Proposed Structures for the Department of Defence (Dod) and Office of the State Secretary for Defence (SSD) of the Future South African National Defence Force

Dr Jakkie Cilliers & Brig Bill Sass (rtd)
A report to the JMCC by the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP)

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 16, 1994

Appendix Selection of the most appropriate Department of Defence (DoD) macro structure

INTRODUCTION

On 21 February 1994 the Joint Military Co-Ordinating Council (JMCC) of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) invited a number of interested parties and institutions to contribute to 'the shaping of the new defence establishment ... [by] ... submitting in writing your proposals on the composition, structuring and functioning of the Ministry of Defence as well as on the subject of civil control over the military forces.' (ref. L-1-2-94) This letter was signed by the co-chairman of the JMCC, General Meiring and Mr Siphiwe Nyanda. The Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) was one of the parties to which the request was made.

IDP was in the fortunate situation to be able to draw from its existing research project on civilian control of the military in the execution of this request.

We believe that an input to the JMCC should be the result of a co-ordinated, wide consultative process, rather than the submission of diverse and unco-ordinated written inputs by various parties. To this end IDP invited a number of persons and individuals to participate in three working group sessions on 8, 9 and 15 March 1994. These proposals do not, of course, carry the endorsement of all concerned. Persons from the following sectors and organisations were invited:

private defence industry;

ARMSCOR;

DENEL;

the SADF, MK, Transkei, Venda and Ciskei Defence Forces;

academics and commentators;

think-tanks and research organisations; and

all major political parties.

The methodology used to compile this submission is described below.

Phase 1: An initial round-table discussion, led by an independent professional facilitator, Mr Johan Swart, area representative of Group Dynamics, was convened. The purpose of this session was to define the broad parameters within which civilian control and the DoD structure should be discussed.



Phase 2: This session was followed by an internal IDP research phase which was directed within these broad parameters and this led to a first draft discussion document.



Phase 3: After due preparation a second round-table working group, with the same independent facilitator, was held on 15 March. The purpose of this phase was to decide on the best macro structure for a DoD which would enhance civilian control of the SANDF.



Phase 4: Following this, IDP engaged in a detailed investigation of top-level composition, structure, functions and basic processes within the State Secretary for Defence (SSD), down to the level of director (functional level). A first draft report was then circulated to all participants and other interested parties for final written contributions/comments to be received by the IDP before 12h00 on Thursday 24 March 1994.



Phase 5: Final consolidation of material for submission to the JMCC on Monday 28 March 1994.

AIM

The purpose of this article is to:

present and motivate the most appropriate post-election macro structure for the Department of Defence (DoD) in accordance with established principles of civilian control and the emerging South African constitutional dispensation;



present and motivate the most appropriate division of functions between a post-election Defence Headquarters (DHQ) and the office of a civilian State Secretary for Defence (SSD);



present the top level structure for and functions within the Office of the SSD; and



present a feasible implementation strategy for the establishment of the Office of the SSD.

BACKGROUND

The South African constitution and defence legislation must ensure effective civilian control of the military by the Government, which is transparent and for which the government is accountable. At the same time, it must allow for the most effective force possible.

To achieve this purpose we first need to undertake a broad analysis of the general requirement - why do we need civilian control of the military? Only against this background is it possible to look more closely at the full spectrum of additional measures which, collectively, will ensure full and effective civilian control of the military. In this process a number of alternative DoD structures were compared and evaluated in order to select the most appropriate DoD macro structure for South Africa. Following from this, an investigation was conducted into those functions presently fulfilled within DHQ and a division of functions between a future DHQ and SSD suggested.

A lack of time, resources and information meant that the recommendations contained in this article would require substantial additional analysis, detail and staff work. Specific initiatives should be launched in this regard and some recommendations to this effect are made in the concluding section of the document.

South Africa is in a period of transition. Although a Constitution (Act no 200 of 1993, as amended) has been negotiated, the imminent elections (to be held in April 1994) will herald only the beginning of a second period of constitution-making and restructuring which may last for another five years. During this period substantial and far-reaching changes will occur within the armed forces. The reorganisation of the present DHQ and possible establishment of a civilian State Secretary for Defence (SSD) incorporating greater civilian control, in tandem with the integration of forces, affirmative action programmes, internal deployment and down-sizing represent a daunting challenge. Such changes should occur in an evolutionary manner, building upon existing systems rather than running the risk of severe disruption of South African National Defence Force operations during what is sure to be a lengthy involvement in internal law and order activities.

