the military dimension, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is still seen as the superior force in the region, and in respect of natural resources, South Africa, which has only ten per cent of the region’s water resources, consumes eighty per cent of its water. South Africa would therefore do well to consider an integrative approach to security when it considers a national security policy.

Specifically in the military dimension, the NPD concept, perhaps adjusted to suit the robustness of the security situation of the region and supported by confidence-building measures, would form a sound supportive component of integrative security, within a national security policy. Williams⁵ argues that, notwithstanding the relevance of non-offensive defence (NOD) (which he equates to NPD) to the Southern African scenario, the total application of this concept is not possible for a variety of political, financial, geostrategic and operational reasons.

At the national and civil society levels, the idea of NPD could greatly contribute to the concept of integrative security by strengthening the functioning of South Africa’s own ‘militia’, the reserve component of the SANDF, especially if care is taken to ensure that minorities are well represented. This would clearly indicate that the state is willing to decentralise its organised military power, and would thus allay the fears of minorities of possible coups d’état, or the state using its military power to impose unpopular political decisions. At the international level, it would contribute to confidence-building by creating a less threatening force (due to its larger component being the reserve force), while at the same time showing resolve by way of the existence of a highly motivated force.

In the economic dimension, already existing co-operating mechanisms such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) form a sound basis for applying the concept of integrative security in Southern Africa, while the Southern African Development Community (SADC) forms the basis for integrative security across all sectors of the power base.

The adoption of an integrative security orientation for South Africa and the Southern African region should therefore be one of the pillars of a South African national security policy.

The adoption of a broad interpretation of security to include all the vital sectors of the power base should be the other pillar of a South African national security policy. South Africa and the region are vulnerable to most types of threats, especially against the vital sectors of the power base. States, especially developing ones such as South Africa, will have to look beyond the old definitions, and establish new paradigms applicable to national security and international co-operation. The recognition (and articulation thereof) that a broader concept of security exists, and that non-military issues also form an equally important dimension of South Africa’s national security, will bring home the necessity to government to combine all levels of the security system effectively, from the individual, through civil society and the state, to the international system embodied specifically by the Southern African region.

With the acceptance of a broad interpretation of national security, the aim of a national security policy can no longer be based solely on the need to defend the country against external aggression and the maintenance of internal stability. The factors that will determine the aim of a national security policy now constitute all the sectors of the power base, and the threats and opportunities that exist in each of them. In short, these threats and opportunities can be condensed into strategic issues, which in turn, will lead to an aim for a national security policy.

During several work sessions over the period March to May 1998 of the South African Joint Staff Course (No 39/98), consisting of 35 brigadiers-general, colonels and captains of all the arms of service, and civilians of equal rank from the Defence Secretariat and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the following strategic issues were identified as the most critical issues affecting the national security of South Africa and the security of the region:

•good governance;

the effective combating of crime;

the effective management of water resources;

adequate and appropriate education and training;

the fulfilment of South Africa’s regional role; and

sustainable economic growth.

A brief analysis of these strategic issues reveals that sustainable economic growth is the primary (financial) enabler of all the others, whereas the others are all cost drivers. Sustained competitiveness in a global economy therefore underpins all the other strategic issues, and should be the primary focus of endeavour in the region. Global economic competitiveness is again primarily underpinned by South Africa’s and the region’s future ability to acquire an appropriate and sufficiently large knowledge base which, in turn, will enable it to acquire, master and industrialise new technology.

The attainment of sustained competitiveness by the region in a global economy should therefore be the point of departure for a macro-framework, and should be clearly articulated as the aim and focus of South Africa’s national security policy.

A country’s vital national interests are the primary determinants of its international relations. Throughout history, there has been a strong correlation between countries’ vital national interests and those of countries closest to it.

Especially in Southern Africa, serious endemic problems will force countries to remain in a far stronger regional interdependence than in the case of the developed world, as the internal problems of one affect the others. Major transnational manifestations of Southern African regional problems are large numbers of illegal aliens, ever shrinking resources, especially water, serious socio-economic problems and pressure on the environment.

