INTRODUCTION

After two years of bloody warfare, the warring sides in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict finally signed an interim peace agreement on 18 June 2000. Just how lasting this agreement will be, however, remains to be seen and there are many who doubt its ability to secure a lasting peace. While much of the war of the past two years was characterised by a military stalemate, it is estimated that more than 100 000 soldiers have been killed, and more than one million people have been displaced on either side of the disputed border — up to 750 000 in Eritrea alone. Nor have the consequences been confined to the two belligerents either, for the war has had effects throughout this strategically important and already unstable region.

The military stalemate was broken in a new offensive launched by the Ethiopian defence forces on 12 May 2000, two years to the day since the first major battle, and two days before the Ethiopian elections. The Ethiopian advance, and the subsequent Eritrean defeat from positions it had defended for two years, took everyone by surprise, including the Ethiopians themselves. But, while the war may appear to be over, its underlying causes remain, bringing further instability to the region.

Although the outbreak of the war in May 1998 took even the most seasoned observers of the region by surprise, divisions between the two sides were long-standing. The tactical alliance entered into in 1988 between the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)¹ and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to overthrow the Dergue regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam could not hide the deep-seated ideological differences between the two guerrilla movements. The alliance came at a heavy price for the TPLF: recognition of Eritrean independence.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

Ideological and political differences between Ethiopia and Eritrea re-emerged after Eritrea gained independence in 1993. The EPLF and its leader, Isaias Afewerki, were determined to follow the Singapore model in their creation of an Eritrean nation state — Isaias retaining tight control over the political system while pursuing aggressive free market policies in the economic sphere. Ethiopia, on the other hand, faced a different set of pressures. The TPLF was the dominant party in a multiparty, multi-ethnic Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition, yet its Tigrayan ethnic constituency constituted less than 10% of a total population of 60 million. The TPLF had to contend with an Amhara élite it had supplanted in power, and the Oromo who constitute a numerical majority in Ethiopia and who were, following the Eritrean example, beginning to clamour for independence. Even within the dominant TPLF, there is no absolute leader comparable to Isaias in Eritrea; prime minister Meles Zenawi heads a party that governs collectively. These tendencies within Ethiopian domestic politics exacerbated the push to war. Meles, long associated with the TPLF moderate wing, and seen by many within Ethiopia as too accommodating of Eritrean demands, was forced to adopt the line of TPLF and EPRDF hard-liners to prove his ‘Ethiopian-ness’.

The economic and trade differences between the two countries, which provided the immediate catalyst for the war, have been analysed previously.² In the context of growing bilateral tension, the long-simmering border dispute erupted in a war that took both countries by surprise. Although the smaller of the two countries, Eritrea had always been the dominant partner politically, partly the result of the historical relationship between the EPLF and the TPLF in the days of the liberation war.³ Eritrea, certainly, had not expected the Ethiopian reaction it provoked when its forces entered Badme, and Isaias was not even in the country when hostilities broke out on 6 May 1998. The military situation of both countries was extremely precarious in May 1998 — between 1993 and 1998, Eritrea had reduced its army from 100 000 to 47 000. Ethiopia had reduced its military budget from US $1.13 billion to US $124 million between 1991 and 1996.⁴ The majority of the Ethiopian officer corps were languishing in jail, because of the role they had played in the Dergue army. As a result, the two countries spent the first seven months of the war largely re-equipping their armies on the international arms markets.

AN EXPENSIVE WAR

Both countries have spent huge amounts on arms and other war materiel, chiefly from China, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and the states of the former Soviet Union. Russia has supplied both sides with aircraft — MiG-29s to Eritrea and Sukhoi-27s to Ethiopia. In addition to the eight SU-27 fighters acquired from Russia, Ethiopia also bought Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters and, according to some sources, new Russian Ka-50 ‘Black Shark’ attack helicopters.⁵ In the case of both countries, the procurement deals include technical support and pilots. Eritrea also acquired surface-to-air missiles, probably from Libya.⁶

It is estimated that over 500 000 soldiers are currently massed on the border — 250 000 soldiers on the Eritrean side and 300 000 on the Ethiopian side. This mobilisation has had serious economic consequences for both countries. In the case of Eritrea, with a population of 3.5 million people, virtually all 18-25 year olds, including women, are at the front. Conscription has been extended from 18-40 years to 15-55 years, and the training period for new recruits has been reduced from six to three months.⁷ This has led to serious labour shortages and factories and development projects in Asmara have come to a virtual standstill. Foreign investment in Eritrea has also come to a virtual halt and the situation became so grave that the government was forced to exempt workers in certain key industries from military service. The government has introduced a 20% surcharge to help pay for the war, boosting the personal tax rate to around 50%.

