The 'third wave' of democratisation, as described by Huntinton,¹ finally reached Mozambique in 1992. The former socialist-oriented country entered a peace process that was to end decades of civil war. The election in 1994 not only formally marked the end of the civil war, but was also a first step on a challenging path to political stability and the implementation of democratic structures.

Although an analytical focus on competitive elections as core elements of democracy has been under severe criticism in the past and provoked accusations of a "fallacy of electoralism"² within academic circles, it seems appropriate to evaluate the key democratic variables of competition and participation before anything else in the case of Mozambique’s nascent democracy. In the following analysis, this will be achieved through an examination of the structures of the Mozambican party system and elections conducted in the past.

Mozambique’s developing multiparty system was shaped from the onset by the former conflict structure and the antagonism between the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). Despite these bipolar features of the party system, FRELIMO continued to dominate the political landscape.

Following 1994’s successful parliamentary and presidential elections, Mozambique’s democratic transition faced its first litmus test with local elections in May 1998. However, the boycott by RENAMO, as the senior and dominant opposition party, and the low voter turnout of 14,58 per cent cast doubt on the transitional process. As yet unanswerable questions arise, such as whether Mozambique will be able to conduct another round of national elections which would demonstrate a genuine democratic transition and would not need to be veiled in the well-known international observer’s euphemism of ‘substantially free and fair’.

Against this background, the presidential and parliamentary elections in December 1999 will be crucial indicators of the status quo of Mozambique’s democratisation.

When the authoritarian Caetano regime in Portugal was overthrown in 1974, FRELIMO — which had been fighting its war of independence since 1962 — was already in control of three of Mozambique’s ten provinces.

With Mozambique’s independence in 1975, a Constitution came into force that stipulated the role of FRELIMO as the leading force in state and society and legitimised a one-party regime.

Whereas the 1970s can be largely described as the phase of FRELIMO’s consolidation of power, the 1980s showed the first symptoms of a state in crisis. In terms of structural and material economic conditions, the concept of the state³ as the exclusive agent responsible for national economic development proved to be a failure. The establishment of communal villages and the resulting resettlement of people by force were met with fierce resistance by large parts of the rural population. The traditional subsistence economy of small peasants had no place in the socialist model of development, and major segments of rural society became further marginalised and totally disillusioned with the ruling government.⁴ Large segments of the population felt excluded from a political system that bore all too familiar patrimonial features. The state became a source of privileges and material resources for those who had access to them.

The enforced resettlement of people, almost non-existing state services and the eradication of traditional structures eroded the social foundations of FRELIMO. This source of discontent was used by RENAMO⁵ to form its own support base within the Mozambican population. While RENAMO continued to gain support in the central provinces of Sofala and Manica, as well as new support in the northern provinces, the grouping remained a primarily military movement which Christian Geffray characterised as:

"RENAMO is certainly not the association portrayed by FRELIMO propaganda. But it is also not a political organisation, it does not address the needs of a population that feels neglected for the last fifteen years."⁶

FRELIMO’s hopes that — after the Lancaster House agreement and the removal of the Smith regime in Zimbabwe (1980) — RENAMO would have lost its external support and that a military solution to the conflict would therefore only be a question of time, proved to be wrong. Logistic support for RENAMO continued and, in fact, became part of South Africa’s military concept of ‘Total National Strategy’.⁷

The complexity of Mozambique’s transitional process and its problems — like the situation in Angola — can be attributed to the political situation in the country dominated by a civil war, and entangled in the conflict structure of Southern Africa at the time. Successful democratisation in Mozambique did not merely require changes to the institutional framework and the adoption of a multiparty system. Prerequisites for the democratic transition in Mozambique were the end of the civil war and a stable peace process. Analytically, therefore, two interdependent processes were each determined by internal and external factors.

