The Implications of Unionisation for the Combat-effectiveness of the Armed Forces *

Mark Malan
Department of Political Science, Military Academy

* Paper presented at a mini-symposium on The Impact of the Evolving Labour Relations System on the SA Defence Force: SADF COLET, Pretoria, 2 March 1994

The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and shold not be considered to be representative of the views or policy of the South African Military Academy or the South African Defence Force

In this paper, soldiers are referred to exclusively by use of the male pronoun in the interest of simplicity. No exclusion of female members of the armed forces is implied.

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 16, 1994

INTRODUCTION

The bill of rights enshrined in South Africa's interim constitution guarantees, inter alia, the right of all individuals and groups in society to join or to form unions for the purpose of collective bargaining in order to protect or promote their occupational interests. Although Section 33 provides for the limitation of these rights, such limitation must be proven to be reasonable, justifiable and necessary (RSA, 1993: 18). Furthermore, once the Constitutional Assembly is elected, however, the only constitutional guideline which will be valid in this regard is Constitutional Principle XXVIII, which states that:

... The right of employers and employees to join and form employer organisations and trade unions and to engage in collective bargaining shall be recognised and protected. Provision shall be made that every person shall have the right to fair labour practices. (RSA, 1993: 210)

This raises the spectre of increasing pressure on the new national defence force to condone or even to protect the right of its members to form or join organisations for the purpose of bargaining with the command structure on matters related to their terms of service. Fanaroff (1992: 10), for example, has stated that 'members of the forces should retain as many as possible of the normal and trade union rights compatible with their position', and believes that this a fundamental prerequisite for the new defence force. Heinecken (1993: 25-29) has articulated several seemingly convincing arguments on the virtual inevitability of the unionisation of South Africa's armed forces. Sass (1994: 23) has also predicted that:

The future defence force will, like all government departments, also have to deal with some form of trade union or personnel association. This could be either one exclusively for uniform SADF personnel or a wider grouping including all security agencies or several unions divided on functional lines.

According to an official internal communique, the SADF acknowledges that members of the defence force will enjoy all the rights of citizenship, except those that are incompatible with military service, such as the right to be elected to parliament or the right to strike. (CSADF, 1993: 4) Denial of a soldier's right to strike does not, however, necessarily mean that he will be denied the right to belong to a union or similar association.

Whether or not the 'unionisation' of members of the armed forces is desirable or, indeed, feasible in a democratic South Africa will obviously depend upon the 'compatibility' of such membership with the nature and purpose of military service. The test of compatibility will, in turn, depend upon a very clear image of what the citizenry expects its military forces to be able to accomplish, for this will determine the nature and meaning of military service. Once the meaning and nature of military service has been clearly articulated, it is up to the democratically-elected representatives of the people to decide whether they deem it wise to grant or withhold from some or all of the members of the armed forces the right to 'unionise'.

The exact composition and role (and even the name) of the new defence force has yet to emerge from the multi-party political-military debate, or eventually from the Government of National Unity. However, it is almost universally accepted that the primary role of a nation's armed forces is to protect the state against hostile military action. Hostile military action poses a threat to all the components of the state: it may not only lead to the relatively sudden destruction or distortion of a state's physical infrastructure, resources and institutions, but can also threaten the survival or continuation of the state as a social entity. In the case of the democratic state, this could mean the termination of a self-created rule by consent and the imposition of rule by coercion (Buzan, 1983: 75). It is almost unthinkable that the new political leadership of South Africa, as guardians of a fragile and long-awaited democratic dispensation, would fail to accord sufficient priority to the military protection of the state.

The basic premise of this paper is that South Africa needs a defence force which, among other things, is capable of waging war effectively against and prevailing over those armed forces which exhibit the capability and possible intent to subvert the state by means of military action. The possession of such a force is a minimum requirement for deterring hostile military operations by either external or internal opponents of the newly-established political order.

If this premise is accepted, one may proceed to the observation that God is not always on the side of the larger battalions. We should not dismiss Napoleon Bonaparte's dictum that 'in war the moral is to the material as three is to one'. This century has provided us with sufficient evidence that success in modern conventional and guerilla warfare is not determined by sheer weight of men and equipment alone. Troop commitment, leadership, proficiency and cohesion are as important as the size of formations in determining the outcome of battles and wars. The latter are essential ingredients of combat effectiveness, and their importance increases as the weight of men and equipment decreases due to various imperatives for downsizing a defence force.

AIM

The aim of this article is to focus on the human, rather than the material, dimensions of combat effectiveness in order to illustrate the potential effects of military unionism on the integrity of the armed forces and, ultimately, the state. In other words, this article is intended to provide clarity on the issue of compatibility between trade union rights and military performance, and tentatively proposes a compromise solution to the problem of soldiers' rights versus the military mission.

