INTRODUCTION

As the 21st century begins, much of Africa is characterised by poverty, violence and instability. Facing the pressures of globalisation, the information revolution, economic trauma and rising expectations, some African governments may be losing the ability to control pent-up discontent. In states with relatively strong economies and civil societies, this has sparked pressure for increased government accountability and popular participation. In less resilient states, the devolution of state power has led to collapse, fragmentation and violence. Some, like Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, tumbled into anarchy in the 1990s and are only now slowly rebuilding order. Others have spent years trying to wrest control of their hinterlands from rebel warlords. As a result, Africa is the most war-torn region on earth at the dawning of the 21st century.¹

Many African societies face the bleak prospect of decades of political turbulence. But, social unrest and violence may not be the most serious threats: the natural environment also poses many significant challenges. Such threats range from epidemic diseases to natural disasters such as droughts, desertification, and catastrophic floods. In Africa, humans and nature still live in a precarious balance, with the balance often tipped against societies’ most vulnerable members.

Yet, what is true of Africa at the beginning of the century need not be true at the century’s end. Africa’s security challenges are serious, perhaps even dire, but they are not insurmountable. They can be controlled with careful planning and wise leadership. One of the prime determinants of Africa’s future will be the way in which its leaders approach the continent’s problems. An important feature of any solution must be the establishment of a consensus in African societies about the kind of security that is needed. Another is the development of well-conceived national, subregional and regional security strategies that provide coherent paths towards identifying, advancing and protecting societies’ interests.

This article briefly examines some of the circumstances that undermine security in Africa. However, it is important from the outset to provide a definition of ‘security’ — and to acknowledge that every society defines the concept in a somewhat different way. All too often during the 20th century, African political leaders viewed ‘security’ only in the narrow sense within the context of the preservation of a regime or the rule of a political party. Often, national leaders did not share the same priorities as those of the societies they led: national debates on the nature of security — and the steps appropriate in obtaining it — were very rare in Africa.

For this discussion, ‘security’ is taken to be a condition that is only meaningful if it is confirmed by a society as a whole — not just by a small élite within such a society. It is used in a broad sense — meaning the protection and preservation of all that the society considers to be important and valuable. Security includes the safety of individuals and groups from physical harm. It also includes the conditions of life that are healthful and satisfying to all of society’s members. It also applies to the preservation of the economic and environmental heritage passed on to future generations. In the broad sense used here, security can also include the protection of individuals and groups from arbitrary and coercive forms of political rule. This article will identify and discuss some of the threats to security in Africa based on this broader definition.

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO AFRICAN SECURITY

Economically, most African states are burdened by the legacies of their past. As European powers developed their African colonies, they did not seek to create self-sustaining economies with internal markets. Instead, they deliberately designed economies that would produce primary products for export, but would remain dependent on the colonial power for manufactured goods. With the exception of South Africa, no sub-Saharan African state has fully been able to transcend its pervasive economic dependence on outsiders. To a large extent, African nations remain producers of primary products, whether agricultural, or mineral, like copper and petroleum.

Since the mid-1970s, commodity prices have fluctuated wildly within the global economy, with prices controlled by markets or organisations outside the producing nations. As a result, African states have only minimal control over their national income. This complicates economic planning. Few African states have well-developed internal markets, and national infrastructures therefore remain oriented towards export markets. European colonial metropoles largely snuffed out the extensive intra-African trade of the precolonial period, thus stifling regional integration, or the division of labour. The emphasis on extractive industries and primary products has done little to encourage the kind of educational establishments suited to the needs of developing countries.²

Poor economic decisions by African leaders have exacerbated the problems they have inherited. In contrast to the ‘Asian’ economic model — with its focus on financial and budgetary discipline, the encouragement of the private sector, slow building for long-term growth, and integration into the global economy first through labour-intensive manufacturing and then capital and technology-intensive industry — most African states pursued alternative development strategies. Often, these were state-centric and — because of the sensitivity to dependence — designed for self-sufficiency rather than integration into the global economy. This turned into a dead end and left Africa far behind other developing areas like Latin America or the Asia-Pacific, once it became clear that integration into the world economy alone could fuel sustained growth.

At the same time, many African bureaucracies were used more for patronage than for efficient administration. They thus tended to be exceptionally bloated with excess personnel, causing persistent and debilitating budgetary deficits. Industrial projects were supported by external borrowing and controlled by the state, thus stifling the growth of an entrepreneurial class in the formal sector. Early efforts to industrialise also tended to result in an inefficient industry, with large-scale projects, often for the ‘show’, which did not match the needs or capabilities of local workers and managers.

In the years since independence, African borrowing has been so extensive that debt-servicing equals 25% of sub-Saharan Africa’s export earnings.³ Nigeria spends between 35% and 40% of its national budget to service its debt.⁴ Of the 36 low income nations that the World Bank rates as "severely indebted", 29 are in Africa; 23 of these have a debt burden greater than their gross national product (GNP).⁵ A heavy debt burden severely reduces the resources for investment in any sector — including security — and is itself destabilising.

Ironically, much of the capital that flows into Africa ends up in the overseas bank accounts of the region’s leaders. The capital held overseas by Africans is equivalent to 39% of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP), compared to 6% for Asia.⁶ At the same time, the weakness of African educational systems and the persistent ‘brain drain’ — among others, the tendency of Africans educated in North America or Europe to stay there rather than to return home — have severely hindered economic growth and forced many foreign corporations to rely on expatriate managers and technicians rather than on local people.