One of Ethiopia’s first steps when the war broke out was to move its traffic from the Eritrean port of Assab to Djibouti port. This represented a huge loss of income for Eritrea, affecting the port, as well as the oil refinery and private transport companies. Assab has been economically devastated by the conflict as its value to Eritrea came through its position as the entrepôt between Ethiopia and the outside world. Assab was used almost exclusively by Ethiopia, and provided Eritrea with up to a fifth of its revenue.8 The Ethiopian authorities have systematically deported Eritreans residing in Ethiopia. The arrival in Eritrea of over 50 000 penniless deportees has placed an added burden on the Eritrean authorities.

It has been estimated that Eritrea spent up to 44% of gross national product (GNP) on the war in 1999.⁹ Economic growth fell from over 8% in 1997 to 4% in 1998. GNP growth in 1999 stood at just under 1%, and the government has projected a growth rate of minus 10% in 2000. Inflation, which stood at 1.3% in 1997, is expected to rise to 18.1% in 2000. Food inflation currently stands at 25% (September 2000).¹⁰ Economic planning has been disturbed by the need to supply and equip the armed forces. In addition, Eritrean foreign currency reserves have been reduced from the equivalent of seven months of imports before the war, to three months in April 1999.¹¹ Eritrea’s economy has been kept afloat by remittances from the Eritrean diaspora who, up to May 2000, had contributed an estimated US $400 million to the public coffers,¹² as well as the fact that public borrowing rates are low.

The economic consequences on Ethiopia have been as severe and there are signs that Ethiopia has also begun to pay the economic costs of the war. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), careful not to appear to be fuelling the conflict, have suspended all new loans to both countries. Ethiopia has largely funded the war with the proceeds of its privatisation programme, which are estimated at US $360 million. In December 1999, the Ethiopian government introduced a new 10% surtax on all imported goods excluding fertiliser, petrol, public transport and special purpose vehicles, and other strategic goods and spares. This additional revenue was directed toward financing the war. Although public finances are still relatively sound, the Ethiopian government is coming under increased financial pressure as other income dries up, threatening the hitherto stable macro-economic environment. Ethiopia’s foreign exchange reserves, once at six months, has dropped to two months, and the IMF has warned that the war is impacting on national finances, and urged Ethiopia to tighten its fiscal policy.

The national budget, which had been scheduled for presentation to parliament in July 2000, has been postponed until October. Donors concerned about the war have withheld much of the 3.6 billion Birr in donor assistance that had previously been promised. This has had a greater impact on Ethiopia than on Eritrea. Unlike the latter, Ethiopia’s foreign borrowing rates are high and aid used to account for 60% of capital expenditure.¹³ Ethiopia, like Eritrea, finds it difficult to budget in a situation where war has not been replaced by peace.

The government recently increased fuel prices by 29%, placing additional inflationary pressure on the economy, and adding to the already existing energy crisis. Addis Ababa has been hit by power cuts, which cannot be explained by the drought, and which have further affected the industrial sector’s productive capacity.¹⁴

In addition to this, the Ethiopian government issued its strongest international warning yet, in March 2000, of an impending humanitarian disaster. Both the government and international relief agencies estimate that up to eight million people face the possibility of famine in Ethiopia, largely as a result of prolonged drought and displacement by the war with Eritrea. The current crisis constitutes the most serious food shortage since the 1984-85 Ethiopian famine.

The areas most affected are the south-east and south-west of the country, where an ‘advanced emergency’ has existed since March. Other areas also at risk include the northern and eastern highlands on North and South Wello, South Tigray, North Shoa and East and West Haraghe.

