INTRODUCTION
The literature on demobilisation is characterised by the argument that, if the needs of former soldiers are not adequately addressed, there is the danger that they might resort to crime to earn a livelihood. The emphasis is always on the proper planning and execution of the demobilisation and reintegration process with the aim of successfully reintegrating soldiers into society. However, despite this concern, none of the studies have been able to develop a proper model for demobilisation. It is clear that each demobilisation and reintegration process involves distinct military, political and socio-economic circumstances. The model proposed by Ball1 is the most desirable.
The lack of a model for the demobilisation and reintegration process compels a focus on other factors that influence the success or failure of these programmes. Arguably, demobilisation and reintegration programmes on their own are not enough to reintegrate former soldiers successfully into society. This article thus identifies two factors that may shape the success or failure of demobilisation and reintegration. These are the personal development of soldiers during the war and the state of the economy at the end of the war. The focus is on a limited sample of former Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) soldiers to illustrate how the nature of their personal development during the armed struggle and the state of the economy at the end of the struggle affected their demobilisation and reintegration.
THE DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION PROCESS
Ball2 identifies four phases in the demobilisation and reintegration process: assembly, discharge, short-term reinsertion and longer term reintegration. According to Ball, the first two phases constitute the demobilisation stage while the latter two are part of the reintegration stage. He argues that the assembly stage has political and security objectives. Assembly is necessary to account for all soldiers and their weapons and, where there is no clear victor, to build confidence between the former warring parties.3 The assembly phase may be used to achieve some reconciliation and to build a common institutional culture in cases where the peace deal includes the integration of all armed forces to build a new national defence force.
In order to maintain the proper functioning of the armed forces, some soldiers are exempted from cantonments. The assembly phase will differ from one case to another. In peacetime demobilisation, assembly may take place over a short period of time to allow soldiers to hand in their weapons, receive demobilisation documentation and undergo a brief orientation towards civilian life.4 The assembly period may also be limited by inadequate resources. In cases where there is not enough funding, it may become dangerous to keep soldiers in barracks, as they have to be fed, clothed, and provided with sanitary facilities and medical care. If these needs are not adequately met, this may lead to frustration among the soldiers and possible protests.
The second phase in the demobilisation stage is discharge. If a large number of soldiers are demobilised, this phase may take place over a longer period of time. Very often the discharge of soldiers is linked to the compliance with other provisions in a peace accord. Thus, there is no clear formula on how and when to discharge soldiers. When discharged, soldiers are transported to their home districts or places where they want to start a new life. Food or food coupons are provided to the soldiers. The discharge package may also include part of the insertion benefits.5
Discharge is followed by the first phase in reintegration called reinsertion. Reinsertion assistance is a form of transitory safety net to help former soldiers settle down. Most of them return to ruins and, in some cases, all family members have been wiped out by the war, houses have been destroyed and there is thus no base from which former soldiers can start off. Reinsertion assistance provides the basic necessities of life such as shelter, medical care, food, clothing and household goods, for between several months and two years. Reinsertion assistance also includes special support for physically handicapped former soldiers and child soldiers, psychological counselling, and assistance to enable them to regenerate their coping skills. However, in most demobilisation and reintegration processes, psychological problems have received less attention. Reinsertion is a short-term stage and is followed by reintegration aimed at assisting former soldiers to develop some economic independence as opposed to becoming dependent upon the state.
The reintegration stage has economic and social aspects. Economic reintegration is:
"the process through which the ex-combatant’s household builds up its livelihood, through production and/or other forms of gainful employment."6
The most commonly used reintegration mechanisms are cash payments, counselling (employment and psychological), vocational training, apprenticeships, formal education, job generation, support for job-seeking, access to land, credit, technical assistance, and support in identifying market needs.7 In most demobilisation processes, the economic aspects of reintegration are emphasised at the expense of social aspects.
Social reintegration refers to the phase when former combatants and their families begin to feel part of and accepted by the community. Kingma notes that rituals and gifts may play a role in the social reintegration of former soldiers:
"[I]n Mozambique, some ex-combatants spent a good part of their initial demobilisation money on gifts to village elders. That played an important contribution to being accepted in the village, becoming part of the ‘social security’ ... Most ex-soldiers had to undergo cleansing rituals in order to be accepted, and this had an impact both on the acceptance by the community and as well as the feelings of the ex-combatant him/herself."8
THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
The South African demobilisation and reintegration process deviates from this model, illustrating the point that the process depends on the specific context. The negotiated settlement in South Africa, which had no clear victors, had a specific impact on the nature of the demobilisation and reintegration process. Negotiations between the apartheid government and the African National Congress (ANC) led to the suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC. Following this, an arrangement was made for MK soldiers to return to South Africa as ‘unarmed civilians’.