Cultural factors have also complicated economic development. African culture emphasises obligation to family and kin. Frequently, an African who acquires power, prestige, or wealth feels a moral obligation to use this to benefit family members, clients, or members of the same ethnic group. To take one example, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the long-time president of Côte d’Ivoire, lavished public money on projects in his home town of Yamoussoukro, a small and obscure place. These included a US $300 million Roman Catholic basilica bigger than St Peter’s in Rome. Henri Konan Bédié, who succeeded Houphouët-Boigny as the Ivorian president, stopped work in Yamoussoukro and, instead, poured money into his home town of Daoukro, an equally small and obscure place.⁷ The December 1999 coup, which removed Bédié from office, will undoubtedly end this spate of projects. But, such spending itself is a common pattern in Africa.

While the obligation to help clients and relatives provides social and economic support structures to its participants, it can lead to conflict and instability, since everyone recognises the immense stakes of political competition. Democracy works best when the stakes of the contest are at a minimum. When political power, as well as wealth hinge on elections or political competitions, the tendency is for no-holds barred methods and for the losers to refuse to accept defeat willingly. At a minimum, the political spoils system leads to debilitating nepotism, corruption and mismanage-ment that hinder development.⁸ As former American diplomat David Passage notes:

This is, perhaps, painfully blunt, but the problem is real. To take one example, President Obasanjo of Nigeria estimates that between US $4 and $5 billion was looted by the government of his predecessor, Sani Abacha.¹⁰

Corruption is, of course, not limited to Africa. Suharto’s Indonesia, the Philippines under Marcos, Mexico under Salinas, and others have matched or surpassed anything seen in Africa. It was rampant in the US during prohibition and remains an American problem, particularly among big city law enforcement agencies. But, corruption is a major obstacle to African development.¹¹ Former Tanzanian prime minister, Joseph S Warioba, and former minister of Justice, Frederick Werema, in a paper at an anti-corruption conference in Washington DC, stated: "In many African countries corruption is very pervasive."¹²

Even in states like Uganda, often considered a model for economic and political reform, corruption has become a serious burden, siphoning off as much money as the World Bank spends in the country each year.¹³ At a time when Africa desperately needs capital to fuel development, foreign investment is discouraged not only by Africa’s lack of infrastructure, an educated workforce and functioning legal systems, but also by the depths of corruption and nepotism. Put simply, Africa is not itself an attractive economic partner when compared to other developing areas like Latin America or the Asia-Pacific.

The combination of a weak infrastructure, corruption and a labour force that lags behind those of most other countries in the world in terms of education and health, retards economic growth and leaves Africa dependent upon foreign aid. Africa has received the bulk of assistance disbursed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund over the past decades, and at least as much in governmental bilateral aid.¹⁴

Dependence on foreign aid remains a significant liability. Aid, which accounted for 10 to 20% of the GNP of many African nations by the 1980s, has declined in the 1990s, in part because donors, like lenders, have become frustrated with the paucity of tangible results from earlier transfers.15 As analyst David Rieff notes:

"By most criteria, Africa has received more aid than any other region of the world. And yet, for the very tangible good it has done, aid has clearly had a far more minimal effect on Africa’s development than either donor countries or recipients ever imagined."16

Through a combination of colonialism’s legacy, poor economic decisions, and the structure of the world economy, Africa has undergone a long-term degradation of its economic situation. Most African countries are worse off economically than they were in the 1960s. The decade of the 1980s, in particular, was one of regression. The few states that did experience economic growth saw it swallowed up by increased population growth rates.

In the early 1990s, a number of African countries undertook serious reforms designed to stabilise their economies, liberalise exchange rates, encourage productivity in the private sector, and open the way for increased trade and investment. The results were significant, leading to what the US State Department called "a major economic transformation."17 Yet, even the United Nations admits that the recovery is fragile and any gains are easily eroded by bad harvests and downturns in the global market for primary products.18 The World Bank estimates that it will take long-term annual growth of 8 to 9% to make significant progress in reducing poverty in Africa.19 But, growth has already begun to slow down in sub-Saharan Africa, from 4.2% in 1996 to 3.5% in 1997. Expectations were that it would decrease again in 1998 to 2.1 to 2.4% before rebounding to 3.5% in 1999—2000 under relatively favourable assumptions.20 Today, as Marina Ottaway notes, "African countries remain marginal to all global trends."21

The long-term prospects for economic development in Africa are not bright. Population growth continues to outstrip expansion in Africa’s educational and health care systems, thus limiting the quality of the workforce compared to other parts of the world. The World Bank’s World development report for 1998/99 shows Africa with a 2.8% annual growth rate (using 1994 statistics) — nearly double the rate of Asia, the second-fastest growing continent.

In many rural areas, population growth has led or is leading to environmental problems such as deforestation and desertification.22 It is also not only the aggregate population figure, but its distribution that creates problems. Africa is experiencing an extensive migration to its cities where growing slum belts are potential hotbeds of violence, crime and disease. While Africa is currently the least urbanised continent, its cities are expected to undergo "explosive growth in the future," thus overwhelming the ability of governments to provide basic services.23

Nor is population increases a boon to national economies. In today’s globalising economy, cheap labour is no longer enough. It is high quality labour that helps to attract capital and thus fuels growth. Equally important, Africa’s nearly obsessive fear of dependency and the tendency of the region’s leaders to see political power as an opportunity to reward followers limit the extent to which it can undertake the steps that allow a nation to integrate into the global economy. (The necessary reforms — so far lacking in many African countries — include developing transparent governance and finance, limiting state control over the economy, and building a non-corrupt, effective judicial system.) As a result, Africa is falling further behind both the advanced parts of the world and the advancing parts.

European colonial authorities in Africa typically established centralised administrative, political and economic power while suppressing political pluralism.24 At the time of independence, no African state had a firm foundation for a pluralistic democracy. There were few good models of rule by law, an independent judiciary, a free press, or a vibrant civil society built upon local government and civic or political organisations. Not surprisingly, most African states, since independence, have suffered what is called ‘personal rule’, often by a dictator who either seized power through force or was elected and subsequently suppressed political opposition.25 Most of these states attempted, at least, to build a façade of democracy immediately after independence, but nearly every one saw open government crumble. These ranged from outright and undisguised dictatorships such as those of Idi Amin in Uganda, a dynasty of generals in Nigeria, or Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaïre, to those with thin veneers of democracy such as Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or Daniel Arap Moi’s Kenya. Only Botswana, Mauritius and Senegal have sustained decades of multiparty systems with regular, free and fair elections.