There has been much public disagreement about the causes of the famine, with many observers linking it directly to the current conflict with Eritrea. There has also been strong criticism of the Ethiopian government for spending so much of its budget on war materiel at a time when a significant part of its population face starvation. While the international community has heeded the call for emergency relief, major powers have also tried to use the emergency to pressure the Ethiopian government into concluding a peace deal. The Ethiopian government has countered these accusations by going on the offensive, denying any link between the food shortage and the war, and by pointing out that the food crisis is not confined to Ethiopia, but affects the entire region, including Somalia, Eritrea and parts of Kenya.

While it is true that the war has exacerbated the food crisis, it is not in fact clear that it is directly responsible for it. The causes appear to be a combination of prolonged drought (rains in the region have failed for the past three years), shrinking farm sizes, reduced employment opportunities and the erosion of coping mechanisms in affected communities as a result of the drought. The war has impacted on the situation largely in the field of emergency supply distribution logistics, because it has diverted trucking capacity and increased costs, and has closed access to the ports of Assab and Massawa, thereby creating bottlenecks at Djibouti port. Many of the affected population, especially in the northern and eastern highlands, have also been denied their traditional supplementary incomes from trade with Eritrea.

TRENCH WARFARE VERSUS WAR OF ATTRITION

There are three fronts in this war: Badme to the west, Zalembessa/Alitena in the centre, and Bure to the east, on the road to Assab. Initially, Eritrea retained the upper hand, having merely to defend its positions, and Ethiopia found it difficult to achieve a breakthrough. Eritrea’s initial strategic assessment of Ethiopia was based on the political fragility of Ethiopia’s ethnic coalition government. Eritrea believed that existing resentment of the minority Tigrayan government in Addis Ababa would grow as the rest of the Ethiopian population would perceive this as a Tigrayan war. For this reason, Eritrea provided material support to Ethiopian opposition groups, most notably the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), as well as to the Islamic fundamentalist group Al Itihad Al Islami, operating in both Ethiopia and Somalia.

Ethiopia’s strategic assessment was based on the vulnerability of the Eritrean economy. Given its vulnerability to shocks because of its size and lack of economies of scale, and shorn of a major source of revenue — the port and related facilities of Assab — Ethiopia believed it was now just a matter of time before the Eritrean economy would collapse, leading to a retreat by Eritrea and, possibly, the collapse of the government in Asmara. Given these opposing perceptions, it is not surprising that neither side was prepared to compromise in negotiations.

In February 1999, after a seven-month stalemate, Ethiopia attacked Eritrean positions on the western front at Badme, with a combination of artillery, aircraft, tanks and human-wave assaults reminiscent of World War I. After four days of fighting, during which Ethiopia incurred heavy losses, Eritrea’s defences were broken. Eritrea, overconfident and believing its own propaganda, had constructed only a single line of defences. Eritrea learned its lesson and, when Ethiopian forces attacked Tsorona on the central front two weeks later, they failed to break through Eritrea’s triple line of defences.

As a result of the unexpected defeat at Badme, Eritrea accepted the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Framework Agreement for peace that it had hitherto been rejecting. However, despite acceptance of the peace plan, Eritrea remained unwilling to withdraw from areas it captured during the war. Ethiopia, on the other hand, believed that the longer the war dragged on, the greater its chances of success, and consequently, it rejected the Framework Agreement.

This stalemate continued throughout 1999 and into 2000. While both countries claimed to accept the Framework Agreement, they differed on the Technical Arrangements, the document elaborating on its implementation. Eritrea argued that a cease-fire agreement should precede any discussion of troop withdrawal from the disputed territories. Ethiopia, on the other hand, argued that Eritrean withdrawal from the disputed territories should precede a cessation of hostilities. The OAU, assisted by United States and European Union mediators, spent the next year shuttling between the two capitals trying to get agreement on the Technical Arrangements. However, the stalemate was only broken in May/June 2000, after Ethiopian forces launched a new offensive against Eritrea on all fronts, making striking gains and achieving its objective of pushing Eritrea out of disputed territory.

