THE ARTA CONFERENCE

In May 2000, a reconciliation conference aimed at bringing together Somalia’s divided population began in Arta, Djibouti. This was the thirteenth attempt to convene a national reconciliation conference in the decade since Somalia’s government collapsed and the country was plunged into civil war. All previous attempts had failed, and many observers held little hope that this one would succeed. Yet, four months later, and to the surprise of many outsiders, the conference in Arta elected a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which in turn elected an interim president. The new president appointed a prime minister and a cabinet. How did the Arta conference achieve so much where all twelve previous conferences had failed? Secondly, and far more importantly, what are the chances of success for this new interim government?

Djibouti’s new president, Ismail Omar Guellah, first mooted the idea of a national reconciliation conference in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1999. His plan differed from previous ones in that it focused on ‘civil society’ — including elders, professionals and intellectuals from Somalia and the Somali diaspora, as well as the business community and women’s groups. The faction leaders, who had held sway for so long in Somalia and who had derailed all previous reconciliation attempts, were conspicuous in their absence. This explains the Arta conference’s (apparent) success and, at the same time, points to its greatest potential weakness.

The conference, which began in Arta in early May, drew over 2 000 people from all of Somalia’s clans as well as from the Somali diaspora, which is estimated to number at least 1 million. Business leaders and Islamic clerics were also present. The intended focus on ‘civil society’, however, brought with it a new set of problems. Just who or what is ‘Somali civil society’ and how is it identified? This lack of clarity allowed a number of armed militia groups and leaders to repackage themselves as ‘grassroots organisations’, thereby earning the right to represent Somali civil society in Arta. Groups such as the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), which controls the south-central Bay/Bakool since wresting it from Hussein Aidid’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) faction in June 1999, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of General Said Hersi ‘Morgan’, which is fighting for control of the far south around Kismaayo, and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, a prominent north Mogadishu faction leader in the 1990s, were all reincarnated as civil society groups. That more militia groups were not represented was due only to their rejection of the conference.

Given that there was very little agreement among the participants regarding the nature of civil society, and that the decade-long civil war had destroyed almost all social institutions in Somalia, the conference ultimately had to rely on clan as the only commonly acceptable form of social organisation, hence all negotiations regarding the future government and distribution of power were conducted along clan lines.

Negotiations at Arta were painfully slow, and it took four months of wrangling before agreement was reached on how power would be distributed. Power was distributed along clan lines according to a complex formula. Seats in the new transitional assembly were to be divided between the four main clans — the Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Digil-Mirifle — and further among a multiplicity of subclans and sub-subclans. Most importantly, clan representatives were chosen not because of the military arsenal under their control, but because they had won the respect of their clans.

DECLINE OF THE FACTION LEADERS

The outcome of the Arta conference confirms what many have believed for some time: that the faction leaders, once so powerful, have lost much of their power. Developments over the last three years have fundamentally altered the power balance in Somalia, and perhaps the most important factor in President Guelleh’s favour was that the time for reconciliation was now more auspicious than ever. Where once faction leaders and their militias held sway, businessmen and Islamic clerics were now the power brokers. Most importantly, the Somali population has begun to withdraw its support from these faction leaders.

The business community emerged initially as an offshoot of the faction leaders, controlling the latters’ business interests, thereby allowing them to finance their wars. In time, however, as the business community’s ventures grew more successful and expanded, this relationship was inverted. There was less and less money to be made by the faction leaders in the business of war, and more to be made by entrepreneurs operating in the absence of any government regulation. The faction leaders and their militias were often little more than private security guards for businessmen. As these tendencies grew in the late 1990s, businessmen began to free themselves from their relations with the faction leaders and establish their own militias, whose raison d’être was no longer clan allegiance but profit.

For businessmen, the initial advantages that came with the absence of a state has become a liability, and they are now one of the principal groups supporting the resurrection of the Somali state. Where once they benefited from freedom from taxes and regulations, they now view as onerous the need to supply their own electricity and water, and to provide for their own security and basic infrastructure. A state is needed that can fulfil these minimum obligations.