Still, in the 1990s, Africa appeared to undergo a democratic awakening. Between 1990 and 1995, 38 of the then 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa held competitive, multiparty national elections.26 Where there were five African countries that could be described as democratic in 1989, there were 20 in 1998.27 But, as Richard Joseph notes, much of what looked like political reform in Africa was actually perception manipulation by leaders who recognised that continued international respectability and access to aid and credit were contingent upon the appearance of democracy.28 To pull off this sleight of hand, some of the national political élite held national conferences or elections with no plans for institutionalising the transfer of power. Others found subtle ways of preserving personal power like Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe or Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, both of whom revived the notion of a ’single-party democracy’ that was popular in the 1970s. In fact, most African leaders "remain extremely suspicious of popular participation and even more so of party politics."29 As long as political power leads to control over national wealth and is seen as a means of building and sustaining a patronage network, real democracy will remain elusive.

ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES TO AFRICAN SECURITY

Although Africa is still renowned for its magnificent natural environment, with natural features, flora and fauna found nowhere else on earth, citizens of African societies contend with a host of environmental problems that pose significant long-term threats to their health and livelihood.30 Environmental hazards include poor soil, natural disasters, particularly devastating droughts, diseases and the intersection of burgeoning populations with fragile ecologies. Some African countries have permitted the dumping of highly toxic wastes from the industrialised nations of the world. Deforestation, overgrazing and harmful irrigation practices have turned significant areas of Africa into agriculturally unproductive zones.31

African populations contend with a host of debilitating tropical diseases, including schistosomiasis (also known as bilharziasis) and malaria, which infect significant proportions of the population over large areas of the continent. Hemorrhagic fevers still threaten highly lethal, unpredictable outbreaks. Gastro-intestinal diseases routinely strike concentrated populations: refugees are especially vulnerable. But, the traditional disease threats pale by comparison to the ongoing HIV/AIDS pandemic.

The numbers are simply numbing. According to Dr Peter Piot, Executive Director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 20 million people in sub-Saharan Africa are infected with HIV or have AIDS.32 This means that one in every 13 people between the ages of 15 and 49 will die of the disease. By 1998, AIDS had surpassed malaria as the main cause of death in Africa.33 Nigeria, Uganda, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa are particularly hard hit. For instance, in Zimbabwe where the adult infection rate is estimated at 26%, there were 130 000 AIDS deaths in 1997 and nearly half a million AIDS orphans.34 In Botswana, the infection rate is 25%. The 1997 death toll was 15 000 (in a country of 1 448 454) and there are 28 000 AIDS orphans.35 Life expectancy in Botswana is expected to drop from 61 years in 1990-95 to 47 years in 1995-2000 because of AIDS.36 In South Africa — the continent’s most developed country and its potential economic locomotive — the AIDS infection rate among adults is expected to climb from a debilitating 11% to a disastrous 18% by 2005.37 Other estimates contend that, by 2010, it could be 25% given the strong cultural barriers to the kinds of interventions that prevent AIDS.38 Some 1 500 more South Africans are infected with AIDS every day.39 Nigeria’s health minister estimated that 5.8 million Nigerians were HIV-positive or had AIDS, and it was spreading at a rate of one person per minute.40

The AIDS epidemic has been particularly damaging to development. AIDS in African societies is killing citizens in their most productive years, leaving whole villages in the most highly infected areas composed solely of the very old and/or the very young. In some regions, farms lie idle and agricultural tasks remain undone because the disease has decimated the workforce.41 The impact on professionals is dire. In Zimbabwe, whole businesses have closed as a result of AIDS deaths.42 About a quarter of the police force in South Africa is HIV-positive or has AIDS.43 Ugandan President Museveni admitted frustration with spending money to train military officers, only to have most of them die of AIDS in a short period of time.44 Estimates of HIV infection among regional armies include 50% in the DRC and Angola, 66% in Uganda, 75% in Malawi, and 80% in Zimbabwe.45 In some African countries, three-quarters of the military hospital beds are occupied by AIDS patients. At best, Africa will take decades to recover from AIDS and its related problems.

It is as easy to find the environmental threats so daunting as to lose hope of finding solutions. To be sure, Africa’s environmental problems pose significant security challenges to the continent’s societies. But none is irreversible. True enough, solutions to many of these problems require care, judicious planning and long-term effort. But, African scientists and experts, in co-operation with partners from elsewhere in the world, are finding solutions. Some African governments are making the policy decisions necessary to address environmental dilemmas. There is great potential for significant progress if African leaders can provide the vision that stimulates their societies to address these issues, and if they can establish and nurture international partnerships to solve environmental problems.

MILITARY CHALLENGES AND AFRICAN SECURITY

African militaries are and will remain crucial political actors. "The question is not," according to William Gutteridge, "whether armies will participate in politics but to what extent and by what means."46 Civil-military relations in much of Africa continue to be problematic, despite some recent improvements. Developing healthier civil-military relations, though, is an extraordinarily complex process. Until African states have competent, ethical and accountable civilian rulers (and public officials who can exercise control over the military), the armed forces will be tempted to intervene.47

With the exception of states like Zimbabwe and Angola — where the contemporary military can trace its roots to a liberation force — most African armed forces are the direct descendants of colonial security establishments. They were originally designed to suppress internal threats and are frequently still seen more as a tool for government control or for the military’s own self-enrichment than as the protector of the citizenry. Even when such perceptions are not justified, many African militaries have an ‘image problem’ deriving from the past.