Contrary to the Angolan case, the civil war in Mozambique has never been a proxy war waged by the superpowers. Although Mozambique received military aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and other countries in the Warsaw Pact, FRELIMO never followed Moscow ideologically as the Movimento Popular pela Libertação de Angola (MPLA) did. The Mozambican government always tried to conduct an independent foreign policy⁸ and continuously denied the USSR permission to establish military bases on Mozambican territory.⁹ Moreover, RENAMO never inherited the degree of legitimacy that the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) had within the US State Department. In contrast, RENAMO had the reputation of being an "African Khmer Rouge."¹⁰

Although the international dimension of the Mozambican conflict remained less developed than in Angola, the regional entanglement of the conflict provided its own dynamics.¹¹

A decisive aspect of the initial steps towards peace talks was the growing consciousness of changing regional and international realities, and thus the growing reality of a military stalemate. With the change in South Africa’s regional foreign policy,¹² RENAMO’s logistic support ceased and it had to rely increasingly on weapons captured from FRELIMO. Additionally, RENAMO’s brutal modus operandi was documented in the Gersony Report of the US State Department, thus discrediting RENAMO’s international reputation. The terror spread by RENAMO among the rural population reduced the movement’s support in society and at least provoked a certain amount of passive resistance.¹³

Simultaneously, increasing economic constraints were placed on the government in an attempt to bring the civil war to an end. Financial aid from abroad dried up and the Structural Adjustment Programme implemented in 1986 had not been able to alleviate the poverty of ordinary people. Militarily, there was a stalemate. The Forças Armadas Moçambicanas (FAM) failed to achieve any substantial successes and, to a large extent, was dependent upon Zimbabwean contingents. Zimbabwe, constrained by its own fragile economy at the end of the 1980s, considered the withdrawal of its troops. Furthermore, the USSR announced in 1989 that their military advisors would leave within the next two years.

It is in this context that a first round of peace talks started in Nairobi in August 1989 and continued through additional rounds in Rome from July 1990 onwards.

Alongside the peace talks, the government in Maputo went ahead with its process of political liberalisation. At the fifth party congress in 1989, the state had already been separated from the party and references of Marxism-Leninism had been removed from the party statutes.

Slowly, RENAMO’s raison d’être for a continuing war diminished.¹⁴ The Constitution of November 1990 finally included everything RENAMO had been fighting for:

a guarantee of individual basic rights like the freedom of belief, opinion and association;

party pluralism;

the independence of the courts;

free and secret elections; and

a direct vote by the president.

At first, these unilateral reforms, guided by FRELIMO, had a negative impact on the peace talks. RENAMO saw itself caught in a hopeless dilemma. Its bargaining position had been reduced. RENAMO had to accept the rules of the game set by FRELIMO and hope for success in the elections despite its political and programmatic weaknesses. Alternatively, RENAMO could boycott further negotiations and resume hostilities with the knowledge that the war could not be won, thereby enhancing international support for FRELIMO. The chosen path has been characterised by Alden and Simpson as one that was "... as obstructionist as possible, in the hope that FRELIMO would make concessions that might favour them during the elections."¹⁵ Despite these difficulties, it was possible to move the peace negotiations in Rome slowly towards the General Peace Accord (GPA) that outlined a framework for democratic transition.¹⁶ The treaty also created an environment enabling the structural transformation of RENAMO and guaranteed the survival of the party in times of peace.

With the lessons learned in Angola, a successful demobilisation of both forces became a precondition for multiparty elections. The United Nations mandate encompassed the surveillance of the peace treaty, the provision of humanitarian aid and the monitoring of the elections. Despite some initial difficulties regarding the implementation of the peace treaty and demilitarisation, the UN successfully demobilised both forces and managed to prepare for national elections in October 1994.

Mozambique’s transition highlights an instance where external factors were not only crucial for the initiation of democratic transition. The peace process and the subsequent implementation of democratic structures in the run-up to the multiparty elections in October 1994, were shaped by pressure from the international community. The institutional framework of democratisation was determined primarily by the former belligerents, FRELIMO and RENAMO. As the multiparty conference for the drafting of electoral legislation showed, other political forces — the so-called non-armed parties, established from 1990 onwards — had only a few opportunities to influence and shape the transitional process.¹⁷ The opposition, feeling excluded, assumed that every political step FRELIMO took, was for the party’s own advantage. This feeling of distrust was not only nurtured, but also confirmed by the ruling party dictating the conditions and the conduct of the democratisation process.

