Lindy Heinecken
Centre for Military Studies (Cemis): Military Academy

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Military Academy or the South African National Defence Force. Paper presented at the conference on Defence Legislation in a New South Africa, the Institute for Defence Policy and the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Midrand, 25 March 1994

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 16, 1994

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the nineties, influential South African laws were amended and a new Constitution promulgated, affecting all spheres of society, including the military. Many of these changes denote that basic civil liberties of a democratic society are provided for by law and guaranteed in practice. The basic rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining are regarded as vital attributes of an open society.

The extension of collective bargaining and trade union rights to state employees, comes at a time of political change and uncertainty in South Africa. Within this climate state sector trade unionism has witnessed a period of unprecedented growth. Almost every state department has been subjected to the increasing militancy of government employees, including those departments closest to central government, the security forces.

The extension of basic worker rights to civilian personnel in the security forces, as well as uniformed members of the Department of Correctional Services under the Public Service Labour Relations Act and the subsequent extension of union rights to policemen, have created a climate conducive to unionisation within the military. Although the recent amendments to the Defence Act have restricted these rights for uniformed military personnel, they have nevertheless been guaranteed in the interim constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

With the acceptance of unionisation for members of the military in other Western democracies and with basic rights such as freedom of association entrenched in the constitution, the effect on the military cannot be ignored. Considering present trends within society and the military environment itself, a distinct possibility exists that uniformed members in the military may desire some form of collective forum, through which they can influence and participate in decision-making.

In essence, this paper is concerned with changes in labour and defence legislation affecting the defence force as well as those societal trends which could influence the prospects for military unionisation. In it I do not endeavour to debate whether it is desirable or inept in a military environment, nor does it attempt to evaluate the possible impact unionisation may have on military effectiveness.

'WORKER DEMOCRACY' IN MILITARY ORGANISATION

The trend towards greater worker democracy and participation in decision-making processes within the working environment is, to a large extent, related to the trend of greater political democracy and egalitarianism in society. Although in many respects the military is unique due to the social role it fulfills, it is part of society and cannot be divorced from these influences.

While the military is quick to adapt to changes in the technological environment, it often lags behind assimilating changes in the cultural and social environment. This places the military institution at a disadvantage, especially if there are forces at work which could affect aspects of military functioning. One such aspect is the current trend within society towards greater participation by employees in aspects relating to the overall improvement of their working life (Broedling 1977 : 26).

In essence, this implies the desire by employees for increased participation in problem-solving and decision-making within an organisation. The implementation of such participative principles may take a wide range of forms, ranging from actions which allow the employee control over getting his or her own work done, to actions which give employees a say in policies and practices of the organisation (Broedling 1977 : 15).

This process begins with the acceptance of basic procedures such as grievance and disciplinary procedures and the establishment of discussion forums which provide employees with formal mechanisms to exercise some influence over their working environment (Bendix 1992 : 132). The more educated the work-force becomes, the greater the demand to participate in the functions of the organisation. The degree to which these expectations are not met may affect the attitude towards unionisation (Manley, McNichols, Young 1977 : 133). This move within society towards greater participation by employees in matters affecting their working lives is often met with resistance by the military. This is partly due to the fact that the military does not equate itself with an industrial organisation and for the fear such participation may hold for overall military-effectiveness and-readiness.

Broedling, in her study on employee participation in the United States Armed Forces, is however, of the opinion that the lack of participative management principles has resulted in a working environment in which many military personnel feel alienated and frustrated, due to the lack of influence over the formation of military policies and practices. She feels that should appropriate techniques be implemented into the military structure, it would enhance military effectiveness by improving job satisfaction and manpower utilisation and this would lessen the pressure for unionisation (Broedling 1977 : 23, 24). In this respect Segal states that : 'The degree to which individuals, by behaving in ways supportive of an organisation, fulfil their own needs, their commitment to the organisation will be increased; where this complementary does not exist, their commitment will be minimized.' (Segal 1977 : 28)

When the military creates structures to allow for greater worker democracy, it represents a change in the traditional hierarchical, authoritarian managerial styles characteristic of most armed forces. Due to its combat mission, the military will always have a chain of command structure. Consequently, it requires ingenuity to develop representational vehicles to accommodate the needs of the individual and those of the military organisation. There is an inherent strain between organisational requirements to maintain combat-effectiveness and societal pressures to provide a socially-representative and responsive military establishment (Segal 1977 : 26). Should the military not provide vehicles to meet the popular needs of its members, a possibility exists that the option would be to pursue these means via alternative structures such as trade unions (Broedling 1977 : 20, 24).