THE MAY OFFENSIVE

Ethiopia’s May-June 2000 offensive was executed in three phases. On 12 May 2000, two days before Ethiopian elections, Ethiopia launched an attack on the western front across the Mereb-Setit River. Once again Eritrea’s defences were found wanting, and Ethiopian forces penetrated deep into Eritrean territory. Given the fact that Ethiopia had already taken the western front at Badme in February 1999, most military observers had expected that any new attack would most likely be concentrated on the central front. This is where Eritrean forces were concentrated. The surprise element was the stroke of genius in Ethiopia’s military strategy, and partly reflected the important role played by former Dergue officers who had been recalled into the army to help co-ordinate strategy.

Ethiopia realised that it could not dislodge Eritrean forces in a frontal trench war, and that its previous failed attempts of March 1999 would merely be repeated. Thus, Ethiopia’s strategy was to attack through western Eritrea, where Eritrean defences were weak, and then to threaten the Zalembessa front from the rear.

On 18 May 2000, within a week of launching its offensive, Ethiopian troops broke through Eritrean defences on the western front, pushing beyond the borders into Eritrea and sending Eritrea’s army into further disarray with a two-pronged attack. By capturing the garrison town of Barentu, Ethiopian troops cut off Eritrea’s supply lines to its troops on the western front and effectively captured the entire south-west corner of Eritrea.

Eritrea, realising it could no longer hold on to the western front with its supply lines cut, abandoned Barentu in what the Eritrean government termed a ‘strategic retreat’. This was an age-old tactic of the Eritrean army, which had allowed it to remain intact throughout 30 years of struggle against the Ethiopian government — ‘stay alive to fight another day’. The situation this time, however, was very different from a liberation war.

Having taken the western front, the Ethiopian forces then turned their attention to the central front, moving along the route from Barentu toward Mendefera in a manoeuvre that threatened to trap the Eritrean forces in a pincer movement. Having made this move, Ethiopia threatened Zalembessa from the front, in another pincer movement, forcing Eritrea to withdraw from this most symbolic town.

Even here, surprise was an important element in Ethiopia’s strategy. Ethiopia attacked on the western flank of the central front, which Eritrea had discounted because of the tough terrain — the ridge rises to 2 854 metres above sea level.¹⁵ For the first time in the war, Ethiopia was able to translate its offensive position into superior mobility, and Eritrea’s static defence was unable to cope.

Eritrea withdrew from Zalembessa on 24 May 2000, 13 days after Ethiopia launched its offensive. The following day, Isaias issued an all-fronts order to withdraw from the disputed territories. But, despite this withdrawal, Ethiopia refused to stop. Instead, it attacked further into Eritrea on the central front, as well as on the eastern, Bure/Assab front, leading to claims by Eritrea that the border dispute had never been the real issue, but that Ethiopia’s real agenda was to recolonise Eritrea or, at the very least, to capture Assab.

On 29 May, Isaias issued an all-fronts order to Eritrean forces to withdraw 30 kilometres. This amounted to a capitulation to Ethiopian demands that Eritrea withdraw from all disputed territory before any cease-fire agreement could be considered. Ethiopia announced its withdrawal from western Eritrea on 30 May, claiming it had achieved its military aims of expelling Eritrean forces from the disputed territory. But, this did not herald the immediate end of the fighting, and Eritrea’s claims that Ethiopia’s purported ‘withdrawal’ was, in fact, a response to Eritrea’s regrouping of its forces appeared to be confirmed over the next few days, as heavy fighting occurred at Senafe, on the central front well inside Eritrean territory, and on the eastern front at Bure.

Despite the regrouping of Eritrea’s forces and a seeming return to military stalemate, Ethiopia clearly had the upper hand politically and diplomatically. Ethiopia’s initial demand in the peace negotiations, that Eritrea withdraw its forces from disputed territories as a precondition to cease-fire and final acceptance of the Framework Agreement, had been achieved through military means which meant that Ethiopia would have to increase its demands in the final peace agreement.

