Coast Guard Function in Southern Africa*

Rear Admiral Chris Bennett (SA Navy Retired)
Institute for Defence Policy, Cape Region

Paper presented at a conference on South Africa and International Naval Co-operation, 9 August 1994 at the Nassau Centre, Cape Town, jointly presented by the Institute for Defence Policy and the South African Institute of International Affairs .

*This paper is based on studies conducted by Mr T J N Beukes of the Institute for Maritime Technology in Simon's Town and three reports which resulted from these studies. However the opinions and conclusions are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of either IMT or Mr Beukes.

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 18, 1994

INTRODUCTION

The investigation into how various countries handle their ocean space management and policing problem shows many similarities in the tasks and missions actually being done, but a wide diversity in allocation of these duties and the responsibility therefor.

As the largest and most well known of all formal coastguard organisations, the United States Coastguard has the most extensive roles and is therefore used in this paper as an example and guideline. The inherent naval capability (both in the military and the diplomatic sense) of the United States Coastguard, which exceeds that of many small national navies, leads to much of the concept proposed in the conclusion.

This paper is divided into the following sections:

Coastguard missions;

Political responsibility;

The coastguard function in Southern Africa; and

The future.

COASTGUARD MISSIONS

Typical coastguard missions can be grouped into four types, or categories of mission including the naval or military mission, which is normally limited to the large and powerful nations such as the USA.

Promotion of Maritime Safety

This would include:

the provision and maintenance of maritime aids to navigation;



ice breaking and other ice operations;



search and rescue at sea;



the promotion of commercial vessel safety, including vessel inspection and the development and enforcement of standards;



the promotion of recreational boat safety, not only by developing standards and regulations for enforcement, but also by other means, including education programmes;



the promotion of port safety;



maritime licensing, including the licensing of officers and seamen, as well as the regulation of vessel manning; and



marine weather and oceanographic services

Maritime Law Enforcement

This would include:

the interdiction of illegal immigration and smuggling by sea;



the enforcement of laws and regulations relating to fish and other resources in territorial waters and in the exclusive economic zone;



the enforcement of all laws relating to marine matters, including those relating to safety;



the combating of maritime terrorism; and



port security

Marine Environmental Protection

This would include:

preventing the discharge of pollutants into the marine environment



the detection and clean-up of those pollutant discharges which do occur; and



regulation of the handling, in the marine environment, of pollutants and other hazardous materials.

Military and Political Tasks

This could include:

port or harbour defence;



patrolling in support of territorial or other jurisdictional claims;



support of naval or military operations; and



various tasks in support of foreign policy, for example representation at international conferences and assistance to foreign navies and coastguards.

POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY

A coastguard is usually either a paramilitary organisation run by a department of transport, or, a more or less identifiable organisational branch of the national navy. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) for example is run as a military organisation within the US Department of Transport and operates as a part of the US Navy in times of national emergency, or whenever the President so directs. The USCG is regarded as the fullest development of the concept of a coastguard in the world today, and in some respects actually exceeds the functions of a simple coastguard because it undertakes some political and military missions that, in other countries, are usually discharged by the navy.

In contrast to this situation, some of the smaller navies of the world perform mainly a coastguard function and have extremely limited naval capabilities. These navies really are essentially coastguards with varying degrees of ability to fulfil the military and diplomatic functions inherent in any navy.

THE COAST GUARD FUNCTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Accepting that neither South Africa nor any of the other littoral states of southern Africa, either singly or jointly, has the financial or technical wealth to be able to maintain a separate naval and coastguard capability, it has always been accepted that some compromise solution is required.

Division of Responsibilities

At present neither South Africa nor any other state in southern Africa has a properly constituted coastguard. In South Africa for example, the performance of coastguard tasks has been divided amongst a number of State and Provincial (Old SA) Departments and Non Governmental Agencies.

These are:

The Department of Transport together with Transnet Ltd. and Portnet Ltd.



The Department of the Environment.



The Department of Justice and the South African Police Service.



The Cape Provincial Administration and its division Cape Nature Conservation.



The Natal Provincial Administration, the Natal Parks Board and the Natal Sharks Board.



The Department of Finance (Customs and Excise).



The Department of Defence, especially the SA Navy and, to a lesser extent, the South African Air Force.



The National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI).

The South African situation is further complicated by the fact that in a number of areas, responsibility for the performance of a single coastguard task has been split up and allocated to more than one body. For example:

Although maritime law enforcement has in general been entrusted to the SA Police Service, some of the responsibilities concerning fishing have been allocated to the Cape Provincial Administration.