This emergence of a ‘business imperative’ is not a new phenomenon. As early as 1995, Somali commentators remarked that:

"a growing number of Somali entrepreneurs are perceiving that their business interests will now be better served by the creation and recognition of some sort of authority, though one which will co-exist with rather than challenge the mafia-based economy on which these merchants profit."1

During the height of the Somali civil war and international intervention in the early 1990s, the business community backed the various faction leaders as part of their own business strategy. However, the profits they made were not invested in weapons, but rather in continued trade, particularly with the Gulf states (the most important resources traded with the Gulf states were livestock and charcoal). Most of the current business entrepreneurs were once closely associated with the various faction leaders.

The business leaders have also undermined the faction leaders by recruiting their militiamen. The faction leaders, their power weakened by the split with the business community, find their access to revenue curtailed. Consequently, they are no longer able to pay their militiamen who have been defecting to the business community. Many militiamen are believed to have defected in the past two years. All the militiamen currently employed by the business community were once clan militia serving under faction leaders.

The other significant change has been the growth of the Islamic courts. In the absence of a government or a judiciary that can provide law and order, the Islamic courts, run under Islamic Shari’a law, have filled a vital gap, imposing law, order and punishment in cases ranging from petty theft to murder, rape and drug-smuggling. This has led to fears in some quarters, which is highlighted by the faction leaders for their own benefit, of the growth of Islamic fundamentalism.

Over 90% of Somalis are Sunni Muslims, and Islam is one of the few institutions to have survived the anarchy of the last decade. Somalia has not traditionally been a fundamentalist Muslim society, and Islam was regarded largely as a private matter of religion in a largely secular society. But the chaos of the war years has seen a growth in its influence.

The Shari’a Courts were initially established by the faction leaders themselves. Ali Mahdi Mohammed, former faction leader in north Mogadishu, and one of the main protagonists in the civil war that destroyed Mogadishu in the early 1990s (and who has now been resuscitated as a respectable politician), first established the Islamic courts in north Mogadishu in the early 1990s as a way both of securing the support of the Islamic clerics, and of winning the support of the local populace by reducing levels of crime in this part of the city. For many, Islamic Shari’a courts have brought a measure of security to their lives and is the only recourse they have to any form of justice. This has won the courts and the clerics who run them a measure of popular support, making the Islamic clerics important power brokers. This fact has been used by those opposing the interim government, who argue that the government is dominated by Islamic fundamentalists. It is true that the Islamic clerics do have an influential role in the government, some going so far as to argue that the interim government is too western and should return to Islamic values. On the other hand, however, the clerics also recognise that the interim government is Somalia’s best hope, and they therefore support it. While believing that they deserve some power after helping to restore law and order in the past few years, they are also wary, at present, of appearing divisive and thereby reigniting the civil war. If they do make a play for power, it will not be for some time, while they give the government a chance to establish itself, simultaneously trying to extract the maximum benefit for their own cause.

THE OUTCOME OF THE ARTA CONFERENCE

After four months of negotiations, the delegates at the Arta conference adopted an interim Transitional Charter. The charter provides for a three-year transitional government, based on a federal system, and a transitional national assembly elected on the basis of clan affiliation. The conference also approved the establishment of a provisional capital in Baidoa, which would house the new government until the national capital, Mogadishu, had been secured. A special national task committee was also established to restore security in Mogadishu.

The TNA consists of 245 representatives. Each of the four main clans would have 49 seats, divided among their subclans. Women have 25 seats and the ‘Alliance’ — an agglomeration of minority ethnic groups such as Bantu and Arab — occupies 24 seats.

There was much haggling over the composition of the TNA and the government, and the formula adopted at Arta meant that even minor posts were the subject of much debate and dealings. Once a senior post was secured, the clan of the successful individual was effectively eliminated from the remaining top posts.

The first senior position to be allocated was that of parliamentary speaker, which went to Abdul Rahman Derow Isaak, former secretary-general of the RRA and a member of the Digil-Mirifle clan. His election led to a walkout by members of his own clan who had wanted a more prominent position. However, their walkout proved that it was possible to be elected without the support of one’s own clan, and that the formula adopted did not eliminate the possibility of cross-clan support.

On 25 August, the TNA elected Abd-al Qassim Salat Hassan as interim president. Salat is a member of the Hawiye, the dominant clan in Mogadishu. This was an important factor as it was believed that only a Hawiye would be able to deal with the Mogadishu faction leaders, especially since the momentum generated by the Arta conference and the support it had won inside Somalia suggested that it may be possible to move directly to Mogadishu without setting up a temporary capital in Baidoa.