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE UNIONISATION

As in South Africa, the emergence of unionisation in the security forces of European countries evolved from the maturation of public sector collective bargaining. Likewise, the security forces and particularly the military were the last to be affected in the trend towards unionisation and worker democracy in these countries. A number of European nations have granted uniformed military personnel the right to participate in decisions affecting their working environment, by creating a diversity of representative forums ranging from vocational organisations to full trade union rights:

The Dutch Armed Forces boast a lengthy experience of trade unionism starting in 1883. Twelve groupings of military associations based on rank, religion, branch of service and status represent the interests of their members on a broad range of interests including pay, leave and working hours, through mandatory consultations with the Ministry of Defence. (USA 1977 : 3) All members of the military are permitted to join associations. The goals of the military associations differ. Some are concerned mainly with the material well-being of their members while other associations view their military mission as most important. Ninety percent of military personnel in the Dutch Armed Forces belong to military associations. (USA 1977 : 5-6)



Military pay in the Netherlands is generally not a critical issue as salaries and increases are based on private industry wage trends. It is the non-economic gains which are important. Besides the claimed gains for more liberal hairstyles and the abolition of saluting, the associations also avail themselves to more serious issues such as government's plan to reduce the military budget, the possible reduction in military benefits and amendments to the system of military justice (USA 1977 : 7). Military personnel of the Dutch armed forces do not have the right to strike and provisions exist for the suspension of association activities during wartime (USA 1977 : 3).



Germany too, has a long history of unionisation amongst its armed forces. Four military personnel representation forums represent the interests of military members. These include a military association, military union, unit personnel council and a military ombudsman for combat unit personnel (USA 1977 : 10).



The most influential is the Federal Armed Force Association, a professional organisation open to all military personnel. This association views itself as a lobby or pressure group interested in the well-being of its members. This organisation is not a union, but a vocational organisation of career members of the armed forces who lobby for improvements in compensation and working conditions (Krendel 1977 : 141). This association consults with the Ministry of Defence on a regular basis on matters which affect its armed forces. Military personnel receive basically the same salaries as civilian public employees. The Ministry of Defence regulates any special problems peculiar to the military (USA 1977 : 11).

The Public Services and Transport Union obtained permission from government in 1966 to enroll members of the armed forces. This union represents a small group of technicians.

The military personnel councils represent military employees on matters not covered in negotiated contracts. These councils represent both union and non-union personnel. Military personnel councils exist at the Ministry of Defence level, regional level and the local unit level. Civilian and uniformed employees elect representatives to represent them in dealings with the local management, presumably of the unit. The personnel councils also represent employees in the case of disputes and grievances. The interests of military personnel are also attended to by an ombudsman who deals with the complaints and grievances of military members (USA 1977 : 13).

Outside the military environment, the German Trade Union Federation, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, with seven million members, is a powerful bargaining force in the public service. This federation also constitutes the main lobbying body for soldiers' rights, welfare and pay with the government (Krendel 1977 : 142). Neither civilian officials nor military personnel have the right to strike (Krendel 1977 : 141). Unlike the Netherlands, Germany has no legal provision suspending union activities during wartime.

In Denmark the military have been granted similar rights to those in the private sector. Military personnel and other public employees do not, however, have the right to strike. As in the case of the Netherlands, provision exists for suspension of military representation arrangements during wartime or national emergency (USA 1977 : 20).