SCOPE

The article comprises the following sections:

definitions and terminology;

the meaning of 'civilian control of the military';

the need for civilian control of the military;

the most appropriate DoD macro structure;

the division of functions between the office of the SSD and DHQ;

preferred design and functioning of the Office of the SSD; and

implementation strategy for the Office of the SSD.

DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

The Defence policy of the Government is decided by the Cabinet. Within the cabinet, the Minister of Defence is responsible for formulating and executing defence policy and is accountable to Parliament in respect of defence matters. The Minister of Defence (Minister) is the term used to describe the most senior politician working within the Department of Defence (DoD).

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is the collective term used for Defence Headquarters (DHQ) and the Office of the State Secretary for Defence (OSSD). The Minister of Defence and possibly a Deputy Minister stand at the head of the MoD and are part thereof. The MoD is represented diagrammatically in figure 1.

The Department of Defence (DoD) is a department in central government, headed by the Minister of Defence. It is a collective term which includes both the civilian and uniformed component, encompassing the Ministry of Defence, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), civil servants who work within the Department, as well as the equipment procurement agency for the SANDF, ARMSCOR. Diagramatically the DoD is presented in figure 2.

The Chief of the SANDF (CSANDF) is the most senior military officer in the Republic (presently the Chief of the SADF). At present he has the equivalent civil service rank of director-general and is the official who is financially accountable for the DoD. He is the military advisor to the cabinet and to the President. As such he has direct access to the President. According to the interim constitution he will, after the April elections, continue to exercise military executive command of the SANDF subject to directions of the Minister of Defence or President (during a state of national defence). Among his present functions is the administration of the civil service contingent within the DoD.

Defence Headquarters (DHQ) is the term used to describe the military headquarters of the present SADF and future SANDF. It is primarily staffed by military officers and civilians appointed for staff and clerical work.

Presently, South Africa does not have a civilian State Secretary for Defence (SSD). Should such a post be established, he/she could either:

Replace the CSANDF as the effective head of the DoD (thereby becoming its most senior civil servant and being made financially accountable for the department). The post-election Constitution appears to preclude such an appointment (see section 225); or



be appointed at the same level as the CSANDF, thus taking over certain responsibilities from the present CSADF; or



be appointed under the CSANDF, performing a particular set of functions, such as head of defence finance.

Throughout this document the term procurement agency is synonymous with ARMSCOR. Within the present DoD much procurement of items (excluding arms, ammunition and other sensitive supplies) is undertaken by the SADF directly. As will be noted, no changes are proposed in the present functions or position of ARMSCOR within the DoD.

THE MEANING OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

Civilian control is a condition to be achieved which ensures that the military operates in accordance with the constitution and the wishes of Parliament.

Various mechanisms can be used together to bring about this condition. These can be divided into two categories:

those falling within the ambit of the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; and



those falling outside the ambit of the formal state (i.e., in civil society, the role of the media and so forth).

This document concentrates only on the former category of mechanisms. In particular it provides for shared functions of oversight of the military, divided between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.

These control measures are not aimed at usurping or interfering with the military chain of command or the military disciplinary code. They are aimed at the integration of the military into a democratic society, strengthening mutual trust between the public and the military and promoting a sense of honour within the military in serving a democratic, constitutional state.

To this end defence policy should be decided by Parliament, debated and agreed upon by the standing committee on defence in Parliament and accepted by cabinet.

THE NEED FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

There are two fields of tension which exist in a democratic state vis-â-vis the military and which should be reconciled. These are:

the concentration of power in military assets, which makes a defence force efficient, versus the restrictions on power required by democratic control; and



the freedom and rights of the individual versus the requirements of authoritarian-type military discipline and order.

The problem of armed forces in a democracy, therefore, is how to limit the power of the central executive, on the one hand, and that of military commanders on the other, thus ensuring that the forces serving the nation fulfill their intended purpose.