Protection of the marine environment is the responsibility of a number of different departments and agencies:



Marine environmental protection has been entrusted mainly to the Department of Environmental Affairs, although the Natal and Cape Provincial Administrations also have delegated responsibilities. The complexity of this situation was once again highlighted in the recent (June 1994) incident on the Cape west coast, in that, although the Department of Environmental Affairs is responsible for the combating of oil pollution, this is only once it has occurred, and even then the local Municipality (in this case Cape Town) seems to carry most of the load of clearing up actions.



The prevention of oil pollution at sea, including the salvage and transhipment of oil cargo, has been assigned as the responsibility of the Department of Transport.



The protection of the environment within the port areas has in its turn been delegated to Portnet. In this category although clean-up efforts in collaboration with the Department of Environment Affairs and local authorities has recently begun, allocation of funds has to date been minimal.



Search and rescue at sea is a third obvious example of a single coastguard task performed in South Africa by a variety of bodies. The Department of Transport is responsible for the overall co-ordination and management of the South African Search and Rescue Organisation (SASAR). The members of SASAR are the Department of Transport, the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) (specifically the Navy and the Air Force), the SA Police Services, Portnet and the National Sea Rescue Institute As the Department of Transport does not have either the aircraft or the seagoing vessels to execute this function they are dependent on other departments and agencies, largely the SANDF and the NSRI for the provision of this service. In this context the NSRI basically restricts itself to 'white water' operations and as a result SASAR is very dependent on the SA Navy and SA Air Force for ships and aircraft in any search and rescue operation.

Execution of Tasks

Apart from the SANDF there are other State Departments, Provincial Authorities and Agencies involved in South African water space management and policing who operate their own flotillas. These are:

The South African Police Water Wing which operates a flotilla of small craft. This flotilla includes the following vessels:



Seven 12 ton vessels with an endurance of 18 hours,

four 5 ton craft with an endurance of 20 hours and

nine boats of 4 metres length.



The NSRI from its 21 rescue stations along the South African coast, operates 46 small craft, manned by some 600 volunteers.



The Department of Environment Affairs deploys two distinct flotillas:



For the purpose of combating oil pollution the Department has a flotilla of four 29 metre long vessels with a range of 5000 nautical miles (known as the Kuswag I, II, IV and V), as well as one aircraft (known as Kuswag VII). These vessels and aircraft are operated for the Department under contract by Pentow Marine (Pty) Ltd.



For research purposes the Department operates a flotilla of four ships;



the SA Agulhas (6123 tons), used mainly in support of the South African Antarctic base, and



three vessels used for fisheries research by the SA Fisheries Research Institute, the Africana (2522 tons), the Algoa (760 tons) and the Sardinops (255 tons).



Two organisations within the Natal Provincial Administration operate flotillas of small craft of their own:



The Natal Sharks Board operates some 26 small craft (4 to 6,6 metres long) for the purposes of shark control and



the Natal Parks Board operates 5 ski-boats and 1 inflatable boat capable of patrolling out to 10 nautical miles from the beach.



The Cape Provincial Administration division Nature Conservation, operates a flotilla of seven vessels and some 27 ski-boats to patrol the fisheries protection zone. This flotilla has severe limitations and recent indications are that effective patrolling by the seven larger vessels does not occur due to lack of funds. Of the seven larger vessels whose average age is 20 years:



Only one, the Custos, has deep-sea capabilities and is capable of patrolling out to the full 200 nautical miles from the coast line extent of the Exclusive Economic Zone. She will however require a major refit within four years to meet her Lloyds certificate of seaworthiness requirement.



Four are limited to 50 nautical miles from the coastline and



the remaining two are limited to 25 nautical miles.

Legislation

This fragmentation of responsibilities and the lack of funds for effective patrolling is not the only problem that plagues marine environmental protection in South Africa. Major legislation in many areas either does not exist, is outdated, or is not enforced or enforceable.

In trying to implement legislation to bring the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone into being South African legislators seem to have tried to take an easy route and merely extended the old 12 nautical mile fishing zone to 200 nautical miles making South Africa an anomaly in the International Laws of the Sea scenario.



The Environment Conservation Act of 1989 has so far proved to be ineffectual in protecting the marine environment from abuse and only limited attention has been given to its provisions. For example, although the act makes provision for limited development areas, none have as yet been declared.



