INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of this millennium, only 15% of Africans live in an environment considered minimally adequate for sustainable growth and development. In addition, at least 45% of Africans live in poverty. Only three countries in sun-Saharan Africa have a reasonable growth rate: Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and Rwanda. Growth in Congo-Brazzaville and Angola is oil-driven whereas that of Rwanda is aid-driven.¹ Against this background, Africa faces a number of challenges in the 21st century:²

intrastate and interstate wars on the continent;

political instability of states, as well as the faltering democratisation on the continent;

economic crises and poverty;

debt;

the low level of socio-political development;

pressures arising from globalisation and the global economy;

the relative weak impact of regional economic integration;

HIV/AIDS; and

environmental issues such as deforestation, land degradation, soil erosion, droughts, floods and food insecurity.

There is increasing concern about the adequacy of the natural resource base of states in Africa. Much of the relative economic development in Africa is attributable to the exploitation of non-renewable resources like fossil fuels and metallic ores or to non-sustainable rates of exploitation of renewable resources such as forestry, fisheries, related water systems and agriculture.³ The increased demand for resources for local, national and export markets, as well as escalating competition for the control of natural resources have been a source of insecurity in the Southern African region.⁴ Adding to this is the prospect of the recolonisation of Africa’s resources as a result of economic liberalisation since the 1980s. Examples of this include the concession of territorial enclaves rich in mineral, forest and biodiversity resources to direct control of multinational corporations. Recent research indicates that the lack of resources and environmental degradation are playing more prominent roles in factors contributing to destabilisation on the continent. Development which contributes to environmental change may also cause instability.⁵

Resource issues have become prominent in national and international politics due to the growing concern about the prospects and implications of resource scarcity. As Freedman states:

"economic, social and environmental factors deserved attention because they could aggravate violent tendencies, trigger cross-border conflicts, and affect the conduct of war."⁶

Linked to this are issues around Africa’s food security and the recurrence of famine on the continent. The most vulnerable in terms of food supplies remain rural Africans, women and children. This has led to an understanding that famine and food security are linked to poverty and vulnerability, to the uneven availability of and access to food, and to the nature of food production and distribution. Resource depletion, underdevelop-ment, poverty and the collapse of social and economic infrastructure seem to be linked.⁷ A key factor in this is the availability of water as it is crucial to food production, economic progress and development in Africa.

Resources, development and security should not be regarded as separate concerns.⁸ Economic development cannot be realised in an insecure environment. Security therefore implies the absence of certain threats, which clearly points to the interconnectedness between resources, development and security.⁹ This article considers the link between the lack of resources and development in Africa. The aim is to:

concentrate on resources in Africa and their negative effect on food security as a development issue;



indicate how this and related issues could contribute to the destabilisation of Africa and its impact on South Africa and Southern Africa; and



indicate how South Africa and some of its government institutions such as the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) can contribute to initiatives aimed at stabilising the region.

 CLASSIFICATION OF RESOURCES

Zimmerman states that "resources are not, they become."¹⁰ The availability of resources for human use, and not just their mere physical presence, is their most important characteristic. Different value systems, national interests and levels of technology will often mean that a phenomenon that is regarded neutrally by one community at a specific time may become a resource to the community at another time. This statement underpins the relation between resources and development in any community. A resource may be defined as "a functional relationship between people and their environment from which they obtain goods and services in order to satisfy their needs and aspirations."¹¹

Resources have important implications for development, management and international relations as they are often not confined to one particular state or substate in a region. Development refers to:

"the combined process of capital accumulation, rising per capita income (with consequent falling birthrates), the increasing skills in the population, the adoption of new technological styles, and other related social and economic changes."¹²

Todaro identifies three objectives of development:¹³

to increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health and protection;



to raise standards of living through, for example, employment and education; and



to expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and states.

According to Goldstein, three aspects shape the role of resources in international co-operation and conflict:¹⁴

Natural resources are required for the operation of an economy (albeit industrial or agrarian).



The sources of natural resources (albeit mineral deposits or rivers) are associated with a specific geographic area over which states or non-state actors may fight for control.



Natural resources tend to be unevenly distributed across the globe.