On 1 June, Ethiopia said it wanted ‘international guarantees’ before it would withdraw from Eritrean soil. Eritrea, meanwhile, scoffed at Ethiopian claims that the war was over, saying a cease-fire was impossible until all Ethiopian forces had withdrawn from its territory. Ethiopia held all the cards, however, and Eritrea, desperate to secure peace, found its bargaining position severely weakened. It could not afford to continue fighting, as this could threaten its armed forces and ultimately its very existence. The Eritrean government was unable to contemplate politically the sorts of losses continued fighting would have entailed. Thus on 18 June 2000, an interim peace agreement was signed which recognised Ethiopia’s military advantage. In terms of the agreement, Ethiopia had the ‘international guarantees’ which it demanded as a precondition for withdrawal from Eritrean territory. A United Nations peacekeeping force, under the auspices of the OAU, will be deployed in a ‘temporary security zone’ to monitor the cease-fire until the common border is finally delimited by the UN cartographic unit. Ethiopian forces will not have to withdraw from the territory it currently occupies inside Eritrea until two weeks after the peacekeeping force has been deployed. Moreover, this force will be deployed, not on the border, but in a zone 25 kilometres inside Eritrea. The Eritrean military will be prevented from redeploying to this zone, although the civilian administration, including the police and local militia, will be allowed to return.

REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE WAR

The effects of the war have not been confined to the two countries involved, but have spread throughout the region. Somalia has effectively become a ‘second front’. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have supported armed opposition groups fighting to overthrow the other’s government. Eritrea has supported both the OLF and the ONLF operating in eastern and southern Ethiopia. Eritrean arms have been channelled to these movements via Hussein Aidid’s faction in Somalia. Two planeloads of arms arrived in Mogadishu in February 1999, one shipload docked in Merca (120 kilometres south of Mogadishu) in March 1999, and another arrived there in May 1999, carrying several hundred Oromo fighters fresh from training, military advisors and landmine experts.

In response, Ethiopia has over 3 000 troops in south-west Somalia, with the aim of setting up a buffer zone that will prevent OLF/ONLF infiltration into Ethiopia’s vulnerable southern and eastern regions. Ethiopia has also increased its support for Aidid’s opponents in south-central Somalia, most notably the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA). With the assistance of Ethiopian equipment and troops, the RRA drove Aidid’s forces out of Baidabho in June 1999, after his faction had controlled the town for four years. By flooding Somalia with weapons in support of rival Somali factions, the war reignited the country’s conflict, which had appeared to be dying out because of war fatigue. It has set back the peace process in Somalia considerably and, despite recent peace initiatives there, it is unlikely that Somalia will be unable to settle its problems before the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is fully resolved.

The main beneficiary of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war has been Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) government. US strategy in the region had envisioned an Ethiopia-Eritrea-Uganda alliance as a buffer zone between the NIF government of Sudan and the mullahs in Saudi Arabia, thereby containing Islamism in the region and protecting US oil supplies. Until the outbreak of the war in 1998, both Ethiopia and Eritrea were hostile toward the Khartoum regime and provided political and material support to the Sudanese opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA). With the outbreak of the war, however, this anti-Khartoum alliance collapsed. Ethiopia was the first to seek rapprochement with Khartoum, prompting fears in Asmara that Sudan would permit Ethiopia to attack Eritrea from Kassala (in Sudanese territory, on Eritrea’s western border). Beginning in mid-1999, therefore, Eritrea also began making overtures to Khartoum, culminating in the restoration of full diplomatic relations between Asmara and Khartoum in late 1999, and the NDA was ordered to vacate the Sudanese embassy that had been its headquarters since 1994. The Sudanese government now finds itself in the unlikely position of being courted by its two erstwhile enemies, while the Sudanese opposition suffered a debilitating blow, one that is further aggravated by the conflict in the Great Lakes region.

Although Ethiopia surprised everyone, including itself, by the apparent ease with which it broke through Eritrean defences on the western front in May, at a time when most analysts had been expecting an attack on the central front, there are growing question marks surrounding Sudan’s role in the offensive. The first attack in May penetrated deep into western Eritrea, very close to the Sudanese/Eritrean border, in areas that are relatively unmilitarised. Eritrean insiders are convinced that Ethiopia was allowed to launch its attack, at least in part, from Sudan’s Kassala Province, which has intensified Eritrean bitterness at what it sees as international abandonment. This has recently led to a deterioration in Eritrean-Sudanese relations, prompting speculation in the pro-Khartoum Sudanese press that Eritrea is massing troops on the border and planning an attack on Sudan. Eritrea has been at pains to refute such speculation, and sent a high-level delegation to Khartoum in a bid to mend the rift.