In Sweden these services are highly organised. Three military unions represent most of the regular military personnel. These unions belong to larger central organisations which negotiate certain issues on their behalf. The military unions are integrated into the Swedish collective bargaining system and because of this, the rights of the military unions are extensive. Legislation permits them to strike and the government has the right to a lock-out (USA 1977 : 22).

Military associations have existed in Sweden since the early 1900s, but were not given rights of association and collective bargaining until 1965:

Many improvements in pay and general working conditions for Swedish military personnel are attributed to the military unions. The unions were successful in negotiating a 40-hour week and paid overtime. Also, the unions were primarily responsible for changes in military justice of transferring certain disciplinary authority from the military to civil authorities (USA 1977 : 27).

Although the type of representation varied in the countries studied, it was generally related to pay and living and working conditions. Involvement or interference in military matters, operations, organisation and discipline is generally prohibited (USA 1977 : i).

In all the examples examined, the unions and associations operate within a legal labour relations framework and have the co-operation and support of government and military authorities. Many feel that personnel practices and communication have improved since the acceptance of military associations and unions. What is interesting is that these practices have not seemed to affect military discipline, efficiency or morale (USA 1977 : ii). Nor has it appeared to have an overall adverse effect on combat-readiness and -effectiveness (USA 1977 : 29). The most obvious negative effect has been the impact on the flexibility of military management as regards the limitations placed on overtime work and the application of strict work-week rules. Consultations, negotiations and meetings between military management and personnel representatives have also tended to slow the decision-making process. However, 'these practices are viewed as a way to communicate and resolve problems.' (USA 1977 : 29)

It should be emphasised that the rights of military members to belong to trade unions or associations have evolved over many years. It also appears as if the military was the last sector to receive these rights and that there are still a number of restrictions and modifications applying to military organisations (USA 1977 : 33). Due to the social, political and military differences between these more democratic and developed countries and South Africa, the experiences of military unionisation cannot be readily related to the local situation. These countries are relatively homogeneous, have a high standard of living, and are not faced with the political instability and unrest prevalent in this country. It is also easier to extend democratic rights to military personnel in peacetime service in a relatively static situation, than in countries where the military is called upon to fulfill combat functions, either in defence of the country or to maintain order and stability.

However, these international examples do set a precedent, as South Africa moves towards a more democratic political dispensation.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY

Another development within society which may have an impact on labour relations in the armed forces is the inclusion of certain basic fundamental rights in the new Constitution for South Africa. Among others, the following rights have been guaranteed in the interim constitution:

Employee rights (section 27)

Every person shall have the right to fair labour practices.



Workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions, and employers shall have the right to form and join employers' organisations.



Workers and employers shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively.



Workers shall have the right to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (SECTION 18)

Every person has the right to the freedom of association, and no person may prohibit or be prevented from associating with another person and no person may be compelled to associate with another individual.

However, a restriction of these fundamental rights may be authorised, where the extent of such a restriction is considered reasonably essential.

LIMITATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (SECTION 33)

These fundamental rights may be limited by law of general application, provided that such limitation is (i) reasonable and (ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. (RSA 1994 : 12,16,18)

The question at hand is whether the creation of unions or associations within the security forces is susceptible to affecting national safety, which is the responsibility of the military. Does the restriction of the right of association apply to the duties of all members of the security forces in uniform?

At present these rights for uniformed members of the defence forces have not been curtailed in the constitution. Should uniformed members thus challenge the restrictions placed on their membership to trade unions by a law of general application such as the Defence Act, the onus would be on the military to prove to the Constitutional Court that granting uniformed personnel this right would endanger the maintenance of state security or public order.

In such an event, the court could refer to international criteria on unionisation in armed forces. If found within the South African context that these rights need to be restricted, alternative remedies to compensate for the restriction of these rights will need to be instituted. The International Labour Organisation, Convention no 87 of 1948 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise), article 9(1) stipulates that 'the extent to which this right can be extended to the security forces and police be subject to national legislation and regulations.' It is thus left to the individual state's discretion if defence force members and policemen should be allowed to join trade unions or personnel associations (Smit 1991 : 1).