An effective democracy requires civilian control of the military since military forces have been and always will be susceptible to manipulation by political groupings whose purpose it may be to use these forces to control, capture or replace Parliament. Equally, individual military commanders may abuse their authority to turn the forces against the government and Parliament and thus seize power. Such control exemplifies the principle that military force is not an end in itself but a means that the civil authority may use to bring about political objectives. As a result, in parliamentary democracies the Parliament, as supreme authority of the people, decides on the allocation of resources for defence as well as the control thereof. As an additional set of measures, responsibility for broad defence policy and provision of resources for defence at the highest level is typically assigned to civilian administrative authorities, as opposed to military bodies. As a result, detailed defence planning to satisfy such defence policy requirements is characterised by close co-ordination between civilian and military authorities. This form of control is more precise, direct and quantitative than an internal military alternative. It translates political and civilian control into practice.

The military is, of course, part of the executive branch of government, subservient to the constitution, Parliament and the interpretation of both the constitution and other laws by the judiciary. The implication of effective civilian control is that the military is not only subservient to political leadership, but that its leadership may also have to countenance intervention in what it may consider to be professional military matters, insofar as these affairs have political implications or ramifications. Obvious aspects in this regard include the role and mission of the military, its manpower policies, force structure and armaments. Such control then, is wide-ranging and pervasive. Indeed, the principle of civilian control is a requirement of military professionalism in a democracy.

Such control does not, however, imply interference in the tactical decision-making of military operations in the field. These must be left to the appropriate military commanders, though civilian control will still ensure a closer linkage between military operations and political objectives.

MOST APPROPRIATE DoD MACRO STRUCTURE

Various alternative functional relationships for the DoD were investigated in the light of a set of negotiable and non-negotiable criteria (see Appendix). These, and the methodology used to select the most suitable DoD structure for South Africa are presented in the appendix to this article.

The option of a Joint Chiefs of Staff approach similar to that taken by the US military is negated by section 224 of the constitution which determines that the CSANDF exercises military executive command of the SANDF. The chain of command must therefore run through the CSANDF to the SANDF. Similarly, no official (such as a State Secretary for Defence) can be appointed in the command chain between the Minister of Defence and the CSANDF.

A number of analysts who responded to an earlier draft document were in favour of the institution of a National Security Advisor post, comparable to that in the USA. This proposal was discussed at length amongst a number of experts. The majority opinion was against the institution of such a post given the relatively small size and limited complexity of the South African national strategic environment and area of direct interest. Such an appointment would also sit uncomfortably with the direct chain of command from the State President downwards to the CSANDF.

In our opinion the Deputy Minister of Defence should be given specific responsibilities by cabinet. One such responsibility could be for interdepartmental co-ordination of maritime security and maritime law enforcement. Another could be for supervision of various transitional issues such as integration of forces, affirmative action, retraining to set standards, gender equality, and so on.

To achieve a greater degree of civilian control than at present, certain functions which are presently performed within the SADF should be allocated to civilians working within the DoD.

An implication of the recommendations that follow below is that a reorganisation of Defence Headquarters (DHQ) will be necessary. Such a reorganisation is not discussed in this document but should be decided upon following an intensive investigation. Provision is, however, made regarding the implementation strategy for the SSD (including a smaller DHQ).

There is little further discussion on the role and functioning of ARMSCOR. In effect ARMSCOR remains unchanged in terms of any recommendations made in this study. The general feeling amongst most participants in the working sessions was that ARMSCOR should, at least for the foreseeable future, retain its present commercial orientation, functions and modus operandi.

Finally, the division of the total Defence Budget should occur at the level of the Minister and be administered by the SSD, although CSANDF, ARMSCOR and the SSD must each account for the portion allocated to them respectively. The CSANDF, SSD and ARMSCOR therefore each manage a part of the defence finances and are responsible to the SSD who, as far as Parliament is concerned, is the single accounting officer for the total defence budget.

THE DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND UNIFORMED PERSONS (BETWEEN THE OSSD AND DHQ)

An essential part of the establishment of a SSD is that some of those (SSD) functions which are presently being performed within DHQ by uniform personnel will be transferred. The vast majority of such functions if not all of them, will become those of the SSD. A small number will go to the Minister, Parliament and the courts. This section is primarily concerned with the division of functions between a future DHQ and SSD.