South Africa, being the most wealthy country in Southern Africa, has the most to lose by this transnational flow of regional problems. Its vital national interests are therefore irrevocably intertwined with those of the region.

South Africa’s vital national interests are, or at least should be:

•sustainable global economic competitiveness;

the socio-economic upliftment of its people;

the preservation of resources, especially water;

the advancement and consolidation of democracy and effective political leadership; and

the preservation of the environment.

South Africa will only be able to create a lasting positive momentum in the promotion of these vital national interests, by promoting them within a regional context. The development of SADC was therefore the first correct and vital step towards rebuilding the region. It is in line with Buzan’s concept of integrative security, and will go a long way towards an integrative, multisectoral approach to solve the region’s problems.

A thorough analysis of South Africa’s vital national interests, and the types of regional mechanisms through which these should be promoted, should feature strongly in South Africa’s national security policy.

A broad spectrum of interaction, based on the common interests of SADC countries, should form the main thrust of operations of regional mechanisms. Besides the socio-economic upliftment that will result, they will also serve as confidence-building measures. One vital sector of the power base that can be fruitfully applied in confidence and capacity-building is that of defence. Combined training, and the provision of education and training by the SANDF in subjects such as civil-military relations, peace operations, leadership and command, and military management, can serve to uplift Southern African defence forces, and build regional confidence. The SANDF education, training and development (ETD) system currently being established, could be an effective enabler towards such regional aspirations. However, it should be embodied in national security policy that denotes South Africa and the SANDF as the change agents for the region, if it is to be ensured that the ETD system will have the capacity to support these aspirations. The South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) and the SA Army’s 1 Construction Regiment (creation of expertise in building infrastructure) are still other defence organisations that can play a role in regional confidence and capacity-building, however modest it may be. The SA Army’s mine clearance capability through a company such as MECHEM, is a potential earner of considerable revenue for South Africa.

Some government organisations at departmental level, however, do not have sufficient capacity in themselves to carry out regional confidence and capacity-building tasks. Individually, they also lack the capacity and leverage to engage potential extraregional supporting partners in regional endeavours, or to attract sufficient funds to finance capacity-building activities. In fact, some of these organisations’ viability, due to shrinking budgets, may be in question. The answer to this problem could well lie in the amalgamation of such organisations, and their elevation to national agency status. The US has done this with its former Defence Mapping Agency, now the National Intelligence Mapping Agency (NIMA) The proposed amalgamation of Infoplan and Central Computer Services into a State Information Technology Agency (SITA), is a South African example of creating national and regional capacity, and a forerunner of things to come. In the same way, for example, the Hartebeeshoek Satellite Applications Centre (SAC), the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC), the Navy’s Hydrographer and the Army’s 4 Survey and Cartography Regiment could be organisationally amalgamated into a South African National Mapping Agency. Such an agency could attract sufficient funds and have the capacities described to make a significant regional impact on, for example, town, infrastructure and agricultural planning, and maritime hydrographic services. At the same time, the individual components would still be able to deliver the required operational service.

The use of the SANDF in regional capacity and confidence-building should be clearly articulated in a national security policy, so that the SANDF can structure and prepare itself for this task. The establishment of capacity and international leverage by amalgamating small departmental level units and elevating them to national agency level should be a principle articulated in a national security policy.

It is not possible for Southern Africa to achieve regional security on its own. The region must therefore seek strong extraregional partners with the organisations, capacity and interest to support South Africa and the region in their endeavours. The US and Western European countries such as Germany would be suitable partners, with China also a possibility. The binational committees set up by South Africa with the US and Germany, and the attempts to set up a preferential trade agreement with the European Union, are important first steps in this regard. These committees, forums and agreements will have to be optimally managed and expanded, taking full advantage of the US and Western European idea that Southern Africa can be developed through South Africa. For example, the US Department of Defense would be a willing partner to the ETD system’s regional efforts, and the US Army would be a willing partner in assisting the SA Army’s 1 Construction Regiment in regional confidence and capacity-building tasks. In the same way, the US’s NIMA would probably be an equally willing partner to similar regional endeavours by a South African National Mapping Agency. This would mean, however, that South Africa in particular, without giving up its sovereignty, would have to adopt a more synergistic attitude towards these extraregional partners, specifically the US, than has been the case so far.