As previously indicated, some Western nations have acknowledged the needs of military personnel to have impartial and effective channels to address their grievances, and have allowed the formation of soldiers' organisations. Restrictions are often placed on the form the military employee organisation may take, as well as which personnel are allowed to belong to these organisations.

EXTENSION OF WORKER RIGHTS TO SECURITY FORCES

Until recently, public service employees, of which the security forces (South African Police Services, Department of Correctional Services and SA National Defence Force) make up 26 percent, were denied most of the basic worker rights universally accepted as fundamental to industrial relations systems based on democratic principles. The main reasons given for these restrictions are related to the implications of collective bargaining and industrial action for the state, both financially and politically. For the security forces these rights were curbed due to the critical role the forces play in society in maintaining order, stability and national safety (Heinecken 1993a : 4). However, on 2 August 1993, after years of labour unrest amongst government employees, the Public Service Labour Relations Act, 102 of 1993 (PSLRA) came into effect granting state employees the right to belong to trade unions and to benefit from the process of collective bargaining. The PSLRA is limited only to public service personnel as defined in Section 1 of the Public Service Act, 111 of 1984. It does not include persons employed in terms of an Act other than the Public Service Act, such as the Defence Act. Uniformed personnel are therefore excluded from the ambit of the PSLRA, though civilian personnel are not.

RIGHTS OF CIVILIANS IN THE MILITARY

Until very recently civilian personnel serving in the former SADF make up an estimated 32 percent of the permanent manpower of the SADF. These employees are fully integrated with the uniformed personnel and perform vital logistical and support functions, in combination with uniformed personnel.

These civilians now have the right to join trade unions of their choice and can partake in collective bargaining. They are however, classified as part of the essential services and are thus not permitted to strike (Heinecken 1993b : 16).

The SADF accepted these rights and formulated a labour relations policy for civilians stating that it would enter into a procedural or recognition agreement with any trade union or worker organisation that meets certain criteria. Such criteria would include proven representation and meeting the requirements specified in the new Act.

In terms of the PSLRA, civilians in the military have the following rights (the principles and implications for the military are emphasised below):

Freedom of association (section 4 [1-3]). Whereas in the past these employees only had the choice of belonging to personnel associations, they now have the freedom to join any trade union or any trade union federation. Any closed shop provision, compelling certain categories of employees to belong to a specific union, will be ruled out.



Protection against unfair discrimination and victimisation (section 4 [7]). The implication of this fundamental principle is that any incidence of intimidation, victimisation or unfair discrimination, based on race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, membership or non-membership of an employee organisation, can be considered an alleged unfair labour practice. Besides the collective bargaining machinery offered by the PSLRA, an individual employee will, in the case of claimed victimisation or unfair discrimination, have access to the Industrial Court.



Access to members during working hour (section 4 [10]). Once an employee organisation has been recognised in terms of section 17 of the Act, trade unions will also have access to their members to conduct union activities. Such access is subject to the prior approval of the head of that department, but shall not be unreasonably withheld. This implies, for example, that recognised trade union officials will have access to military bases for the conduct of union activities. Until recently access by any trade union official has been strictly forbidden.



Access to information not deemed classified (section 4 [11]). The employer shall provide an employee organisation contemplated in section 4 (10) with any relevant information on matters concerning the terms and conditions of employment, remuneration and the employment of employees who are members of such organisation, including the full contents of its policy frameworks and any information which is necessary for the negotiation processes in terms of this Act.

Classified information, according to the definition of this term in the Act, means any document, model, article or information contemplated in the Protection of Information Act, 1982, or any other document or information, the disclosure of which would prejudice effective public administration. This provision is important especially within the security forces where information is often classified.

Responsibility of the state (section 4 [15]). This provision specifies that parties shall at all times act in such a way as not to compromise the provision of a neutral, apolitical and impartial service to the public. This, in effect, implies that industrial action may not be politically-directed and that the service rendered by the state to the community should in no way be compromised or be subject to undue hardships caused by such actions.