Resource allocation and use are determined by both physical and social factors. The physical environment is the source of elements essential for human survival, such as food, water and energy. Political systems such as states identify particular forms and quantities of these resources that are necessary for their political and economic development. Different groups or states, over time, may develop new needs with regard to their resource pool. New needs and new definitions contribute to potential conflicts caused by the lack of resources.¹⁵

These aspects contribute to the profitable trade in natural resources. This also means that trade in natural resources are clearly politicised. Such trade creates market inequalities through, for instance, monopolies, oligopolies and price manipulation. Throughout history, states have competed to gain secure access to adequate supplies of resources. Very few wars were truly monocausal, as were conflicts over renewable and non-renewable resources. Competition for the control of renewable and non-renewable resources can contribute to the onset of acute conflict. Oil remains a good example. The 1991 Gulf war is a contemporary case study of the role of oil as a source of conflict.

RESOURCES IN AFRICA: AN ILLUSION OF PLENTY?

Whatever the reasons for the current crises in Africa, it must be noted that Africa was in some form of crisis even before colonialism. Nature’s bad hand on the continent is often ignored and an illusion of plenty prevails. African soil is often poor and not fertile enough to sustain a population. Botswana and Lesotho, for example, are not very suitable for agricultural production. Table 1 indicates land use in selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. These countries import food mainly from South Africa. In other parts of the region, droughts and floods often impact on food production.¹⁶ Unusual weather patterns such as El Niño influenced the rainfall patterns and crop production of the continent. During the 1991/1992 El Niño-related drought in Southern Africa, it was estimated that 20 000 agricultural jobs were lost in South Africa alone.¹⁷

Resources or the capacity to produce commodity crops is spread unevenly through Africa. As table 1 indicates, agriculture accounts for a large percentage of Africa’s total production. Africa has an estimated 30% of the world’s minerals. It accounts for about 15% of the world’s copper production. However, an abundance of certain resources has not meant any rapid development of the continent, which remains one of the world’s poorest regions.¹⁸

The debate about development has been ongoing. An alternative vision of development is based on the transformation of power structures (such as race, class and land ownership) within a given state. The question of land ownership is of particular importance, given recent events in Zimbabwe. In South Africa and Namibia, the question of land is also on the political and popular agenda. Within states, the structure of land ownership is an important determinant of the economic condition of large sections of the population. Land ownership is related to the ability of peasants to provide their own food and livelihood. The transformation of the land ownership structure is vital if access to resources is to be altered significantly. Many developing countries are characterised by highly unequal patterns of land ownership that prevent many rural people from providing for their own needs. The combined percentage of landless and near-landless agricultural households in Africa totals 40%.¹⁹

Land reform remains an unresolved, desirable and inevitable issue in Africa and Southern Africa (see table 2).²⁰ In Angola, land reform was never addressed after independence. Current political instability will continue as will small-scale farming. In Botswana, only 5% of the land is arable. By the late 1980s, 30 privately owned farms in Botswana produced 80% of the food grown in the country. The trend for the rest of the region is the same: arable land is scarce and land ownership is unequally distributed.²¹ In addition, agriculture in most countries in the region has been characterised by some form of state intervention favouring the commercial farming sector. This has been the case in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.²²

On the one hand, leaders commit themselves to land reform but, on the other, they are afraid of alienating landowners from the political process. African governments often lack the organisational capacity to implement the land reform process.²³ These reasons, coupled with corruption are some of the contributing factors in the current Zimbabwe crisis.

The extent of the lack of resources should be viewed with caution. A state or region richly endowed with resources does not automatically ensure development. Arnold mentions a number of factors that need to be taken into account:²⁴

operations by multinational corporations;

political pressures which force a state to use resources for quick revenue;

resource management; and

agricultural production.

As table 3 indicates, resources remain an important source of foreign exchange for states in Southern Africa. African exports consist of a much higher share of primary commodities (over 60%) than the average for the rest of the world (less than 25%). This contributes to Africa’s vulnerability in world markets. Prices tend to flux. Since the 1970s, Africa’s market share for these commodities have declined. Market share losses were 40% for commodities such as copper, timber and coffee, almost 60% for iron ore and 30% for cotton and cocoa. This is reflected in the continent’s declining share of world trade. Africa’s failure to develop and expand alternatives to export products such as manufacturing is also reflected in this.²⁵ As consumption of natural resources by modern industrial economies remains very high (45 to 85 metric tonnes per person annually) African states will continue to deliver the goods to earn foreign currency. It currently requires 300 kilograms of natural resources to generate US $100 of income in the world’s most advanced economies.²⁶