A decisive issue in Mozambique’s democratisation was the question whether it would be possible to develop a pluralistic party system with a competitive structure. But democratisation also needed the successful transformation of RENAMO from a primarily military movement to a political party. Moreover, RENAMO was confronted by a problem seldom encountered by African political parties. In general, African political parties are groups concentrated in urban areas and focused on the intellectual élite. Most of the time, they struggle to create a support base in rural areas. RENAMO, however, lacked a support base in the urban centres of the country.

By the mid-1980s, RENAMO had already established a political wing and finally consolidated its political structures at the first party congress in 1989. The new party leadership encompassed well-trained party politicians, who had already worked closely with RENAMO leader, Afonso Dhlakama. Furthermore, the new leadership became ethnically heterogeneous and dispelled the stereotype of RENAMO as an ethnic movement dominated by the Ndau and concentrated in central Mozambique.¹⁸ However, one of the biggest problems regarding parliamentary work was the lack of staff with higher education. An essential human resource base for the party were administrators in formerly RENAMO controlled areas and former clandestine RENAMO sympathisers.¹⁹ As part of Mozambique’s intellectual élite, the latter became increasingly important in parliamentary activities — only eighteen of 112 RENAMO parliamentarians had fought in the bush during the civil war²⁰ — but thereby created tensions with long-serving former guerrilla fighters. Quite often, these newly recruited technocrats were confronted by accusations of opportunism.²¹

Despite these structural weaknesses and consolidation problems, it can be argued that RENAMO has succeeded in transforming itself into a political party for the following reasons:

far-reaching demobilisation of combatants took place;

the core structures of a political party were developed; and

the party was able to establish itself in urban centres.

Symptomatic of the weaknesses of all Mozambican opposition parties, including RENAMO, is the lack of financial resources and logistic infrastructure. As direct financing by external sponsors is prohibited by law, party funding remains problematic. Since the acceptance of 1990’s multiparty Constitution, more than thirty political parties have registered. Yet, these often seem to be little more than reflections of the personal megalomania of their leaders. Parties are regularly reduced to insignificance through split-ups and walkouts caused by personal rivalries.

Within Mozambique’s fragmented and weak opposition camp, the Movimento Nacionalista Moçambicano (MONAMO)²² and the Frente Unida de Moçambique — Partido da Convergência Democrática (FUMO-PCD)²³ remain significant. These parties — two of the oldest — have well-structured political programmes and their leaders are constantly engaged in the political process, broadening the leadership basis of the opposition.

The only other opposition party in Parliament besides RENAMO is the electoral union — União Democrática (UD) — consisting of the Partido Democrático e Liberal de Moçambique (PALMO), the Partido Nacional Moçambicana (PANAMO) and the Partido Nacional Democrático (PANADE). As the UM is not well-known nationwide, its parliamentary representation is rather an historical coincidence. The party had — like President Chissano for the presidential elections — the last place on the ballot paper for the parliamentary elections. It is widely assumed that many of Chissano’s voters merely voted by association and that UD thus passed the five per cent barrier provided for in legislation.²⁴

Although Mozambique’s electoral law prohibits the establishment of ethnic or religious parties, the consequences for religion-oriented parties have been more formal than substantial. The Partido Islâmico de Moçambique only had to change its name to Partido Independente de Moçambique (PIMO), but continues to distribute religious ideas without hindrance.

So far, party dynamics in Mozambique have exhibited a number of characteristics. Firstly, FRELIMO controls access to state resources and the entire administration is still in FRELIMO’s hands. Secondly, key positions for democratisation are held by FRELIMO affiliates, thus allowing the ruling party control over the course and pace of the transition process. Regarding the opposition’s structural weaknesses and the dominant position of FRELIMO within the de jure existing multiparty system, Mozambique’s party system consequently is still unipolar. In the presence of financial, organisational and programmatic weaknesses, a concentration of opposition forces and the potential creation of coalitions are at hand. In the past, however, coalitions with RENAMO failed — it has a very centralised structure focused on Dhlakama — as the party had no interest in powersharing. With regard to RENAMO-União Eleitoral, the electoral alliance formed by RENAMO at the end of June 1999, it is expected that there will not be many concessions in staff matters and other political positions, as Dhlakama has already assumed the position of presidential candidate. Just recently, Dhlakama demonstrated his autocratic leadership style, when a discussion broke out whether Raul Domingos, acting leader of the RENAMO parliamentary group, could be the future strongman of the party, and Dhlakama stated clearly in the media, "I am the one who commands within RENAMO."²⁵