Unfair labour practice. (Sec 4. (16). The most important implication of the definition of an unfair labour practice can be seen to relate to the concept of fairness and lawfulness and it is these two concepts which will have to be considered when making labour-related decisions in terms of the Act.

Other important features of the Public Service Labour Relations Act, pertaining to civilians in the military, are the creation of collective bargaining and dispute-resolution machinery at both central and departmental levels.

RIGHTS OF POLICE AND PRISONS PERSONNEL

Shortly after the Public Service Labour Relations Act, No 102 of 1993 (PSLRA) came into effect, granting state employees, including civilian employees in the security forces, the right to belong to trade unions and to partake in collective bargaining, the Department of Correctional Services requested that these rights be extended to its uniformed personnel. This decision was made after accessing the position of prisons services internationally and after witnessing the increasing inclination amongst prisons personnel towards unionisation.

This move was to have considerable impact on the South African Police. The Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) represents both uniformed police and prisons personnel and joint labour actions are often planned by these members. In 1993 both the SAP and the Correctional services witnessed their unformed personnel participating in overtly political trade union activities. The spillover from the prisons department to the SAP was thus inevitable. By denying trade union rights to policemen the SAP would have been ignoring the changing reality of labour relations amongst its personnel.

Consequently, the SAP requested that the Police Act be extended to allow policemen to belong to trade unions. The SAP in the interim formed an alternative employee organisation to represent the interests of policemen. This amendment, allowing trade unionism amongst the police force, came at a time of growing support and legitimacy for POPCRU) amongst particularly the black police assistants.

The significance of this labour unrest in the SAP and the Department of Correctional Services for the military is that, despite strict legislative prohibitions on trade union activities at the time and the creation of alternative structures to address employee grievances, there were still incidences of labour unrest. Another aspect of importance for the military is that collective bargaining emerged despite alleged acceptance by the police of a military command structure, which required unquestioning obedience and discipline (Fradin 1977 : 133).

The acceptance of trade union and collective bargaining rights for the police may also have implications for the military in its present role, where the military is required to perform similar tasks to the police force. The proposed strike by police for parity in salaries with their colleagues in the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF), could similarly apply to military personnel, who may be equally disturbed by the disparities. In this regard 'policemen on the ground believe that a strike will work for them because it worked for the NPKF.' (Cameron 1993 : 1) This comes in the aftermath of increases granted to trainees of the NPKF, who went on strike when they discovered that they were paid at the lowest rate for their particular rank instead of the highest, as promised.

While there may be intensive debate over whether military personnel should have some form of collective rights, one aspect the military cannot ignore is the possible spillover of these developments in the other security force departments.

RIGHTS OF UNIFORMED PERSONNEL IN THE MILITARY

The response of the SADF to the changing labour dispensation within the security forces has been cautious, primarily as a result of the restriction often placed on the freedom of association for uniformed military personnel internationally and because of the limited incidence of labour unrest within the military. The only major incidence of labour unrest in the military involved civilian employees (Du Plessis and Heinecken 1992 : 13).

An amendment to the Defence Act, No 44 of 1957, concerning the prohibition of membership of trade unions and participation in strikes and protests, was passed by Parliament on 24 September 1993. Section 126B (1) reads:

A member of the Permanent Force shall not be or become a member of any trade union as defined in section 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 : Provided that this provision shall not preclude any member of such a Force from being or becoming a member of any professional or vocational institute, society, association or like body approved by the Minister.

Section 126 B (2) furthermore states that:

a member of the SADF who is subject to the said Military Discipline code, shall not strike or perform any act of public protest or participate in any strike or act of public protest or conspire with or incite or encourage, instigate or command any other person (whether or not such person is a member of the SADF or an officer or employee referred to in section 83A(2) serving in the SADF or a member of any auxiliary or nursing service established under this Act) to strike or to perform such an act or to participate in a strike or such an act.

These provisions were to ensure that no member of the Permanent Force belongs to a trade union and that no member of the SADF, who is subject to the Military Discipline Code, takes part in strikes or actions of public protest.