Both countries had been allied to Israel — part of Israel-US attempts to seek a counterbalance to the Arab world in the Red Sea. Since the outbreak of the war, Israel apparently has taken sides with Ethiopia believing that, in the long term, Ethiopia is the only possible victor given its comparative size advantage. Eritrea thus turned more and more to the Arab world in search of financial and military assistance. It has moved closer to Libya, Qatar and Egypt, the latter a long-time rival of Ethiopia on account of its interests in the Nile River.

Djibouti has also been affected by the conflict. With the outbreak of war, Ethiopia lost its access to the sea via the Eritrean port of Assab. It turned to Djibouti, which had recently completed a major refurbishment of its port facilities. Since May 1998, Djibouti has seen an increase of 161% in its port activity. This led to serious bottlenecks initially, but these have largely been resolved. Djibouti has forged strong links with Ethiopia, cutting its ties with Eritrea, which it accused of trying to destabilise the region. Diplomatic links between Eritrea and Djibouti have recently been restored, as Eritrea attempts to rehabilitate its image in the region, but they are likely to remain strained for a long time. Eritrea backed the Djibouti rebel movement, the Front pour la restauration de l’unité et de la démocratie (FRUD), which forced Ethiopia to provide Djibouti with military assistance; the two countries jointly patrol the road and rail links between Addis Ababa and Djibouti port against attacks by Eritrean-sponsored rebel groups.

The drought and resultant food crisis in Ethiopia has ironically also benefited Ethiopia. The emergency food aid that has been sent to Ethiopia has had to go through Djibouti port, and has forced the international community to spend huge amounts of money upgrading the port facilities even further, thereby lessening Ethiopia’s need for Assab and reducing its incentives to conclude a peace deal with Eritrea. By the same token, it has weakened Assab as a bargaining chip for Eritrea.

Also as a result of congestion at Djibouti port, Ethiopia has begun to investigate the supplementary use of Berbera on Somaliland coast. This has led to speculation that Ethiopia may soon be forced to recognise Somaliland as an independent state. If this happens, the rest of the international community would have little choice but to follow suit, spelling the end to any hopes for a united Somalia and accelerating the ‘Balkanisation’ of the country.

CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE POSITIVE SPINOFFS?

Eritrea’s assessment of Ethiopia’s Achilles heel seems to have been mistaken, at least in the short term. As Lijphart¹⁶ has argued, élite co-operation is enhanced by the perception of external threat to the country. The TPLF and prime minister Meles, under increasing threat from discontented Amharic élite and the majority Oromo population in 1998, are now more popular than at any time in the past. The only internal threat now facing Meles and the TPLF comes from hardliners within the party who are pushing for the total defeat of Eritrea. Given the massive anti-Eritrea propaganda campaign waged by the Ethiopian government, Meles may find it difficult to survive the peace without showing any tangible gains. For Ethiopia certainly, and the economic dislocation notwithstanding, war is easier to manage than peace, making lasting peace difficult to realise. Ethiopia can continue this war of attrition much longer than Eritrea can. It is squeezing the Eritrean economy, and the Eritrean diaspora, which bankrolled Asmara’s war effort, are beginning to ask awkward questions. While it is unlikely that any further major battles will be fought, given the massive losses both countries have sustained, Ethiopia will most probably keep just enough pressure on Eritrea to force it to keep its forces on high alert on the border. The longer it does this, the more damage it can inflict on the Eritrean economy.

The Eritrean economy also suffered a devastating blow as a result of the population displacement that occurred during the May offensive. It is estimated that between 500 000 and 730 000 people have been displaced, most of them during the last round of fighting. The country’s main bread basket, the south-western Gash Barka region, which accounts for 60 to 70% of the country’s total food production, was ravaged by the latest round of the war. Some of the region is still under Ethiopian military occupation, and Eritrean farmers are reluctant to return to their fields from their refuge in Sudan and the Eritrean lowlands, thus missing the year’s main planting season, which started in June. In any event, the Ethiopian forces destroyed almost everything in their path, including grain stores, livestock, equipment and infrastructure. Both countries laid landmines, further endangering the lives of those who want to return. Eritrea, which had just managed to become more or less self-sufficient in food, now finds itself having to rely on international food aid for at least the next 18 months, until the next crop cycle in November/December 2001.