Research showed that, when these soldiers returned to the country, the major concern was their economic reintegration, and they therefore received R50 each and were released into their respective communities. Unlike the model outlined by Ball, there was no assembly of soldiers in a formal sense. Interviews with former MK soldiers reveal that they had to wait for about two months before they received grants of R300 each administered from Khotso House. The majority indicated that they received a total of six R300 grants. However, there is evidence that former soldiers received different amounts of money. A study conducted by Cock revealed that there was no proper accounting as some people were paid twice. "The ANC gave some individuals extra money. Sometimes this was as much as R2 500."9
This can be characterised as an informal part of the demobilisation process. However, the limited amounts of money handed to former soldiers are similar to grants offered in the reinsertion phase of the formal reintegration stage as outlined by Ball. The problem with this reinsertion process was that it was not immediately followed by long-term reintegration. This was left for the formal demobilisation and reintegration process. During this time, a number of former MK soldiers found alternative employment, and some lived in poverty (after exhausting their grants) while waiting for the formal demobilisation process.
The formal demobilisation and reintegration process started after 1994 and legislation to this effect was passed in 1996. The main concern at the time was the integration of all armed forces into a new national defence force. According to Motumi and Mckenzie:
"[p]lanning only began in earnest when there was a crisis over what to do with the elderly and infirm combatants who had failed to meet the standards set for integration."10
The demobilisation package had three components. The first was once-off gratuities, which ranged from R42 058 to R12 734, depending on a soldier’s period in service. The second component was limited counselling over a two-week period on personal matters, careers, social services and finances. The last component was an opportunity to join the Service Corps for 18 months. During this time, it was expected that soldiers would receive training in basic skills, life skills and adult literacy. No further training or social reintegration was offered.
The formal demobilisation and reintegration process did not distinguish between short-term reinsertion and long-term reintegration. By now, most of the former soldiers had exhausted their gratuities and, like the majority of black South Africans, had plunged into poverty. Handing out cash payments is an example of short-term reinsertion. Joining the Service Corps was not compulsory, and the majority of former MK soldiers decided not to join. Thus, most of them depended on these gratuities and had nothing else to fall back on. However, reasons for the lack of interest in the Service Corps differ from individual to individual. Some argued that the training was too basic. This argument should be seen against the fact that soldiers who were in the commanding structures of MK now had to undergo the same training as footsoldiers. Others felt that they had adequate skills to survive as civilians.
WHERE ARE THEY NOW?
Kingma11 argues that reintegration is not one general process, but consists of thousands of ‘micro-stories’, with individual and group efforts, and setbacks and successes. It is thus important to investigate the place of former soldiers in society. Currently, there are no in-depth studies available on the place of demobilised soldiers in society. The majority focus on an ethnographic description of the demobilisation and reintegration process. Perhaps the only significant studies that focused on demobilised soldiers were undertaken by the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM). In 1999, the Defence and Development Project (DDP) of GEM commissioned studies on demobilisation and reintegration. The first study was an ethnographic study of the demobilisation and reintegration process (Mokalobe, 1999).12 The study included some interviews with a small sample of former Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) and MK soldiers. The second study was a sociological profile of former MK soldiers (Mashike, 1999).13 While the two studies complemented each other, they were limited by their small samples. Despite this, some lessons can be drawn from the studies about the place of former soldiers in society today.
The sociological profile included twelve former MK combatants and was based on a snowball sample. This methodology was chosen due to the difficulty of obtaining a sampling frame of former MK soldiers. In cases where a list exists, former soldiers, for a number of reasons, may not be willing to share their experiences. Despite this sampling strategy, the researcher was able to gather data on former soldiers of different social characteristics. The sample included two former soldiers who were captured as spies in MK camps. During interviews, these soldiers were willing to share their experiences before and after their return to South Africa. The sample further included a serving captain in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), a film producer, a high profile criminal, and employees of a local municipality.
This study confirmed Kingma’s argument that the demobilisation and reintegration process is characterised by setbacks and successes. However, what became clear from the research was that successes could not be attributed to the demobilisation and reintegration process. Those who were living comfortably were able to do so because they took the opportunity to develop themselves while in exile. Those who are poor and destitute are former soldiers who thought that the end of apartheid would mean prosperity irrespective of their educational achievements and skill levels.