However, section 126B (1) is intriguing, especially as regards the clause stating that 'a member of the Force may become a member of any professional or vocational institute, society, association or like body approved by the Minister.' This clause leaves room for the creation of associations of a deontological nature as have been created for uniformed military personnel in other forces, with the aim of safeguarding the rights and duties of members in certain professions.

According to sources within the SADF, various options are currently being explored against the background of international trends in military unionisation.

At present, uniformed military personnel have limited formalised structures to address collectively issues of living and working conditions. Although it is claimed that uniformed members' interests may be addressed by the SADF labour relations committee system, this system has almost exclusively focused on the needs of civilian employees (Heinecken 1993b : 10).

Clearly, uniformed personnel in the military are the last large ununionised sector of the South African economy in the eyes of many employee organisations. Should there be discontent amongst military personnel, any one of the unions presently active in the public service will be most obliged to take up their cause. It will come as no surprise if a public service union such as POPCRU, presently recruiting civilians, or other security force personnel, amends its constitution to permit military membership.

International trends have also shown that pro-labour governments are more inclined to extend labour rights to the military. With the present interpenetration of the leading labour federation, COSATU, in the state's decision-making structures, labour is in a powerful position to influence the formulation of labour policy and other matters affecting employment. It is predicted that labour will continue to play an influential political role under a new political dispensation, at least for the immediate future (Du Plessis and Heinecken 1994 : 16).

MILITARY TRENDS INFLUENCING UNIONISATION

Besides the trends in broader society which impact on the military, there are developments coupled to these trends also specific to the military, which may influence the management of labour relations in the military.

DECLINE IN DEFENCE SPENDING

In recent years the defence force has observed far-reaching cuts in its defence budget. As a proportion of state expenditure the defence budget decreased from 15,7 percent in 1989 to 9,9 percent in 1993. As a proportion of the Gross Domestic Product, defence expenditure declined form 4,3 percent in 1989 to an estimated 2,6 percent in 1993. In the short- to medium-term, this decline in the defence budget is expected to continue as the national priority shifts away from defence to socio-economic development (Du Plessis 1993 : 8).

The requirement to restrict government spending and to reduce the number of people in the service will compel a reduction of the full-time forces of the Defence force. With personnel costs making up more than half of the defence budget, the most likely cuts will be on the terrain of manpower (Du Plessis 1993 : 5). Past cuts in the defence budget have already been associated with large-scale retrenchments, where roughly 18 percent of the total defence force cadre was layed off (Du Plessis 1993 : 6). This increases the sense of insecurity amongst uniformed personnel who have little recourse of action should they be retrenched.

In recent years uniformed personnel of the military have also experienced an erosion of benefits, long associated with their military careers. Should such an erosion of military conditions of employment continue, it may well provide the stimulus toward military unionisation. Surveys done in the US Armed Forces reveal that 'military personnel seek the same characteristics in their jobs as do civilian employees.' (Segal 1977 : 45)

All-volunteer forces are traditionally more concerned with protecting the erosion of military benefits, such as housing, pensions, and medical care. However, it is precisely the high costs of these benefits which come under close scrutiny in times of budgetary constraints (Lane 1977 : 100).

THE SUSCEPTIBILITY Of ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCES TO UNIONISATION

Another development which may carry the seeds for military unionisation is the move of the armed forces in the direction of an all-volunteer force.

From international trends it appears as if all-volunteer forces are more susceptible to unionisation, as they view the service as a long-range career. Lane states that 'perhaps the major incentive to unionisation amongst an all-volunteer force would be the perception of an erosion of self-related benefits and a certain frustration and helplessness to do anything about it.' Many claim that the shift towards an all volunteer force leads to a new contractual basis for military employment, with an accompanying decline in the notion of service as a duty or calling to that of an occupation (Cortright 1977 : 218).

According to Bernie Fanaroff, National Secretary of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (Numsa), if the military is to be an all-volunteer force 'then joining the forces is a career choice, and there is no obvious reason why the members of the forces, should not have normal trade union rights' (Fanaroff 1993 : 15).