Southern Africa has large resources of energy in various forms. However, the problem with utilising these resources is that they are often far from the point of demand. The countries in the region are also some of the poorest in the world with little access to the funding needed to develop these resources. Other contributing factors are the political instability in the region, poverty and the lack of incentives to develop energy resources.²⁷

RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Africa is a vast continent with enormous ecological variation. Although it is home to some of the world’s largest rain forests, it is also home to some of the most arid regions on the globe. However, a number of difficulties in sustaining economic development are associated with natural resource abundance. Natural resources are often regarded as providing an opportunity to finance economic growth, but, it also causes problems that can impede development:

The existence of natural resources tends to divert attention from human resource development.



Natural resources tend to reduce the state to rentier status, relying on an enclave for its revenues.



The enclave nature of economic production tends to worsen income distribution.



Natural resource economies can earn valuable foreign exchange for a state. However, this contributes to the state motivating industry to earn its own part.



Reliance on resource-based exports exposes the economy to greater instability and vulnerability.



The success of the export of one commodity contributes to the appreciation of the domestic currency. This stifles export opportunities of other tradable goods.²⁸

Resources form the foundation of economic, social and political development in any community. In order to promote economic development by raising living standards, providing infrastructure, employment, education, recreation, health, and earning foreign currency, a state has to rely on increasing production from agriculture, forestry, fishery, wildlife, minerals or promoting manufacturing, trading, services and tourism. There is a link between resources and the level of economic development within a state. This link is often referred to as "earth capital."²⁹ Yet, the lack and often skewed distribution of resources remain a critical issue in Africa. In Southern Africa, access to safe water, for example, remains a problem.

In economic terms, development has traditionally meant the capacity of a state whose initial economic condition has been more or less static for a long time to generate and sustain an annual increase in its gross national product (GNP) at rates of 5% or more. An alternative to this has been the use of rates of growth in income per capita. Another definition of development refers to the alteration of the structure of production and employment so that agriculture’s share declines and that of industry increases. Another definition refers to non-economic social indicators such as the United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI measures the overall achievement in a country in three dimensions of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. This is measured by life expectancy, education and income. Seychelles ranks the highest and Mozambique the lowest.

The World Bank broadened its definition of development to include improved education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a clean and safe environment, individual freedom and opportunity. Development is therefore defined as:

"a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of poverty."³⁰

 ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS

The lack of resources and development and the impact on security can take a number of forms. The lack of resources is always local in its effects and regional in its security and political impact. Countries with high population growth rates are often the hardest hit in terms of the lack of resources. This contributes to health problems and food insecurity.

Developing countries are often less endowed with natural resources than developed nations were at the time when they began their modern growth. Some parts of Africa where resources are more plentiful often require large investments to exploit them. Africa shares the following characteristics with other developing continents:

low standards of living, income, education and poor health;



low levels of productivity;



high rates of population growth and dependency burdens;



high and rising levels of unemployment and underemployment;



the prevalence of imperfect markets and limited information;



dominance, dependence and vulnerability in international relations; and



as table 4 indicates, substantial dependence on agricultural production and primary product exports (such as agriculture, fuel, forestry and raw materials) as opposed to secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (service) activities. In sub-Saharan Africa, primary products account for over 80% of total export earnings.³¹

Over the next 35 years, global food production will need to double because of high population growth rates and low economic development. The doubling of food supply comes at a time when more than 800 million people world-wide are malnourished, 25 billion tonnes of topsoil are lost annually, and 75% of the ocean’s fish resources are overexploited. Water scarcities will adversely affect agriculture which utilises 70 to 80% of the available fresh water in the world. Food security could become a major issue. In recent years, food supply has been based on irrigation, and agricultural production will fall as irrigation supplies dry up.³² Health will suffer as more and more people will use unsafe water. Under these conditions, the potential for conflict over water resources is likely to increase.