SCOPE

With the foregoing introductory perspectives in mind, the topic will be addressed by examining four crucial issues: the need for cohesion and compliance in armed forces; the civilianisation of armed forces; the compatibility of civilian-type labour organisations with the military mission; and the inroads made by trade unions in the armed forces of select countries. The paper will conclude with some ideas on how to reconcile demands for the protection of the rights of military personnel with the demands of an effective combat force.

MORAL INGREDIENTS OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: COHESION AND COMPLIANCE

Any large organisation, designed to achieve success through the co-ordinated activity of its various components under highly unfavourable circumstances, is dependent upon extremely high levels of cohesion and compliance among its members. A military force which is created for the purpose of waging warfare and prevailing over potential enemies is no exception to this generalisation:

Armed forces are first and foremost emergency services, needing physiology's analogous to those of animals who are never completely relaxed to potential danger. ... Each organ must know its place and purpose and be tuned to react with speed, accuracy and power to the first hint of danger. (Downey, 1977: 63)

Cohesion

A logical point of departure for sociological analysis of combat effectiveness would be to address a basic question which has plagued philosophers and social scientists for centuries: Why do soldiers fight, and continue to fight despite the undeniable horrors of the battlefield? What explanation can be found for the countless historical examples of soldiers who have stood firm against overwhelming odds, against almost certain death, when to flee or hide might seem the obvious human reaction? Indeed, history is also replete with examples of soldiers and their units which have crumbled into ineffectiveness, surrender or headlong flight.

William Hauser, a soldier and social scientist who spent twenty-five years observing the behaviour of soldiers, officers and units of the US Army, has concluded that there are four basic factors which apparently persuade or compel men to fight: submission, fear, loyalty and pride. (Hauser, 1980 : 188) Each of these factors originates from a number of sources, and there is a degree of interdependence among them in sustaining the soldier's will to fight.

Submission

By his initial act of enlisting, or allowing himself to be conscripted, the soldier submits to legitimate military authority. During his subsequent training, he submits daily to the authority of officers and non-commissioned officers, and to a plethora of rules, regulations and customs. He is repeatedly made to do things which he ordinarily would not choose to do - to forfeit sleep and endure cold and heat and filth and fatigue - for the first rule of the soldier is to obey. Where this aspect of institutional socialisation has been effective and military authority has retained its legitimacy, soldiers will continue to submit to orders, even though they may be contrary to their instincts of self-preservation (Hauser, 1980: 188-189).

Fear

Although fear sometimes makes soldiers flee from battle, the same basic emotion is a major factor in sustaining the will to fight. The difference between a positive reaction (fighting) and a negative reaction (flight) is determined by cohesion or lack thereof, for if the soldier knows and trusts his comrades, he will tend to perceive greater safety in continuing to fight alongside them than in rearward flight away from them. Such cohesion can only be engendered through a lengthy process of intensive training and socialisation which involves shared experiences, including hardship and deprivation (Hauser, 1980: 190-191).

Loyalty

The will to stand and fight is also sustained by loyalty which, like fear, is an emotional rather than a rational phenomenon. The soldier should, ideally, be loyal to his comrades, his leaders, his unit, his country and his cause (Hauser, 1980: 192). However, this ideal is seldom attained in the average soldier, and recent theories of combat motivation tend to stress the importance of small-group solidarity above more elevated notions of patriotism and ideology. Solidarity at sub-sub-unit and sub-unit level sustains the soldier in battle only insofar as the goals of the smaller, cohesive primary group are not incompatible with the larger organisation. A substantial challenge for every military leader is thus the reconciliation of the goals and values of primary groups with those of the organisational unit under his command.

Pride

The final source of fighting spirit is pride: the soldier's pride in himself as an individual and pride in his unit or sub-unit. If the soldier has been well-trained, he knows it and is proud of his military skills which others depend on for their safety and for the accomplishment of the unit's mission. The unit leader must therefore recognise the functional role of the individual soldier and acknowledge the significance of it by according praise when it is due and apportioning blame when it is called for. (Hauser, 1980: 198-199). Under no circumstances, though, should the leader risk injuring a soldier's sense of pride through actions which degrade or humiliate the individual.

The basic thrust of Hauser's argument is that a combat-effective military must nurture those aspects of individual psychological and group dynamics which contribute to the cohesion of the armed forces. Wesbrook has attempted to explain the willingness to fight from another perspective by focussing on compliance theory. The two approaches are by no means antithetical, but complement one another at various levels of analysis.