Ironically, the war may produce positive spinoffs in so far as democratisation in both countries is concerned. In Ethiopia, the position of non-Tigrayan ethnic groups has been strengthened and the moral claims of the Tigrayans, based on their disproportionate contribution to the overthrow of the Dergue, have been weakened. The Amhara, in particular, feel vindicated: having repeatedly warned the TPLF about the dangers of alliance with Eritrea at the expense of the rest of the Ethiopian population, they can in future count on a greater say in the government. The war also emphasised the need to ‘Ethiopianise’ the army, which had been dominated by Tigrayans at the expense of the largely Amharic professional corps. The OLF has also been discredited in the eyes of many Ethiopians, because of its co-operation with the enemy. It is quite possible that, given this new configuration of politics, both the TPLF and the opposition may find their way to a more equitable compromise than before.

In Eritrea, the mass mobilisation of the entire population similarly threatens Isaias’s future grip on power. While both Isaias and the ruling PFDJ have retained their popularity, politics has changed forever. While the population may have rallied behind the government in the face of defeat and humiliation, it is unclear how long this will last. In a post-war situation, demobilised soldiers may feel that they have earned a stake in the country, thereby demanding a greater role in this highly centralised political system. There have already been reports of growing insubordination among the younger generation within the armed forces, a generation that has no experience of the long, hard years of the liberation struggle, and who are therefore unlikely to continue to accept PFDJ rule unquestioningly.¹⁷

In terms of regional geopolitics, Eritrea views the west’s response to Ethiopian aggression, especially following the Ethiopian invasion of sovereign Eritrean territory in May 2000, as a betrayal. Always a proud and prickly nation, there are fears that Eritrea may retreat further into a laager. For the time being, however, the humanitarian devastation resulting from the war means that Eritrea is more reliant on the international community than ever before.

Eritrea has taken a beating and has been humiliated by Ethiopia. But, Ethiopia itself has little to show for its so-called victory. Unless it can translate its military gains into long-term political gains, Ethiopia may still end up the loser. It is unclear what such gains would constitute, but it seems likely that they would include some guaranteed access to the port of Assab. For unless this happens, Ethiopia still remains a landlocked country, a fact which seriously compromises its aspirations to regional hegemony.

Eritrea may have taken a beating, but it clearly holds the moral high-ground now. None of its troops are on Ethiopian territory, and it is confident that, when the border is delimited, its claims will be recognised.

It is difficult to see how relations between the two countries can be mended as long as both governments remain in power in their respective capitals. Thus, while the guns are now silent, the peace remains fragile and the scores are still unsettled.

NOTES

After independence, the EPLF changed its name to People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, or PFDJ.



See R Cornwell, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Fratricidal conflict in the Horn, African Security Review 7(5), 1998.



For an exposition of the often troubled relations between the EPLF and the TPLF from the 1970s onward, see M Plaut & P Gilkes, Conflict in the Horn: Why Eritrea and Ethiopia are at war, Royal Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper 1, March 1999.



G Bloch, No Compromise for Eritrea and Ethiopia, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 January 2000.



Defense and Security, 26 May 2000.



War in Africa: The biggest conflict in the world, The Independent, 22 June 1999.



Africa Confidential, 5 November 1999.



The Economist, 24 June 2000.



Economist Intelligence Unit Fourth Quarter Report, 1999.



Statistics provided by acting Finance minister, Dr Wolday Fitur, September 2000.



Ethiopia: Seven days update, 21 April 1999.



After the May 2000 Ethiopian offensive and subsequent Eritrean military reverses, diaspora remittances rose sharply.



Economist Intelligence Unit, 30 May 2000.



Africa Analysis, 28 July 2000.



Reuters, 29 May 2000.



A Lijphart, Democracy in plural societies, quoted in I Spears, Angola — Understanding inclusive peace agreements in Africa: The problems of power sharing, Third World Quarterly, February 2000.



See Eritrea: The morning-after effect, Indian Ocean Newsletter 912, 15 July 2000.