One of the effects of the war in Angola is the lack of resources for ordinary Angolans to make ends meet. An area just outside Luena, originally forested, but now stripped, has caused five major and eight minor ravines. Since 1998, 130 000 displaced people seeking refuge in Luena caused this environmental degradation.³³ The Western Sahara conflict has complex causes, but one of the main elements has been the control of rock phosphate. The Shaba Rebellion in the Belgian Congo was about control of the cobalt mines. These are only some examples of resource conflicts in Africa.34 There are several links between resources, security and development in Africa, each with varying impact on destabilisation on the continent:

As resources becomes scarcer, tensions will rise. Due to population growth, access to resources will not necessarily improve. The lack of resources also contributes to health issues. The UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) estimated that 80% of all diseases are caused by polluted water.³⁵



Resources have been and still are used for military and political goals in Africa. Resources are often the defining factor in the power and wealth of a state. However, a number of variables determine the use of resources for a military or political goal. These are the degree of resource scarcity, the extent to which the resource supply is shared by two or more groups, the relative power of these groups, and the ease of access to alternative resources.³⁶ A recent report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) pointed out that becoming rich by controlling resources in war in Africa is a common practice. Rebels, governments and even peacekeepers have fought for diamonds, minerals and timber in recent wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, one of the recent peace agreements was only reached after the rebel leader, Foday Sankoh, was given a say in the country’s mining industry. In Angola, the once ideological war made way for a scramble for oil (by the government) and for diamonds by the rebels. Rebels have been offered permission to operate diamond mines legally.³⁷



Resources have been used as an instrument or tool of conflict in Africa.³⁸ In the Sudan, foreign food aid is said to prolong the war.³⁹ Another example is the crisis in the Great Lakes region. The genocide in Rwanda has been partly described as a resource war between Hutus and Tutsis. This conflict, for one, has generated refugees which had an impact on the politics and security of neighbouring states.⁴⁰



Resources and resource installations such as dams or rivers, have been used as targets of violence, conflict and/or war.⁴¹ According to officials of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho in September 1998 was to defend, among others, the Katse Dam which is part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Although there were indications that the Lesotho Defence Force troops have attempted to bombard the Katse Dam after the battle at Makhanyane, it never materialised.⁴²



Inequalities in resource distribution, use, management and development can result nationally and/or internationally in conflict.⁴³ In this regard, Sierra Leone is another example.⁴⁴

Against this background, Moyo and Tevera identify six key issues in the emerging patterns of instability due to resources in Southern Africa:⁴⁵

secure supplies of water/energy in terms of quantity, quality, regularity and pricing;



competing or conflicting claims to and uses of resources at interstate or transborder community level;



transborder ecological effects of resource management caused mainly by intrastate practices leading to various effects;



the militarisation and regimentation of environmental management in relation to the illegal and armed acquisition of natural resources across national borders;



new forms of land alienation through joint and crossborder management of natural resources to achieve economies of scale (such as the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park), the development of regional products such as tourism packages, and spatial development schemes such as the Maputo Corridor; and



external global hegemony and control over resources and their use through the private crossborder investment by multinational corporations supported by regional governments, through global governance treaties (such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species — CITES), trade and aid conditionalities.

the north-south divide between developing and developed states;

national policies on how wealth is shared;

the rural-urban divide;

social class;

gender;

age;

race; and

disability.⁴⁶

Developing countries produce more than 40% of the world’s food, but the majority of food insecure people live in these areas. It is often the case that African countries produce crops to earn valuable foreign currency. Food security is not enhanced, because self-sufficiency is replaced by cash crop production for agribusiness, a powerful force in the international political economy. As Africa invested more in cash crops, per capita food production declined.⁴⁷ As table 5 indicates, some SADC countries were food exporters by 1996.

One of the unfolding emergencies in Africa is the growing imbalance between food and people. Africa remains the only continent where per capita income, food production and industrial production have declined since the 1980s. Per capita food production dropped by 12% between 1980 and 1990 and more than 220 million people in Africa live below the poverty line.⁴⁸ African concern with food security began in ancient times. The wheat stores of Joseph in Egypt are an early example of building reserve stocks for shortages in bad years. Resources and food have figured persistently throughout history in the relations between states. This was often the driving force for many international political events. They were the primary motives for the European colonisation of most of Africa, which subsequently underlie much of the current trade relations between developed and developing countries.⁴⁹

For most of Africa, there are only two production sectors, large-scale and traditional. Food distribution is largely concentrated in urban areas to secure and maintain political stability, and as a result of inadequate infrastructure to distribute in both urban and rural areas.⁵⁰

The key question is whether there would be enough land and water to produce the necessary quantities of food. The quantity amount actually needed by a given population is the product of two factors:

the number of people; and

the average (minimal) food requirement per person.