Compliance

A basic fact of combat which has been well documented by Marshall (1947) in Men Against Fire is that a soldier does not fight more or less capably by increments: he either fights or he does not. If he fights, he usually performs well, but the will to fight is typically an all-or-nothing affair. A second critical fact is that soldiers rarely fight unless they are told to do so. In other words, if soldiers stand and fight, they do so directly or indirectly as an act of compliance with military demands (Wesbrook, 1980: 246). Where this compliance is lacking, disintegration occurs. Military disintegration has been defined by Wesbrook (1980: 244) as 'a condition of organisational paralysis characterised by the total and often sudden collapse of the willingness of the average soldier to resist or to attack the enemy'. According to this definition, it would be possible for a military organisation to suffer defeat without disintegrating as long as the average soldier continues to fight under control of the military organisation.

Military non-compliance, and ultimately disintegration, occurs when the average soldier fails to perceive the formal demands of the hierarchy to be legitimate in terms of his own moral involvement in the system. Where organisational demands are perceived as illegitimate, the soldier simply feels no obligation to comply. Historically, soldiers' rejection of hierarchical demands appear to be related to the following general factors:

Organisational demands may be inherently incompatible with the soldiers' moral involvement in the system. In other words, if compliance with demands will serve the interests of neither the nation, the unit, or the primary group, or if the demands are inconsistent with the soldiers' values and attitudes, soldiers will consider such demands illegitimate and resist them (Wesbrook, 1980: 261).



The leadership may fail to communicate to its soldiers a cause that associates hierarchical demands with the soldiers' values. Where a nation is at war and its survival at stake, the need for formal communication of a cause may be minimal. However, during peace-time or low-intensity conflict, the problem is more complex. Here military leaders must help convince the soldier that what he is doing is right, how his specific acts contribute to the unit's success, and how the unit's success will contribute to the national cause (Wesbrook, 1980: 261-262).



The broader society may fail to reinforce the soldier's compliance behaviour. The soldier who is not occasionally reassured by members of society extraneous to the military hierarchy that his acts are consistent with societal norms and in the interests of the nation will begin to doubt whether society's demands and the hierarchy's demands are the same. Societal approval includes a willingness to impose sanctions through legal punishment and social ostracism on those soldiers who fail to comply with hierarchical demands (Wesbrook, 1980: 262).



Soldiers may doubt the legitimacy of hierarchical demands because the leadership itself fails to comply with them and to make the sacrifices such compliance entails. If the demands of society, as conveyed through the military hierarchy, are valid for the soldier, then they should be similarly valid for the leaders themselves (Wesbrook, 1980: 262). This point is not only relevant to the danger and deprivation of battle, but also relates to general conditions of service.

Both cohesion and compliance may been seen as functions of military leadership. In the technologically-advanced and complex organisational environments of the modern military, however, the importance of traditional elements of leadership seems to have declined in favour of rational management principles. Whereas management tends to deal with those aspects which are material and organisational, leadership emphasises human, psychological and intellectual factors (Downey, 1977: 128). 'Ever since the time of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and Marmont ... all treatises on military psychology written in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are agreed that the prime requirement of all is mutual confidence between officers and men.' (Demeter, 1965: 19) The trend towards 'managerialism' parallels a broader tendency towards the civilianisation of modern armed forces, a trend which has very definite implications for the presumed cohesion and compliance of the military.

CIVILIANISATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

The civilianisation of armed forces is largely a product of this century, and is most evident in post-industrial societies. The complexity of warfare increased rapidly throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, but it was only in this century that the military began to form specialised support systems in any great number (Downey, 1977: 55). Prior to World War II there were clear-cut differences between military and civilian workforces in even the most developed countries, as well as fundamental technological differences between the two spheres. The differences were rooted in the fact that military personnel spent their time doing different things than civilians. Warfare was primarily a land-based phenomenon, with the infantry and armour at the core of the army. The typical soldier was male, young and single, and military work-forces were elastic, expanding rapidly in times of war and demobilising rapidly thereafter. The increased use of air power and the advent of nuclear technology during World War II made warfare a capital-intensive activity which increasingly required personnel with skills which were also needed in the civilian economy. By 1945, this process had accelerated to the extent that 'service support units' comprised 45 per cent of the total strength of the US Army. In terms of overall personnel, only three out of ten soldiers had combat functions, and even within combat divisions one man in four was in a non-combatant category. By the 1950s and 1960s, military sociologists recognised an increasing similarity between the military and civilian sectors of American society (Segal and Lengerman, 1980: 167; Downey, 1977: 56). Janowitz (1964: 17), for example, argued that 'to analyse the contemporary military as a social system, it is ... necessary to assume that for some time it has tended to display more and more characteristics typical of any large-scale nonmilitary bureaucracy.'