The degree of professionalism of the armed services varies across the continent. Some African armed forces are rife with internal divisions based on ethnicity, regionalism, religion, or clientelism. Others are well-disciplined, well-trained and well-led. Many African officers have been educated in American or European military schools and have taken part in multinational peacekeeping operations. Some African military establishments are models of sound civil-military relations and professional capability, others display a pronounced tendency toward political meddling, self-enrichment, and promotion based on ethnicity or patronage.

In African militaries, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel tend to be very poorly trained and educated. Nearly every African military is also hindered by the absence of formal processes for linking national security objectives to military budgets and operational readiness. To take one example, in recent years, the Zimbabwean military released large numbers of troops for long-term home leave because it could not afford to feed them while, at the same time, it purchased new staff cars for all field and flag grade officers.48

The security environment in which African militaries operate also poses serious and persistent challenges to stability. The continent is awash in arms and traversed by arms merchants, many of whom came from military or intelligence services in the former Soviet bloc or from South Africa.49 Some of the weapons available in Africa are residues of the Cold War era when outside states plied their clients with military hardware. Others are more recent purchases from the world market. The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War made military equipment available at discount rates.50 When Ugandan President Museveni began looking for tanks in 1999, he found that T-55s were available for the equivalent of US $30 000 — substantially less than the Toyota Land Cruisers and Land Rovers which are so popular in Africa.51 Similarly, the end of the Cold War led Western and Asian arms manufacturers to seek new markets, including Africa.

Although it is impossible to gauge the number of small arms in circulation in Africa accurately, the number is excessive. For example, Mozambique may have imported as many as 6 million small arms during its civil war, while there are 4.1 million licensed firearms in civilian hands and somewhere between 400 000 and 8 million illegal weapons in South Africa.52 Africa also has the heaviest concentration of landmines in the world (over 30 million).53 The situation is so serious that the UN Security Council passed a resolution expressing:

"grave concern at the destabilizing effect of illicit arms flows, in particular of small arms, to and in Africa and at their excessive accumulation and circulation, which threaten national, regional and international security and have serious consequences for development and for the humanitarian situation in the continent."54

To complicate matters further, Africa has long attracted international mercenaries. Since independence, European soldiers of fortune like ‘Mad Mike’ Hoare and Bob Dénard plied their trade on the continent.55 Today, mercenarism is a still a factor. During the collapse of the Mobutu regime in Zaïre, the dying dictator hired French, Belgian, South African, Bosnian, Serb, Russian and Ukrainian mercenaries in a failed attempt to stave off Laurent Kabila’s rebel force.

The formation of the South African corporation, Executive Outcomes, in 1989 added a new twist — home-grown African mercenaries. Executive Outcomes was mainly composed of combat veterans from the former South African Defence Force (SADF). It not only offered military advice and consulting, but also combat forces which saw action in Angola and Sierra Leone.56 While Executive Outcomes officially closed its operations at the end of 1998 — largely in response to South Africa’s promulgation of the Military and Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibited South African citizens or corporations from providing mercenary services — a successor or successors may have emerged.57 In fact, there were reports in early 1999 that South African mercenaries simply relocated to Eastern Europe and continued to serve the Angolan rebels (who could pay with the proceeds of diamond sales).58 This is simply the starkest example of a wider trend towards the privatisation of security in Africa.59

Africa has seen the persistence of armed separatist movements and violent ethnic conflict, now made even more dangerous by an increase in armed intervention by other African states. The idea that the enemy of my enemy is my friend has a long history in Africa as regimes often offer support and sanctuary to armed groups fighting an unfriendly neighbour. Initially, this was an aspect of the ideological and racial wars on the continent. South Africa, for instance, backed the National Resistance Movement in Mozambique (RENAMO), ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) in Zimbabwe, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola because other African states supported movements fighting against white minority rule like the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in South Africa, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in the former Rhodesia, and the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in the then South West Africa. Today, proxy aggression has escalated to the point that it is one of Africa’s most pressing security problems.

As the African security environment has evolved, some African states have broken with the tradition of eschewing direct intervention in their neighbours’ affairs. ECOMOG — an ad hoc military observer group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — intervened in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, while a Southern African Development Community (SADC) force fought in Lesotho.60 The driving idea is that regional integration has reached the point that internal violence invariably spills over and endangers neighbouring states.

The most dangerous intervention of all has occurred in the drifting hulk of the DRC. In many ways, the country — if ‘country’ is not too strong a term — is a distillation of all the pathologies that hinder development, stability and progress in Africa.61 It is more an amalgam of weakly related regions than a nation. Under Mobutu, it reached unsurpassed levels of corruption, keeping a country that is exceptionally rich in natural resources among the poorest on earth. A new word was invented to describe the Zaïrian system of government: kleptocracy — a system where corruption and theft form the core of political leadership and administration.

Zaïre became the paragon of personal rule and repression, as well as the kind of dual economy where an extractive sector enriched a tiny élite while most other people fended for themselves in the informal sector. In the security realm, Zaïre could not defend itself, thus attracting intervention by outsiders interested in its wealth, on the one hand, and actually inviting intervention to save the regime, on the other.62

More recently, the DRC has seen extensive direct intervention by other African states that sought to solidify their own national security or carve out a profitable sphere of influence. There were reports, for instance, that Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe — facing an imminent economic disaster at home — demanded preferential treatment for Zimbabwean corporations over those from South Africa by the DRC as a condition for military intervention in support of the Kabila government.63 Rumours also spread that Uganda was seeking deals in gold and diamonds as payment for its support for the Congolese rebels.64 The end result has been what Georgetown University Professor Herbert Howe calls "states as mercenaries."65