That the Arta conference delegates and the members of parliament believed only a member of the Hawiye clan could handle the Mogadishu warlords was ironic, given that many viewed the Hawiye as the clan responsible for much of the chaos in the city. This was resented by many of the other clans in Arta. However, to the surprise of many observers pragmatism once again ruled, giving further credence to the view that the clan has become less important as a political organising principle in Somalia in recent years.

President Salat appointed Ali Khalif Galeid as his prime minister, with the responsibility of establishing a reconciliation and reconstruction government. Although from the Somaliland territory, Galeid is a member of the Darod clan, coming from the part of Somaliland claimed by Puntland. Galeid was a former minister of industry under Siad Barré, and is a leading Somali businessman. He has business contacts in the Gulf states, having run his telecommunications company from the region. He is viewed as crucial in obtaining desperately needed Arab aid for and investment into Somalia.

The transitional government’s task is to lead Somalia through a three-year period leading up to elections. This entails restoring peace and stability to the country, disarming the militias and creating a national security force, creating a government from scratch, rebuilding the economy, and restoring basic minimum services such as education and health care to ordinary citizens. This would be an enormous task for any government, and is made more difficult now that the Mogadishu faction leaders have vowed to prevent the new government from establishing itself. The northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland have disputed the new government’s authority. In addition, the transitional administration has no money and lacks even government offices. Given all these obstacles, what chance does the new dispensation have of success?

The new government threatens the Mogadishu faction leaders. Consequently the faction leaders have vowed to stop the new government from moving to Mogadishu. Immediately after his election, President Salat paid a visit to Mogadishu, before embarking on an international tour to drum up political and financial support for his government. On his arrival in the city, President Salat was welcomed by more than 100 000 Mogadishu residents in the biggest political gathering since the collapse of the Siad Barré regime. This was the clearest sign that the power of the faction leaders is on the wane, and it strengthened the new government’s resolve to move directly to Mogadishu, instead of first setting up a government in Baidoa. Aside from the fact that the faction leaders find themselves squeezed by a lack of resources and the emergence of alternative centres of power in the business community and among Islamic clerics, the Somali population have grown weary of war and are desperate for some, indeed, any form of government. The massive show of support evidenced in Mogadishu signifies less that the population support the new government per se, but more that any government would now be given the benefit of the doubt.

More importantly, the war fatigue extends to the faction militiamen, many of whom see the new transitional government as an opportunity for them to abandon their current lifestyle and enter regular employment, perhaps in the new police force, but also in other areas. These factors combine to offer Somalia the best chance for peace since 1991.

Observers fear that, while the faction leaders have been seriously weakened, they still have enough firepower to pose a serious threat to the interim government. Such fears were highlighted immediately after the inauguration of the new administration, with the outbreak of renewed violence in parts of Mogadishu. There have subsequently been a number of assassinations of high profile members of the transitional government. It is clear that, at the very least, the faction leaders can seriously threaten public confidence in a still very fragile authority.

Given the problems posed by those factions in Mogadishu opposed to the interim government, President Salat’s first priority will be to disarm the militias. In pursuit of this goal, a disarmament committee has been established to demobilise and disarm the militiamen who roam Mogadishu’s streets, aiming eventually to incorporate them into a new security force. Local business leaders have given the disarmament committee US $750 000 to finance the demobilisation effort for the first three months. The hope is that by then the government will be sufficiently established to continue the process.

The demobilisation process aims, in its first phase, to recruit 4 000 men who will act as a security force for the new government until they are incorporated into the new police force. The committee has made a steady start, already having recruited more than 2 000 men. However, most of the militiamen thus far recruited have come from the militias of businessmen and clerics. The real test will be to see if this process is extended to the faction militias, and whether those militiamen defect with their weapons and ‘technicals’ (trucks mounted with heavy weapons). The greatest fear is that the disarmament committee does not have the capacity to handle the demobilisation process once it begins in earnest. There have already been street battles between members of the new force and other militiamen demanding to be included.

WAR CRIMINALS AND DISSIDENTS

The new Somali government offers no posts to any of the main opposition faction leaders, or to the leaders of the breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Some observers, both inside and outside Somalia, had suggested that the government tried to buy off the opposition leaders with senior government posts, and negotiations were held between the various faction and regional leaders. However, with the announcement of cabinet posts this did not materialise. Instead, the Somali government’s strategy seems to have been to incorporate individuals into the new interim government and cabinet who could form serious opposition to the current ‘dissidents’, thereby breaking their power.