The table above illustrates the degree of progressive civilianisation of the US Army from the time of the Civil War to 1954.

Occupational Group	Civil War %	Span.-Amer. War %	WW I %	WW II %	Korean War %	1954 %
Civilian-type occupations
Technical/scientific	0,2	0,5	3,7	10,1	10,7	14,5
Administrative/clerical	0,7	3,1	8,0	14,6	19,2	17,5
Mechanics/maintenance	0,6	1,1	21,5	15,8	16,9	20,3
Service Workers	2,4	6,5	12,5	9,7	11,5	10,4
Operative/labourers	2,9	2,2	20,2	13,6	8,6	8,4
Military-type occupations	93,2	86,6	34,1	36,2	33,1	28,8

The increasing civilianisation of personnel and occupations within the military obviously lends impetus to the arguments of those in favour of military unionisation, at least as far as non-combat personnel are concerned. With reference to the American military at the end of the 1970s, Wakin (1979: 219) observed that:

One of the alarming signs of the occupational model is increased military pay within the structure of the all-volunteer force; another is the increasing use of civilian technicians to perform military functions. Possible consequences of these trends are the unionisation of the military and the ultimate loss of military legitimacy.

However, it is not possible to negate the possibly deleterious effects of unionisation on combat-effectiveness by making a simple distinction between combatants on the one hand, and uniformed and civilian support personnel on the other. As Moskos (1979: 226) has stated:

... it [is] difficult to overstate the extent to which the operational side of the military system now relies on civilian technicians ... [for example] the large warships of the US Navy are combat ineffective without the technical skills of contract civilians.

In spite of the perceived long-term trend towards civilianisation in the United States military, there is growing awareness of the fact that certain aspects of the military must remain fundamentally different from the civilian sector. Moskos (1973: 255-275), for example, argued that some elements of the armed forces would remain divergent and traditionally military (particularly the ground combat forces), while others would be convergent and civilianised (particularly clerical, technical and administrative areas). This basic theme of force differentiation was elaborated by other analysts. Hauser (1973), for example, envisaged an American Army consisting of a combat force which would be divergent from civilian society and maintain traditional military values, and a support force, which would be convergent with civilian society and serve as a civil-military buffer. Empirical research into military attitudes and organisational structure within the American and Canadian armed forces led Segal and Lengerman to the conclusion that though it may be possible, through technology, to rationalise naval and aerial warfare to the extent that it might be waged by people who are merely doing a job, ground combat was neither rational nor rationalisable, for:

... the acts of engaging and killing other human beings, at great risk of being killed or wounded oneself, require a primordial affective orientation that is in no way equivalent to the dispassionate performance of mechanical tasks ... [therefore] common technologies, leading to common organisational forms, could not lead to total elimination of the fundamental difference between that which is military and that which is civilian. (Segal and Lengerman, 1980: 166-168)

Focusing on the problems of managing complex military organisations, Downey (1977: 65) has similarly admitted that:

... in spite of the great need for thrift and business efficiency in the economic management of such expensive institutions, it is essential that armed forces do not try to identify themselves with business enterprises to the extent that the fundamental differences become blurred. This is particularly important in its effect on the attitudes of military men who must see themselves as professionals with outstanding social responsibilities rather than as members of one of a number of occupations reaping material rewards which need to be constantly compared and kept in step. This does not mean that an army which is relatively badly paid will recruit successfully, but it does mean that an army cannot march far on material incentives alone.

Although the South African Defence Force is currently nowhere near as complex an organisation as the pre-Vietnam US Army, it has also experienced a marked trend towards civilianisation. Recent statistics reveal that civilians constitute some 38 percent of the full-time force, or 29 000 out of a total complement of 76 000 (Heinecken, 1993: 6).

Irrespective of the degree of civilianisation of armed forces and the ratio of the 'teeth' arms to the supporting 'tail', the warrior ethos tends to predominate, sometimes much to the frustration of those support personnel who regard service in the military as just another job. This situation is likely to persist, in spite of conceptualisations such as Moskos's two-force structure. The risks to military cohesion and ultimately to the combat-effectiveness of armed forces are simply too great to operationalise the concept of two distinct forces which are fundamentally different with respect to ethos and organisation, but which are totally dependent upon one another for the successful accomplishment of the military mission. As Downey puts it: 'An armed force is a body of men organised to achieve its ends irresistibly by coordinated action. Cohesion is therefore the essence of its being' (1977: 62).