The research revealed that the schooling of 10 out of 12 respondents was disrupted when they joined MK. However, despite this disruption, eight of the respondents passed Standard 10, three passed Standard 8 and one passed Standard 7. Four have post-matric qualifications and others have skills such as computer, typing and dressmaking skills. Most notable is the fact that post-secondary school qualifications include a Bachelor of Administration degree (Oxford University), a certificate in journalism, a certificate in film production (from a German institution) and a certificate in communication. This illustrates that some MK members took the opportunity to study.
There are conflicting evidence on the opportunities to study offered to MK soldiers in exile. According to most respondents, MK soldiers were given a chance to study, but some did not take advantage of it or simply misused it. Respondents stated that MK soldiers had a choice either to pursue both formal education and military training, or to choose between the two. However, this depended on the individual. Those who had passed Standard 10 were given a chance, while those without Standard 10 were assessed to see if they could cope. According to the respondents, those who were declared unfit for an academic career, were sent for technical training. However, some of the members of MK misused the chance to study. Respondents pointed out that some members squandered the money instead of paying their tuition fees. The misuse of funds was motivated by the fact that most of them believed they would return to South Africa with everything arranged for them. Some argued that an opportunity to study depended on the kind of ties forged with the commanding officers.
The consequences of the situation outlined above were that the end of apartheid divided MK soldiers into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Winners were those who pursued and acquired some level of education during their service in MK, while losers were those without an education. The winners can also be divided into those who were integrated into the new army because they met the criteria for integration, and those who sought alternative employment.
The Service Corps was thus intended to cater for the losers. It is possible to view the Service Corps as a form of long-term integration, since the packages given to MK soldiers on their return to South Africa and the subsequent demobilisation gratuities were inadequate. However, as a form of long-term reintegration, the Service Corps proved to be inadequate in meeting the demands of former soldiers.
The ethnographic study by Mokalobe pointed to a number of problems associated with the Service Corps. He noted that some skills-training offered by the Service Corps, for example, motor mechanics and bricklaying, were already abundantly available in the civilian communities where former soldiers were to reintegrate. Starting a new informal business was a nightmare, since these former soldiers had to compete with established enterprises (including backyard workshops). One respondent who trained as a motor mechanic is worth quoting here:
"After completing my motor mechanics training I decided to open up my business. However, many other people in this business were already well established. I literally did not have any customers. I am now unemployed and it is very hard for me to live on the mercy of my relatives."14
The study further revealed that the respondent threatened to shoot his family members every time he was upset:
"The situation is worse when he is drunk. He threatens to shoot all those he suspects of hating him in the community. People complain almost every weekend about him ... They resent him."15
This confirms Nübler’s argument that several preconditions are required for the actual use of skills.16 The first is that the available skills of former combatants can only be used productively if there is a demand for these skills, and employment opportunities are provided in relevant occupations in the civilian sector. The case above illustrates that the first condition did not exist in South Africa. The second precondition is that former soldiers must feel the motivation and incentive to work in the particular occupation. Nübler argues that the process through which individuals decide to implement changes and actually utilise their capabilities is influenced by future expectations and past experience. Thus, training people who fought for the liberation of the nation in carpentry may be regarded as a slap in the face. The third precondition is that, even where employment opportunities exist and former soldiers are motivated, various obstacles may prevent them from applying their skills.
The obstacles may be cultural attitudes or expected negative feedback such as jealousy and resentment. In the sociological profile, one former MK soldier stated that he experienced problems when he returned to South Africa in 1996.17 He joined Siemens as an electronics engineer. The company was restructured and management positions were occupied by white male South Africans. According to this soldier, the company was faced with a number of problems after restructuring. He stated that he was often accused of sabotage, with the comment that, "after all, you are a terrorist." This forced him to leave the company and start his own electronics security company, a venture that collapsed and left him with huge debts. He later decided to work for other security companies, but complained that customers (who were mainly white) were not prepared to pay for the services he offered.18 In his case, social rejection turned him into a loser, despite his education.
As pointed out earlier, success stories cannot be linked exclusively and directly to demobilisation. A former MK soldier based in Orange Farm on the West Rand is another case in point. He could not join the SANDF because the highest standard he completed at school was Standard 7 as opposed to Standard 10, which was one of the criteria for integration. In this sense, he became a loser. However, he is currently running the Orange Farm Anti-AIDS Club from his two-room shack. He does not believe that the government should give handouts to former soldiers. His idea is that former soldiers must be creative and that the government should only support initiatives taken by former soldiers.19 This can only be achieved if officials involved in demobilisation conduct a needs assessment to find out where soldiers want to go after the process has been completed. Failure to do this leads to the failure of reintegration programmes.