By the autumn of 1998, a number of African states were involved in the DRC conflict in one way or the other.66 The result has been Africa’s first "great war."67 But it may not be the last. History may show that the DRC was the first of many conflicts arising from the emergence of a new, post-Cold War geostrategic configuration in Africa, this time primarily pitting the Central African nations of Uganda and Rwanda, which support the Congolese rebels wanting to overthrow Kabila, against Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, which back the regime.68

To complicate matters further, an array of often brutal rebel groups — including genocidal Rwandan Hutus — are also involved.69 As South African deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad noted, the conflict in the DRC has the potential to "explode into major conventional war involving many of the continent’s armies."70 In August 1999, such a possibility seemed horrifyingly close as Uganda and Rwanda — two former allies bound by common interests and personal ties between Museveni and Kagame — found their militaries in combat against each other.71 This escalated to the point where Museveni issued a public warning that he was prepared for full-scale war with Rwanda.72 The ‘Congo effect’ is also having an adverse political and economic impact within the intervening states.73 Zimbabwe, for instance, appears to be having a very difficult time sustaining its military effort.74 Uganda’s defence spending for the fiscal year 1999 was 30.6% above budget, in part because of its intervention in the DRC.75 The pattern of state failure followed by outside intervention is likely to cause wild fluctuations in African defence budgets unless some effective method for regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping emerges.

OPPORTUNITIES

Even given the immense challenges faced by African leaders, recent signs of progress — modest though they may be — are encouraging. In mid-1999, South Africa undertook a surprisingly peaceful election and the transfer of power from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki. In 1999, Nigeria took another stab at democracy with the election of Olesegun Obasanjo as president. So far, the Nigerian transition has been stable. President Obasanjo has faced political opposition and sporadic outbreaks of ethnic violence, but has pursued vital steps like the deregulation of the economy and an anti-corruption campaign.76

The political transitions in South Africa and Nigeria are very hopeful signs. Still, the December 1999 overthrow of an elected government in Côte d’Ivoire — long considered to be one of Africa’s most stable states — is a reminder that upheaval is never far away.77 The potential for reversal and violence remains in Africa’s giants, particularly in Nigeria, but also in South Africa. If major conflict did break out in any of Africa’s large states, the result could be disastrous, including major refugee flows, the spread of instability and violence to weaker neighbours, and a strong possibility of some kind of international intervention. Similarly, there is also the possibility that other African states will be overwhelmed by the difficulties and tensions associated with economic and political reform. This could lead to regression towards even more personal rule and parasitic economic policies, and to many failed states, each generating its own internal power struggles and humanitarian disasters.

On the other hand, Africa may continue along the road of political and economic reform. African leaders recognise that with the diminishing of their leverage over aid donors by the end of the Cold War, only states undertaking reform can count on external assistance. The currents of change in Africa are also driven by a true public awakening associated with the global communications revolution. Some Africans — at least in cities — now know that reformers in places like the Philippines and Indonesia were able to spark change, and thus they are less willing to tolerate repression. As analyst John Makumbe writes:

"The resurgence of civic protest in virtually all sub-Saharan African countries since the late 1980s has resulted, inter alia, in the transformation of the continent’s governance and political systems, with civic groups in most of these countries demanding that their government be democratic, transparent and accountable to the people."78

The combination of a desire for change and frustration with the old models based on socialism, personal rule and parasitism may open the way for what South African President Thabo Mbeki calls the ‘African Renaissance’.79

It is relatively easy for coercive regimes to see dangers in the world-wide information revolution. But, this revolution also provides marvellous opportunities. One such an opportunity is the encouragement of communication within civil-society and among world-wide networks of like-minded people. This, in turn, could empower an attentive public in an African country to engage in genuine debate about national priorities. A far-sighted national government could seize the opportunity to stimulate such a debate, resulting ultimately in a consensus about national security — developing a shared view within society about the kind of security appropriate to its needs, determining how much security is enough, and what resources the society is willing to devote.

A STRATEGIC APPROACH

The ability of African societies — and their leaders — to cope with security challenges is highly dependent on the quality of their strategic planning. The more difficult and complex the security problems that a nation faces, the greater the need for a strategic approach.

Strategy is the organised and deliberate use of power resources to attain, protect, or promote goals with a minimum of waste and a maximum chance of success. In the security realm, all nations define goals and use the elements of national power to attain them, but not all nations do it in a consistently strategic fashion. If a state chooses a strategic approach, ad hoc applications of national power give way to orderly ones. As a result, efficiency increases.

Before African states can begin to develop coherent national strategies, they must strengthen the foundation of security, understood in the broadest sense of the term. Prosperity, good governance (including responsiveness to the public will), national consensus and the development of human capital can provide the foundation of security. On such a foundation, African leaders can begin to approach security strategically. This would entail several steps.

Firstly, all strategies require the definition of a national vision. This is simply a broad notion of the situation that the leaders would prefer. By developing a vision and obtaining the consent of society for its objectives, leaders can begin the process of developing strategic plans and programmes. For Africa, a strategic vision might entail:

effective methods for economic advancement and input into the political system for all groups within the country, thus avoiding internal conflict and violence;



a strong sense of national identity and consensus on national goals and procedures;



deterrence of external enemies by some combination of political and military means;



if deterrence fails or internal conflict does occur, a security establishment capable of defending the nation in an humane and ethical way, either alone or in conjunction with allies;



the provision of resources adequate (but not excessive) to national security;



a professional and effective security establishment — military, police and intelligence services — playing a role in framing national strategy, but with civilian oversight;



a norm of regional and subregional co-operation on shared problems; and



regular, formal procedures for developing national strategy, refining it, and co-ordinating it with other states in the region.

Once a national vision is developed, the next step is to identify national interests and objectives. Some method of assessing interests is important because it allows resources to be matched to interests in a logical way.