An up to date Coastal Zone Management Act is desperately needed to replace the outdated Sea Shore Act of 1935 but has not yet even been formulated. Reliance for the protection of the marine environment must still be placed on the outdated and obsolete Act.

As can be seen South Africa's efforts to fulfil its coastguard responsibilities suffer from a high degree of fragmentation, lack of sufficient funding and ineffective legislation. The actual scale of the present efforts in this direction is completely out of proportion to the physical demands imposed simply by the extent of the area of responsibility alone.

The South African coastline is 2881 km long and therefore can generate a nominal territorial sea area of 64 068 square km, or about 5% of its land area (1 221 037 square km). The nominal Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that this coastline can generate is 1 067 802 square km, or about 87,5 % of the total land area of the Republic of South Africa. However, these figures do not include the territorial waters and huge EEZ which are generated by the Prince Edward Islands (including Marion Island). In addition, the weather conditions in this whole region make the seas around South Africa amongst the roughest and most unpredictable in the world.

As far as water space management and policing is concerned the status quo in South Africa is very far removed from the acceptable let alone the ideal. Achieving singularity of responsibility and allocation of proper funding to maritime matters as is normally found in a properly structured maritime nation, could bring about numerous advantages, some of which are:

In the first place this would support the formulation and execution of a coherent marine and maritime policy, something that South Africa desperately needs.



Secondly, it would greatly simplify and expedite marine and maritime policy execution.



Thirdly, it would represent a more effective use of resources. With a single, large body responsible for coastguard tasks it should be possible to achieve much greater cost-effectiveness especially in respect of the control function and vessel technical support.

THE FUTURE

Having recently surprised the world by achieving a peaceful transition to democracy, South Africa now needs a second miracle, this time an economic one. Very careful consideration must therefore be given to the cost implications of any changes instituted in any national structures. South Africa has, over the past few years, moved slowly out of an era where most, if not all public interests, such as transport, were in the hands of government, to an era where a mix of state and private enterprise now provides these services. Ocean spaces management is no exception and great care must be taken with the development of a coastguard function that this mix of State and private sector is retained.

Although most of these functions can only be provided by the State - especially those requiring the use of force or the powers of arrest - there will always be some which the private sector can provide more cost effectively.

The SA Navy and the Coastguard Function

There have been a number of suggestions that the duties of the South African Navy could be logically, fairly easily and cost-effectively extended to include those of a coastguard. This approach is born out when a study is made of the accepted roles of an average navy.

The fundamental roles or functions of any navy are generally accepted as being expressed in the Booth Triangle. In this approach a triangle is used to depict the three primary functions of navies, with the military role at the base. The very essence of a navy is its military character, its ability to use force provides the ability to perform its other roles. The diplomatic impact of a navy or what is commonly referred to as 'gunboat diplomacy' for instance, derives from this ability to use force, and is defined by Booth as 'support of foreign policy without actually employing violence' In this way warships can be used to support foreign policy by making an unmistakable point in particular bargaining situations or as a show of friendship during general international intercourse.

The third fundamental role of navies, is called the 'policing' role by Booth, but known as the 'water space management and policing' role in United States Coast Guard terminology. This role concerns primarily the preservation, or extension of sovereignty, and securing own resource exploitation and the maintenance of good order. It may also be used to promote nation-building by contributing to internal stability, especially during times of political or natural turmoil, and can, in Third World countries, bring about technological advancement by promoting modernisation. These limited contributions to nation-building can be seen as the naval equivalent of peaceful uses of military force and military assistance to the civilian community.

Booth also shows that, for over one third of the world's navies, the policing role as mission constitutes the extent of their tasks and aspirations. He notes that the governments of the countries concerned either do not perceive an external naval threat or have no capability to match one. They therefore leave the continuity of their use of the sea and the preservation of their maritime frontiers in the hands of the bigger powers and the hope of continued international stability. South Africa cannot afford to follow this line since, apart from any other consideration, as the major power in the region the other nations of southern Africa are going to be looking to South Africa to exercise her strength and maintain stability in the region.

Even such a cursory contemplation of the fundamental roles or functions of a navy indicates that none can be considered irrelevant or unimportant to South Africa. Nevertheless, it must be accepted that the priority and emphasis of these roles and missions may change over time. Obviously the military role and military missions will enjoy the highest priority during times of international tension or when the likelihood of conflict is judged to be high. In contrast, during more peaceful periods priority should be given to missions ensuing from the water space management and policing role.

Missions of a diplomatic nature can usually be seen as a requirement whatever the priority of the other two roles happens to be, and are relevant in both.