The food consumed by a population is determined by its basic needs, its income, and its dietary preferences. The food required by a population depends on the wastage between production (farm) and consumption, as well as on the level of consumption. Diets are mainly determined by economic factors. Africa can be divided into three foodcrop zones:

the sorghum and millet zone (chickpeas and cowpeas): Sudano-Sahelian region from Mauritania to Somalia;



the root crop zone (cassava and yams): Guinea to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and



the maize zone: Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola to South Africa.⁵¹

In Africa, people derive two-thirds of their calories from less expensive starchy staples (such as cereals and roots). Only 6% is derived from animal products. In Europe, for example, this percentage is reversed.⁵²

In 1930, Africa was an exporter of food. In 1950, the continent was self-sufficient. Since the 1980s, food imports to the continent increased at a dramatic rate, with the main causes of food insecurity on the continent:

low domestic production, or production variability: many environmental factors determine variability, with climatic factors such as El Niño playing a part;



fluctuations in world food prizes: linked to this is the weakness of most African currencies;⁵³



military conflicts: it was estimated that the conflict in Eritrea cost between 65 000 and 95 000 tonnes of lost food production per year;



drought and crop failure;



agricultural policies;



erosion and soil degradation;



land ownership policies;



market restrictions; and



infrastructure constraints which hinder market integration, as well as access to food.⁵⁴

Since the 1970s, the self-sufficiency ratio of cereals has declined by more than 1% per year. It is estimated that cereal imports will triple by 2020. Many African states do not have the foreign currency to pay for these imports. Food imports, in general, are rising rapidly in developing countries. This contributes to a decrease in food efficiency, as well as to the loss of foreign exchange. Recent events in Zimbabwe is a case in point. With the land settlements, commercial farmers were driven from their farms. Very little winter planting could be done in the politically unstable period. Food scarcity is the next crisis that will hit Zimbabwe as it already has very little foreign exchange to import food.

A country enjoys food security when food is available at all times and when all people can access it. This also means that food must be nutritionally adequate in terms of quality, quantity, variety and acceptability. Access can be provided by rights of ownership over food production, or income from food production or the sale of food. Both access and availability of food indicate the security or political dimension of food.⁵⁵

The issue of food security is not just an issue of food alone. Food security is really about politics and power. It echoes Harold Lasswell’s definition of politics: who gets what, where, when and how?⁵⁶ It is also about the alleviation of poverty and the unequal distribution of resources. Famine is one of the most severe illustrations of food insecurity. A brief review of past famines and food insecurities in Africa indicates the degree of risk states are exposed to. The oldest recorded famine in Africa occurred 5 000 years ago in Egypt. Ethiopia experienced about ten major famines each century. From 1979, Kenya experienced more than 15 famines. Since the 1960s, famines occurred in the current DRC, Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and in the Sahel.⁵⁷

Food security entails improving a developing nation’s access to cheaper food from comparatively advantaged exporting countries. It is generally more efficient and cheaper for a developing state to import food than to produce it. This form of security also requires that richer countries lower their tariffs on all goods from developing countries so that these developing countries can earn some foreign currency.⁵⁸

FOOD SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

In terms of article 21(3) of the SADC Treaty members agreed to co-operate in a number of areas, among them food security, land and agriculture, natural resources and the environment. SADC addresses developmental and security issues in a number of sectors.⁵⁹ It is somewhat ironic that Zimbabwe is responsible for the SADC sector on food, agriculture and natural resources. This sector is divided into seven subsectors:

agricultural research and training (Botswana);

food security (Zimbabwe);

forestry (Malawi);

inland fisheries (Malawi);

wildlife (Malawi);

livestock production and animal disease control (Botswana); and

marine fisheries (Namibia).

The capacity of many SADC countries to co-ordinate activities in their allocated sectors and subsectors is limited.⁶⁰ The total agricultural output in Southern Africa have grown considerably over the past 25 years. South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe are the leading countries in this regard.