The SADF is run on a five-legged staff system. Each leg represents one of five functions - personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics and finances. They are described below.

The personnel management function includes at present both civilian employees in the SADF and members in uniform. It includes full-time and part-time members for all four arms of the service (Army, Air Force, Navy and Medical Services). It begins with the registration of citizens at a certain age and includes the administration of members who have been discharged or are on pension.



The intelligence function covers both military and counter-intelligence activities. It provides strategic military inputs for co-ordination outside the DoD in the broader intelligence community as well as inputs to the various arms of service for tactical use. It also provides inputs to SADF force design and operations.



The operations function covers all employment of troops in peace time and during a state of national defence. It includes the planning function. The operations function may also be described as the execution of the departmental line function.



The logistics function manages all procurement, maintenance and disposal requirements of the Defence Force. It works closely with ARMSCOR in the procurement of arms and ammunition as well as with the state and private defence industry.



The financial management function concerns the planning, accounting and management of finance in accordance with the requirements for an independent state department.

In a new DoD most of these functions will be split between DHQ and the Office of the SSD. Hence there may, for example, be a military personnel component within both DHQ and the Office of the SSD.

IDP obtained from the SADF a list of major functions presently performed within DHQ. Based on this list a schematic presentation was compiled reflecting the distribution of military and civilian functions between a future DHQ and SSD on a continuum which ranges from 'completely the responsibility of uniformed persons within DHQ' on the one hand to 'completely the responsibility of civilians within the OSSD' on the other. Figure 3 above shows this general division between civilian and military functions but does not include ARMSCOR (i.e. procurement of arms and ammunition for the military by civilians).

Some duplication between DHQ and the Office of the SSD is unavoidable since, even in respect of the main functions of the SSD (responsibility for managing procurement, resources, finances, manpower, policy, etc.), a certain proportion of the responsibilities will remain with the CSANDF.

PREFERRED DESIGN AND FUNCTIONING OF THE OFFICE OF THE STATE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE (OSSD)

The proposed functioning of the Office of the SSD presented in figures 4 and 5 below is only one of a number of possibilities. We propose that this design be used as a draft submission to the SADF for their comment and revision. In particular, clarity must be obtained as to the full implications of civilianising large parts of DHQ. What are the service benefits that will apply? Will the persons who are requested to transfer out of uniform be prepared to do so? Apart from greater civilian control, the most important consideration should be that of effectiveness of DHQ.

The geographic locations of the various offices, in particular those of Deputy Director General Policy and Chief Director of Public Relations, will, of course, depend upon the location of the Minister of Defence. Some of the personnel in these sections will, in fact, accompany the Minister, should Parliament stay in Cape Town.

The Defence Secretariat is to be composed of civil service posts although many may initially be filled by uniform personnel transferred from the staff of CSADF in the start-up phase.

At the head of the Secretariat is the State Secretary for Defence (SSD), a senior civil servant, holding the position of Director General with a personal staff (not shown in diagram). The SSD will be held financially accountable to Parliament for the total defence budget. In relation to matters of administration, the SSD and the CSANDF may jointly issue directives to members of the SANDF, but the SSD should not issue such directives unilaterally, nor issue directives concerning matters falling within the command of the CSANDF. The CSANDF, of course, also holds the civil service position equivalent to that of Director General.

The head of the MoD Internal Support and Administration Section (Internal Services in diagram) will report directly to the SSD. This group is responsible for providing all domestic support services such as those related to pay, administration, logistics and transport, to the MoD (i.e., to the Minister, Deputy Minister, Military Secretary and the Defence Secretariat as a whole).

Below the level of the SSD, the Secretariat comprises four main groups. Three of them are headed by a Deputy Director General (DDG) and the fourth by a Chief Director. The functions listed under each Chief Director may form separate directorates, depending on the grouping of tasks and functions. (See figure 4)

The detail allocation of functions are presented in figure 5.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY FOR THE OFFICE OF THE SSD

Factors Affecting Implementation

A number of points are relevant in regard to the implementation of the recommended division of functions between the present DHQ and a future SSD structure. These are described below:

The wishes of a new cabinet and Minister of Defence cannot be pre-empted or pre-judged without clear direction from the TEC. Depending on the view of the TEC and its Sub-Council of Defence, it would be prudent to proceed only with preparatory staff work prior to the elections.