The South African government will therefore have to consider and co-ordinate its interdepartmental and international diplomatic actions more thoroughly, than it has until now. This will require a well-staffed and well-oiled political-administrative system with the capacity to deal with countries like the US, which have very strong political-administrative systems, on a broad front of national security issues. The expansion of strategic co-ordinating committees like the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC), to include permanent representatives of all departments to give expression to the broadened concept of national security, should be considered. This would enhance South Africa’s capability to conduct proactive diplomacy effectively.

The engagement of extraregional partners such as the US, China and Germany, with the will and capacity to assist in regional capacity and confidence-building, and the establishment of negotiating capacity and leverage through an effective political-administrative system, are imperatives that should be clearly articulated in a South African national security policy.

Over time, when SADC has gained sufficient unity and political-administrative capacity, it will be both necessary and advantageous to create bilateral forums or mechanisms between SADC and these extraregional partners. This will empower Southern Africa to speak with one voice (as the European Union does), it will make all SADC members feel that they are equal stakeholders, and it will ensure that co-operation with these partners is conducted in a regionally integrated and coherent manner. This is not easy, and it is known that there are many opponents to such an idea who feel that bilateral forums or mechanisms are simpler and easier to manage. Such a unified Southern African negotiating bloc will become an imperative, if the region wishes to achieve progress with its security issues in a more urgent and coherent manner.

It is becoming evident that the South African government is struggling to come to grips with the multifaceted, complicated and large variety of national security issues facing the country and the region. The reason for this, and South Africa is not alone here, is that the government simply does not have the political-administrative capacity and expertise and, with the many imperatives for smaller governments, will never have. The South African government should consider engaging civil society as a partner in addressing those national strategic issues which closest affect it.

McGowan⁶ argues that, with the advent of the global information economy, the state’s centrality in world affairs is diminishing, and the new global village has powerfully energised social movements throughout the world. He argues that, especially in the areas of human rights, democracy and the environment, it is increasingly the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International and Green Peace that act effectively, and that are connected to and supported by social movements world-wide. He further argues that the mainstream international relations theory is state-centric and ignores non-state phenomena such as social movements, therefore making this theory a poor guide to policy-making for South Africans, among others.

McGowan stresses that governments must be better organised to be able to deal with this new world. This means that any country’s international relations are no longer the sole prerogative of a department of Foreign Affairs or a department of State. Each of the major international trends is too complex and requires specialist knowledge that does not normally reside in a department of Foreign Affairs, unless its bureaucracy is very large. Thus, besides essential interdepartmental co-ordination and co-operation, South African scholars, government officials, leaders in civil society and ordinary citizens will most likely have to engage in bricolage (the exchange and sharing of an assorted collection of knowledge, viewpoints and ideas).

Muller⁷ argues that the environment now belongs to enduring basic social values, and that although the environmental agenda in South Africa will be determined by government for the foreseeable future, the influence of environmental pressure groups should not be underestimated. He contends that these groups will continue to seek strategic alliances with other groupings to mobilise power. Although Muller made his remarks primarily within the South African context, it is contended that, in the new information age, especially with the Internet as a communication medium, it is both feasible and highly desirable to seek coalitions with environmental organisations outside South Africa, to find empowerment.

Hudson⁸ contends that broad civil participation would reduce the chances of the military gaining control over the management of environmental conflicts, so that more desirable socio-political and economic solutions are found, rather than military ones.

Swatuk⁹ points to the fact that the government alone cannot do enough to ensure the conservation of the environment. Civil societies should be encouraged to organise against common environmental enemies and concerns, and should be encouraged, perhaps with the assistance of international NGOs like the World Conservation Union and the United Nations Development Programme’s Africa 2000 programme, to press for recognition of their rights to equitable resources.