The parliamentary and presidential elections in October 1994 were the peak and formal end of the peace process in Mozambique. With voter participation as high as 87,89 per cent, the Mozambican population expressed its desire for peace and reconciliation. The elections were characterised by international observers as ‘free and fair’, and "[i]rregularities which were noted proved to be of a minor character and had no significant effect."²⁶ However, detailed analyses of the elections provide a complex picture of minor irregularities, and reveals defects regarding aspects of participation, as well as competition.²⁷ To classify elections as ‘free and fair’, it is not sufficient to guarantee the secret ballot free of external interference. ‘Free and fair’ also imply equal opportunities to canvass for the support of the electorate. This presupposes financial resources as well as access to the media. However, the financial budgets of parties showed major discrepancies. FRELIMO undoubtedly holds the most favourable position, as the party has had access to state resources for years and could use the state’s infrastructure in its electoral campaign.²⁸ In the GPA, RENAMO was promised US $12 million to assist the party to become competitive. In contrast, the rest of the opposition, the unarmed parties, only had a common Trust Fund of US $1,8 million. The distribution of financial resources shows quite clearly that the first and foremost objective of the international community was to support the transformation of RENAMO into a competitive political party, and to secure the acceptance of the election results for a successful settlement of the peace process. Under these premises, the 1994 election has to be regarded as successful. Dhlakama’s boycott announcement on the eve of the elections, had no significant effects, as the party withdrew on the second day and the election period was extended by another day. Finally, Dhlakama accepted his defeat in the presidential elections (33,73 per cent of the votes against Chissano’s 53,2 per cent). RENAMO gained 112 parliamentary seats (out of 250), and thus assumed the role of the prime opposition party in Parliament.

Even when the 1994 election is seen as a further step in the democratic transition of Mozambique, it must be noted that it took place in a special context, as part of the peace process and under external influences. As evidence for the advancement of Mozambique’s democratisation, however, the outcome of the election has only limited strength.

A crucial test for democratisation in Mozambique were the local elections held in June 1998.²⁹ Shadows were cast when RENAMO and nine other parties decided to boycott the elections and accused FRELIMO of irregularities during voter registration, including the loss of sixty of the 1994 voter rolls. As RENAMO was unable to prove election fraud by FRELIMO or an advanced manipulation of the elections, speculations on the real reasons for the boycott grew. Several observers assumed that RENAMO’s boycott had been a tactical manoeuvre to improve the party’s chances in the 1999 national elections. Withdrawal from any political responsibility provided the party with an opportunity to be perceived as the immaculate alternative.³⁰

A characteristic of these elections was their organisational chaos. Some polling stations were not able to open before afternoon, as officials did not have keys to the boxes of election material or did not have any material at all.³¹

Certainly, the election boycott by RENAMO, a lack of alternatives to FRELIMO, disorganisation and insufficient civic education³² can be blamed for the high voter abstention of 85,42 per cent. It can be said without doubt that the local elections were a setback in Mozambique’s transition process. With a FRELIMO victory in all Municipal Chambers of Deputies — only a few independent candidates for the municipal presidencies succeeded in the elections — the power structure at local level has remained the same as before, enforcing the existing alienation between the political leadership and society.

The local elections have revealed alarming weaknesses in Mozambique’s democratisation — an almost non-existing competition, an exceedingly low level of participation, and the disillusionment of the population with the existing political system. This becomes a growing concern for 1999’s national elections.

As Mozambique approaches its second parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 3 and 4 December, it has to face the apparent weaknesses and defects and cope with them.