SADC’s food security assessment indicated a cereal harvest for the region of 20.98 million tonnes for 1997/1998. This is 6% less than the 22.38 million tonnes of 1996/1997. Low rainfall in Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia is regarded as the main cause for the decline in cereal production. Current estimates indicate a regional maize harvest of 16.10 million tonnes. This is 6% down from the previous year. A wheat deficit of 1.35 million tonnes is expected. Namibia remains the most vulnerable country. It issued an appeal for US $6 million in international assistance to meet the food needs of 600 000 people in the arid north of the country.⁶¹

Food trade is an important aspect of food security in Southern Africa. The region remains very dependent on the agricultural sector to meet its food needs. The agricultural sector also employs 70% of SADC’s population, contributes 35% to the region’s GDP and generates 30% of the region’s foreign exchange. However, from 1979 to 1991, food production in the region has decreased from 3.7% to 0.7% per year. The total decrease from 1979 to 1991 ranged from 8.4% to 44%. The total annual SADC demand for maize will increase from the current 27 million tonnes to 70 million tonnes in 2025. Of this, the urban population’s share of the demand will rise from 9 million tonnes to 34 million tonnes in 2025. This implies an extension of the current area dedicated to cereal production from 35 million hectares to 55 million hectares by 2025. South Africa and Zimbabwe will see no major expansion of maize production as these countries have already reached the limits of their production. More staple food will need to be produced in Zambia, Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique, but is unlikely.⁶²

As one of the largest landowners in South Africa, the SANDF can assist in the land reform process in South Africa.



The SANDF can assist in crossborder projects, such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, to extend the resources in the region.⁶⁵



The SANDF can become involved in SADC’s Regional Early Warning System (REWS) for food security.⁶⁶ This could be done via bilateral joint permanent commissions or agreements on defence and security in the region. South Africa should also finalise its food security policy, following a shift in agricultural policy from food self-sufficiency to food security.



SADC members have signed a number of protocols on water, drug-trafficking, energy, trade, mining, health, development and tourism. The objectives of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security does not list food security.⁶⁷ To address this issue, a protocol on food security is needed. Like water, food can be a source of regional co-operation or conflict.⁶⁸



Another possible solution is the establishment of a Regional Food Authority with adequate powers to co-ordinate food security efforts.⁶⁹



Greater South African involvement and activity are required in the SADC sector on food, agriculture and natural resources. This applies to the subsector on food security. South Africa can also become more involved in the establishment of the proposed sector on crop production. Sector co-ordinating units have not been assigned to any particular country.⁷⁰



South Africa can focus on improved regional co-operation in the resource sector. Such co-operation would improve human development, increase access to resources for much needed development, utilise the region’s resources more effectively, improve regional security, reduce dependence on resource imports, save foreign exchange and improve environmental management.⁷¹



State structures have to be strengthened. Four fundamental tasks underlie every government’s mission without which sustainable, poverty reducing development is impossible. These are the establishment of law and order; maintaining a healthy policy environment; investing in basic social services and infrastructure; and protecting the vulnerable and the environment.⁷²



Attention should be paid to improved resource management with the help of international actors.



Initiatives should be undertaken leading to agricultural diversification and modernisation in the region.⁷³



The virtual resource option, after Allan’s concept of virtual water, should be considered. In this scenario, states import food for which they lack adequate water to grow it.⁷⁴



Linked to this is the trade in resources according to market mechanisms. A certain degree of trust needs to be developed.⁷⁵



Food insecurity is costly. Not only is the cost high to private households, but also for the country that is affected and the international community when it intervenes. Eritrea is currently asking international financial institutions for US $100 million to cover the food needs of 850 000 people in a population of 3 million. In Eritrea, the food crisis is more due to war than to drought.⁷⁶ Some solutions are direct food transfers (feeding camps, food aid distribution), public works (food-for-work like the working-for-water scheme in South Africa), asset and technology transfers.⁷⁷



Technological solutions should be considered to address the lack of resources.⁷⁸ In this regard, Paarlberg discusses the genetic modification of plants and animals as a possible solution. Unlike their American and Asian counterparts, African farmers fell behind because they do not have access to the full package of this so-called green revolution technology. Easier bred crops still require farmers to buy supplementary products such as chemicals.⁷⁹



A number of regional organisations exist in Africa, which should be strengthened. This would include the strengthening of regional conflict resolution mechanisms and collaborative security.⁸⁰

 NOTES

This is an edited version of a paper presented at the seminar on Africa in crisis, organised by the Chief of the South African National Defence Force (Defence Intelligence), Pretoria, 21 June 2000.