If cohesion and compliance lie at the root of combat-effective armed forces, and the tendency towards civilianisation is propelling the military towards an acceptance of trade unionism, how compatible are the two spheres? As illustrated in the introductory section, any future justification for imposing constitutional limits on the trade union rights of members of the South African armed forces will hinge upon the answers to this question, for such limitation could only be fair, justifiable and necessary if the absence thereof would be deleterious to the effectiveness of the armed forces and therefore the integrity of the state.

COMPATIBILITY OF CIVILIAN-TYPE LABOUR RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY MISSION

Voluntary enlistment in the armed forces of any state carries with it the implicit or express acceptance by the recruit that he may be ordered to risk his life, and perhaps to lose it, without the right of lawful refusal. The right to life may arguably be regarded as the most fundamental of all human rights. The acceptance by soldiers of the possible denial of this right as a basic condition of service in the armed forces makes the denial of other human rights and civil liberties pale in comparison. It is also true that denial of the basic right to life and other rights of citizenship should only occur in circumstances where such denial is essential to the accomplishment of the military mission as approved by the political sovereign. It may thus be conceded that there is a need to ensure that the rights of soldiers be protected against unnecessary abuse. That some form of trade union or employees' association would be a suitable vehicle for ensuring such protection is highly debatable, especially against the background of the imperatives of combat effectiveness.

Military unionism constitutes a fundamental denial of the legitimacy of military authority as exercised through the chain of command. The need to form a military union can only arise from a widespread belief that it is in the nature of military leadership to impose unfair or illegitimate demands upon personnel functioning at subordinate levels of the organisational hierarchy. Acceptance of a unionised military thus amounts to an overt denial of the legitimacy of military hierarchical demands, and destroys a major cornerstone of the type of compliance behaviour demanded by the military mission.

Where trade unions strive for the improvement of the physical and material service conditions of their members, the fostering of cohesion in the armed forces demands a certain amount of hardship and deprivation. Wesbrook (1980: 250) is convinced that:

The physical and psychological stress of battle is so great that no calculative involvement based on remunerative power is possible. There are no reasonable tangible incentives or rewards sufficient to induce soldiers on a mass scale to withstand the deprivation and danger of modern battle.

Furthermore, unions would offer an alternative locus of institutional loyalty to that of their members' military sub-unit or unit. In terms of the military ideal of reconciling individual and informal group interests and values with those of the operational unit or sub-unit, the union has an unfair advantage, for it professes to exist solely for the purpose of promoting issues related to the self-interest of the soldier. Unionisation would therefore have a potentially destructive effect on military cohesion, and would reinforce other tendencies towards disintegration.

The soldier is a man with pride in his military skills and accomplishment. He is proud that others depend upon him for the accomplishment of the military mission, and perhaps even for their survival. The moment he becomes a union member, however, he accepts that he is dependent on an organisation extraneous to his primary group and unit for ensuring his physical, material and even his psychological well-being. If he must rely on the union to ensure that he is fairly paid and fairly treated, indeed, that his very dignity is respected, what pride can he have in his unit, his leaders, and in himself? The soldier earns the respect of society through his willingness to make the supreme sacrifice in defence of that society. He cannot retain this respect if society realises that their protectors need unions to protect them. Furthermore the unions can offer the soldier no protection at the time when he most needs it - when he is committed to combat.

The admission of trade unions to armed forces would have to be based upon the premise that the sharing of interests, which is fundamental to military cohesion, could be served by a system which was designed for the exact opposite - for the protection of opposing interests from each other (Downey, 1977: 212). The existence of opposing interests is, in turn, predicated on the existence of distinct classes which pursue divergent objectives, such as management and workers. The only such dichotomy of interests which should be recognised in the military is those of comrades-in-arms against those of the enemy. Unionisation thus implies an adversarial relationship, where the military leadership is regarded by the rank-and-file as the enemy. In so far as compliance in combat could be maintained under such circumstances, it would have to be based on the large-scale coercion of alienated subordinates, which would be counterbalanced by the constant threat of leader assassination.

Despite the previous arguments, the armed forces of several established liberal democracies such as the USA, Holland and Sweden have, for the past few decades, experienced increasing pressure from leftwing groups and the unions themselves to allow trade unions in the military.