However, attempts at organising military personnel will only be successful if there is a perceived need for a military union, accompanied by the belief that a union would be effective. Without a definite felt need, military personnel are unlikely to join a union. A factor that could be a major attraction, especially for the careerist, is that it represents a means of lobbying to prevent the erosion of perceived benefits.

Given that this trend exists in the military and with the acknowledgment that disputes over conditions of work were influential in the unionisation of the armed forces of some European countries, one may expect the same trend to develop in South Africa. Two recent examples within the African context which substantiate this expectation is the strike by Lesotho soldiers for a 100 percent pay rise and the recent strike by members of the NPKF over discrepancies in salary scales. One can therefore expect that, unless the salary and service benefit disparities are eliminated as soon as possible, labour unrest could occur during the implementation of the integration process in the new National Defence Force.

THE UNIT VERSUS THE UNION

Unions as well as unit personnel structures within the military serve the same function, in that they both provide for the basic needs of personnel. These include financial issues and working conditions, as well as matters affecting career development. Whether a union presence exists or not, labour relations is an integral part of the managerial function within any organisation, be this for civilian employees or for uniformed personnel. The question is whether the basic needs of personnel are fulfilled within the unit personnel structures.

In the South African Army, all the different directors of corps, for example, Director Infantry, Director Armour and Director Artillery, have their own personnel branches and their units on the ground with their own personnel staff officers. Specifically within combat units, the combat commanders in companies, squadrons and batteries regard the well-being of their soldiers as being of primary importance. The importance of their men is secondary only to the fulfillment of their combat mission.

If these functions are met by the units or formations, the inclination towards unionisation will be reduced. On the other hand, if the personnel structures are inefficient or insensitive to the needs of employees, the desire for unions will increase. It comes down to the following: either the military and the unit looks after the interests of the soldiers, or the union will do it for them.

It also appears as if certain sectors of the military, or certain units, are more prone to unionisation than others. In this regard, Moskos maintains that non-combat formations are more inclined to adopt practices associated with their counterparts in the civilian labour force, due to similarities in the nature of their work. Combat elements, who perform military-specific tasks, show a greater commitment towards duty, service and military traditions. Consequently, combat elements are less inclined towards any form of unionisation (Segal and Kramer 1977 : 137). There is also a greater sense of cohesion and brotherhood amongst combat forces, which can replace the need for a union.

The desire amongst military personnel to form unions or associations, like in all other sectors of society, will only emerge if there is a feeling of individual deprivation, which is converted into collective deprivation. Perhaps the key factor presently obviating the appeal for unions within the SADF was, as Lane (1977 : 104) states, 'the individual's pride in serving in a well trained professional unit, a command structure that considers men and morale a vital part of their overall mission and a nation that appreciates the sacrifices required by the military profession.' The crucial question is whether this will be so in the new National Defence Force with the influx of new recruits, who are less socialised into the military culture and who are, at the same time, more critical of and possibly less receptive to orders.

CHANGING MANPOWER STRUCTURE

The changing racial composition of defence manpower may also influence the receptiveness of the forces towards unions. At the beginning of the eighties only one-third (33,6 percent in 1981) of the full-time forces was non-white. This figure increased to more than one-half by the early nineties (Du Plessis 1993 : 16). This trend is likely to increase due to demographics but also as a result of the integration of the independent and homeland armies into the new National Defence Force.

From past actions it appears as if the predominantly black recruits entering the security forces have a more positive disposition towards unionisation. This is seen in the support for organisations such as POPCRU amongst black policemen and prisons personnel, even in the absence of any law recognising such rights. Members of the ANC's military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, bound to be integrated in the SADF, have also shown their sympathy with the cause of POPCRU (Dumbutshena 1993 : 1). Once integrated, it will be of interest to observe to what extent this support will continue, or be allowed in the military.

The experiences of the Lesotho Army, whose soldiers demanded a 100 per cent pay rise, and the recent pay strike at the National Peacekeeping Force at De Brug substantiate the inclination towards collectivism amongst blacks.