For example, the government named Abdullahi Boqor Muse as defence minister, a member of the Darod clan dominant in Puntland, and a relative and rival of the Puntland president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The new foreign minister is Ismail Hurreh Buba, a member of the Isaaq clan that dominates the Somaliland region, though Buba did briefly serve under Mogadishu faction leader Mohammed Farah Aidid in the early 1990s. Buba’s appointment is seen as a direct challenge to Somaliland president Mohammed Ibrahim Egal; they are related and are also rivals for Isaaq clan support.

The new TNA, however, does include many individuals closely associated with the deposed and discredited Siad Barré regime. Not only were the president and prime minister members of the former regime, but even individuals strongly associated with war crimes, such as General Hashi Ganni and General Said Hersi Morgan, the two ‘butchers of Hargeisa’, are both members of the TNA (though General Morgan has since withdrawn his support for the transitional government in what appears to be a tactical manoeuvre). This opens the government to a serious challenge by those opposed to it, and hampers the interim government’s search for legitimacy inside Somalia. Without a process to identify and deal with war criminals, it becomes more difficult to counter the arguments of those opposed to the interim government, especially those in regions such as Somaliland, who suffered the worst excesses under the Barré regime. The interim government’s response to such criticism is that, were individuals such as General Morgan not included in the new government, they might be driven to take up arms against it. The government also claims, with some truth, that it has made efforts to reach out to the dissident faction leaders in Mogadishu and in the northern territories, including through mediation by Libya, Yemen and Italy, but with no success.

The dissident factions have held a number of meetings in recent months, in an attempt to form a united front against the interim government. These meetings have included most of the Mogadishu faction leaders, including Hussein Muhammed Aidid, Uthman Hassan Ali ‘Ato’, Muhammed Qanyare Afrah, as well as Puntland president Abdullahi Yusuf. Significantly, the meetings have not included Muse Sudi Yalahow, the faction leader who controls south-west Mogadishu and who is regarded by many as the most powerful faction leader in Mogadishu at present. But the faction leaders’ options are limited, and they are aware that most of their supporters favour some sort of accommodation with the interim government.

The dissident faction leaders have issued a number of demands, including that an all-inclusive reconciliation conference must be held in Somalia, and that this conference should be spearheaded by the faction leaders. Furthermore, President Salat should be regarded simply as another faction leader. Significantly, however, the most recent statements issued by the faction leaders steer away from any explicit call to violence against the interim government.

Aidid, Mogadishu’s most prominent (even if no longer the most powerful) faction leader has come under tremendous pressure recently, from his clan, his political organisation, the SNA, and from his supporters, most importantly Libya, to reach agreement with the new government. In late September, Libyan president Colonel Muamar Ghaddafi organised a reconciliation meeting between Aidid and President Salat, and then issued a statement that the two leaders had reached agreement. Aidid was later forced to deny this, but it is clear that he has been under pressure from Libya, which has been one of his main supporters for years. Husayn Siyad Qorgab, former vice-chairperson of the SNA, resigned as the deputy head of the supreme committee of the Habr Gedir’s Sa’ad subclan (the clan to which Aidid belongs, and which he leads), declaring his support for the interim government. The Habr Gedir Council of Elders also voiced its support for the Arta process. Abdullahi Hassan Ganey ‘Firimbi’, the internal secretary of the USC-SNA faction headed by Ato, expressed his faction’s support for the new government, and repudiated Ato’s statements opposing the government.

THE NORTHERN RECOVERY ZONES

Given the fact that the faction leaders have been weakened, the interim government faces a bigger problem trying to reconcile with the two breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland — the two so-called ‘northern recovery zones’ — which have enjoyed a measure of peace for some years now.