This effective delay shortens the already limited time available before a change in the structure of the DoD must be completed, if the new organisation is to take responsibility for the new budget. There are two options. Either the key appointments of the Defence Secretariat should be fully effective before the end of May, assuming a budget debate in June/July 1994, as has recently been announced, or the implementation of the split in the present Defence Headquarters should be delayed until after June/July. In the meanwhile the ongoing management of the present budget and administration should not be disrupted unnecessarily.



The number of approved posts, some of which will convert from military to civilian and the number of suitable, qualified personnel available presents an obvious problem. A limited number of personnel may have to be held over and above the approved establishment tables.



It is expected that former members of the SADF, TDF, VDF, BDF and CDF and non-statutory armies, as well as civilians and civil servants from a variety of sources will fill SSD and MoD posts. Transfers from uniform to the civilian civil service would require individual investigation and planning so as to ensure no loss of remuneration, pension and other benefits. It may be useful to engage in a preparatory survey of these persons to determine what effect such a split and 'civilianisation' would have on the present officer cadre.

Given these considerations we would strongly recommend that no attempt be made to complete the establishment of the SSD before the budget debate scheduled for June/July 1994. Such an attempt would, in our opinion, result in a virtual collapse in defence management at a crucial stage of transition.

The implementation phases and steps which are proposed are presented in figure 6.

Phase l

1. Period: From approval in principle by the Sub-Council of Defence/JMCC) (expected mid-April 1994) up until appointment of a new cabinet (finalised by 10 May 1994), including the appointment of a new Minister of Defence.

2. Aim: Preparatory planning and investigation to prepare detailed implementation plan according to guidelines received.

3. Recommendations:

Step 1: Presentation to the JMCC and Sub-Council of Defence of the Draft structure for the DoD with a request for approval in principle by the TEC, pending post-election cabinet approval.

Step 2: Appointment by the JMCC of a joint project team to undertake detailed planning in terms of organisational guidelines decided on by the Sub-Council of Defence/TEC. This team should aim to complete as many of the following tasks as possible:

the listing (and, if necessary, revision) of the direct functions, activities and decisions, both routine and special, presently the responsibility of the State President, Minister of Defence and Deputy Minister of Defence. The SADF Directorate of Management Services could be charged with this task.



the listing of defence staff directorates, together with their general functions. This too could be undertaken by the Directorate of Management Services. This list should provide a basis for decision-making about what should remain under CSANDF and what should move from CSANDF to the SSD, according to guidelines of the organisation established in Step 1.



a study (with external input, including guidance from the Commission for Administration and cabinet) to determine detailed posts and structure, including all aspects relating to the establishment and reorganisation of the areas of responsibility of the MoD, CSANDF and SSD.



a study per individual member, in conjunction with the Commission for Administration, of the revised service regulations, comparable grades, remuneration and so on for personnel who may be requested to transfer from uniform to civilian posts within the SSD.



organisation and management studies on the proposed organisation.

Phase ll1.

Period: From the time of appointment of a new Minister of Defence until June 1994 (approval of DoD budget).2. Aim: Final approval of the structure for the DoD and plan for its implementation. Once approved, restructuring can commence.

3. Recommendations:

Step 1: At the first opportunity after the inauguration of the new Parliament and appointment of a new President and Minister of Defence, the implementation plan for the restructured DoD should be presented to the joint standing committee on defence for discussion and recommendation to the cabinet.



Step 2: The post of State Secretary for Defence should be filled as early as possible.



Step 3: Following discussion, amendment and cabinet approval, the Chief of the SANDF should commence the restructuring of DHQ using existing uniform personnel as a recruitment pool to fill all posts in both structures - the SANDF headquarters and the SSD.



Step 4: Rationalisation of personnel should not be effected until formal O&M studies into the structure at both the Office of the SSD as well as for DHQ have been undertaken. This may mean that initially only existing posts are authorised and some people may have to be retained as supernumerary to the establishment tables. Authorisation for this must be obtained from the TEC/JMCC/Commission for Administration as soon as is possible.

joint decision-making (between politicians, civil servants and military persons within the DoD) on various other issues, exemplified by the institution of certain committees and procedures;



the involvement of outside agencies through the establishment of advisory panels, oversight committees and other groups.