The Present Military Strategic Situation

Although a clear military threat may be absent at the moment, South Africa cannot afford to postpone naval mission definition and force acquisition until one does eventually materialise. Whatever navy a country might possess at the onset of any conflict, those forces will very probably be the only ones available to them for the duration of hostilities, since they are unlikely to be either reinforced or have any losses replaced. Warships, whether acquired from internal or foreign sources, require lead times calculated in several years before they become operationally effective. Furthermore, since the Second World War warfare at sea has tended to comprise intensely violent episodes of short duration.

It should also be borne in mind that military threats can develop very quickly if naval forces are involved. A naval task force can be assembled quickly from widely dispersed warships and then dispatched to a distant region, where it can change the local balance of force overnight. If, for instance, one of the countries involved in a regional dispute has allies with powerful naval units, it is possible for the balance of power in southern Africa to change very quickly to the detriment of South Africa.

In view of these considerations it would be short sighted for any maritime state, including South Africa, to attempt to survive without appropriate naval forces until an obvious military threat materialises.

In the absence of any clear military threat, the best course of action regarding military mission definition is to stress versatility and balance. Ideally this would result in a navy capable of responding appropriately to whatever military threat eventually could materialise. It must however, not be seen as a carte blanche to invest in a large variety of high performance naval vessels and sophisticated weapons systems. The balanced force must be appropriate to the financial and industrial capabilities of the country.

As this paper is aimed at the strategic policy making level, and the question of what is appropriate to the navy's requirements inevitably leads to a highly emotional debate on technical aspects, such as speed, endurance, equipment etc., no attempt will be made to enter this technical argument. It is however valid to comment that the philosophy of design which the SA Navy requires at this time, is a vessel with a good seakeeping hull design, capable of staying at sea even in adverse weather conditions without extreme crew discomfort. As sophisticated weapons systems are not a priority at this stage provision for them in future could be made with a 'built for but not with' philosophy

It can be concluded from this, that the mission statement of the South African Navy should provide for the military role to be accorded a lower priority than the policing and diplomatic roles during this period of low threat probability.

Nevertheless the military role of the SA Navy can not be put aside and should always enjoy some priority for the following reasons:

Military threats involving naval forces can materialise very quickly.



In retaining its military capability the South African Navy is still a useful deterrent, even if it cannot defeat stronger military forces that may threaten South African interests in the future. Deterrence will normally succeed against any rational opponent as long as the defending forces are capable of raising the cost of military aggression higher than any possible gain for the aggressor.



Even an extremely modest capacity to engage in combat at sea, however hopeless from a purely military viewpoint, is still politically highly significant in an interconnected world with great inhibitions about the overt use of force. Thus, for instance, even much larger naval powers than South Africa may be denied the opportunity for adventurism in the region in the guise of being merely a naval peace keeping force, or executing a police action.



The absence of a military threat involving naval forces does not necessarily mean that South Africa will derive no military utility from its own naval forces. Sub-Saharan Africa remains a region plagued by conflict and instability. Such regional instability also adversely affects South Africa, who as the regional power, now without the stigma of apartheid, may want to use naval forces to improve stability in the region by participating in international or bilateral peacekeeping efforts. Owing to their colonial past, nearly all Sub-Saharan countries bordering on the oceans have capitals on the coast, as well as road and rail nets that tend to run inland from the sea. Furthermore, road and rail transport in these countries tends to be less reliable and more expensive over long distances than coastal shipping, and as a result they are highly dependent on maritime stability.

Arguments used for extending the role of the SA Navy

In the South African context the discussion on how to implement the coastguard function invariably becomes a discussion on whether or not the SA Navy should be utilised in this role, and if so to what extent. This argument becomes confused as many of the arguments both for and against, are generated from the same sources, i.e. either from within the Defence Force or the other State Departments involved.

Nevertheless there are some very cogent and logical reasons apart from acceptance of the normal role of navies, in the arguments for involving the SA Navy in coastguard functions:

It already assists in the performance of some coastguard tasks and has done so for many decades.



It already possesses a significant part of the organisational expertise and crewing skills required for the operation of a coastguard.



A coastguard could easily be accommodated within a navy organisational structure by the creation of a dedicated flotilla. Chile, for instance, operates its coastguard as part of its navy. In addition, the South African Navy already owns an impressive infrastructure with which to technically support coastguard vessels. This supporting infrastructure includes the only naval dockyard in Sub-Saharan Africa.



The extension of duties would represent good value for tax-payer money by increasing the utility of the South African Navy during peacetime.