Africa: The heart of the matter, The Economist, 13 May 2000.



J K Akokpari, Africa in the new millennium: reflections on some challenges and possibilities, paper presented at the 40th Annual Conference of the Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 30 May — 2 June 2000, pp 2-10.



C W Howe, A challenge to the developing countries, in C W Howe (ed) Managing renewable natural resources in developing countries, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1982, p 1.



S Moyo & D Tevera, The environmental security agenda in Southern Africa, Southern African Political and Economic Monthly, January 2000, p 50.



Ibid, p 51.



L Freedman, International security: changing targets, Foreign Policy, Spring 1998, p 53.



R Bush, The politics of food and starvation, Review of African Political Economy 68, 1996 p 171.



See, for example, M Schoeman, An exploration of the link between security and development, in H Solomon & M Schoeman (eds), Security, development and gender in Africa, ISS Monograph 27, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, August 1998, pp 5-26.



M Muller, The application of the new security agenda for Southern Africa — a response, in H Solomon & M van Aardt (eds), ‘Caring’ security in Africa: Theoretical and practical considerations of new security thinking, ISS Monograph 20, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, February 1998, p 118.



P Omara-Ojungu, Environmental resources and development, in R Fox & K Rowntree (eds), The geography of South Africa in an changing world, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2000, p 419.



Ibid, p 420.?



J S Goldstein, International relations, Harper Collins, New York, 1996, p 509.



M P Todaro, Economic development, Addison Wesley, New York, 2000, p 18.



Goldstein, op cit, pp 442-443.



U Luterbacher, J Schellnhuber, E Wiegandt, Water resource conflicts: The use of formal approaches, undated, unpublished research document, Graduate Institute of International Studies and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, p 3.



See, for example, L Timberlake, Africa in crisis: The causes, the cures of environmental bankruptcy, Earthscan, London, 1985.



C Vogel, El Nino: The mystery continues, Global Dialogue 3(1), 1998, p 9.



G Arnold, The third world handbook, Cassell, London, 1994, p 165.



C Thomas, Poverty, development and hunger, in J Baylis & S Smith (eds), The globalization of world politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p 458.



J van Rooyen, Agricultural prospects for trade and cooperation, in L Kritzinger-van Niekerk (ed), Towards strengthening multisectoral linkages in SADC, Development Bank of Southern Africa Paper 33, Midrand, March 1997, p 73.



See S Zipperer, Food security: Agricultural policy and hunger, ZIMFEP, Harare, 1987, p 26.



Van Rooyen, op cit, p 69.



Thomas, op cit, p 458.



Arnold, op cit, p 161.



T A Oyejide, African trade prospects in a globalizing era, Cooperation South 2, 1998, pp 110-111.



Sustainable Development Information Service (SDIS), Trends point to gains in human development while many negative human impacts on vital ecosystems are increasing, 2000, <www.wri.org/wri/trends/index.htm>.



R K Dutkiewicz, Energy: prospects for trade and cooperation, in Kritzinger-van Niekerk, op cit, p 106.



T Mkandawire & C C Soludo, Our continent, our future: African perspectives on structural adjustment, Council for the development of Social Science in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, 1999, p 34.



Omara-Ojungu, op cit, pp 427-428.



Todaro, op cit, pp 14-16.



Ibid, pp 42 & 59.



World Bank, Entering the 21st century: World development report 1999/2000. Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p 28.



Mines, firewood and ravines, The Economist, 27 May 2000.



P Rogers, Resource issues, in TCSalmon (ed), Issues in international relations, Routledge, London, 2000, pp 133-134.



A Pahad, Security issues and concerns in Southern Africa, in G Mils (ed), Southern Africa into the next millennium, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Braamfontein, 1998, pp 42-45.



A R Turton, Water wars in Southern Africa: Challenging conventional wisdom, Water for peace in the Middle East and Southern Africa, Green Cross International, Geneva, 2000, p 113.



The business of conflict, The Economist, 4 March 2000.



Turton, op cit, p 113.



The business of conflict, op cit.



C Obi, Environmental security in Africa: Some theoretical concerns and emerging issues, Africa Insight 28(1/2), 1998, p 45.



Turton, op cit, p 113.



K Lambrechts, Crisis in Lesotho: The challenge of managing conflict in Southern Africa, Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD), Braamfontein, 1999, p 27.