Hyden¹⁰ contends that the building of social capital to strengthen civic and democratic norms no longer takes place at the national level only, but has extended itself to the global level. He also refers to the ‘universalisation’ of specific policy issues and the evolution of organisations that serve as so-called global advocates, such as Amnesty International and Green Peace. He adds to his argument the growing role of international donor agencies that push the democratic agenda in developing countries, especially those in Africa. On this agenda, he says, the notion of building social capital through the strengthening of civil society has been very prominent. He further contends that it is too limiting to think of NGOs in world affairs merely as transnational interest groups and that their political relevance goes beyond that to the building of social capital through long-distance international relations that help to promote the concept of a global civil society. Hyden specifically mentions the fields of public health and environmental conservation, where donor-funded NGOs have helped to shape the character of public opinion and public life.

On the one hand, government cannot keep up with all national security issues. On the other hand, the rising global village with its readily available information across international boundaries enables and empowers civil society to play a bigger role, especially in respect of those issues which affect society most directly, such as the environment, human rights, health, education and resources. This makes a compelling case for the useful application of Buzan’s concept of integrative security, where security is created by a distribution of power and responsibility, and interaction between actors at all levels, from the individual through civil society and government, to the international level.

The South African government should see this as an opportunity to break away from the mainstream international relations state-centric theory. It is now possible to throw more resources at these pressing national security problems, by empowering civil society to play a more direct and larger role in these efforts.

Downs and Iida¹¹ define collective security as "... collective self-regulation: a group of states attempts to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish any member that violates the system’s norms." They state that this internal focus distinguishes it from a typical alliance system, which has the goal of collectively reducing threats originating from outside its membership. Alliance systems are also less likely to have self-regulatory provisions that limit arms production and force size.

Collective security arrangements have historically not performed well. This has led to the adoption of a theoretically narrow definition of what constitutes collective security, a tendency to equate its limitations with irreparable conceptual flaws, and an inattention to the conditions under which different collective security designs may indeed lead to modest security gains. One way Downs and Iida propose to overcome these problems is to accept that there should be a regional hegemon, or ‘club manager’, who has the clout to keep wayward members in line.

According to Kupchan,¹² collective security provides a more stable or less war-prone international environment than "balancing under anarchy":

It is more effective in deterring and resisting aggressors, by making the formation of a balancing coalition more likely and by confronting aggressors, with the prospect of preponderant, as opposed to roughly equal force.



Collective security institutionalises and, therefore, promotes co-operation.



Collective security ameliorates the security dilemma, thereby enhancing stability and reducing the likelihood of unintended spirals of hostility.

Implications for South and Southern Africa

The objectives of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security are, among others, "... to develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats ..."¹³ This objective, whether deliberately or not, appears to be an endeavour towards a hybrid between a collective security system and an alliance. The Defence Review also alludes to the need for collective security and calls for security against external threat.¹⁴

Although SADC and the Organ appear to be on the right track to a theoretically well-founded organisation, it is not clear whether the theoretical principles of security on which SADC is supposed to be predicated, were ever consciously or purposefully articulated. Such articulation is necessary to ensure that its members fully understand the implications of belonging to such an organisation for their behaviour, but even more so, that the conditions for membership are clear. A case in point is the acceptance of the Democratic Republic of Congo into SADC. SADC will have to guard against spreading its wings too wide, but more so, where it has included in its membership fairly stable and democratically emerging states until now, it must become more selective in terms of whom it accepts into its fold, like the EU in the case of Turkey and Italy. This will only be possible by clearly articulating what type of security organisation SADC will be, and by setting clear rules for the required conduct of prospective and current members.

With regard to the implications for South Africa and its national security policy, the country would do well at least to embody in its policy the need for exploring and clarifying the various types of regional security options in SADC. An appropriate formal security system for the region, which it apparently is striving for, could be that of a hybrid between the pure alliance, on the one hand, and pure collective security, on the other.

South Africa has no option but to assume a leading role, if collective security is to work for the region. It has so far shied away from this role, which is understandable if South Africa’s own internal problems and the obvious fear of being perceived as a dominant partner are considered. There is much South Africa could do to soften its dominant image. One possible method is by adopting a defence policy of NPD, or at least a variant that is appropriate to the region.