The northern-most part of Somalia, formerly the British Protectorate of Somaliland, suffered the worst effects of Siad Barré’s regime, and declared independence shortly after his fall in 1991. The region has enjoyed peace since 1995, and has established its own ‘government’, which has not been recognised by the international community. The self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland rejects the outcome of the Arta conference on the grounds that developments in Somalia have nothing to do with it, an independent state. Somaliland also rejects calls for it, a peaceful region, to enter into negotiations with a region that is still in conflict, on the grounds that its own hard-won peace may be threatened. But there has been a marked softening in the position of Somaliland government ministers recently. A number of senior Somaliland government officials have begun talking of eventual recognition with the rest of Somalia, if and when the south can restore security and peace in its regions. President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, in recent months, has toned down his calls for full independence, calling instead for recognition of the ‘special’ status of Somaliland, comparable to that accorded to Kosovo, Palestine and East Timor. The problem in Somaliland appears to be that, while the leadership is beginning to contemplate eventual reunification with the rest of Somalia, the population are implacably opposed to such a move. Somaliland’s population experienced the worst of the Siad Barré regime’s repression in the 1980s, and the inclusion of so many leading members of this regime in the interim government constitutes an impediment to reconciliation. The Somaliland population believe that reunification cannot begin to be discussed until the war criminals of the Siad Barré regime are brought to book.

Somaliland fears that the new Somali government in Mogadishu will threaten its stability. In contrast to the rest of Somalia, the Somaliland economy is growing, underpinned by foreign remittances and a thriving livestock trade with the Arabian Peninsula. A growing number of Somalis are returning from exile abroad, and have even begun investing in property, building large villas on the outskirts of Hargeisa. Somaliland boasts five private airlines serving Somalia and the Gulf region, five private telecommunications companies offering mobile and internet services and instant dial-up access to anywhere in the world at the cheapest rates in the region. The Somaliland port of Berbera exports livestock and frankincense to the Gulf states and has increased its business, as a result of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and Ethiopia’s subsequent loss of access to the Eritrean port of Assab. Since March 2000, the United Nations has been shipping food aid destined for famine relief in Ethiopia through Berbera, as Djibouti cannot cope with the volumes.

But this economic growth and political stability are hampered by Somaliland’s lack of international recognition, which is a serious impediment to international investment and financing. Although there has been some oil exploration both on and offshore, international companies find it impossible to obtain financing for any investments, and Somaliland is still lumped together with the rest of Somalia in terms of its risk profile. Traders find it impossible to obtain letters of credit, and the Somaliland national bank cannot have direct relations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Puntland in the north-east is the other ‘northern haven’, having declared itself an autonomous region in August 1998. Puntland has not declared its intention to break away from Somalia, but argues that reincorporation into the south can only be discussed once the latter restores security and peace. The situation in Puntland also differs in that there is clear evidence that the population support the new Somali government, in contrast to the authorities. Since May, there have been regular demonstrations throughout the Puntland region in support of the Arta process and the interim government, and against the Puntland authorities’ decision to reject the process. Puntland president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was recently stoned at a public rally, and was forced to cancel other public appearances after he was advised that such appearance would be unsafe. There have also been reports of defections from some Puntland security forces to the new security forces being established by the interim government.

Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf has also weakened his position by aligning himself with the Mogadishu faction leaders, the same ones he opposed before and claimed to be the cause of the instability in the south. He has recently held a number of meetings with them in Nairobi, in Garoowe (the Puntland capital) and in Gaalkacyo. The popular pressure from Puntland residents has been so great that Colonel Abdullahi recently announced his intention to retire at the end of his term in 2001. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf is also known to be ill, and it is unlikely that he will be able to stand for re-election. His known opponents have all aligned themselves with the transitional government.

REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS

The situation in Somalia is further complicated by regional geopolitics. The actions and interests of neighbouring states complicate the process of re-establishing a central government in Somalia.

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have armed and supported rival Somali factions in an extension of their border war, exacerbating the fighting in Somalia at a time when the war there showed all signs of burning itself out. This ‘proxy war’ reached its height in 1999, resulting in a series of defeats for Aidid’s forces (which were supported by Eritrea) at the hands of Ethiopian-backed factions. Aidid’s most serious setback came in June 1999, when his forces were driven out of Baidoa, a strategic commercial centre in the south-central region of Bay-Bakool, by the forces of the RRA. Aidid’s faction had controlled this region since September 1995.

But Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia dates back much further than its war with Eritrea, and is motivated by its own security concerns. Ethiopia’s eastern region, Region 5 or the Ogaden, is populated by ethnic Somalis (the region was conquered by Ethiopia in the late 19th century), and there have been repeated attempts since Somali independence in 1961 to have the region incorporated into a greater Somalia. This led to a major war between the two countries in 1977, in which Somalia was defeated by Ethiopia, which was assisted by the then Soviet Union and Cuba. Thus, Ethiopia’s position towards Somalia has always been ambivalent: while continued instability in Somalia does threaten to spill over into Ethiopia, the restoration of a central Somali authority also constitutes a threat to Ethiopia as it brings with it the possibility of a resurgence of Somali irredentism.