Many black soldiers have experienced the benefits of trade unionism and, in some instances, have an external reference group to substantiate this. Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that they will not expect, if not demand, the fundamental social and political rights and needs which are derived from the nature of the employment relationship.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In any discussion about the possibility of trade unionism within armed forces, a consistent theme is the effect that such unionisation will have on the operational efficiency of the military. Will it weaken the ability of the military to carry out an established task? Or is the effect limited to the modification of traditional patterns of authority or an established military culture?

Critics of unionisation of the armed forces maintain that any pressure group within the military would degrade discipline, undermine the chain of command and reduce military effectiveness. Advocates, on the other hand, suggest that military unions address poor working conditions, help maintain military benefits, eliminate violations of basic human rights and even safeguard the interests of the military establishment (Taylor and Earing 1977 : 245). As established in other Western nations, military associations and unions have often strengthened military authority, influencing government policy concerning military issues.

Although it is outside the scope of this article to deliberate the consequences unionisation may have for the military institution or for society for that matter, there nevertheless appears to be an inherent strain between the military organisation's requirement to maintain combat-effectiveness and societal! pressures to maintain a socially-representative and -responsive military establishment. The armed forces are part of society and, like any institution, must adapt to changes in the environment which may impact on military functioning. The emergence of trade unions or collective bargaining is one such factor and it is critical that military management recognises the factors which foster the development of unionisation, and respond accordingly.

Within the context of this paper, certain societal trends were identified which could influence the prospects for military unionisation. These were:

the desire of individuals or groups to participate in decision-making and problem-solving within their own working environment



the international precedent set by some Western nations as regards the creation of military associations or unions



changes to the Constitution which condone the right of individuals to form or join trade unions

These trends, together with the extension of basic worker rights to the police, prisons and civilian military personnel, may transfer to uniformed military personnel who may similarly desire some form of collective representation. This development may provide the additional impetus towards unionisation. Certain trends within the military environment itself, are:

the sense of insecurity presently felt amongst military personnel pending future rationalisation



the shift to an all-volunteer force and occupationalism within the military institution



the debate on whether present unit personnel structures can accommodate the needs of military personnel



the influx of black recruits more prone to collective behaviour

Irrespective of whether unions for uniformed members in the military may or may not be formed, it is important to recognise the need for effective channels to address both individual and/or collective grievances. At present, the main recourse for uniformed military personnel is the Military Disciplinary Code (MDC), though it is debatable whether the MDC in its present form is an effective or impartial channel of restitution. As regards collective grievances, there are limited formalised structures for military personnel to address matters of mutual concern. The latest amendment to the Defence Act does, however, permit members of the armed forces to belong to any professional, or vocational institute, society or association approved by the Minister. Such associations have been created in other militaries, with the purpose of safeguarding the rights and duties of military personnel. This clause in the Defence Act creates the opportunity for the formation of associations within the military.

There are those who have suggested that, if uniformed personnel should seek a collective forum, be this an association or military union, then the military might serve its interests best by having its own organisation. Such an organisation, representing the collective interests of military personnel, will need to be compatible with the traditional authoritarian structure of the military. It will most likely take the form (at least initially) of a quasi-professional organisation, which seeks to increase military effectiveness and preparedness, but at the same time follows an aggressive activist programme promoting the well-being of military personnel. In this regard the defence force is already investigating various options for uniformed members.

For those who fear the consequences of a collective forum for uniformed personnel, there is the suggestion that institutions such as a multiparty defence committee or a military ombudsman will be able to provide sufficient protection for members of the military (Malan 1994 : 38). Although this may be the ideal, it would be to ignore the present trends in society indicating the inclination towards collectivism. Seldom has a company, organisation or institution wanted unions. Unions grew deliberately and self-consciously in circumstances where employees experienced a sense of collective deprivation or felt that certain basic needs were unfulfilled.

The new National Defence Force will have to decide to what extent it is prepared to accommodate such needs, should they arise. One of the major tasks ahead is to prepare the military leadership for this fact.

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