After interests are defined, strategic planners must undertake an honest and comprehensive threat assessment. This would identify groups, states, organisations, or practices that might hamper the attainment of the vision and threaten national interests. In today’s security environment, threats include both traditional ones like foreign invasion and internal insurgency and non-traditional ones like refugees, diseases, environmental degradation and international crime. This threat assessment should not only list the security threats that the nation faces, but should also prioritise them by degree of risk and likelihood. Each society must decide how to balance its efforts between high-risk threats and high-probability threats.

Once a vision is established and the threat assessed, strategic planning entails mobilising and co-ordinating strategic resources, and deciding how to apply them to deter, ameliorate or solve threats. It is important to remember, at this stage, that strategy has both a horizontal dimension and a vertical one. The horizontal dimension co-ordinates the elements of national power — economic, political, military and psychological. This entails close co-operation among different branches and organisations within the government. The vertical dimension entails planning for the long-term, as well as the short-term. Strategists must decide how best to mobilise national power and co-ordinate it over a period of decades, as well as in the coming year. The ultimate ‘products’ of this process are policies and programmes that apply power resources in pursuit of interests and objectives in ways approved by the society at large.

Strategic planning requires a formal, rational process to develop the national vision, identify national interests, assess the threat and apply power in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. An effective strategic plan must undergo regular review and revision. The greater the degree of communication and consultation with the public that goes into this process, the better the chances that the strategy which emerges will be backed by a national consensus. (The process of strategy development and consultation should include all sectors of society.) The military and the executive branch of government should work hand-in-hand with parliamentarians, the private sector, financial institutions, social and religious organisations, local leaders, political parties, the media, and other important sectors of society. The will of the public should be identified and considered.

Obviously, there are elements of the national strategy that must be kept secret, but it is useful for a government to disseminate a public document that explains the national interests, the threats and, in broad terms, the programmes and policies through which national power is used to protect and promote national interests. The US has found it useful to publish an annual public national security strategy document. This document allows a dialogue over national security and thus gives the government a way to understand public perceptions and adjust the strategy accordingly. Even if such a document is published, national leaders must continually explain the strategy to the public and listen to their concerns and perspectives. The media can play a vital role in educating the public on security and providing input to national leaders. The better the media understand the strategy, the smoother the process works.

While it is often overlooked, a strategic approach to security also entails programmes designed to identify, educate and reward strategists. Strategy is a complex art. Not everyone can formulate strategy. To produce strategists, a nation should have programmes in its universities and non-governmental organisations that deal with defence and security issues, a comprehensive programme of professional military education, and some method for identifying and educating civilians with a talent for strategy. This final component cannot be overestimated: effective civilian control over the security sector requires that both elected officials (politicians) and career public officials (bureaucrats) understand defence, security and military issues. In this way, they will know when to work in consultation with the military and when to defer to the military. To assure this, African states should consider sending talented public officials to graduate programmes in Africa and abroad, thus helping to develop such programmes in their own universities, and making maximum use of programmes such as the US Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Finally, the nature of the African security environment means that national strategies must be co-ordinated in subregional and regional forums. Organisations like ECOWAS, East African Co-operation (EAC) and SADC might consider formulating security strategies at least at a general level that could be made public and discussed. As with national strategies, these should have an horizontal dimension that co-ordinates the elements of power and a vertical dimension that projects into the future.

CONCLUSIONS

Africa requires stability and security if it is to unleash its massive human potential and creativity. But, substantial challenges stand between today’s African and a secure future. Because of the complexity of Africa’s security environment and the limited economic and military resources, resources must be applied in the most effective and efficient means possible. This suggests the need for a strategic approach to security. Strategic thinkers must develop a national vision, identify national interests, assess threats, and then engineer policies and programmes that apply strategic resources to protect or promote interests. This should be an ongoing process, with continual refinement of the strategy.

But, simply writing a strategy is not enough. The people of each society must understand it and feel that it reflects their interests and objectives. Security strategy must represent the aspirations of an entire society, not simply of those who crafted the strategy. Public education, consultation and consensus-building are integral to strategy, at least in open political systems. Whenever possible, debate should be open. Leaders should talk about security strategy and write about it. From the marketplace of ideas, the best will emerge. And, because strategy is a challenging art, efforts must be taken to identify those with a skill for it, educate them, and reward their efforts.

Africa’s problems are severe, but they are not insurmountable. The solutions are not easy and will not be rapid, but they are attainable. Africa does not lack the human or material resources to solve African problems. Rather, the problems themselves offer the opportunity for leaders to exhibit what mankind in its best manifestation highly commends: dedicated communal, harnessed efforts by all of society to achieve its goals and selfless service to humanity. Africa awaits the men and women of wisdom and vision who will lead African societies to the peace and prosperity that all desire.

NOTES

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the official positions of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or the US Army War College. The author would like to acknowledge the extensive contribution of Dr Dan Henk to this article.

Arms and conflict in Africa, US Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington DC, July 1999, p 1, <www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/9907_africa_conflict. html>.



K Annan, The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Secretary-General’s report to the United Nations Security Council, United Nations, New York, 16 April 1998, p 3.



D Rieff, In defense of afro-pessimism, World Policy Journal 15(4), Winter 1998/99, p 11.



D Farah, Nigerian leader pushes for debt relief, Washington Post, 30 October 1999.



World Bank, Global development finance, 1998, external debt chart, <www.worldbank.org/data/gdf/edt_gdf2.pdf>.



L Machipisa, Africa loses millions through capital flight, Mail & Guardian, 13 May 1999.



N Onishi, Ivoirian’s birthplace recalls its brief, shining moment as a would-be capital, New York Times, 7 January 2000.



See C Heymans & B Lipietz, Corruption and development: Some perspectives, ISSMonograph 40, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, September 1999.



D Passage, Africa: New realities and US policy, Special Warfare, Summer 1998, p 26.



Farah, op cit.