The South African White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review refer to the region and its security needs, but with regard to force design, the SANDF seriously lacks regional mobility. The SA Army, which has limited air mobility for infantry only, lacks long-range mobility for its motorised and mechanised forces, a prerequisite for peacekeeping operations, for example. It would only be able to gain such mobility by means of a sealift and amphibious capability which, in turn, reflects on shortcomings in the SA Navy’s capabilities. One possible reason for this apparent shortcoming could be that these documents were formulated without benchmarking national security policy, which should embody the fundamentals on which regional security should be built. The result is that the SANDF (and probably the other departments as well) will probably be ill-equipped to support the role of regional ‘club manager’ that will be thrust onto South Africa.

A national security policy which articulates the preferred type of security system for the region and the need for South Africa’s leadership within this system, is therefore imperative as guidance to the various state departments in their preparations for executing their role in the promotion of regional security.

The globalisation of the world and the advancing information age are softening the borders between countries. As a result, there is an enhanced opportunity for South Africa to lead Southern Africa into a new paradigm for security and international relations. To grab this opportunity, South Africa will first have to make a paradigm shift itself, to a more sophisticated, multifaceted and mainly outward-looking national security strategy, and then formulate and articulate its national security policy within this new paradigm. As has been illustrated, such a new paradigm should consist of the imperatives discussed below, which can be used as contributors towards a macro-framework for a national security policy.

The first imperative of the new national security paradigm, and the aim of a national security policy, should be for Southern Africa as a collective unit to attain sustained competitiveness in a global economy. It concerns South Africa and the region’s future ability to acquire a sufficiently large and appropriate knowledge base, so that it can acquire, master and industrialise new technology. This will enable it to become an economically competitive collective unit, capable to eventually develop in pace with the developed world. Attaining a globally competitive region must be the departure point for a macro-framework, and the aim and primary focus of South Africa’s national security policy.

The second imperative of the new paradigm should be to place a South African national security policy on a sound normative foundation, with a realistic focus. It is proposed that the foundation should consist of two pillars: that of an integrative security approach, focused on the Southern African region, and a broad interpretation of security, focused on the vital sectors of South Africa’s power base. Building the first pillar should entail a progression from a state-centric security concept, to a systems approach of distributing power among actors at all levels of the Southern African security system. It implies giving up some of each state’s sovereignty, by spreading responsibility for security to the individual, civil society, the state and the Southern African interstate system. A strong supportive component of this imperative could be NPD/NOD, supported by regional confidence and capacity-building measures. The second pillar, a broad interpretation of the concept of security, will reduce the military tendency in security thinking, and will ensure greater social, national and regional focus on those issues that really threaten South Africa and the region. South Africa’s national security policy will need to articulate this paradigm shift, if it wants the concept to succeed in the region.

The next imperative of the new paradigm is that South Africa must shift from a national security policy of the promotion of its own interests, to one of promoting own interests through the promotion of the interests of the region. The creation of SADC was a major step forward to achieve this, and regional confidence and capacity-building should be the first main thrusts of this organisation. The SANDF’s soon to be launched Education, Training and Development System, the SAMHS and the Army’s 1 Construction Regiment, are examples of units which could play important roles in regional confidence and capacity-building. The organisational amalgamation and elevation of units such as Hartebeeshoek SAC, JARIC, the Navy’s Hydrographer and the Army’s 4 Survey and Cartography Regiment to that of a national agency, to attain capacity and international leverage to carry out regional capacity and confidence-building, should be considered as an essential component of this imperative.

South Africa and the region do not have sufficient resources to carry out capacity and confidence-building on their own. The region will therefore have to engage major extraregional partners with the capacity and the will to assist in these endeavours. Suitable partners will most likely be the US, China and Western European countries such as Germany. Such efforts should be co-ordinated through SADC as soon as it has reached the necessary maturity and cohesion, to ensure that the region acts as one power bloc as far as possible. This will give it international bargaining power, while ensuring that the views and needs of all regional stakeholders are accommodated. This endeavour should be articulated in a national security policy.