CONCLUSIONS

Whatever South Africa does, or does not do in this area, will be of critical importance to the other states of southern Africa since none of them have the infrastructure or ability to monitor their own areas. This also affects the land-locked states since the greater majority of all their trade is carried by sea, and in fact much of it utilises South African harbours.

Generally speaking, in the southern African region as a whole, very little if any attention has been given to the problem of ocean space management and policing. As a result, funding has in its turn been limited or non existent. Even South Africa, who should have the greatest need to give attention to this matter and also has the most developed infrastructure, has never given sufficient priority or funding to maritime matters.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, we must accept that South Africa is going to have to carry the bulk of the load for the whole region. South Africa's neighbours, by force of circumstances, are going to be depending on her to help them in all these various tasks. South Africa in her turn cannot afford to ignore this requirement, as the oceans unlike solid land flow from one area to another, beyond the ability of man to prevent it. For example, a major pollution disaster in the Mozambique Channel is of as much concern to South Africa as it is to Mozambique, as is the over utilisation of the fish resources off the Namibian coast.

To an extent, the present situation in South Africa regarding the coastguard function has been a dilemma for many years. Unfortunately solutions have not been forthcoming largely due to a number of problems with strong emotional foundations:

firstly, the fear by each of the various State Departments involved, and especially Defence and Transport, that they would lose some of their authority and thus some of their ability to motivate funds;



secondly, the fallacious belief amongst many SA Navy personnel that Coastguard duties are not only boring and no challenge, but also beneath their dignity; and



thirdly, that those who fulfil some of these tasks under the aegis of the civilian Departments are concerned about being 'militarised'.

Taking the present world situation, South Africa's geographic position and the virtual total lack of any other effective naval forces in the region into consideration it would be illogical and spendthrift, even possibly immoral, not to utilise the already established and efficient infrastructure of the SA Navy in this task. Accepting this, then the priority and emphasis to be placed on the various roles must be decided upon. The main policy requirement is then to decide whether the SA Navy should become:

a primarily military organisation with a strong subsidiary coastguard role,

or



a primarily service oriented organisation with a strong but subsidiary military role.

The more one looks at this question without emotion or preconceived prejudices, in context with the strategic situation, not to mention the desperate need to utilise extremely limited financial resources to the optimum, the more sense it begins to make to opt for the second alternative.

Acceptance of this option would not imply that the Navy would become 'only' or 'merely' a Coastguard. Given the missions of a Coastguard and especially the military/diplomatic role as fulfilled by the US Coastguard, would make this navy a force for both peace and war. It in reality proposes an extension, rather than a reduction, of the present roles of the SA Navy even though it takes some getting used to.

Unfortunately this on its own would not answer all the problems that beset the ocean space management scene in South Africa. It would leave untouched the multiplicity of responsibilities between numerous Departments and Agencies. Even this problem does, however, have a solution.

Although the thought of any expansion in the number of State Departments goes very much against the grain, the establishment of a single Department of Maritime Affairs and the transfer of all the various speciality functions which affect this community to that Department would solve this remaining dilemma. The process should not require the employment of any more civil servants as those at present doing the job could merely transfer to the new Department. If at the same time the 'expanded role' of the navy were to be properly arranged they, together with the private sector, would provide the means to execute the functions at sea required by the Department of Maritime Affairs.

These two changes would achieve much of what is needed, they would solve the present dilemma of the multiplicity of responsible departments and at the same time, if done with sense and logic, would provide a cost effective solution and a long overdue emphasis on the importance to South Africa of its maritime community.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cf. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a National Maritime Policy for the RSA, Stellenbosch, 31 August 1993, pp. 44 - 52.

Questions about the frequency and extent of patrols by these vessels have however been raised recently. Cf. 'CPA Fails: Fishing Zone Unprotected', Walker T, in SA Commercial Marine Magazine, Vol. 2 Nr 4, pp. 2 - 3 December 1993 - February 1994.

Cf. Walker T, 'CPA Fails: Fishing Zone Unprotected' and 'The Seven Sisters' in SA Commercial Marine Magazine, Vol. 2 Nr 4, pp. 2 -3, December 1993 -February 1994. Also Cf. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a National Maritime Policy for the RSA, pp. J1 - J2.

Booth K; Navies and Foreign Policy, Croom Helm, London, 1977, pp. 16 - 25.

Anon. The US. Coast Guard: A Unique National Security Instrument, US Naval War College, Newport, 1993, p. 17.