Turton, op cit, p 113.



I Douglas, Fighting for diamonds — private military companies in Sierra Leone, in J Cilliers & P Mason (eds), Peace, profit or plunder? The privatisation of security in war-torn African countries, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1999, pp 175-200.



Moyo & Tevera, op cit, pp 51-52.



Thomas, op cit, pp 461-464.



Timberlake, op cit, p 59.



Todaro, op cit, p 708.



Rogers, op cit, p 138.



U Lele & W Candler, Food security: Some East African considerations, in A Valdés (ed), Food security for developing countries, Westview, Boulder, 1981, pp 102 & 109.



Timberlake, op cit, p 127.



W H Bender, How much food will we need in the 21st century?, Environment 39(2), 1997, pp 7-8, 10.



A Valdés & P Konandreas, Assessing food insecurity based on national aggregates in developing countries, in Valdés, op cit, p 25.



P Webb & J von Braun, Famine and food security in Ethiopia: Lessons for Africa, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1994, pp 31-55.



S Jones & J Beynon, Food security and staple foods: Policy issues for South Africa, Land and Agricultural Policy Centre Policy Paper 4 for the Macroeconomic Reform Group (MERG), Johannesburg, 1994, p 2.



Ibid, p 171.



United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Food security in Africa, in O Obasanjo & H D’Orville (eds), The challenges of agricultural production and food security in Africa, Crane Russak, London, 1992, p 37.



C Ford Runge & B Senauer, A removable feast, Foreign Affairs 79(3), 2000, pp 39-40.



J K Cilliers, Building security in Southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture, ISS Monograph 43, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, November 1999, p 11.



M Malan, SADC and sub-regional security: Unde venis et quo vadis?, ISS Monograph 19, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, February 1998, p 5.



Southern African Development Community (SADC), Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 1999, SADC, Gaborone, 1999, p 76.



R Cornwell, South Africa in Africa: imperialism or irresponsibility?, Woord en Daad, October 1998, p 24.



Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Civil strife in Angola leaves millions destitute, Global Watch, 22 May 2000, <www.fao.org/news/ global/GW0010-e.htm>.



Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture Special Alert No 307, Zimbabwe: Concerns over food security mount as economic problems deepen and disturbances affect food production, 28 April 2000, <www.fao.org/WAICENT/ faoinfo/economic/giews/english/alertes/2000/SA307ZIM. htm>.



Van Rooyen, op cit, p 74.



See, for example, M Rukuni & R H Bernstein (eds), Southern Africa: food security policy options: Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference on Food Security Research in Southern Africa, 1-5 November 1987, University of Zimbabwe/Michigan State University Food Security Research Project, Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension, Harare; Van Rooyen, ibid, p 81.



Cilliers, op cit, pp 14-15, 26.



See, for example, M Chenje & P Johnson (eds), Water in Southern Africa, SADC/IUCN/SARDC, Harare, 1996, pp 151-186.



See, for example, M R Rupiya, Southern Africa in water crisis — A case study of the Pagara River water shortage, 1987 — 1996: Towards a resource based conflict management and resolution perspective, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 1(1), 1999, pp 53-76.



Y Kemp Spies, Prospects for political integration in Southern Africa, unpublished masters dissertation, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1999, p 158.



Dutkiewicz, op cit, p 124.



See, in this regard, C Clapham, Africa and the international system: The politics of state survival, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; R Cornwell, The collapse of the African state, in Cilliers & Mason, op cit, p 61-80; World Bank, The state in a changing world: World Development Report 1997, World Bank, New York, 1997.



Bush, op cit, p 181.



A R Turton, The hydropolitics of Southern Africa: The case of the Zambezi River basin as an area of potential co-operation based on Allan’s concept of ‘virtual water’, unpublished masters dissertation, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1998.



Luterbacher et al, op cit, p 16.



Ethiopian famine: natural calamity or man-made disaster?, Mail & Guardian, 28 April 2000.



Webb & von Braun, op cit, pp 99-125.



Luterbacher et al, op cit, p 17.



R Paarlberg, The global food fight, Foreign Affairs 79(3), 2000, pp 24-38.



N Patel, Conflict resolution through regional organisations in Africa, paper presented at the 40th Annual Conference of the Africa Institute of South Africa, 30 May — 2 June 2000, Pretoria.