EXPERIMENTS WITH UNIONISATION IN THE MILITARY

In Holland, the Conscript Union (founded in 1966) initially worked solely for the promotion of its members' material interests, in order that they may follow as closely as possible the consumption patterns of civilian society. However, with the encouragement of some leftwing parties and the leftwing press, the Union soon launched an attack on the very nature of military organisation: the routine of barracks life, the hierarchical chain of authority, and symbols and insignia which marked their inferior status. This obviously led to increasing levels of conflict with officers concerned by the threat of erosion of discipline and overall fighting power, and led even conscripted officers to voice publicly their concern about the combat-effectiveness of the armed forces (Olivier and Teitler, 1982: 79-81).

Although neither the Dutch Conscript Union nor any of the nine other service associations have ever enjoyed the right to strike, they have succeeded in gaining major concessions from the Defence Ministry (the major target of their efforts to influence policy) (Olivier and Teitler p 83-84). The right to strike has, however, been granted to military personnel in the Swedish Armed forces. This somewhat surprising concession has its origins in the fact that since 1966 all wages in the public sector have been negotiated between the State, in its capacity as employer, and the trade unions of both military and civilian public servants. Sweden has a uniform system of collective bargaining for both private and public employees which grants the whole of society the right to strike. This right, in the absence of constitutional limitations, therefore applies to public servants, including military personnel. Unlike the Dutch example, however, conscripts may not belong to a trade union and enjoy no rights in this regard (Andren and Lyth, 1982: 146; 157).

One of the notable effects of Swedish military unionism has been the reduction of commanders' power over their subordinates. For example, the officers' unions succeeded in the early 1960s in attaining an agreement on the regularisation of working hours. This also implied overtime pay and, due to budgetary restrictions, deprived unit commanders of the means or the right to use officers to the extent formerly regarded as necessary in order to achieve fully the goals of training (Andren and Lyth, 1982: 147). The implications of reduced training capacity for combat effectiveness should be obvious, in spite of claims to the contrary.

Heinecken (1993: 23), for example, has stated that European experimentation with civilian-style labour practices has 'not seemed to affect military discipline, efficiency or morale', and has attempted to substantiate the perception by quoting the following statement by the Swedish Ministry of Defence: 'It cannot be claimed that the unions have exerted any direct influence on readiness'. With all due respect, it would be too much to expect the government of even a neutral state, such as Sweden, to openly admit deficiencies in the combat-readiness of its armed forces. Furthermore, the vaguer the perceived military threat to a country, the more complacent policy makers may afford to become with respect to defence-related issues.

As far as the USA is concerned, it was not until the advent of the all-volunteer force that the unionisation of the armed forces became a strong possibility. Unlike the system of conscription, reliance on monetary incentives to recruit military personnel is quite consistent with the notion of trade unionism. By 1975, military commanders were permitted to negotiate with unionised civilian employees on military installations, and to sign local labour agreements with civilian personnel. However, even the substantial initiatives of unions such as the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) [an affiliate of the mighty American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO)], to extend membership eligibility to military personnel serving on active duty, have been successfully resisted by the military establishment. Although the AFGE and other associations catering for civilian defence employees are professed 'bread-and-butter' unions and are staunchly patriotic and conservative in their approach to social change, there is a real fear that should they succeed in organising the military, the politicisation of the armed forces could not be avoided because of the usually close working relationship between the AFL-CIO and the Democratic party (Moskos, 1979: 224-225).

As far as possible future South African experimentation with military unionisation is concerned, Heinecken (1993: 23) has admitted that: 'Because of the social, political and military differences between these more democratic and developed countries, the [Western] experiences of military unionism cannot be readily related to the South African situation.' To this observation, one may add that perhaps in no other country is the potential danger of politicising the armed forces through trade union membership as marked as in contemporary South Africa. Such politicisation would not only affect the combat readiness of the armed forces, but may mean that our embryonic democracy is stillborn. It does not take a great deal of imagination to envisage the political consequences of an army whose members belong to a labour union affiliated with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Given the tremendous influence already wielded by COSATU as one of the most powerful interest groups in the political system, such an 'unholy' alliance could be the new government's worst nightmare.

A further danger exists in regarding Western trends towards military unionisation as a precedent which must be followed as part of the process of democratisation. Heinecken (1993: 29) has observed that '... the predominantly black recruits entering the security forces are far more positively dispositioned [sic] towards unionisation' than white servicemen. Thus the process of unionisation would tend to reinforce ethnic, racial and ideological differences in a defence force striving desperately for normative integration.

It would also be wise to consider the abundant examples of disintegrative behaviour by African soldiers whose awareness of their salaries exceeds that of their commitment to serving the state; the Lesotho mutiny of January 1994, sparked by demands for and denials of a 100 percent pay increase, being the latest case in point. Whether unionisation would ameliorate or exacerbate the potential for this type of conduct is a matter for informed debate which is beyond the scope of this article.