It is an imperative that South Africa, in its foreign relations, should adopt a synergistic attitude, especially towards countries and power blocs like the US, China and Western Europe, that have the will and capacity to assist the country and the region in attaining a sustained competitive position in a global economy. Part of this effort should be the avoidance of a confrontational diplomatic style in favour of pragmatic and ‘quiet’, but resolute diplomacy. It will also require the thorough consideration and co-ordination of South Africa’s diplomatic actions, through an effective political-administrative system, with the capacity to deal with these major partners on a broad front of national security issues. The expansion of committees like NICOC, to include a permanent member from each department to give expression to a broadened interpretation of national security, should be considered.

The need to find a willing and concerned stakeholder to deal with national security issues and build social capital in the region, on the one hand, and the urgent need to rebuild South Africa’s civil society as the synthesis to South Africa’s internal problems, on the other, provides a compelling case for government to create a conducive environment for civil society to participate in national security-building. Within the concept of integrative security, it is therefore an imperative that a South African national security policy contains the necessary enablers for South African civil society to act in appropriate sectors of the power base, with the focus on Southern Africa.

South Africa’s national security policy should leave sufficient latitude for the promotion of multilateral and multidimensional alliances, where power is diffused between more or less compatible partners. These and other relevant principles for the forming of alliances with extraregional powers or power blocs should be embodied in a South African national security policy to ensure that the power balance and relations within the Southern African region are not unnecessarily disturbed.

The final imperative which should form part of a South African national security policy framework, is that South Africa and the region should look beyond the mainstream theories of international security systems, towards new concepts to promote regional security. SADC and its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security already provide a system that is favourably constructed to be the stepping stone to such a hybrid system, but the fundamental principles on which the system is to be based, should be articulated so that the rules for membership are clear, and members understand the implications of membership for their conduct. It appears as if South Africa will have little option but to act as the ‘club manager’ or regional hegemon, whether a pure form of collective security, or a hybrid system is chosen, if such a system is to be successful. To enable itself to act in this capacity, South Africa would have to formulate and articulate a national security policy that would support this concept. This would also provide the necessary and urgent guidance to South African departmental strategy and policy, which must underpin, create and enable departmental systems with the necessary capacity to support such a regional security system.

Rear Admiral (Junior Grade) Frederik E Koetje is Chief of Staff and Second in Command of the newly created Regional Joint Task Force East, in KwaZulu-Natal, one of five new SANDF Task Forces responsible for all internal joint military operations in South Africa. This article is a shortened version of a research paper written during a Joint Staff Course.

B Buzan, People, states and fear, Hartnolls, Cornwall, 1991, pp 35 & 54.



Ibid, p. 330.



Ibid, p 378.



F Barnaby, The automated battlefield, Garden Press, London, 1986, p 162.



R Williams, Confidence-building defence and Southern Africa: The implications of non-offensive defence for South Africa’s defence posture, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 19(1), May 97, p 31.



P J McGowan, Setting the stage: Understanding international relations in the mid-1990s, mission imperfect — Redirecting South Africa’s foreign policy, Proceedings of a Workshop Convened by the Foundation for Global Dialogue and the Centre for Policy Studies, Creda, Cape Town, 1995, p 11.



J J Muller, A greener South Africa? Environmentalism, politics & the future, Politikon, 24(1), June 1997, p 117.



H Hudson, Resource-based conflict: Water (in)security and its strategic implications, in H Solomon (ed), Sink or swim?: Water, resource security and state co-operation, IDP Monograph Series, 6, Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, October 1996, p 13.



L A Swatuk, Environmental issues and prospects for Southern African regional co-operation, in Solomon, ibid, p 37.



G Hyden, The challenges of analysing and building civil society, Africa Insight, 26(2), 1996, p 99.



G W Downs & K Iida, Assessing the theoretical case against collective security, in Collective security beyond the Cold War, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1997, p 18.



C A Kupchan, The case for collective security, in Collective security beyond the Cold War, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1997, p 17.



Terms of Reference for the Proposed SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, Creation of an Organ On Political Co-operation, Peace and Security, SADC Annual Consultative Conference, Gallagher Estate, Midrand, 1996.



Defence Review, First and Second Reports, 26 May 1997.