Electoral registration took place between 20 July and 17 September. FRELIMO’s rather tight election timetable with a short registration period and an early election date provoked severe criticism from the opposition right from the start. Dhlakama called the registration process "a joke", as he maintained that the two-month registration period would not be sufficient to reach every village in the rural areas. RENAMO has been very concerned about this shortcoming as the party’s main support base is in the rural areas.

RENAMO also criticised the staffing of the Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral (STAE), technically responsible for the conduct of the elections. Due to an incorrect interpretation of the electoral law,³³ no representatives of other parties had been on board of the STAE during the first weeks of the registration period. In this context, Domingos has already hinted that it could have serious consequences for the acceptance of the election results.³⁴

The registration process, especially in rural areas, was characterised by severe shortcomings. Registration material arrived late, and the lack of transport facilities throughout the country led to cases where voters had to walk thirty kilometres to their registration posts.³⁵

Apart from the more technical problems related to registration and the compilation of the voters’ roll, a new electoral census also created the need for a thorough civic and voters’ education programme. Seven million Mozambicans who already had voter cards from the last elections had to be convinced that they must register again.

Because no party received an absolute majority in the 1994 elections (FRELIMO 44,3 per cent, RENAMO 37,8 per cent), it was in the interest of the two main parties to pay attention to the voter registration process. The election outcome might well be decided by each party’s success in registering its supporters. For both parties, the main focus of the election campaign has been the central and northern parts of the country. Since FRELIMO suffered a severe setback in the north during 1994, it now hopes to regain lost territory, whereas RENAMO seems to be convinced that it will be able to enlarge its support base in provinces like Nampula and Cabo Delgado.

Contrary to the situation in the 1994 elections, when Mozambican civil society played little more than an observer role, non-governmental organisations have been actively involved in the civic and voter education process in the run-up to this year’s election. The STAE trained civil society organisations and provided them with educational material so that they could act as multipliers with a far greater outreach.

The main challenge of these elections will be to motivate the electorate to register and go to the polling stations on election day. The extraordinarily high voter turnout of 1994 cannot be taken for granted in 1999. In 1994, Mozambicans voted for peace, now they have to vote for democracy. But like the ‘elections without voters’ showed in 1998, apathy and disillusionment with the government among the Mozambican population are high. In a study recently conducted by the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo, Carlos Serra argued that the local elections were an evaluation of the performance of the government in terms of the redistribution of social wealth and the realisation of the promised "futuro melhor" (a better future).³⁶

Although the Mozambican government followed the austerity programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank during the last decade, and achieved an average annual economic growth of 4,9 per cent between 1990 and 1997,³⁷ the average Mozambican has still not seen the benefits.

Mozambique’s debt service repayments were recently reduced by US $41 million per year by the IMF and the World Bank. Shortly afterwards, the Paris Club granted Mozambique approximately US $2,2 billion of foreign debt relief. However, debt service repayments this year will still be much higher (17 per cent of the government budget) than the current health budget (9,1 per cent).

In the interim, Mozambicans — many of whom have linked the abstract term of democratic transition to the hope of better living conditions — have to adjust to the high costs of living and a still rudimentary public and social infrastructure. The motivation of these disillusioned people to participate in the elections will be one of the major tasks for the opposition parties that have to present themselves now as credible alternatives to FRELIMO.

According to Máximo Dias, leader of MONAMO (a member of RENAMO-União Eleitoral), the electoral alliance formed in June will increase the opposition’s chance of gaining the majority in the Assembleia da República. Nevertheless, the coalition still has to prove its stability. There are already concerns among some of the minor parties that RENAMO might be planning to betray them.

Another decisive aspect which has to be considered regarding the ousting of the FRELIMO government, is the proposed new Constitution that would establish a semi-presidential executive structure. Although the position of president will be retained, most of the power will be shifted to Parliament. If the new Constitution is not accepted before the election, the only way for the opposition to assume power in Maputo will be to win the presidential elections.

This is a formidable task given the personal profile and standing of President Joaquim Chissano on the international and regional stage, as well as in Mozambican society.