Whereas military unionism may be considered appropriate to the advanced welfare states of Europe, there is no reason to regard the granting of such rights as a precedent which must be followed by South Africa in the interests of upholding the constitution. In Africa, a continent where the coup d' état has become an endemic part of political life, and where countries are struggling with the process of nation-building, a unionised military would pose an extraordinary danger to the very constitution from which it was spawned.

DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM

Acceptance of the idea that trade unions and employee organisations are incompatible with the military ethos and the requirements of combat-effectiveness does not necessarily entail a rejection of the notion that soldiers' rights be protected and that sensitivity to human rights be inculcated in military personnel. For this proposition to hold true, the fundamental differences between military and civilian institutions must be recognised, and these differences used to promote human and civil rights in a unique manner; a manner which is compatible with the military ethos and mission. This, in turn, demands a rejection of the popular concept that, within a democracy, everything which is civilian is good and everything which is military is inherently bad.

The search for alternatives to trade unionism in the armed forces is neither a civilian nor a military challenge; it is a civil-military challenge, one which demands candour and understanding between politicians and soldiers. It is suggested that the source of an appropriate civil-military solution to the dilemma of labour relations in the military may be found in an appraisal of the following aspects: recruiting; leadership; citizenship and parliamentary control.

APPROPRIATE RECRUITING APPEALS

Where soldiers who voluntarily enlist in the armed forces express the desire to form or join a labour union, there is something fundamentally wrong with the premises upon which they have been recruited and the subsequent process of military socialisation. The chances are that they have entered military service in response to the following type of recruitment appeal, which was designed for the appointment of personnel and logistics officers in the SADF:

The Quartermaster General is interested in people who have recently obtained a three-year B degree or National Diploma in the Personnel or Marketing field. If you are looking for a progressive employer where your qualifications and potential will be put to full use, feel free to come and discuss your prospects ... The SA Defence Force offers a comprehensive remuneration package including a competitive salary supplemented by an annual service bonus and a worthwhile fringe benefit range: * service allowance * excellent pension scheme * free medical and dental treatment * ample leave and sick benefits. (Sunday Times, 1989)

In all fairness, this advertisement was placed with the intention of recruiting support, not combat personnel. However, insofar as the successful candidates were to wear uniform and be admitted to the officer corps it is difficult to condone the total absence of reference to the service ethic. In spite of the functional and organisational distinctions which may exist between combat, staff and support officers, all lay claim to the title of 'military professional', and all should therefore submit to the demands of military professionalism. Similar demands should be made of enlisted support personnel: they are primarily soldiers and secondarily cooks, clerks and mechanics.

Despite the technologically-advanced nature of modern warfare, there should be no fundamental change in the commitment made by a man who elects to enter military service. Like his historical counterpart, he must undertake if necessary to endure hardship and risk his life in the service of a cause. His recompense must necessarily be mainly psychological: he is offered a cause, and membership of a highly structured sector of society devoted to that cause. This is a contract which includes elements of concepts such as patriotism, loyalty, comradeship, tradition, esprit de corps, and discipline (Downey, 1977: 172). If these aspects were stressed in recruiting appeals, the incumbents would have no desire whatsoever to join trade unions: union membership would be foreign to their value-system. It may be feared that altruistic recruitng would fail to attract the minimum number of recruits required by the armed forces, but this is unlikely in a country where unemployment has reached crisis proportions. At the least, recruiting efforts should stress those aspects of military service which, though perhaps enjoyable, cannot be found in most civilian occupations: adventure, excitement, opportunities for travel, etc.

SOUND LEADERSHIP

Military leadership should be characterised by an awareness of the fact that respect for the rights of employees enhances, rather than detracts from, cohesion and combat-effectiveness. A force which is not, for reasons of incompetence and poor leadership, combat-ready, has no moral grounds to deny the unions access to the military. Either the military looks after its own, or the unions will do it for them. Pressure will not only come from the unions in this regard, but from the soldiers themselves. The prevention of unionism demands a rejection of careerism and managerialism in favour of old-fashioned leadership and moral courage.

As has been illustrated, the will to fight is not only a product of submission to military discipline and compliance with orders. These are important, but must be bolstered by emotions such as fear, loyalty and pride. That there is such a strong emotional component to combat-effectiveness is not surprising: war is not a rational pastime. Military leadership must therefore provide what the unions cannot provide - affect. This means genuine interest in and compassion for subordinates, nurtured through close association with them through times of hardship and danger. Unfortunately, the importance of affect has become lost for so many military leaders who, schooled in rational management principles, are more concerned with managing their budget than they are with the welfare of their subordinates. According to the mercenary leader, Mike Hoare, 'A leader must live in the pockets of his men'. He must be aware of their hopes, fears and aspirations. He must know them better than their own families. At platoon, company or battalion level, a remote leader is an absurdity.