The failure to achieve economic reintegration may hamper the proper social reintegration of former soldiers and cement their position as losers. As stated earlier, Kingma noted that gifts played an important role in the social reintegration of former soldiers in Mozambique. The lack of economic resources available to former soldiers may create some resentment in their communities and/or cause stress for these soldiers. At the end of the war former soldiers often return as heroes, but if heroes cannot provide materially, they may soon be viewed as losers who are a burden on family and relatives:
"Society sees us as heroes and just expects too much from us. When they see some of our comrades driving in beautiful cars, they expect the same from us. This is a real frustration to me. To escape this pressure of heroism I spend most of my time drinking."20
Communities must be actively involved in the social reintegration of former soldiers into society. This helps the community to accept former soldiers as community members, and helps former soldiers to feel that they belong. The approach should be based on community development projects in which former soldiers participate. They should not be dismissed as unskilled, but their capabilities should be investigated and put to use in community projects. The former MK soldier referred to above may be dismissed as unskilled because he only completed Standard 7 at school. However, this would have undermined his skills and passion for primary health care. Former soldiers like him could be put to good use, for example, in primary health care projects and anti-HIV/AIDS campaigns.
While the needs of former soldiers have to be taken seriously, care should always be taken not to place undue emphasis on their role in the struggle for liberation. War affects everyone and despite the few who colluded with the enemy during the liberation struggle, almost everyone is the hero of the struggle. History rather than individuals should be presented as the hero of the struggle. The overall development of communities may be undermined by the assertion that one group (the former soldiers) is more important than any other in society. The effect of this could be that former soldiers believe that they still have the right to special resources years after conflict has ended. This would result in their social rejection, especially among the unemployed majority.
One of the complex reasons for the land invasions in Zimbabwe is the emphasis placed on war veterans by the Mugabe government over the years.21 This has caused war veterans to see themselves as a special group requiring special attention. The reality of the situation, however, is that despite cash payments, financial resources become exhausted in time and former soldiers join the unemployed masses. Zimbabwean war veterans have plunged into the depths of poverty experienced by the majority of the Zimbabwean people. Like the majority of the population, they need some help. However, war veterans’ demands are more prominent because:
"unlike the rest [of the population], the ‘ex-combatants’ have wealthy and therefore mobile leaders such as Dr Hunzvi, who knows how to exploit their situation, terrorise the government, and thus jeopardise the economic well-being of [Zimbabwe which] the real ex-combatants once purported to fight for."22
The economic conditions in South Africa are not conducive to the successful economic reintegration of former soldiers in society. Demobilisation took place in a context of an ailing economy and the hegemony of neo-liberalism. The ANC’s adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy makes it impossible to invest in public sector job creation. Instead, the trend is towards privatisation, which is always characterised by job losses and the deterioration of working conditions. This means that the employment prospects of former soldiers are very bleak when considering that they have to compete with skilled civilians. The provision of skills through institutions like the Service Corps in an economy that does not create full employment is not helpful. In some cases, poverty is so rife that the unemployed cannot even consume goods from the informal sector. While a backyard panel beater may enjoy some business from the local communities, the informal business will also have to close in a situation where the majority are unemployed.
During privatisation, the argument is often that the private sector would take better care of job creation. Evidence shows that this is not always the case and that where jobs are created, the conditions are often appalling. The trend under the neo-liberal hegemony is to divide workers into the ‘core’, a small number of permanent workers classified as skilled, and ‘periphery’, a large pool of workers who work on a part-time basis under severe conditions. Former soldiers are mostly seen as unskilled except in the skill of violence, and will automatically be categorised as unskilled. This means competing for scarce job opportunities (which are not guaranteed) with the majority of the population. In cases where former soldiers received some vocational training, other obstacles such as cultural attitudes and negative feedback may exclude them from job opportunities. This is a challenge in a country like South Africa where APLA and MK soldiers were labelled terrorists during the armed struggle. Since the economy is still mostly in the hands of whites (some who do not want to accept change), it is highly likely that former APLA and MK soldiers will be excluded from job opportunities.
CONCLUSION
New perspectives on the failure of reintegration programmes are needed. It is not enough simply to focus on the planning and execution of demobilisation and reintegration programmes. The personal development of soldiers during the armed struggle and the state of the economy at the end of the war must also be considered. Reintegration programmes on their own will not be adequate, especially when offered under economic conditions subjected to neo-liberal hegemony. The South African war of liberation, unlike in most other African countries, was urban rather than rural-based and gave soldiers a chance to continue with their studies. Since not all of them used the opportunity, a gap developed between the winners and losers within the liberation movement. The fact that demobilisation and reintegration programmes were not properly planned in South Africa has meant that the losers would forever remain losers, due to the hegemony of neo-liberalism which, ironically, the ANC is now embracing.
NOTES
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