For instance, in a world-wide survey of corruption, Transparency International has ranked many African states very low with Cameroon, Tanzania and Nigeria considered among the most corrupt. Transparency International, The corruption perceptions index 1998, <www.transparency.de/ documents/cpi/index.html>.



F Werema & J S Warioba, Principles and guidelines to combat corruption, paper read at the International Conference on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity among Justice and Security Officials, Washington DC, 24-26 February 1999, <www.usia.gov/current/news/geog/af/ 99022303.aaf.html?/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml>.



K Vick, Uganda’s glow fades, Washington Post, 7 February 1998.



J Hule, Africa collected the most aid, Mail & Guardian, 30 April 1999.



K DeYoung, Foreign aid shrinking in an age of prosperity, Washington Post, 25 November 1999.



Rieff, op cit, p 11.



Africa: Macroeconomic overview, factsheet, US Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, 27 March 1998.



United Nations Economic and Social Policy Division, Economic Commission for Africa, Economic report on Africa 1998, <www.un.org/Depts/eca/divis/espd/toc.htm>.



Africa: Macroeconomic overview, op cit.



Global economic prospects and the developing countries 1998/99: Beyond financial crisis, Appendix 1, in Regional economic prospects, <www.worldbank.org/prospects/ gep98-99/appx1/safrica.htm>.



M Ottaway, Africa: Think again, Foreign Policy 114, Spring 1999, p 20.



See L R Brown, G Gardner & B Halweil, Beyond Malthus: Sixteen dimensions of the population problem, Worldwatch Paper 143, Worldwatch Institute, Washington DC, 1998.



M O’Meara, Exploring a new vision for cities, in Worldwatch, State of the world 1999: A Worldwatch Institute report on progress toward a sustainable society, W W Norton, New York, 1999, p 136.



Annan, op cit, p 3. An exception to this was the British method of ‘indirect rule’ used in Northern Nigeria and a few other places. This, like London’s administrative policy in India, left local political structures intact, and ruled through them.



The concept of ‘personal rule’ in this context was developed in R H Jackson & C G Rosberg, Personal rule in black Africa: Prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982.



L Diamond, Prospects for democratic development in Africa, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Palo Alto, 1997, p 2. See also J A Wiseman, The new struggle for democracy in Africa, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1996; and M Ottaway (ed), Democracy in Africa: The hard road ahead, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1997.



S E Rice, Democracy in Africa, statement before the Subcommittee on Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 12 March 1998, <www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/rice_98312.html>.



R Joseph, Africa, 1990-1997: From abertura to closure, Journal of Democracy 9(2), April 1998, pp 3-17; R Cornwell, The collapse of the African state, in J Cilliers & P Mason (eds), Peace, profit or plunder? The privatisation of security in war-torn African societies, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 1999, pp 69-71.



Ottaway, op cit, p 14.



J E Nyang’oro, Africa’s environmental problems, in A Gordon & D Gordon (eds), Understanding contemporary Africa, Lynne Rienner, London, 1996, pp 195-219.



Exploitation turning vast areas of Africa into a virtual wasteland, 16 October 1999, <CNN.com>.



UNAIDS press release, Abidjan, 7 December 1997.



AIDS is biggest killer in Africa: UN report, Mail & Guardian, 13 May 1999.



UNAIDS/WHO Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Disease: Zimbabwe, 1998, p 3.



UNAIDS/WHO Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Disease: Botswana, 1998, p 3.



UN Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Affairs, The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS, <www.popin.org/ pop1998/6.htm>.



S Sharpe, AIDS is business’s ‘single biggest crisis’, Business Day, 27 January 1999.



L Duke, Ignorance feeds deadly South African AIDS epidemic, Washington Post, 16 February 1999.



M Pela, SA’s AIDS time bomb, Sowetan, 1 December 1998; D Fuphe, HIV-AIDS spreading rapidly in S Africa, Sowetan, 23 November 1998.



Health minister says 5.8 million HIV positive, The Guardian (Lagos), 2 December 1999.



J Jeter, AIDS sickening African economies, Washington Post, 12 December 1999.



Discussions between the author and US embassy personnel, Harare, June 1998.



P Motale, Shock claim about HIV in police force, The Star, 1 December 1998.



Ugandan president says army losing most officers to AIDS, The New Vision (Kampala), 31 January 1999.



C Bisseker, Africa’s military time bomb, Financial Mail, 11 December 1998.



W Gutteridge, Undoing military coups in Africa, Third World Quarterly 7(1), January 1985, p 79. This point is a common one among writers on Africa. See, for instance, C E Welch, Jr, No farewell to Arms? Military disengagement from politics in Africa and Latin America, Westview, Boulder, 1987, p 4; J W Harbeson, Military rulers in African politics, in J W Harbeson (ed), The military in African politics, Praeger, New York, 1987, p 2.



For an elaboration of this argument, see K H Butts & S Metz, Armies and democracy in the new Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 1996.



Information recounted to the author by a former international military advisor with experience in Zimbabwe, 1998.



Arms and conflict in Africa, op cit.



Ibid.



Museveni begins probe into tank purchase, The New Vision (Kampala), 2 January 1999.



V Gamba & S Meek, Introduction, in V Gamba (ed), Society under siege: Licit responses to illicit arms, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1998, pp 3-4. See also S Meek (ed), Controlling small arms proliferation and reversing cultures of violence in Africa and the Indian Ocean, Iss Monograph 30, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, September 1998; T Nkiwane, M Chachiua & S Meek, Weapons flows in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland, ISS Monograph 34, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, January 1999.



Message from Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity to the First Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines, Kempton Park, South Africa, 19-21 May 1997, reprinted in J Cilliers (ed), Towards a landmine-free Africa: The OAU and the legacy of anti-personnel mines, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1997, p 7.



UN Security Council Resolution 1209, 19 November 1998 (S/1998/1091).