The importance of affect is recognised by the German Bundeswehr, and forms an integral part of the leadership philosphy inherent in the concept of Innere Führung:

... Care and welfare also include duties of the superior laid down in the Military Service Act and going beyond the scope of everyday duty. He is expected to have empathy, the right sense of proportion when he demands performance and a sense of justice and caring for his subordinates - even when these are off-duty. (Wittman, 1994: 10)

The South African Defence Force has followed the American trend towards favouring rational management rather than traditional leadership. The Military Academy, for example, presents undergraduate and post-graduate courses in Military Management, Accountancy, and Industrial Psychology. Officers striving for career advancement are enrolling in increasing numbers for the Magister in Business Administration degree, the popularity of which is exceeded by attendance of much shorter civilian-presented courses on dynamic management techniques. Countless officers have attended Investment in Excellence seminars, many of whom would benefit more by 'investing in (at least) mediocre leadership' or, better still, by internalising the words of a SADF sergeant-major who once told the writer that 'to be a good noncommissioned officer, you must be firm, fair and approachable'. If military leadership was indeed firm, fair and approachable, esprit de corps would be high and military unionism would have no raison d'être.

GOOD CITIZENSHIP AND PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

The denial of trade union rights to members of the emergent armed forces of South Africa need not adversely affect attempts to introduce the concept of the soldier as a citizen in uniform. Indeed, the soldier who has a sound comprehension and appreciation of the rights and duties of the citizen of the democratic state possesses a cause which will help sustain his will to fight those who would destroy democracy and thus the rights of his fellow citizens. He will also understand the notion of service; that some of these rights will temporarily be denied him whilst he is in the military in the best interests of defending them against potential enemies. One of the goals of the German concept of Innere Fhrung is the inculcation of 'the willingness of the serviceman to render his service faithfully and with conviction, to do his duties to the best of his ability and to accept the limitations of his basic rights as stipulated in the Military Service Act.' (Wittman, 1994: 10)

Nor is the denial of certain labour rights antithetical to the establishment of a human rights culture in the new defence force. The soldier who values liberty, property and, above all, human life, will respect those of others. He will not commit atrocities in the name of the military mission; and his willingness to sacrifice certain aspects of his liberty, and even his life, in defence of the society from which he is drawn must earn him the respect and approval of that society. Because the military hierarchy is dependent upon the compliance of such soldiers within such a military culture, it cannot make demands which unnecessarily or illegitimately infringe upon the basic rights of subordinates.

The human rights record of the SADF may not be impeccable, and no doubt there will be demands for guarantees which go beyond the imperatives of combat-effectiveness to ensure that the rights of members of the military and those who come into contact with the armed forces are respected. Insofar as such protection may be needed, it should come from above, not from below. It should be consonant with both the military notion of hierarchy, and the democratic principle of representative government. Appropriate mechanisms for this type of control have already been outlined by Cilliers and Mertz, and include institutions such as a multi-party defence committee and a military ombudsman (Cilliers and Mertz, 1993). Such mechanisms, although primarily motivated by a desire to entrench the democratic principle of civil supremacy over the military, would also be able to ensure that the rights of military personnel are respected by the military hierarchy without adversely affecting the military requirement for cohesion and compliance.

CONCLUSION

South Africa is an embryonic democracy which needs obedient and effective armed forces to guarantee a safe passage for those in pursuit of the democratic ideal. Our armed forces are enmeshed in a process of fundamental transformation which will, hopefully, heighten their legitimacy and therefore their operational effectiveness in the maintenance of internal stability. The new national defence force will probably also play a vital role in the processes of national integration and nation-building. It is conceded that these fundamental changes to the composition and role of the armed forces may, at least in the short term, have a negative effect upon the combat-effectiveness of the military. However, the risk taken in this regard is taken in the national interest, and the element of risk can be minimised by fostering military cohesion through thorough institutional socialisation and sound leadership.

The extension of civilian labour rights to South African soldiers, however, can only be detrimental to the national interest, insofar as it would exacerbate existing strains in the armed forces. A unionised military may be symptomatic of the final evolutionary stages of a Western-style liberal democracy in times of peace, but it would be catastrophic in an emergent nation in the midst of a more or less peaceful democratic revolution, but a revolution with an omnipresent potential for massive violence. Military cohesion and compliance simply cannot be sacrificed to the political expedience of those who are blind to all but visions of an industrial-democratic utopia.

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