IDP has, in the past, made a number of proposals regarding such initiatives. The most important of these is that related to the establishment of an expert advisory Council of Defence to the MoD. This, and other initiatives, are discussed in issue no 8 of the (South) African Defence Review.

PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTING CIVILIAN CONTROL THROUGH THE DOD SYSTEM

(Systems include structure, process and content.)

The military must operate in accordance with the constitution and wishes of Parliament.



Planning and the procurement of resources for Defence at the highest level must be assigned to civilian administration, under political supervision.



Civilian control of the military by the government must be transparent and accountable to enhance mutual trust and confidence between the military, the government and the public.



The most appropriate balance must be achieved between full access to defence-related information and the interests of the security of the State.



The most cost-effective structure compatible with civilian control must be implemented.



Civilian control must be accepted by military professionals.



Conflicting requirements of the rights of the individual and the requirements of service within armed forces must be balanced effectively.

In order to observe these principles, a set of non-negotiable and negotiable design criteria for an appropriate DoD structure were formulated. They are presented in the following two sections.

NON-NEGOTIABLE CRITERIA

The structure must comply with the constitution and, in particular :

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the South African National Defence Force. During a state of national defence the chain of command authority runs from the President directly to the CSANDF. At all other times the chain of command authority runs from Cabinet through the Minister of Defence to the CSANDF.



The Minister responsible for Defence shall be accountable to Parliament, Cabinet and the President for the South African National Defence Force.



The Minister shall act in accordance with the policy determined by the Cabinet.



The procurement of goods and services for any level of government shall be regulated by an Act of Parliament which shall make provision for independent and impartial tender boards.



The Chief of the SANDF shall exercise military executive command.

The structure must also:



Ensure that the government explains its policies to the public.



Increase the level of civilian control from that presently allowed.



Be implemented within 5 years.



Ensure that military policy and doctrine is subject to parliamentary scrutiny.



Separate political and civilian responsibilities from military ones.



Differentiate structurally between the following roles:



Political role (National Defence Policy including procurement policy) (Minister);



Military role (execution of the defence function) (CSANDF);

civilian participation in the formulation of defence policy (PoD);

civilian administrative support for and oversight of the military role (SSD);

procurement through ARMSCOR;

other procurement (OProc).

NEGOTIABLE CRITERIA

The implementation of the structure should:

Minimise disruption of the management of the Defence Force.



Minimise disruption of the management of the procurement function.

Further, the structure should:



Be implementable as soon as possible.



Be efficient (it should minimise bureaucracy, keep communication channels short and maximise devolution of decision-making).



Maximise civilian control of policy decisions regarding procurement, broad defence technology and arms trade.



Minimise additional personnel costs.

OPTIONS

The following options meet the non-negotiable criteria discussed above and were analysed on a comparative basis.

Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5

Legend: The labeling of the variables corresponds with that in the description of the negotiable criteria earlier in this appendix.

PREFERRED DoD DESIGN

Introduction

Following the comparative evaluation, options 2, 4 and 5 emerged as the most acceptable structures, with option 4 being awarded the highest score.

Risk Analysis

The following table summarises the risks attached to each of the structure options.

DESCRIPTION	PROBABILITY	IMPACT	TOTAL
OPTION 2
A perception of monopoly with regard to procurement	8	3	24
A perception of more expensive procurement	8	6	48
More re-organisation required than option 4	10	5	50
Complicates accounting procedures	2	2	4
Requires new procedures between CSANDF and SSD	10	5	50
SUB-TOTAL			176
OPTION 4
Soldiers do jobs which could be done by civilians	10	2	20
Perception of retention of status quo	7	4	28
The generic procurement function is duplicated between ARMSCOR and SADF (OProc)	5	3	15
SUB-TOTAL			63
OPTION 5
The generic procurement function is duplicated between SSD (OProc) and ARMSCOR	5	3	15
Requires more reorganisation than option 4	10	5	50
Requires new procedures between CSANDF and SSD	10	4	40
Complicates accounting procedures	2	2	4
SUB-TOTAL			109