See A Mockler, The new mercenaries, Paragon House, New York, 1987;# D G McNeil Jr, Pocketing the wages of war, New York Times, 16 February 1997; H W French, In Zaire’s unconventional war, Serbs train refugees for combat, New York Times, 12 February 1997; AFP (Paris), broadcast, 24 January 1997; AFP (Paris), broadcast, 21 January 1997; S Laufer, Further on expansion of mercenary group, Business Day, 17 January 1997; S Dumont, Kinshasa said to have recruited Israeli mercenaries, Le Soir (Brussels), 5 February 1997; J C McKinley Jr, Mercenary who came to Zaire and left a bloody trail, New York Times, 19 March 1997; M Radonjic, Our pilot killed in Zaire, Gradjanin (Belgrade), 8 April 1997; Z P Pirocanac, More than 1,000 Serb Republic Army combatants — mercenaries in Zaire, Blic (Belgrade), 22-23 February 1997; Mercenary force reportedly sent to Zaire, The Star, 2 December 1996; K Pech & J Tomlins, Former SADF soldiers said joining white legion in Zaire, Sunday Independent, 12 January 1997.



See D Isenberg, Soldiers of Fortune, Ltd.: A profile of today’s private sector corporate mercenary firms, Center for Defense Information Monograph, November 1997; D Isenberg, The new mercenaries, Christian Science Monitor, 13 October 1998, p 13; D Shearer, Outsourcing war, Foreign Policy 112, Fall 1998, pp 68-81; K Pech, Executive Outcomes: A corporate conquest, in Cilliers & Mason, op cit; H M Howe, Private security forces and African stability: The case of Executive Outcomes, Journal of Modern African Studies 36(2), 1998, pp 307-331.



R Block, African supplier of mercenaries shuts, says it wants to give peace a chance, Wall Street Journal, 11 December 1998. For background on the legislation that led to Executive Outcome’s demise, see M Malan & J Cilliers, Mercenaries and mischief: The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, ISS Paper 25, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, September 1997.



J Seepe, SA’s dogs of war move to E Europe, Sowetan, 3 February 1999



J Cilliers & R Cornwell, Mercenaries and the privatisation of security in Africa, African Security Review 8(2), 1999, pp 31-42.



M Pitts, Sub-regional solutions for African conflict: The ECOMOG experiment, Journal of Conflict Studies 19(1), Spring 1999, pp 49-68; S F Burgess, African security in the twenty-first century: The challenges of indigenization and multilateralism, African Studies Review 41(2), September 1998, pp 37-61.



For detail, see S Metz, Reform, conflict, and security in Zaire, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 1996; W G Thom, Congo-Zaire’s 1996-97 civil war in the context of evolving patterns of military conflict in Africa in the era of independence, paper read at the 40th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, November 1997.



See C Young & T Turner, The rise and decline of the Zairian state, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1985.



DRC slams door on SA trade, favours Zim, The Zimbabwe Independent, 23 October 1998, <www.africanews.org/ central/congo-kinshasa/stories/19981023_feat6.html>.



I Fisher, Uganda’s help to Congo rebels raises questions about motives, New York Times, 21 December 1998.



H Howe, presentation, Global Coalition on Africa Seminar on the Privatization of Security in Africa, Washington DC, 12 March 1999.



J L Katambwa Mike, Eleven countries said ‘facing off’ in eastern DRC, Kinshasa Umoja, 30 September 1998.



D Shearer, Africa’s great war, Survival 41(2), Summer 1999, pp 89-106.



In February 1999, Angola announced that it was withdrawing its forces from the DRC in order to focus on its internal struggle against UNITA. See Angola ‘pulls out’ of DRC, The Post of Zambia, 24 February 1999, <www.africanews.org/ central/congo-kinshasa/stories/19990224_ feat1.html>.



L Duke, Congo, allies beef up anti-guerrilla forces, Washington Post, 24 October 1998.



Quoted in S Laufer, Congo conflict may explode into continent-wide war, Business Day, 23 October 1998, <www.africanews.org/central/congo-kinshasa/stories/ 19981023_feat4.html>.



K Vick, New African leaders turn on each other, Washington Post, 2 September 1999.



Museveni says Uganda ready for full-scale war in DRC, The New Vision (Kampala), 31 August 1999.



L Duke, Combatants feel ‘Congo effect’, Washington Post, 29 January 1999.



The government of Zimbabwe claims that the cost of its military intervention is being paid by Kabila’s government which is, in turn, financed by an unidentified source, rumoured to be Libya; see Zimbabwe: Official denies extra funds sought for DRC war, SAPA, 20 May 1999.



AFP (Paris), broadcast, 19 May 1999.



Obasanjo says deregulation in economy to continue, New Nigerian (Kaduna), 24 December 1999; N Onishi, Nigeria leader amazes many with strong anti-graft drive, New York Times, 23 November 1999.



K Vick, Military clamps down in Ivory Coast, Washington Post, 26 December 1999.



J M Makumbe, Is there a civil society in Africa?, International Affairs 74(2), April 1998, p 317.



T Mbeki, address, Attracting Capital to Africa Summit, Corporate Council on Africa, Chantilly, VA, 19 April 1997, <www.anc.org.za.ancdocs/history/mbeki/1997/sp970419.html>; TMbeki, The African Renaissance, South Africa, and the world, speech at the United Nations University, Japan, 9 April, 1998, <www.anc.org.za.ancdocs/history/mbeki/ 1998/sp980409.html>; TMbeki, statement at the African Renaissance Conference, Johannesburg, 28 September 1998, <www.anc.org.za.ancdocs/history/mbeki/1998/ tm0928.html>. For an analysis of Mbeki’s concept, see P Vale & S Maseko, South Africa and the African Renaissance, International Affairs 74(2), April 1998, pp 271-288.