As a result, Ethiopia’s position towards the Arta process has been ambivalent from the very beginning, and has become clearer since the inauguration of the TNA. Ethiopia has held a number of meetings with its most important Somali ally, Colonel Shaargadud of the RRA, eventually persuading him to withdraw from the TNA. There have also been reports recently of increased sightings of Ethiopian soldiers in south-western Somalia, in RRA-held territory, as well as reports of Ethiopian arms shipments being delivered to factions in this region.

Kenya faces a similar threat from Somali irredentism, given that north-eastern Kenya is also populated by ethnic Somalis (formerly the Northern Frontier District). Kenya’s ambivalence towards the interim government was underlined by remarks made by Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi and the Kenyan foreign minister, Bonaya Godana, shortly after the inauguration of President Salat. President Moi called on the new government to include the Mogadishu faction leaders if it wanted to have any chance of success; this despite the opposition, inside Somalia and among the large Somali exiled population inside Kenya, to any senior government positions being given to the faction leaders. President Moi also met with Aidid, appointed as a de facto ‘leader’ of the dissident faction, shortly after the interim government was inaugurated. For both Ethiopia and Kenya, the restoration of a central state in Somalia brings with it the possibility of a resurgent Somali irredentism, which threatens their own very unstable ethnic balance.

CONCLUSION: A VERY DELICATE BALANCE

The Arta conference, which led to the election of a TNA, a president and the appointment of an interim government, has confounded many observers who expected it to fail, as had so many previous reconciliation attempts. Moreover, this interim government has won the support of the international community and the vast majority of ordinary Somalis who are desperate for a government — any government. The interim government further confounded observers by moving into Mogadishu, backed by more than 1 000 militiamen who were recruited and organised by the business community and the Islamic clerics. This show of force was enough, for now, to silence any attempts by the Mogadishu faction leaders to resist the new government by force.

But even if early attempts by the new government to secure the capital and the rest of the south have succeeded, this is nothing compared to the far greater task of rebuilding the country after a ten-year civil war. The new government is fully aware of this challenge and thus, one week after his inauguration as president, Salat embarked on an international tour designed to consolidate international support for his government as a prerequisite to international aid. President Salat has called on the international community and the Arab world, in particular, to structure a Marshall plan recovery package to rebuild Somalia. However, the west is still very wary of re-entering Somalia, given its past experiences. The irony is that, now more than at any time in the past decade, Somalia is probably ready for international intervention. The interim government needs outside assistance if it is to withstand the opposition of the dissident faction leaders; the latter may have been weakened, but they still have enough firepower to weaken, or even destroy the interim government (which does not have a security force of its own and is relying on its business and Islamic Court allies). The government’s allies are fully behind it now, but they will want to see results soon if they are to continue with their support. And their demands differ. Business leaders will want to see an improvement in their own conditions, initially through an improvement in security conditions, but then also in greater access to international finance. The Islamic clerics will want to see a move towards Islamic government. Unless the interim government delivers, the support of these two groups may begin to fade.

The population will want to see the government delivering services, especially in terms of health and education, but the government is penniless. The militiamen want jobs and education. Unless the government somehow manages to begin to deliver such services, popular support may dissipate with fatal consequences. Yet, all these things cost money and, if the west does not show a willingness to contribute, the government will be forced to look more and more to the Arab world, with its own set of political demands and consequences. Aid has already begun to enter Somalia, from Yemen, Saudi Arabia and probably other Arab countries. Libya has agreed to send in security forces to help the government to restore order in Mogadishu. This may be interpreted by the west as Somalia moving closer towards the Arab world at a time when relations between the west and the Arab world are already deteriorating for various reasons. Not only may this be interpreted as constituting a challenge to the west’s interests in the Gulf region, it may also pose a threat to neighbours like Ethiopia and Kenya that have already showed themselves to be very ambivalent towards the new government.

NOTE

1. K Menkhaus & J Prendergast, Political economy of post-intervention Somalia, quoted in G Prunier, Somalia: Civil war, intervention and withdrawal, Writenet, United Kingdom, nd.